Henry Jenkyns on the thirty-nine articles a study in nineteenth-century Anglican confessionalism

Havens, Anita Sue

Abstract

This thesis studies the theological teaching of Henry Jenkyns (1795-1878), Canon Professor of Theology at Durham University, 1835-64. The analysis attempts to establish what kind of man Jenkyns was: his academic and social predispositions and his intellectual stance; the predominant characteristics of his theology, both in content and method; and the nature of his churchmanship.

The study analyzes a collection of student manuscript notes of Jenkyns' lectures on the Thirty-nine Articles, with a view to elucidating the type and quality of his teaching as a doctrinal theologian of the Church of England. Jenkyns was one of the chief architects of the theological program at Durham University; an analysis of his teaching constitutes a good description of the character of the theological temper at Durham until the reformation of the University in 1862. His lectures, furthermore, represent the first attempt at a systematic exposition of Anglican doctrine within the context of academic theology in England since the Reformation.

Jenkyns emerges as a pre-Tractarian, High-Church theologian with an Arminian bias. His method is essentially eighteenth-century, rationalistic, and neo-scholastic. He understood the scriptures to be the Word of God, plenarily inspired. He believed that at the Reformation the Church of England corrected some of the theological errors held by Rome while retaining the link with the ancient Catholic and Apostolic Church. Jenkyns treats the Articles as a confessional document which sets out, in part, the limits of right doctrine as they are understood in the English national Church, a part of the Universal Church. He stresses in his teaching the human nature of the Church, her priesthood and traditions, and affirms a moderately high view of the dominical sacraments, recognizing them as vehicles of grace and understanding an actual, though spiritual, presence in the eucharist.

Henry Jenkyns on the Thirty-nine Articles

A Study in Nineteenth-Century Anglican Confessionalism

by

Anita Sue Havens

A thesis submitted in qualification for the degree of

Master of Arts in Theology

at the

University of Durham

in the

Department of Theology

1982

'I am thoroughly disgusted with these times and their principles, and most of all because they have spoilt a very sincere and anxious, if not a very powerful, Reformer in the person of Dear Jenkyns'.

Thomas Thorp, Trinity College, Cambs.
22 October 1831 (Jenkyns Papers VA. 3)

'There is but one way towards a real reformation,--a return to Him in heart and spirit, whose sacred truth they have betrayed; all other methods, however fair they may promise, will prove to be but shadows and failures'.

John Henry Newman
Tract XC

Table of Contents

Chapter		Page
General Introduction		7
I	Some Biographical Information	10
	The early years	11
	The Oriel Common Room	21
	Departure from Oriel: The Durham Chair in Greek	34
	Jenkyns' theological temper: The Durham Chair in Theology	42
II	Some Historical Notes	64
	Clerical education in England from the Reformation to the founding of Durham University	65
	Some political factors which contributed to the founding of the University	68
	The theology at Durham as a counter to the theology of the Oxford Movement	73
	The Durham License in Theology	74
	A description of the sources of this study	82
	Jenkyns' theological method: An introduction to the Articles	85
III	Doctrine of Scripture	102
	Article VI	102
	The interpretation of scripture	119
	Article VII	130
	Article VIII	141
	Recollections and Prognostications	151
IV	Doctrine of the Church	154
	Article XIX	154
	Article XX	160
	Article XXI	164
	Article XXXIV	167

Contents, Chapter IV, continued — Page

The Church's ministers (Arts XXIII and XXXIV). . 169

Church and State (Arts XXXVII, XXXVIII, and XXXIX) 172

Conclusions 177

V Doctrine of the Priesthood 180

A reconstruction of Jenkyns' doctrine of priesthood--constituent parts (Arts XXVI and XXXII) 181

A reconstruction of Jenkyns' doctrine of priesthood--the nature of Holy Orders 191

Conclusions: The doctrine of the Church and the doctrine of the priesthood 198

VI Doctrine of Justification 200

Original sin (Art. IX) 201

Free will (Arts X, XVI, and XVII). 205

Justification (Art. XI) 212

Sanctification (Art. XII) 216

Conclusions: Arminianism 229

(Other articles treated in this chapter: XIII, XIV, XV, XVIII, and XXXIII)

VII Doctrine of the Sacraments 233

Article XXV 234

Article XXVII 239

Article XVIII 242

Conclusions 249

(Other articles treated in this chapter: XXIX, XXX, and XXXI)

General Conclusions 251

Footnotes 258

Selected Bibliography 301

Declaration

None of the material contained in this thesis has previously been submitted for a degree in this or in any other university, nor is it based on joint research.

Statement of Copyright

Acknowledgements

I should like to express my thanks to Professor Stephen W. Sykes for the acumen and enthusiasm he has brought to the task of directing the research necessary for the completion of this thesis and, above all, for his unfailing patience.

I should also like to express my gratitude to all others in the University who have assisted me in these researches, especially the staff of the Palace Green Library and of Prior's Kitchen and, in particular, to Mr. P. Mussett and Mr. R. Norris.

Above all, I wish to thank my family for their continual perseverance and love. To my husband, Charles, goes my particular thanks: this thesis is undoubtedly the product of his love and ceaseless support.

Introduction

This thesis is an analysis of the theological teaching of Henry Jenkyns (1795-1878), Canon Professor of Theology at Durham University, 1835-64. The analysis attempts to establish what kind of man Jenkyns was: his academic and social predispositions and his intellectual stance; the predominant characteristics of his theology, both in content and method; and the nature of his churchmanship.

Because Jenkyns was one of the chief architects of the theological program at Durham University, an analysis of his teaching also constitutes a good description of the character of the theological temper at Durham between its foundation and the reformation of the University in 1862 (i.e., subsequent to the recommendations of the Durham University Commissioners). It is reasonable to suggest that Jenkyns' inclination to retire in 1864-5 may have been strengthened by a change in the University after its reform, although his actual retirement was directly prompted by his failing health. At any rate, an understanding of the type of theology which the University founders intended to establish at Durham sheds light on Jenkyns' theological teachings, because he was selected by those founders to be an instrument of their program. By the same token, it was Jenkyns' teachings which gave concrete expression to the theological temper of the University as a whole and which gave a practical determination to the details of the program.

Jenkyns gave a series of lectures on the Thirty-nine Articles of the Church of England, and he considered that these formed the body of his dogmatic teachings; indeed, that the Articles were meant to provide the shaping skeleton of Anglican doctrine, the structure which the clergy of the Reformed Church of England were sworn to uphold. It is these lectures which are the focus of this study, and the analysis presents a view of early nineteenth-century English confessionalism. Because these lectures represent the first attempt at a systematic exposition of Anglican doctrine within the context of academic theology in England since the Reformation, the question was posed: To what extent did the teachings of Henry Jenkyns constitute an Anglican systematic

theology? For that reason, Jenkyns' treatment of the Articles is here presented thematically, in terms of the central doctrines of Christianity, rather than sequentially, following the order of the Articles and of Jenkyns' lectures on them. Such an approach was initially justifiable because Jenkyns himself considered his lectures to treat of Anglican dogmatics. A more detailed study of the lectures themselves further justified such a presentation of Jenkyns' work. It was clear that there was a logical relationship between the treatment of the various areas of Christian doctrine as Jenkyns presented them: for example, what Jenkyns had to say concerning the Church was informed by his conclusions concerning the scriptures and the nature of revelation, and so forth. This analysis, however, does not include a direct consideration of Jenkyns' lectures on the first five of the Thirty-nine Articles, because his treatment of these articles is purely scholastic and does not reflect to any clear degree the influence of Reformation insights.

It is clear from his lectures that Jenkyns considered the Articles to be that confession of the Anglican Church which grew out of and gave expression to the renewal of that Church at the time of the Reformation, and he discusses these Articles in that light. For this reason, this analysis attempts to place the views of Jenkyns himself on the Articles in the context of the theological principles forged in the Reformation, as expressed chiefly in Luther and Calvin, where such a context has seemed helpful. This study also makes comparisons, where they are enlightening, between Jenkyns' views and those of his contemporaries. This is done in an effort to situate Jenkyns in the context of nineteenth-century pre-critical English theology.

Jenkyns never gives any indication in his lectures of the works he may have consulted as sources for his own analysis of the Articles, but it is reasonable to assume that he owed much to the work of Gilbert Burnet, _An Exposition of the Thirty-nine Articles of the Church of England_, since this was the most notable exposition of the Articles--and the most orthodox authority on them--available in Jenkyns' time. Indeed, a careful comparison of Burnet's

work and of Jenkyns' lectures suggests a great dependence of the latter upon the work of the former. For these reasons, this present analysis of Jenkyns' lectures draws frequent comparisons between the teachings of Jenkyns and of Burnet. Jenkyns' failure to acknowledge his debt to Burnet must not be misunderstood as an indication of careless or less than honest scholarship on his part: first, because the conventions which governed the attribution of sources in scholarship were evidently more relaxed in Jenkyns' day, and the conventions would have been even more informal in the case of these lectures since Jenkyns was not presenting his material for publication; secondly, because Burnet's Articles was such a standard work at the time that it may be assumed to have been in the library of any clergyman or aspirant to the ministry in the Church of England in the period; thirdly, and for these reasons, it may be assumed that Jenkyns commended Burnet to his students, and it is equally reasonable to think that they may well have failed to note the recommendation of such a theological commonplace in their records of Jenkyns' lectures.

Finally, this study frequently compares Jenkyns' views to those expressed by Charles Hardwick in his Articles of Religion because this work remains to this day the standard source of a history of the Thirty-nine Articles of the Church of England and was roughly contemporary with the period in which Jenkyns was teaching. It thereby provides the best basis of comparison by which to assess Jenkyns' historical accuracy in treating the development of the Articles themselves and of related documents.

Chapter I

Some Biographical Information

Very little specific biographical information is available about Henry Jemkyns, and that little which has been brought to bear in the present study has been gleaned chiefly from his fragmented correspondence as it is preserved in the Jenkyns Papers (Balliol College Library, Oxford), as well as from passing references from various works dealing with the University of Durham, chiefly Joseph Thomas Fowler's Durham University (London, 1904) and Charles Edwin Whiting's The University of Durham (London, 1932). As a scholar, he refused to publish any of his research; as a churchman and theologian of some stature in the early nineteenth century, he refused to enter into public debates on the doctrinal issues which stirred his contemporaries; and as a private correspondent, at least according to the witness of those of his personal letters which remain, he was reticent to a degree concerning his theological and political views. For that reason, the portrait of him which is presented in this chapter is necessarily incomplete and has been reconstructed from a variety of sources, many of which are not directly related to his theological teachings.

This chapter is in no sense a biography of Henry Jenkyns, but rather it is an attempt to appraise his background, character, and theological temper, in order to provide a framework for his doctrinal teachings on the Thirty-nine Articles of the Church of England. The first section of the chapter deals with the early years of Henry's life, and it provides some glimpses of him in relation to his contemporaries as a confidant, scholar, and educator. The second section of this discussion treats Jenkyns' years as a fellow at Oriel, including his researches on the works of Cranmer and his relationship to his fellows in the Oriel common room. The last section of the chapter deals with his departure from Oriel to his teaching duties at the University of Durham. In particular, this section attempts to provide some account of the circumstances which led to his being made Professor of Theology at Durham.

The early years.

Henry Jenkyns was born the last of six children: the son of John Jenkyns (1753-1824), Vicar of Evercreech, Somerset, and Prebend of Wells Cathedral,[1] and Jane Banister (1754-1825). The Jenkyns were a predominantly clerical family from Somerset; the Banisters, a Bristol merchant family.[2] Correspondence between one Richard Jenkyns and John Jenkyns suggests that the John Jenkyns family was secure, comfortably wealthy, and highly literate.[3] The families' religious and political sympathies were, as might be expected, High Church and Tory. The only other member of Henry's family who is of particular interest is his elder brother, Richard (1782-1854), Master of Balliol (1819-54) and Dean of Wells (1845-54).

Henry was educated at Eton and went up to Christ Church College, Oxford, at the age of eighteen. In 1816, he took a double first in the university examinations. He was elected a fellow of Oriel in 1818 and continued such until 1834. During this period, he was tutor to the sons of Charles Manners-Sutton, Speaker of the House of Commons (1817-33),[4] and as such passed several terms at Eton in the care and instruction of his charges.[5]

Henry ceased his tutorial activity sometime before 1834 (probably by 1830), although he continued to receive a stipend from Charles Manners-Sutton.[6] It is difficult to say what private researches may have occupied Henry between 1818, when he was made a fellow of Oriel, and 1830, when he took up residence in the college. There is some evidence in the Jenkyns Papers that he was academically active in his own pursuits (i.e., apart from the tuition of the Manners-Sutton sons) and that several people among his acquaintances valued his abilities. The first indications appear in 1821. Some time in that year, Thomas Arnold undertook the preparation of an edition of Thucydides for Oxford University.[7] Henry translated at least the first fifty chapters of Book II for Arnold. But most references to his early scholarly activity appear in Henry's correspodence from 1830 to 1833, during his years of residence at Oriel. Generally speaking, the correspondence reflects

Henry's role in three spheres of activity: (1) as personal adviser to his fellows; (2) as a scholar concerned to encourage the publication of new and needed works; and (3) as educator.

1. Adviser. Among the letters of 1830 and 1831 are those to Henry from William Selwyn and (probably, Edward) Burton. They are of interest because they demonstrate that Henry's acquaintances sought his advice both as a guide to the development of their personal theological opinions and as a scholar upon whose knowledge in historical questions they could rely.

William Selwyn apparently regarded Henry as something of a spiritual adviser. In November of 1830,[8] he laments the distance at which he is placed from Henry's influence: 'I am afraid your good advice in the pulpit has not quite cured me [of errant opinions], and I have now no one to restrain my fancy from unauthorized and unfounded conjecture'. And Selwyn solicits Henry's direction through correspondence in matters of academic concern, as well as of attitude: 'I wish particularly to know whether Bishop Marsh is right in saying that there can be no types except what the New Testament [evidently to the exclusion of the Old Testament] declares'; and 'Can you tell me how to bring myself to full respect for the Bishop of Exeter [Henry Phillpotts, Bishop 1830-69; Canon of Durham, 9th stall, 1809-15; 2nd stall, 1815-20; 6th stall, 1831-69] as I wish to do for every Bishop--but I hope sincerely the gentry of Devonshire will be wiser than to refuse to call upon him' [a courtesy due the station of the new bishop, regardless of his character].[9] Selwyn's letter of 3 December 1830,[10] takes us further into his discussion with Henry on typology:

> You say you doubt 'whether all the typical actions and religious rites can be shown to be of prophetic import'. I do not say that they have. I only say that all which have a prophetic meaning, have also a present meaning, and this whether they were ordained by God, or the Events of life--Thus Abraham's offering was prophetic, and it was also a trial of his faith; and herein is

> the double import, I think the types differ from the significations of the prophets, which had only a future meaning.

But we shall see better what Henry thinks about typology when we consider his lectures on the interpretation and criticism of scripture (Chapter II, below)..

Burton's letter to Jenkyns[11] indicates that he was regarded as somewhat of an authority on the English Reformation. Burton had received from another party two queries, which he then referred to Henry for assistance in answering: '1. Whitgift introduced the subscription to the 3 Articles in the 36th Canon--do you know whether he had any authority for so doing? 2. Burnet says (fol. 1 317. Lond. or 237 Dublin) that there was a book of Homilies printed in 1542 on each Gospel and Epistle. What were these?'. The fact that the questions were referred to Henry suggests that he could speak with some authority on questions of subscription and related issues.

John Whitgift, the Archbishiop of Canterbury from 1583 to 1604, drew up in 1583 three canons or articles aimed at insuring uniformity of doctrine among non-conformist ministers. In the beginning of the seventeenth century, these three articles received synodal authority and were adopted almost verbatim in the thirty-sixth canon in the series put forth and ratified in 1604, during the reign of James I. The thirty-sixth canon defines the subscription to be required of such as are to be made ministers of the Church of England.[12]

The second question in Burton's letter undoubtedly refers to the following passage from Burnet's History of the Reformation (1679-1715):[13]

> a book of Homilies was printed, in which the Gospels and Epistles of all the Sundays and holy-days of the year were set down, with an homily to everyone of these, which is plain and practical paraphrase on these parcels of Scripture. To these were added, many serious exhortations, and some short explanations of the most obvious difficulties that show the compiler of them was a

> man both of good judgment and learning. To these were also added, sermons upon several occasions; as for weddings, christenings, and funerals; and these were to be read to the people by such as were not licensed to preach.

This passage from Burnet is exerpted from his comments on 1542 and evidently refers to a group of homilies collected and edited by Richard Taverner, one edition of which appeared in that year: The Epistles and Gospelles with a brief Postyl upon the same from Advent tyll Lowe sundaye which is the Wynter parte drawen forth by diverse learned men for the singular commoditie of al good christen persons, etc. According to Edward Cardwell,[14] Taverner's Postils on the Epistles and Gospels first appeared in 1540, but there was another edition in 1542 and this latter was probably the only one known to Burnet. At any rate, Burnet's description is clearly of Taverner's collection and is not, as one might have suspected from Burton's letter, a reference to either of the Edwardian books of homilies.

2. Scholar. A letter from Richard Whately[15] indicates that Henry had some scheme afoot for the publication of a multi-volume work, probably on prophecy or on the inspiration and authority of scripture. Jenkyns evidently asked Whately to contribute a volume, and Whately suggested that Samuel Hinds might contribute a work on the inspiration of scripture (probably what appeared as Inquiry into Proofs, etc, of Inspiration and into the Authority of Scripture, 1831). There are other letters in the Jenkyns papers relating to this proposed several-volume work, but, as it never appeared in print as such, we can never know precisely what was entertained or what was Henry's precise relationship to the proposal. Nonetheless, the existence of the correspondence does show that Henry was concerned to encourage (or to produce) scholarly publications.

3. Educator. We know a bit about Henry as an educator, too, from the correspondence of this period. At least in 1831[16] and 1833,[17] Henry was an Examiner in Greek for the Newcastle Scholarship at Eton. Edward Coleridge wrote to

Henry from Eton in 1832[18] to express his pleasure over a set of examination papers which were prepared by Henry: 'let me thank you for those you sent me, which are excellent, and far more liberally conceived, than any I have before seen. Herbert and Allies were deterred from a third attempt by the unprofitable dryness and tastelessness of the previous examination papers. You should have given them a list of the gentlemanly reform you intended making, and then perchance my Pupil-room might have been enrolled'. Evidently Henry was an academic innovator, and, as such, a liberal, who attempted to combine quality of examination with an interesting content or form in the examining questions.

Henry was also among the examiners for Oriel fellowships in 1823, from which event derives an illuminating anecdote: In Easter of 1823, when Philip Edward Pusey was sitting the fellowship examinations at Oriel, Henry was among the examiners (or at least among the invigilators) in the examining room. Pusey was extremely distraught during the first day of examinations--he tore up his essay. The second day he wrote a letter asking to retire from the examination and left the hall. Ordinarily, this would have meant the end of any aspirations Pusey might have had for a fellowship. However, Henry Jenkyns had pieced together the rent essay of the first day, and it had been read. On the strength of this essay, Pusey was recalled to the hall, persuaded to continue the examination, and--ultimately--was elected a fellow of Oriel.[19] It is difficult to reconcile this clear indication in Henry of a painstaking care for students with the more current characterization of him as 'cold as ice, clear as ice, and hard as ice' and as being, in the eyes of his students, totally unapproachable.[20] Perhaps this Henry who involved himself in the examination hysterics of the young Pusey had more in common with the Henry who gave of his personal income to establish scholarships for needy and deserving Durham divinity students. At any rate, both of these aspects of his life suggest that the impression of impenetrable aloofness which the mature Henry presented was not an absolutely accurate

portrayal of his character.

In 1830, Henry began his preparation of Cranmer's Remains.[21] The Remains is a complete edition of the works of Thomas Cranmer, and it constitutes Henry's chief contribution to published research. In collecting the materials for this edition, Henry discovered in the library of Lambeth Palace a copy of the Thirteen Articles (1538). These articles, drawing heavily on the Augsberg Confession, represented a sine qua non of agreement for a greater Protestant Communion which Cranmer, and Henry VIII, hoped to establish between Continental and English branches of the Reformation Church.[22] In the 'Preface' of the Remains (pp. i-cxxi), Jenkyns makes some general remarks on Cranmer's theological opinions, expecially regarding the nature of ecclesiastical and secular authority and the doctrines of the priesthood, the Eucharist, and the indefectibility of grace. For the most part, however, the 'Preface' describes Henry's editorial methodology and does not intend to provide a critique of Cranmer's life and thought. For this reason, it little illuminates Henry's own theological attitudes.

Evidently, Henry had first considered writing a work detailing the history of the early Church Councils[23] but abandoned this project in favour of the Cranmer edition.[24] The distillation of his research on the Councils, done at this period or later, is found in the notebooks on his lectures as Professor of Divinity at the University of Durham.[25] Apparently this work on the Councils was taken up by John Henry Newman (perhaps as part of the multi-volume work discussed above) and finally emerged as his Arians of the Fourth Century (Lumley, 1833).[26]

The Cranmer edition was well received and highly praised. Indeed, it remains on of the texts for Cranmer researchers in the present day. Henry, however, did not carry his study of Cranmer further, at least not for the purposes of publication. The only later related work to appear in print was the publication in 1846 of a correspondence between Henry and William Maskell: A Correspondence between the Rev. William Maskell, M.A., and the Rev. Henry Jenkyns, D.D., relating to Some Strictures by the Former on

the Oxford Edition of Cranmer's Remains.[27] Maskell had published a work on the occasional offices of the Church of England, Monumenta Ritualia Ecclesiae Anglicanae (1846), in the preface to which he made some remarks upon Jenkyns' edition of Cranmer's Remains. Jenkyns took umbrage at Maskell's comments and entered into a lengthy correspondence with him concerning them. This correspondence was subsequently published for circulation.

The printed correspondence (less the final letter of Maskell because it did not alter the case) runs to thirty-one printed pages and entails a debate over, for the most part, relatively minute points of disputed accuracy. Maskell essentially concedes none of the points at issue, nor does Henry; however, Henry does succeed in getting Maskell to alter his tone. Because Henry felt that the two men would not 'argue each other into agreement', he suggested that their dispute, including at length the relevant passage from the Preface to the Remains, should be submitted in print to the public.[28] Maskell agreed to the publication of the correspondence, but he refused to have the printed correspondence attached to his books because he believed (1) that this was an exceptional thing to do and (2) that the correspondence essentially reiterated his original objections.

There are essentially five points at issue in the Correspondence: (1) The question of whether or not to attribute the 'authorship' of the Common Prayer Book (the 'First Book of Edward VI') and of the Ordination Services to Cranmer; secondarily, the relative dates of publication for the two works.[30] (2) The question of the Latin preface to the Prymer of Henry VIII (1544). The real issue here is the question of how many editions of the Prymer Henry Jenkyns examined in his researches, because the Latin preface does not appear in all editions and was not included in the one to which Henry refers. And it does seem that Henry failed to do his homework, since copies of the Prymer including the preface were in the Bodleian, the British Museum, and the Cambridge University Library.[31] On this point, however, Maskell's real target is Dr. Edward Burton,

who, subsequent to the Remains, published an edition of three prymers. Burton--according to Maskell--relied on Henry's comments in the preface concerning the existence or non-existence of the Latin preface to Henry VIII's Prymer, and Maskell holds Burton strongly to account for his neglect of the original sources.[32] (3) The question of Henry's 'insinuation against the accuracy, if not the honesty, of David Wilkins',[33] one of Henry's sources. Henry makes it clear that he did not intend to impugn Wilkins in any way, and Maskell concedes the point. (4) A question of diction in the discussion of the publication of the Litany (1544) and of Henry VIII's Prymer (1545). (5) The question of a doubt raised by Henry respecting the citation and condemnation of Thomas Becket, which Maskell dismisses 'rather summarily'.[34] Henry suggests that this matter is a question of opinion and open to discussion, but he feels that Maskell has failed to weigh the evidence properly.

Only two of these questions deserve attention here, and they are of interest chiefly because they shed some light on the area of Henry's scholarly judgments: the question of the 'authorship' of the Common Prayer Book[35] and the question of diction in the discussion of the Litany (1544) and the Prymer (1545).[36] Maskell's chief objection (p. 10) is that Henry failed to make clear whether or not authorship of the Prayer Book and the Ordinal should be attributed to Cranmer and that Cranmer's great contributions to both, especially in the composition of the Prefaces, should be acknowledged.

In this portion of the debate, Henry appears to deserve the honours. He does make it clear (p. 16) that he does not believe that Cranmer can be considered the author of the First Book of Edward VI and the Ordinal. Furthermore, his reasons for this belief are stated and are valid: (1) the Prayer Book 'consists chiefly of translations from the older Liturgies' and (2) Cranmer was 'assisted by other Commissioners of acknowledged learning and talents' in the preparation of the works in question (p. 16). These reasons reflect careful, scholarly discrimination. The same things may be said for his position on the authorship of the Prefaces. One suspects that the real source of Maskell's

complaint is that he probably would have included the Prefaces to these two works on a list of Cranmer's works, whereas Henry has chosen not to do so. Such a decision is a question of judgement and cannot be decided, in the strictest sense, rightly or wrongly; nonetheless, Henry's caution seems commendable, and Maskell does not advance any documentary evidence to support his opinion. It is precisely Henry's contention that such evidence cannot be advanced; therefore, that the opinion cannot be given sufficient scholarly support to sustain it in publication.

As for the issue of the dates of Prayer Book and Ordinal, the dispute is over a point that seems too small to notice. Both Maskell and Henry agree on the essentials: (1) The first Common Prayer Book appeared before the Ordinal; (2) the publication of the latter followed close on the former: within twelve-months. And none of this discussion of dates goes toward the main question, namely that of the works to be included (or not) in a list of Cranmer's writings.

Maskell's objections to Henry's discussion of the publication of the Litany (1544) and of Henry VIII's Prymer (i.e., the fourth objection raised in the Correspondence) seems to derive from a misreading. Maskell represents Henry as 'explaining King Henry's Prymer to be a book which for the first time contained "besides an English Litany, translations from the Matins, Vespers, and other parts of the Breviary; and thus supplied the means of joining in some portion at least of the public worship with the understanding as well as with the spirit"' (p. 7).[37] Henry objects to this criticism (pp. 7-8) on the grounds that Maskell has simply misunderstood the passage in question. The real source of Maskell's irritation does not emerge until late in the Correspondence (pp. 27-8): he takes exception to the fact that Jenkyns attributed to Henry VIII, on the strength of the Litany of 1544, the introduction of the use of English into public worship. Maskell says that Henry VIII 'did not to the day of his death' introduce the English

language 'into the public worship itself' (and he nowhere acknowledges Henry's point that the Primers were used for private worship) 'except in the case of the Litany'. Presumably, Maskell bases this claim on a questionable distinction: the Litany of 1544 was not a part of the then established services--for example, Matins and the Mass--but was used for processions on special occasions or as an introduction, or preamble, to the established services of worship; nonetheless, it formed a part of public worship, and, since public worship was led by a priest, it therefore could be construed as 'enabling the people to follow the devotions of the priest'. Henry's statement, then, seems to fall within the boundaries set by the situation he was attempting to describe. At any rate, the sentiment that underlay Jenkyns' description, namely, that the impetus for the use of the vernacular in the public worship of the Church of England rests with Henry VIII, seems accurate.

In fact, it is probably Henry's attribution of liturgical progress and decision in matters of worship to the authority of Henry VIII which rests at the heart of Maskell's rancour. In the first half of the nineteenth century in England, there existed two sorts of orthodox, High Churchmen:[38] There were those who, like Henry Jenkyns, were Church-and-State, Establishment men. That Henry was of this persuasion is made abundantly clear in his introductory lectures on the Thirty-nine Articles, especially in his treatment of subscription, as well as in his expostion of Article XXXVII.[39] There were, however, High Churchmen of another sort--Church-above-State, and ultimately disestablishment men. To members of this group, and subsequent events showed Maskell to be among their ranks, the Church constituted a purely spiritual organization which was independent of the State in all matters relating to doctrine, practice, and spiritual authority. Maskell's feelings on this matter were so strong that, when in 1850 the Court of Arches overthrew the decision of the ecclesiastical court in the case of G. C. Gorham, the former seceded to Rome:[40] in that instance, the State had suceeded in dictating to the Church of England in that area of matters spiritual which

was properly under the exclusive authority of the Church, at least in the view of Maskell.

In the main, the criticism directed by Maskell toward Henry's preface seems to constitute the kind of hair-splitting that the expert in a field directs against the researcher who attempts to make some general statements which touch upon the area of the former's expertise. If this assessment is accurate, Maskell was at fault in holding Henry responsible for a precision of detail which was not appropriate to the task he had set himself. It was Henry's intention--his explicit intention--to give a general outline of the situation in which Cranmer wrote and to explain the criteria by which he (Henry) designated, among the many works attributed to Cranmer, those works which could certainly be said to be Cranmer's and which were, therefore, treated in the Remains. Henry deliberately left the detailed treatment of Cranmer's life and times to others more equipped in those areas of research than he was.[41] And, be it noticed, Maskell, despite his criticisms, does acknowledge that Henry did his task well: '[I] will also express more plainly my high opinion of your excellent edition of Cranmer's Works: so far as I have been able to judge of it, I value it very much' (p. 15).

The Oriel Common Room.

In 1828, Henry Jenkyns, though still not a resident fellow, was drawn into the activities of the Oriel Common Room. In this year Edward Copleston, Provost since 1814, resigned the headship of the college, and it became necessary that the fellows elect from among themselves a new Provost. The choice lay between Edward Hawkins and John Keble; the fellows might have been divided over the issue except that Keble effectively withdrew from the race before the event. Keble comments in a letter to Hawkins:

> Having brought all into a sum, (as George Herbert says,) I have pretty well satisfied myself that greatly as the college would be benefitted were the choice of the majority, in this matter, to fall on me, it may do very well,--provided you

> are a good boy and do your very very best,-- under your auspices: and such being the case, and I having private and family reasons of my own, which lead me, as a matter of taste not to wish for the office, I really see no reason why the college should be troubled with any differnce of opinion about the matter.[42]

Several letters among the Jenkyns Papers show that Henry was much involved in the exchange of opinions among the fellows relative to this election.[43] There are also several letters between Hawkins and Jenkyns, who seem to have been close friends, relating to the election and to the anticipation of Henry's taking up residence in the college.[44] On February 2, 1828, Hawkins was by unanimous vote duly elected Provost, but between this time and October, 1830, when Henry took up residence at Oriel, a marked division appeared in the ranks of the fellows, essentially between Hawkins and Newman and his followers (i.e., those people who would have voted for Keble in the election, although Newman himself had always favoured Hawkins).

The division centered upon the conflicting attitudes of Hawkins and Newman[45] and was anchored in their very different ideas concerning the relationship between the pastoral and the educational responsibilities of a tutor toward his pupils. The conflict, which eventually led to Newman's resignation from his tutorial duties (1830) and to a trip to Italy (1832-3), is reflected in the Jenkyns Papers as developing on two fronts over two periods of time: (1) The dispute over the tutorial system, 1828-30; (2) The dispute over the relative responsibilities of Provost (Hawkins) and Dean (Newman), 1832.

1. The tutorial system. Newman and Hawkins held two incompatible views concerning the role of the college tutor. Newman was strongly opposed to compulsory religious conformity but, following Laud's Oxford Statutes, believed that a tutor should be 'a moral and religious guardian to the youths committed to him'.[46] He commented on the relationship between tutors and undergraduates:

> There is much in the system which I think wrong;

> I think the tutors see too little of the men, and there is not enough of direct religious instruction. It is my wish to consider myself as the minister of Christ. Unless I find that opportunities occur of doing spiritual good to those over whom I am placed, it will become a grave question whether I ought to continue in the tuition.[47]

In short, Newman felt that it was the tutor's responsibility to mold the religious opinions of his charges.

On the contrary, Hawkins did not believe that the tutor's concern with his pupils extended to their religious views. He was willing to enforce minimal conformity to the Church of England among his students for the sake of college regulation and conversion, and evidently he enforced such religious participation in college to a remarkable extent, as this account of Oriel by William Jackson (1829) shows:

> With regard to the Chapel, I certainly had no idea that any thing like it existed at either University. The decorum, the full attendance, the uniformity of response, were all delightful. It seems to be the rule that whatever fellows are seen <u>at dinner</u> should show themselves also <u>at Chapel</u>. This cannot but have the happiest possible effect on the whole system. How differently must the daily Service be regarded in such a case, from the way in which it is viewed in the many colleges where for the seniors to go to Chapel is the exception,--to stay away, the rule![48]

However, Hawkins also believed (1) that any attempt to force religious views on students would be resented and (2) that the undergraduates had a right to call their minds and souls their own, that they should be permitted to arrive at religious truth by their own efforts. Hawkins believed that the role of the tutor was to teach the students <u>how to use</u> their minds, but <u>not to make them up for them</u>.[49]

Newman began to introduce alterations in the tutorial system which had the effect of extending his personal

influence among the undergraduates: (1) Instead of limiting his contact with students to routine lectures, he began to give supervisions (i.e., particular tuition) to his own pupils (i.e., those for whose course of study he was made responsible). (2) He cultivated intimate and friendly relationships with promising students. (3) Beginning in 1828 when Newman became Vicar of St.Mary's (succeeding Hawkins), his growing following attended his sermons there and therein began to receive direct religious instruction.[50] In 1829-30, Newman and his collegues (Wilberforce and Froude) elaborated a scheme for the reorganization of the tutorial system, subject to the Provost's approval. They proposed that the less able men be thrown into large lectures, while the more promising men should be put into small lectures chiefly under the direction of their own tutors on an informal basis. The intention of this scheme is clear: It fulfills the minimum requirement of instruction for the average or below average student while it reserves maximum time and conditions of more individual tuition for the education of bright, promising students. The system also makes almost exclusive the influence of the tutor over the undergraduates whose supervision falls to him.

The problems with such an elitist system are immediately clear, and Hawkins was quick to point them out: (1) Newman's system sacrificed the many to the few and, on the basis of personal influence and favouritism, left the slower, more indolent students to work out their own salvation. Such a system, Hawkins believed, left such students without a possibly successful goad to achievement in the association with better students and the exposure to the best tuition. Newman felt, on the other hand, that the alternative, non-selective tuition sacrificed the brilliant to a worthless and uninteresting program of instruction. (2) Hawkins objected to each tutor having his own batch of students: it excluded other students from the advantages to be gained from the talents of all of the tutors and narrowed the exposure of some students to a single point of view and influence. (3) He felt deeply suspicious of the influence some of the new tutors (e.g., Newman, Wilberforce, and

Froude) were beginning to exercise on the best men: He objected to the development of 'red-hot high churchmenship', to the conversion of education into an excuse for proselytizing.[51]

The disagreement between Hawkins and Newman was already creating a division in Oriel in 1828, but apparently not such as to be disruptive. Newman himself did not feel that there was any breach: 'We have gone through the year famously . . . [Hawkins] has not (nor should a Head) taken the initiative in these innovations [reform of the lecture system to include 'first classes'; reduced number of gentlemen commoners'; reduced number of non-productive students, through their being sent down; general lightening of discipline; and the revival of a Chapel sermon at Eucharistic services], but has always approved--sometimes kept abreast with us--and at Collections has slain the bad men manfully'.[52] Hawkins evidently chose to be cautious and politic with Newman and hoped to persuade him to realign himself in accordance with the Provost's views. In 1830, on the eve of Henry's coming to take up residence at Oriel, Hawkins is still optimistic:

> But I am happy to hear, what I think you [Henry] scarcely expected when I saw you, that the Speaker [Charles Manners-Sutton] acknowledges his debt to you; and I shall hope therefore that he will still find some means of discharging it handsomely. In the meantime I feel confident that you could scarcely dispose of yourself more usefully than by a residence at Oriel, and I by no means despair of your finding it an agreeable residence in too many respects. And I do not imagine that any dissentions here of such a kind as to make the society here painful to you unless indeed we should get <u>worse</u> than we are at present--I am myself proceeding very slowly and cautiously in healing matters about the Tuition--For I found in fact, that a more systematic change had actually been introduced than I had been previously informed of; this I found when I received

> the communications of the subject from Newman which he had promised me at the time I last saw you--and at the same time I found also a degree of irritation on his part against me much beyond anything I had imagined--So I set myself to work to heal the latter first, and thus I do not despair of bringing all matters round pretty well . . . .[53]

A few weeks later, however, Hawkins was much less sanguine and related his fears to his friend:

> I fear I shall only so far heal matters at Oriel as to prevent any personal disagreement between any of the tutors and myself. But I shall not be able to prevail on some of the tutors to abandon the new system of making classes (that is the most important of them) consist of their own particular pupils only--though I have asked no more than that they would gradually return to the old system, and let all the students have the benefit of the instruction of all the Tutors indiscriminantly. But the story is too long to tell at present, as I have a great many letters to prepare.
>
> Should I not succeed with Newman, as I cannot think it right to sanction the practice they would introduce, I shall be obliged to decline giving them any more pupils. Think only of the different Tutors as have [been] at Oriel within the last twenty years, and is it right to make the students exclusively the pupils of this or that tutor?[54]

Hawkins' sense of the irremedial nature of the dispute was correct. In June, 1830, he wrote to Newman, Froude, and Wilberforce to the effect that they would be given no more pupils unless they conformed to the older system of inclusive lectures.[55]

2. The Provost and the Dean. It was into this atmosphere of dissension that Henry came in October, 1830. He was a friend of Hawkins and had been his confidant

throughout the period of disagreement; Newman himself, is listed Henry among the 'friends of the Provost'.[56] nevertheless, it is clear that the fellows were not divided into armed camps, or at least that Henry did not pitch his tent in one camp or another. Entries in Newman's diary for 1830-32 indicate that Henry was frequently in his company for meals and as a walking companion. Indeed, there is at least one very friendly letter written by Newman to Henry while Newman was in Italy (1833)--that is, after Newman's rupture with Hawkins was complete.[57] Precisely because he was less adamantly engaged in the opinions of one side or the other, Henry acted as arbitrator of the dispute.[58] The ultimate question throughout the history of the Newman-Hawkins controversy was one of authority: would Newman, or would he not, submit in areas of disagreement to the judgement of the Provost, Hawkins, Newman's superior in rank. The issue came to a head in 1832 when Newman's seniority in the college put him in the line of succession for the office of Dean. The responsibilities of the Provost and the Dean were overlapping to a degree, and some of the fellows, Newman among them, felt able to argue that there were instances in which the authority of the Dean took precedence. Newman described the situation thus:

> The Dean of a College at Oxford has, or had in my time, the charge of the discipline of the place. At Oriel he had this charge, but was Vice Provost also and took rank accordingly.
>
> In 1832 Dornford, who had been Dean, retired on a living in Devonshire, and I came next in seniority. It would have followed as a matter of course that I should be elected in the following October into his place, except for the difference I had had with the Provost about my duties as a Tutor of the College.
>
> Accordingly, Dornford and Jenkyns, another of the Fellows, as friends of the Provost, wished me by an act of my own to withdraw myself from the ordinary routine of offices--and thus to save the College from the alternative of evils which

> threatened it, a serious division among the Fellows, when the time of election came, some voting for me, some not, or my election to the Provost's annoyance.
>
> But I thought it unfair to me, that I should be made to condemn myself and retire from active work in the College, and that the more, as it would be aiding the Provost in what I considered his usurpation on the rights of the Fellows. Moreover, I thought I could manage to discharge the duties of Dean, without any serious collision with him; and, as far as I recollect, the years in which I was Dean, (say) 1834, 1835, confirmed this anticipation. There was only one point which threatened a difficulty, and I think that, in the years to which I refer, that danger was not realized.[59]

On 28 June, Newman wrote to Henry saying that he believed it was up to the college to decide whether or not to elect him to the office of Dean, rather than up to him to decide whether to accept or to reject the office.[60] Henry responded, expressing his regret over Newman's decision because the fellows could not be sufficiently adequate judges of the attitudes of Dean and Provost (and the success of the project in this instance depended on the coordination of the personalities--not on the talents--of the two men). Henry comes directly to the point--the fear of a conflict over authority--and the basis upon which he feels that questions of relative authority and the election of a college officer should be settled:

> My own notion is, as I told you the other day, that the Dean though elected by the College, is bound both by statute and custom to assist and act under the Provost; and I cannot think that any one who is not prepared so to do, ought to hold the office--At the same time I am fully aware that the efficiency of an officer greatly depends on the degree in which he is left to his own discretion--but I consider it to be equaly clear,

> that if any question arises respecting the limits of this discretion, the decision must rest, not with the subordinate but with the principal--These are my views on the subject--how far they agree with those of other fellows I do not know, with the exception of Dornford, who, I conceive from what he said the other day in your presence, must coincide in them--I shall be glad to know whether or not you also approve of them.[61]

The last sentence makes it clear that Henry believes he has drawn the limits of the disputed territory.

Newman persisted in placing full responsibility on the electing fellows and said he of himself felt he had nothing to say regarding his views or the Provost's views. He continues, 'I am not conscious of cherishing any specific plan or novel principle about College discipline etc which I am desirous of bringing into operation, or I would say so frankly'.[62] In the same letter, Newman responds to some specific questions posed by Jenkyns:

> 1. I do not recollect the words of the Statute, but, without waiting for precise terms, I fully think that the Dean is bound to assist and act under the Provost in maintaining the discipline and good order of the College.
>
> 2. I fully allow that the discretion of the Dean is limited, that is, is in its particular acts stopped by the veto of the Provost.
>
> But here, some remarks occur to me, though, since they do not interfere with this admission, they may seem irrelevant.
>
> [I] I conceive the Dean at liberty to act upon the usages as he finds them, when he wishes, without interfering with the Provost's discretion. I conceive the Dean to have the right of acting himself by existing rules. E.g. supposing (to take an absurd case) it was proposed **that Gentlemen** commoners **should** sleep out of College, the Dean need not be party to such an arrangement.
>
> [II] I think the Dean has the right of

determining whether he is acting up to his duty as prescribed by statute or usage.

[III] Is he not <u>the</u> Chaplain of the College, that is, the sole officiator in the ordinary servce of the Church? E.g. supposing my feelings go strongly against administering the Sacrament to an individual, and the Provost wishes me and I refuse, here his Veto cannot come in. He can only say 'You **are** disobeying--' a point to be decided by my judgment, not by his.

Rudd, in his letter to Henry of 9 **June**, 1832,[63] feels that the issue which 'will explode if not settled privately' is that of the status of the Gentlemen Commoners. Certainly they were an undesirable element in college as far as Newman was concerned, but, as paragraph II in the second set of remarks above makes clear, the status of the Gentlemen Commoners was not the central issue. Rudd has, perhaps through not being a resident in college, misunderstood the situation: he has construed the mole-hill as the mountain. From Newman's letter it is clear that the basic issue is the one of whether or not he will submit to the authority of Hawkins. But the particular area in which the fellows feared conflagration was in that of the responsibilities and authority of the chaplain of the college. It is paragraph III in the letter that speaks to the heart of the matter: Newman feels that the Dean, as chaplain, is the sole liturgical officer in the college and the paramount figure of ecclesiastical and pastoral authority. The particular question was whether or not Newman would admit to the Sacrament all those undergraduates whom Hawkins deemed worthy to receive it. The argument has brought us full circle to the original difference between the two men: the extent and nature of the responsibility of college officials for the religious conditions and opinions of individual undergraduates.

Hawkins believed it his duty to enforce the regulations of the college, which, in particular instances, required the attendance of undergraduates upon the Sacraments--**specifically**, the Eucharist. Newman objected in all cases to

compulsory conformity to the Church of England. Beyond these considerations, there was the more pastoral question of the basis on which an administering priest (or the minister of the Church upon whom this responsibility lay) should decide whether or not a particular would-be communicant was fit to receive the Sacrament. By custom in the college, this responsibility fell to the Provost, and Hawkins did not fail to examine candidates. It was his habit to examine every freshman on the degree of his religious knowledge before admitting him to Holy Communion: Had the student been confirmed? Who had prepared him for Confirmation? What was the work (the 'textbook') which had formed the basis on which the student's preparation for Confirmation had been based?[64] But these questions may be said to relate to the 'surface qualifications' of any nominal member of the Church of England, and the examination was evidently a once-for-all-time inquisition. Perhaps the question of what book had been the basis for Confirmation instruction indicates that Hawkins attempted to assess the particular 'brand' of religious instruction (e.g., high church, low church, Calvinistic) a student had received, but there is no evidence to suggest that Hawkins admitted or refused to admit a student to Holy Communion on this basis. Above all, judgments as to an individual's state of grace at a particular moment in time Hawkins left to the personal conscience of that individual and to God. Newman radically disagreed with this approach, and he makes it clear that he, as Dean, would not feel bound to follow the custom or to abide by Hawkins' decision in the matter:

> I avow without reserve on my side that it would be underhand in me to attempt any change, which I believed the Provost to consider important, without giving him the opportunity of interposing, . . . Still I will never pledge myself, on the other hand, to mention to the Provost all I do on my own discretion . . . .
>
> However, let me come to the practical point of the Sacrament; for, if the question is to turn upon this, we are both of us losing time.

> I have at present no formed opinion about administering it to the mass of Undergraduates; but, if I have to make up my mind, I think it very likely I shall make it a point of conscience to act upon it. Then the question will be, whether the Provost will make it a point of conscience to bid me administer it to individuals to whom I object to administer it. If so, it is frank to say that I should not consider myself bound to obey him in a matter so solemn. I will also say that I am against the present rule of obliging undergraduates to receive the Sacrament.[65]

Henry makes clear his view (1) on the relative authority of Provost and Dean, (2) of the basis on which his judgments rest, and, indirectly, (3) on the question of religious conformity and admission to the Sacraments:

> The terms in which you describe the limitation of the Dean's discretion, seem to imply that there is nothing to restrain him from pursuing his own plans, until the veto of the Provost is imposed. This does not appear to me to be quite the case. I consider that he has no independent authority at all, but that it is his business to act in concert with the Provost, and to do the work, which if the physical powers of any individual were equal to it, the Provost would do himself--And this seems to be the view taken by the Statutes; in which he is said to be appointed for the purpose of supplying the place of the Provost when absent, and of assisting him when present. . . .
>
> With regard to your last remark [i.e., about the scope of the chaplaincy] I cannot speak [decidedly] without referring to the statutes, to which in Dornford's absence I have no ready access--but my impression is, that the Dean can in no sense be called the chaplain--With respect to officiating, I believe the Statutes speak not only of a chaplain, but of chaplains, besides the Dean; and with

> respect to the <u>government</u> of the chapel, the ecclesiastical supremacy, if such a phrase may be used, is vested I conceive, solely in the Provost--[66]

how Newman and Hawkins would have reacted to one another over these questions as Dean and Provost at this time remains a mystery. Newman's decision to take a leave of absence and to travel to Italy with Froude, a journey which was to commence in November, 1832, rendered the question moot: Newman's removal from the college obviated his becoming Dean in that year. But we are indebted to the incident and to the local controversy for the light it sheds on the character of Henry Jenkyns.

Henry believed (1) that the ultimate authority for the decisions to be taken in questions open to debate lay with the Provost, within the boundaries of and according to the guidelines set forth in the statutes and customs of the college:

> It appears to me that the practical question we have to consider is, not whether the Provost will allow the Dean any discretionary power, (for this I do not doubt) but which of the two in the event of a difference of opinion, is to give way--<u>I</u> am **decidedly of** the opinion that in such a case **concession** must be made by the Dean--<u>your</u> judgment on this point has not been explicitly **declared**--[67]

He felt (2) that all questions concerning the regulation of college--specifically, here, the role of chaplain and the regulation of chapel--were to be arbitrated by the accepted and confirmed statutes of the college, which in this **instance** vested these powers in the Provost (as Henry read the statutes): 'I have obtained the Dean's copy of the Statutes [which he forwarded to Newman] . . . you will find, I think, that what I stated the other day respecting the chaplains and the regulation of the chapel, was correct':[68] Such questions were not issues of individual conscience. (In future, Henry will seek to settle other disputed modes of conduct in other spheres by recourse to law and statute.) (3) Whether or not he fully agreed with compulsory religious

conformity, Henry was not sufficiently troubled in conscience over Hawkins' views of the matter to object to its effects in this instance. In fact, Henry will make it clear in his theological lectures in Durham that the question of an individual's fitness to be admitted to Holy Communion is ultimately a matter of the communicant's conscience and of God's judgment, not a moral decision to be taken by the celebrant. Finally, (4), he was an effective arbitrator of disputes, recognized as and called upon to be such by his colleagues,[69] precisely because he refrained from emotional involvement and attempted to be objective in his assesment of situations.

Departure from Oriel: The Durham Chair in Greek.

Eventually Henry grew restive and dissatisfied with his position at Oriel: he was beginning to feel like the elderly statesman of the common room (he was 37 years old in 1833); he evidently desired to marry, which he could not do and retain his fellowship.[70] Several letters from Henry Hobhouse, Manners-Sutton, and others indicate that Henry was seeking, directly or through his connections,[71] another employment; and at least two positions--the Principalship of King's College, London, and of St Mary's Hall, Oxford--were in the offing.

In 1831, Henry was apparently considered for the position of Principal of King's College, London. It is not clear whether or not he was formally offered the position, but it seems it would have been his had he desired it. In a letter to John Lonsdale, Henry, seeking his friend's advice, expressed his own reservations concerning the position:[72] (1) King's College was then in its infancy, having only been incorporated in 1829. The position of Principal guaranteed an income (which had not yet been determined) for three years only, since continuation of the post beyond that point would depend on the success of the new institution. Henry feared that the Principal at the end of three years would 'either be deprived of his official existence at once, or be suffered to die a lingering death with the rest of the establishment', (2) The duties of the Principal had not

yet been defined, but Henry feared they would be so demanding as to 'be incompatible with any other preferment, and though merely temporary would yet have the reputation of being a valuable appointment'. Clearly, Henry was not sanguine concerning the ultimate success of the college. On the other hand, Henry feared to refuse the offer were it made to him lest Archbishop Howley 'consider a reluctance to undertake this charge to be a symptom of unfitness for any other', and cease to have a favourable opinion of him.

Lonsdale responded with encouragement and information, but with reservations on the question of the college's future success: The suggested salary for the post was between £ 500 and £ 800, and Howley favoured the higher figure. Lonsdale granted that the salary was guaranteed for only three years, but he reassured Henry about the Principal's possible future penury: 'I cannot for a moment apprehend, with you, that in case of the failure of the College (which I am bound to say I consider far from impossible--I had almost said improbable) the Principal might be overlooked, or suffered to depart unrecompensed'.[73] Lonsdale added what particulars of the post he knew: 'the duties of the principal will be to superintend the whole, for which purpose daily attendance for a certain number of hours will [be] expected; (except during vacations)--to give lectures in theology--and to preach on Sundays in the Chapel of the College:[74] This description of the duties at King's which never developed for Henry is remarkably apt when applied to that post of Professor of Divinity at Durham which he ultimately held. At any rate, Henry declined the principalship.

In 1833 the Principalship of St Mary's Hall was vacant. Richard of Balliol apparently asked Lord Grenville, Chancellor of the University, to consider Henry for this post. Grenville replied in the negative, however. He allowed (1) that he would be eager to do Richard such a favour and (2) that he felt sure Henry was more than qualified for the position; nonetheless, 'the general opinion in favour of Mr [Renn Dickson] Hampden's pretentions seems to be so prevalent at Oxford, and so well founded, that I cannot

better execute my own trust than in appointing him to that situation'.[75] Thus, Henry was never offered this position.

At last, a reasonably desirable position became available and was offered to Henry. Bishop Van Mildert offered him the Professorship of Greek at the newly founded University of Durham, which was intended by design to be a bastion of orthodoxy and high churchmanship, and the choice of Henry makes it clear that he was considered by most of his contemporaries to be a High Churchman. The question of Henry's churchmanship is considered at length below and bears much upon the content of his lectures: One of the aspects of his teaching which seems puzzling to an analyst is the curious trace of apparently Evangelical attitudes which constitutes a single thread in an otherwise uniformly orthodox fabric. A full discussion of Henry's doctrinal attitudes must await presentation, but it is very interesting to note that in 1833, at least one of Jenkyns' Oriel contemporaries dissented from Van Mildert's assessment. Froude commented to Newman: 'What a floor the Bishop of Durham has made in thinking Jenkyns a high church man? Rose ought to have known better'.[76] Froude no doubt took particular exception to that aspect of Henry's theological views which led him to endorse and defend the union of Church and State in an established Church.

Henry Jenkyns was not the only person considered for the post at Durham. J. J. Blunt, Samuel Hinds, Frederick Biscoe, Edward Churton, William Mills, Edward Greswell, and William Jackson were also considered. Charles Atmore Ogilvie was also suggested for the post of Professor of Divinity at this time.[77] It is relevant that all of these men, with the exception of Hinds, were High Churchmen. Almost all of them were discussed by Thomas Gaisford (Regius Prof. of Greek, Oxford, 1812: Canon of Durham, 4th stall, 1829; 11th stall, 1829-31: Dean of Christ Church, Oxford, 1831), upon whose judgment Van Mildert relied heavily, in letters to Van Mildert.[78] Despite his opposition to the founding of Durham as a degree-granting institution, Gaisford was willing to make recommendations for various posts in the new university, and it was through him that the

Professorship of Greek was ultimately offered to Henry. In his letter to Henry, Gaisford gave the details of the post as he knew them: the professor was eventually to have a stall, but Gaisford did not know how soon this would come about; in the meantime, the salary was to be about £ 400 per annum; the residence of students was to be for a period of six months, and the duties of the professor would be proportional: and Gaisford suggested that he would be willing to discuss the proposal with Henry should the latter so desire.[79] The chief obstacle to accepting the chair, as Henry saw it, was the question of the income and, concomitantly, of the annexation of a stall to the professorship.

Henry wrote to Van Mildert requesting particulars about the stall before he made his decision about the offered chair. Van Mildert sent to Henry the current scheme for annexing prebends to university offices:

> Of the first 6 stalls vacant by death, 3 shall be given to the officers of the University, viz. to the Warden, to the Divinity Professor, and to the Professor of Greek and Classical Literature.
>
> Provided that whenever 2 vacancies shall have happened by death, some one stall shall be so given.
>
> Saving to the Bishop and his Successors the right of removing, upon occasion of vacancies, any member of Chapter, whether officers of the University or others, from the stalls they hold to other stalls, any statute of Law to the contrary not withstanding.[80]

The plan constituted the design by the Bishop in conjunction with the Chapter: 'This plan, after full deliberation, is thought to be the most unexceptional with reference to the respective interests of the parties concerned. Should you wish', says Van Mildert, 'for further explanation of it, I would refer you to Mr. Archdeacon Thorp, who is Warden of the College, as well as a member of the Chapter, [and he] will be happy to give you the fullest information upon this and every other matter relative to the appointment'.[81]

Van Mildert makes clear his earnest desire that Henry

accept the position, and he expresses his willingness to remove all difficulties which lie in the path of this objective and are within his power. The Bishop says of Henry: 'Your well-earned literary and academical reputation cannot but be a most valuable acquisition to us'.[82] Henry's particular qualifications for the position are impressive: He had taken a double first at Christ Church. He had the recommendation of Richard Jenkyns and of Thomas Gaisford, a formidable Greek scholar. He had examined for Greek prizes at Eton. He had assisted Thomas Arnold in the preparation of Thucydides. He had edited Cranmer's Remains. And there was also his 'private reputation' among his friends and acquaintances, the details of which one cannot know but may reasonably expect to have been adequate at the very least.

In a letter dated 19 October, 1832 [recte, 1833], Henry begs more time to consider, and points out the obvious difficulties over an income promised on the basis of a stall to be so conferred in the future:

> The distant period to which succession to a prebendal stall may be postponed [none of the current canons were particularly elderly or of infirm health], obliges me to ascertain as exactly as possible the income on which I can depend in the interval [especially since Henry hoped to bring a wife to Durham]--And it is also desirable for the College as well as myself, that I should be more thoroughly acquainted, than is the case at present, with the services required, before I engage to perform them.[83]

Henry was ever cautious and precise, and always sought to know, and to record, the exact conditions and stipulations of any proposal--a trait that was to serve him well over the years.

On October 28, 1833, Henry accepted the professorship, according to the terms arranged--a salary of £ 500 per annum, exclusive of the fees from independent members of the

university; and Henry was to be responsible for providing his own housing--but with some reservations because he still took exception to the proposals for annexing stalls:

> It scarcely defines with sufficient distinctness the order in which the offices of the University are to be preferred; the mode in which they are successively named, being the only guide to the point--A doubt also of a similar kind may arise in the event of the removal of the Professor of Divinity, as to whether his successor though previously unconnected with the University would stand first for admission to the Chapter, or whether precedence in this respect would be reserved to the officer of older standing--
>
> I hope I am not taking any undue liberty in making these remarks--Though I have ventured to submit them to your Lordship's consideration, I have not done so with a view of negotiating new conditions of acceptance--For I consider myself fully pledged to undertake the charge under the plan proposed, and I shall accordingly apply myself to the work with all the powers I possess--I have indeed to apologize for having entered on it already without waiting in the regular manner for your Lordship's appointment; for I have assisted this morning at the examination of candidates for admission--The wishes of the Warden and his assurance that this step would receive your Lordship's approbation, will I hope excuse this informality.[84]

Clearly, with or without reservations, once committed, Henry gave himself with a will to the task in hand.

Van Mildert was pleased and encouraged by the fact that Henry so readily assumed his duties, and he promised to consider Henry's remarks on the intended arrangements respecting the scheme for prebendal stalls, recognizing that the plan (given above) might admit of modification. The Bishop assured Henry: 'I have no other desire than to make

it as unexceptionable as possible, with reference to the interests of all the parties to be affected by it'.[85] In a letter to Thorp, Van Mildert expresses serious reservations about the plan for the stalls, and he suggests two alternative approaches: (1) the nomination of three particular stalls to be collated as they fell vacant to the offices of the university; (2) the annexation of the first three stalls as they fell vacant. The difficulties over deciding on any plan arose from two factors: As previously mentioned, none of the incumbents was particularly aged or infirm; therefore, the vacancy of any stall did not seem imminent. And Van Mildert had to restrict his intentions to stalls made vacant by death, lest he be accused of depriving any of the incumbent canons of a stall merely in order to provide a place for a university officer. Moreover, not all of the stalls were of equal value, and Van Mildert hoped to ensure the prestige of the university by conferring on its officers the most lucrative benefices in his gift. Obviously the assignation of stalls made randomly available by death could not be certain to fulfill Van Mildert's purpose. For this reason, he preferred the first of the two options above, but he hoped to protect himself from any slur on his character: 'To prevent, however, any surmise of an interested motive in making this arrangement, I would name three stalls, each, at present, occupied by an Incumbent older than myself; and moreover two out of the three, of such value as may do away [with] any imputation in that respect of unworthy intentions'. The Bishop proposed to attach the twelth stall [held by S. Smith], being the richest, to the Warden, because of 'the weight and dignity, the labours, the responsibility' of that office. He suggested the third [held by Prosser] and the sixth [held by Gisborne] stalls for the professorships, the Divinity Professor having the choice of the first to become available. Van Mildert says:

> I should think under this arrangement, no dissatisfaction could arise, in the possible event of some other stall becoming vacant, and consequently at the Bishop's disposal, before the others are filled up. With the exception of Mr.

> Durell [holder of the first stall] and the Bishop of Bristol [holder of the second stall], there are no other Prebends, I believe, so aged as myself. I could not therefore make a selection, less likely to be cavilled at in that respect.[86]

It should be noted that this revised plan deals with Henry's criticism of the first scheme: the order of precedence in the annexation of stalls has been stipulated: the Warden to the most valuable stall; the other two stalls, with first choice given to the Divinity Professor, to the two chairs. Henry was right to be so suspicious about this question of annexation. As events proved, it was not to be settled for several years hence, and was infinitely complicated by Van Mildert's death and the machinations of the Ecclesiastical Commission. Indeed, the annexation of the third stall to the Divinity Professorship continued, in some respects, a plague to Henry almost until his death.[87] Nevertheless, amidst plaudits from his friends,[88] Henry betook himself to Durham.

The transition to Durham was not entirely smooth. Henry had great difficulties in finding a house, which it was his responsibility to provide for himself until such time as he became a canon of the Cathedral. This problem was particularly pressing because Henry wished to marry immediately, and he could not bring his bride to Durham until he could provide her with an adequate household.[89] But Henry was not unassisted in his plight: Through the good offices of Charles Thorp, it became possible for Henry to have 'the house opposite the College gate'.[90] Henry accepted the house, provided that (1) it was put in repair, (2) an offensive drain was cured, (3) a pump was erected, and (4) the house would be further improved 'by throwing in the adjoining house belonging to the Chapter as soon as possession can be obtained'.[91] Possessed of a house, Henry married Harriet Hobhouse, daughter of Henry Hobhouse, early in 1834.[92] Besides these domestic difficulties, there were evidently some details concerning Henry's duties as Greek Professor which had to be reconciled, but these were evidently smoothed over in the first year, and Henry was soon

embroiled in the support and establishment of the new 'seminary in the North'.[93]

Jenkyns' theological temper: the Durham Chair in Theology.

One of the chief difficulties that Van Mildert faced in founding the University of Durham was that of persuading any of the established scholars of the time to come North. Durham was felt to be isolated by its location from all the significant academic activity in England, which centered in the South. Indeed, this difficulty may partly explain why the Greek chair was finally offered to Henry: On the one hand, he had the kind of academic credentials in Greek which bespoke a gifted scholar, and his abilities in Greek were recognized by his contemporaries. On the other hand, he was not already established in an academic post in the South, and he was in need of a good job with possibilities for advancement. But such an explanation does not suffice to answer the question of why he was ultimately appointed Professor of Theology at Durham. While it is true that it was difficult to persuade people to come North, Hugh James Rose had been so persuaded and so might others have been. It does not, therefore, seem likely that Jenkyns was chosen merely because he was already in residence at Durham. But the appointment is puzzling because, at first sight, Henry seems to lack precisely those qualifications demanded of notable theologians of his era. Leading theologians of the period--for example, Whately, Arnold, Hampden, Newman, Pusey, Keble, Rose, Churton, and Faber, to name but a few--were to a greater or lesser extent controversialists. They made their reputations by publication and disputation: two activities into which Henry steadfastly refused to enter. One searches his papers, public or private, in vain for the scrap of a polemical theological position. Even in the records of his lectures, it is difficult to discover the kind of position-taking remarks one might expect from an eminent nineteenth-century theologian. Certainly there is evidence in his lectures, especially on the Thirty-nine Articles, that Henry held some clear doctrinal positions, but his remarks on these points are not polemically

developed: they do not seem to be directly aimed at any of the prevalent views; nor are his theological views systematically developed such that they clearly reflect the position of a particular party, or a necessary determination not to enter into party stances.

This fact is even more remarkable when we consider Henry's proximity to and acquaintance with the most prominent figures of the age. During his period at Oriel, he supped with the Noetics and took tea with the leaders of the incipient Oxford Movement.[94] His brother, Richard, was head of perhaps the leading college in Oxford: he participated in the censure of Hampden and led, reluctantly at first, the prosecution of Ward. Thomas Gaisford, Dean of Christ Church, Oxford, and former canon of Durham, was Henry's brother-in-law. Henry was the confidant of Hawkins during the time when the storm was brewing in the Oriel Common Room between Hawkins and Newman and his followers. The only papers extant which reflect Henry's involvement with the people and issues of the time show him as the arbitrator of disputes, the diplomat chosen for his role precisely because he remains personally aloof from argument. There is at least one hint from Henry Jenkyns, Jr, that his father held some opinions in the matter:

> In Chapter xxxvi Mr. Mozley refers to the conflict between the provost and tutors of Oriel in 1830 and subsequent years; the details are almost entirely omitted, and the dates are not clearly given; but the statements made, particularly the unfavourable remarks on the provost, are not in accordance with the account I heard from my late father, who was then resident and acted as an intermediary in the dispute--an account of which is borne out by letters on the points to which they refer.[95]

But, whatever these opinions were, Henry was certainly loath to express them in writing, whether publicly or privately. If one had to debate doctrinal issues and to take up a position in a party in order to claim one's place

in the rank of theologians, then Henry Jenkyns did not enter the fray.

Nor was Henry willing to make a reputation for himself by means of scholarly publication. Apart from his edition of Cranmer and the publication of his first public lecture as Professor of Greek at Durham,[96] he steadfastly refused to demonstrate the results of his researches in print. The first indication that one finds of the disinclination to publish appears in 1835. Evidently Van Mildert heard and praised Henry's second public lecture: the Bishop wrote to Henry, suggesting that the lecture should soon appear in print. Van Mildert's initial letter is not to be found, but a draft of Henry's reply makes his position regarding publication--at least, of his lectures--clear:

> My own feelings on this subject [i.e., the refusal to publish the lecture in question] were strengthened by the opinions of the Dean of Christ Church [Thomas Gaisford] and my brother [Richard, Master of Balliol], who concurred in thinking that my observations would be more useful if read from time to time to new sets of students, than if committed to the press. Still however I should not have finally determined against publication, if the Warden [Charles Thorp], when I consulted him on the subject, had not expressed his full belief that your Lordship would be in no way displeased by my pursuing the course which was most in accordance with my own views.[97]

Van Mildert in reply is courteous and graciously acknowledges Henry's arguments and right of self-determination, while he persists in his own evaluation of the quality of Jenkyns' scholarship:

> Much as I admired your second Lecture, and felt persuaded that the publication of it might be beneficial to others, as well as creditable to our University and yourself, I should not wish you at anytime to act otherwise than your judgment would direct, and the judgment of those who had better means than I had of deliberating

> upon it, and giving you the best advice. . . .
>
> I shall nevertheless not be backward at any time in testifying my opinion of such excellent performances as that which I had the pleasure of witnessing, and I trust that opportunities may again occur of doing so.[98]

Henry's refusal to publish persisted to the end of his life, though the reasons given above--'that my observations would be more useful if read from time to time to new sets of students'--was no longer valid, since he had ceased to lecture to students:

> In late life, after his resignation, on one occasion, when he thought that notes from his lectures were about to be put forth, he consulted [A. S. Farrar, his successor as Professor of Theology] for facts, with a view to get legal embargo, if necessary to forbid the publication. It may be a matter of regret that he did not himself communicate his knowledge to the world. But an English Professor in a busy life has little time to write.[99]

Farrar also states that Jenkyns, while he was professor, would neither write his lectures out in full nor publish them. Farrar's estimate of the motive for such reticence was that 'the fastidiousness of the scholar prevented this.'[100]

The point to be made by these observations is that Henry refused to enter into the two chief activities, disputation and publication, whereby he could distinguish himself publicly as a theologian. Van Mildert wished, in founding Durham, to establish the leading institution of theological education in England. To forward this aim, he attempted to attract the best--and best known--academics to positions at the university. To insure the appeal of posts at Durham, he sought to attach the professorships to prebendal stalls, thereby guaranteeing a good stipend and ecclesiastical preferment to the professors of Durham. Why then did he in the end select the publicly unremarkable Henry Jenkyns to fill the most important chair in the

university?

Hugh James Rose resigned as Professor of Theology in 1834. Jenkyns and Chevallier (Prof. of Math.) between them assumed the duties of the Theology chair for a year; that is to say, Van Mildert left the post unfilled for one full year, possibly--if not probably--in order to reflect for a space upon the qualifications of various people who might be appointed to the vacancy left by Rose. There are two problems about this line of reasoning: (1) Rose, sometime in October, 1834, as Henry reports to H. Hobhouse, wrote to Henry Jenkyns: 'Rose in a very kind letter written to put me in possession of some matters relating to his retirement, which he thought concerned me, says that it is probably an offer of the vacant chair may be made to me'.[101] Thus, the evidence suggests that Henry was, in the mind of the Bishop, the likeliest candidate to replace Rose <u>from the beginning</u>. (2) There is no indication at all that anyone else was considered for the chair, let alone approached with an offer of it.

In the event, Van Mildert offered the chair to Henry in a letter, 28 September 1835, and on 5 October 1835, Henry wrote to the Bishop accepting the post.[102] From 1835 to 1840, Henry continued to retain the title of Professor of Greek because as such he would succeed to a prebendal stall more quickly than had he assumed the title of Professor of Divinity;[103] nonetheless, he ceased from 1835 to be responsible for the duties of the Greek professor and was completely obligated to the post in Divinity. In 1839 the third stall of the Durham Chapter fell vacant, and Henry was collated thereto by Edward Maltby, the Bishop of Durham, on 21 October 1839.[104] He was soon thereafter promoted to the Divinity chair in the University, continuing to hold that professorship until 1864 when he retired because of ill health.

There is no concrete evidence which gives a clue to Van Mildert's motivation in offering Jenkyns the chair of theology. Perhaps the Bishop was merely impressed by the fact that Henry was already 'on the spot' and that he had demonstrated himself to be a conscientious teacher in his dispatch of the responsibilities as Professor of Greek. But

there are some facts which lend themselves to inference in the matter, and the evidence is of two types: 1. circumstantial--that is, from elements in the general situation and 2. personal--that is, from aspects within the characters of Henry and Van Mildert.

1. The general situation. There are several factors in the general situation which may contribute to an explanation: Henry was Thomas Gaisford's brother-in-law, and Gaisford carried much influence with Van Mildert. It was partly through Gaisford's agency that Henry had come to Durham as the Professor of Greek. Presumably, Henry continued in his good opinion. Rose's letter to Henry (quoted above) suggests that Henry's appointment as Professor of Divinity carried Rose's approval, and Rose had been Van Mildert's first choice for the position. Henry had an invaluable family connection, through his father-in-law, Henry Hobhouse, on the Ecclesiastical Commission. The operation of this Commission was of paramount importance to the future of Durham University; Van Mildert felt some confidence that Hobhouse's interests would tend in the direction of the best interests, as Van Mildert and others of like mind saw it, of Durham: 'I am glad to learn from the Gazette, that Mr. Henry Hobhouse is put into the new Commission for Church Affairs. He will not be disposed, I think, to put even Deans and Chapters in jeopardy, nor to break down any of the bulwarks of our Establishment'.[105]

The Ecclesiastical Commission of which Hobhouse was a member was appointed in 1835. Its function was to consider reforms in the allotment of Church revenues, ultimately to prepare and implement schemes for the alteration and redistribution of ecclesiastical revenues. In 1836 an Act of Parliament (6 and 7 Will. Iv, c.77) established the Ecclesiastical Commissioners as a permanent body with the power to enforce such reforms of revenue.[106] That aspect of the Commission which concerns us here was its power to confiscate and to redistribute the incomes of Cathedral Deans and Chapters. Because the financial support of Durham University was directly tied to some of the income of the unreformed Chapter of Durham, the contrivances of the Commission for the reform of that particular Chapter were

tantamount to the success or failure of the University. Or so, at least, Van Mildert, Thorp, and other interested parties believed to be the case. Lest these considerations bear too harshly on the conduct of the Commissioners, let it be recalled that the motive, at least on the part of some of the instigators, for founding the university was to frustrated the 'rape' of Chapter revenues by some reforming body such as the Ecclesiastical Commission was created to be.[107]

Though there is no record of Van Mildert's directly invoking to the hoped-for benefit of the University this connection between Henry and the Ecclesiastical Commission, Charles Thorp--Warden of the University and Archdeacon of Durham--certainly did. In his letter of 7 February 1835, Thorp expresses his hope that Henry will 'through his connections to one of the Ecclesiastical Commission' make the situation of the University's connections with and dependence upon the income of Chapter stalls known to that Commission.[108] Indeed, the Jenkyns Papers are replete with drafts of letters to Hobhouse (and to the Ecclesiastical Commission)[109] concerning the interests of Durham, as well as with letters from Hobhouse to Henry reporting the business of the Commission and advising Henry how he and the University might act the best to gain the consideration of the Commission.[110]

All this brings us to consideration of the final circumstantial factor in Henry's appointment: He was <u>there</u>, already committed to the project of sustaining the University, and the general course of his career was inextricably bound up with the success of the venture. He had hitched his wagon to a star: if the star fell, he plumeted with it. A man in such a position makes a powerful advocate, and, indeed, Henry gave a remarkable amount of his energy and talent to the sustaining, government, and administration of the University.

There is abundant evidence for this assertion in the Jenkyns Papers. The Thorp Papers[111] also reflect Henry's efforts on behalf of and involvement in the affairs of the University: many of the drafts of documents

submitted to the Ecclesiastical Commission, and so on, are in Henry's hand and are evidently of his design. Furthermore, his support and good will took, in later years, very material form: beginning in 1839, when he succeeded to the prebendal stall, Henry 'considering himself sufficiently provided for by the possession of a Stall with its entire revenues, . . . began the practice of placing his share of fees [those paid by students for specific tuition] from time to time, as they became due, at the disposal of the Senate, for the general purposes of the University'.[112] In 1840 or 1841, this portion of Henry's fees was redirected by him (with the approval of Senate) to pay for an additional lecture, to be given by one of the tutors, on the Epistles.[113] Henry also applied some of his fees, and invested various monies, to provide scholarships for promising, impecunious divinity students.[114] Finally, upon retiring from the chair, Henry gave £ 1000 a year from his canon's income of £ 3, 900 to the University each year. Of the £ 1000, £ 700 was paid to Dr Farrar, Henry's successor.

Henry made this voluntary arrangement with the University in order that his successor's salary might be sufficient to sustain him. Henry had retained his canonry when he resigned the chair chiefly to protect this income for Farrar and the University.[115] Because the income of the third stall had by this time been readjusted by the Ecclesiastical Commission--the force of which adjustment could not be brought to bear on Henry but would be imposed on his successor in the stall--Henry's resignation as canon would have made a pauper of Dr Farrar. In 1872 an Act was passed under which a resigning canon was entitled to receive as a pension one-third of his former income out of the income of his successor. If Henry had resigned his canonry, 'the whole income of Dr Farrar on succeeding [Henry] as canon would be insufficient to pay the pension . . . so that he [Farrar] would lose all his income, while the University would also lose £ 200 a year. . .'.[116] Van Mildert's judgment of Henry's sense of responsibility and dedication had not been in error.

On the other hand, Van Mildert may have had more

confidence in the quantity known than in that unknown. The reverse implications of the fact that Henry was already at Durham and committed to its success deserves notice: Be it remembered that the fate of the infant institution was very uncertain at best. Many, among them Thomas Gaisford,[119] had not believed the University would succeed in the first place. Under the reforming efforts of the Ecclesiastical Commission, the University was very likely to be bereft of funds. It is probable that no other theologian in the land had taken sufficient leave of his senses that he would have agreed in 1835 to come to Durham as Professor of Divinity.

2. Personal characteristics. The second group of factors contributing to the selection of Henry Jenkyns for the Professorship of Divinity at Durham derive from the characters of Henry and Van Mildert. They were two people whose attitudes and convictions seem to have been eminently suited to one another: they were both High Church Tories; both declined controversy where possible; both were committed to the design and success of Durham. Perhaps one needs discuss in detail only the first of these common traits since the other two are treated elsewhere.

In his Development of English Theology, Vernon F. Storr describes a group of churchmen which he calls the 'Early Orthodox'.[118] The early orthodox group within the Church of England comprised two distinct groups: the 'High Church' party, who were Church-and-State, in all senses 'establishment' men: herein we find both Jenkyns and Van Mildert; and the 'Church supreme and pure' party, made up of those people dedicated to the concept of the Church as a purely spiritual organization which was independent of the state in all matters of doctrine and spiritual authority: herein we find such strange bed-fellows as Newman and Phillpotts. Indeed, this second group may be said to be the ancestor of the Oxford Movement.[119]

Both groups bore the characteristics of orthodoxy: (1) They defended the accepted creeds and traditional position of the Church against all opposition. (2) They were well content with the long, established order. (3) There was among the adherents a marked absence of the desire to

innovate. The theology of the orthodox was generally broader and more 'systematic'[120] than that of the evangelicals, but it was defensive rather than kerygmatic: orthodox theologians were learned and interested in theological (as distinct from dogmatic) issues, but they were inclined to declaim rather than to proclaim. They observed and upheld the stately liturgy of the prayer book, but they were uninterested in ritualism; sacramentalism was present in the theology of ritual, but restrained. While the High Church party gave due emphasis to the catholicity of the Church, it did not share to the same degree the emphasis that the Oxford Movement was later to give to apostolic succession and to the growth of religious emotion and feeling. The orthodox party was always in the minority of the Church, but the most prominent of the bishops graced its members.[121]

Van Mildert's theological views provide an apt example of those sentiments particularized among the orthodox of this period: In his Bampton Lectures (1814),[122] Van Mildert characterized the episcopacy as the essence of the visible church and represented the Sacraments and the priesthood as being 'interwoven into the very substance of Christianity, and inseparable from its general design'. He was hostile to Methodism and 'enthusiasm', and his views agreed generally with Marsh and Horsley.[123] As shall become evident, the convinced but moderate and traditional views of Van Mildert, as well as the moderation with which they are expressed, are much in harmony with the teaching and tone of Henry Jenkyns.[124]

Jenkyns will depart from Van Mildert's views; especially his concept of episcopacy will appear more moderate (and, therefore, perhaps, less orthodox) than Van Mildert's. But the differences in the periods of the two men must be held in mind when one attempts to compare their views: Van Mildert represents the heart of eighteenth-century theological views, and he died before the full force of burgeoning nineteenth-century changes in attitude could truly be felt; in particular, Van Mildert died before the Oxford Movement gave more extreme expression (and such expression as one suspects Van Mildert would have rejected) to such concepts

as episcopacy and priesthood. Jenkyns, on the other hand, was a product of the early nineteenth-century, for all that his training and thought reflects the schooling of the eighteenth: he was a man on the cusp and was forced to react to the trends of two periods in tangent. As a result, his attitudes on the episcopacy and priesthood, though a modification on the more forceful statement of Van Mildert, may be understood as representing Van Mildert's moderate and orthodox attitude in the face of the more extreme and probably less orthodox definitions forged in the Oxford Movement.

At his death, Henry was described as 'a thorough-going conservative and staunch supporter of Church and state' whose lectures were a mine of clear, distinct, dogmatic orthodox divinity'.[125] The details of Henry's orthodoxy are specified in the chapters below which analyze his teaching. Suffice it to say here that he was as 'High Church' and as Tory as Van Mildert himself. One must note, however, that Henry does not seem to have been, at least publicly, a 'party man'. As indicated, he refrained from controversy and, concomitantly, he declined the polemics of platform[126] theology. Indeed there is in his teaching an elusive, almost indefinable--though hardly radical or dangerous--strain of eclecticism (the product, it may be, of his academic commitment).

Perhaps this tendency in Henry to be quietly 'his own man' can be traced to his Oxford days. He was at Oxford from 1814 to 1834; he was a resident fellow at Oriel from 1830 to 1834. While this period encompasses the dawn of the Oxford Movement, it also embraces a period in the activities of the Noetics[127] and their lingering influence, with some of whom Henry lived in fellowship at Oriel. This group comprised a loose band of intellectuals held together by common ideals. The breadth of approach and relaxed affiliation of the individuals in the group prevented it from assuming the animus of a movement <u>per se</u>. The aim of these theologians--among them Copleston, Whately, Hampden, Baden-Powell, and Arnold--was to subject the conventionalities

and dogmas of traditional religious orthodoxy to the criticism of reason and history. Henry must have been only on the fringe of such intentions, so to speak: Where the Noetics sought to expose the devisive and intellectually untenable aggregates of traditional, fundamentalist dogma, Henry assumed to a degree the basic validity of creed and tradition.[128] On the other hand, he did believe, as his treatment of the issues makes abundantly clear, that religious belief was a matter of intellectual assent; that the application of reason and the careful study of history sifted many grains of truth from the chaff of institutional accretion. Perhaps Henry's devotion to the use of reason and the critique of history (as he understood the concept: i.e., as an intellectual wording within a fairly rigid framework, but one capable, within limits, of at once being disinterested and eclectic) manifests itself best in his treatment of apostolic succession and the history of the liturgy.[129] If one examines some of the tenets of various of the Noetics as compared to the specific teachings of Henry Jenkyns, it is clear that one may assert an overlapping of ideas, if not actual influence the one upon the other. The areas in which agreement is most evident are on the issue of episcopacy and the questions of the inspiration and role of scripture.

Edward Copleston, Provost of Oriel from 1814-28, in his Bosworth Lectures made the following observations on the question of apostolic succession: The English Reformers nowhere claimed episcopacy to be essential to the true Church, but they did assert that the Church was a divinely instituted society which could prove succession from apostolic times. Such a succession, however, did not involve a theory of transmitted virtues. This concept of a non-essential episcopacy is the core of Henry's teaching on the validity of episcopacy. Edward Hawkins, successor to Copleston and friend of Henry, insisted that the doctrine of apostolic succession, qua the Tractarians, had no clear warrant in scripture. Henry is at pains to make precisely this point and to show wherein the ambiguity lies in the New Testament documents.[130]

Henry's views on the nature and function of revelation are not easily classified. He insists that the only source of doctrine, the only test for the essentials of faith, is the 'Word of God'. But the 'Word of God', as Henry uses the concept, has no reference to the evangelical 'Word': Henry means the written revelation, the scriptures. Nonetheless, and perhaps without a **full** recognition of the implications, Henry follows the tradition of post-Reformation English theology, using Holy Writ as a great mine of proof texts: he uses scripture to prove externally constructed doctrine, not as the fabric of doctrine itself.[131] Henry's use of scripture, including his concept of inspiration and revelation, is treated in detail below. For the time, suffice it to point out that, while insisting on the centrality of the Word to all theological activity, Henry's use of scripture de facto reflects a tacit agreement with that theory of interpretation advocated by Hawkins in 1818: Doctrine is to be learned from the Church through tradition, and scripture is consulted only to prove the truth of Church teachings.[132] On the other hand, Henry's conscious and repeated stress on scripture as the sole authority in Christian teaching seems to put him in sympathy with Whately and Hampden (although Henry would never have drawn from such a concept the implications that Whately and Hampden derived from it). Henry might well have agreed in principle with Hampden: 'The difference between the New Testament and technical theology is that in one you have divine truth, guaranteed by inspiration, in the other the human rendering of divine truth'.[133] But he probably did not accept Hampden's division of the spoils; nor would he have seen fit to attack the same enemy.

By contrast with the partial agreement between the views of Henry and those of the foregoing Noetics, there is very little in common between the mature thoughts of Thomas Arnold and Henry. Henry certainly was not a broad churchman, though he does seem to share with the broad churchman's rejection of the strife of party factionalism. Arnold was never easy with the doctrine of the Trinity, while Henry was a convinced Trinitarian. Both men favoured the union

of Church and State, though perhaps for different reasons. Henry's views on the episcopacy were moderate; Arnold was radically opposed to the Tractarian doctrine of apostolic succession because it elevated the clergy to a special caste and because, being based as it was on the fourth rather than on the first century, it was unhistorical.

A rather more detailed examination of Henry's relationship with Arnold than with the other Noetics mentioned here is merited because of the light it sheds on Henry's character. It is clear from the Jenkyns Papers that there was a close friendship between Arnold and Henry,[134] and, therefore, one may justly look for some agreement of views between these two men or for some strain of intellectual influence arising from their relationship. Henry was a visitor in the Arnold household both at Laleham[135] and at Rugby.[136] He assisted Arnold in the preparation of the Oxford edition of Thucydides. But, what is most interesting, there is also clear testimony of a continual friendship between the two men despite diverging views on Church and theological questions. In a letter to Henry in 1833, Arnold is discussing Henry's anticipated visit to Rugby as the Oxford Examiner. Arnold begs Henry 'to come early to visit' and promises that 'he shall undertake to keep the Peace upon Church reform and other such Topics'.[137] At a time when others of like mind to Henry were shunning Arnold as a renegade and heretic, and despite disagreement between the two men on theological questions, Henry maintained some degree of personal intercourse with Arnold. Conservative, Tory, possibly opinionated: whatever else Henry Jenkyns may have been, he was not--at least in this instance--a bigot.

By contrast, let us consider Hugh James Rose's response to Thomas Arnold in 1834. In March and April, 1834, the Warden of Durham (Charles Thorp) prepared and presented to the Chapter a set of statutes for the University, stipulating that the Academical Institution established by an Act of Chapter in 1831 be constituted a University; enumerating the various officers of the University; and setting forth the modes for their nominations and appointments.[138] 'On

June 13 the Chapter decided to make a fundamental statute constituting a Senate and a Convocation', and, on the basis of these Statutes, to apply to Parliament for a Royal Charter for the University.[139] In the same year, Van Mildert went to London to present the Bill. In the Bill, framed from the Statutes prepared by Chapter, it was stipulated that the three principal offices of the University--namely, those of the Wardenship and the Professorships of Divinity and of Greek--were to be endowed with prebendal stalls. Canons of cathedral chapters are ordinarily appointed by the bishop; however, if a stall is vacated by royal appointment (e.g., if a canon is elevated to the bench of bishops) the Royal Prerogative pertains, and thus the gift of the stall falls to the crown, that is to say, given the way the principle operated in Van Mildert's day (and to the present), to the government. Because the chief offices of the University were yoked to prebendal stalls and because of the operation of the Royal Prerogative, it was just possible that Parliament, should it so desire, could achieve control of the University through the appointment of its Warden or one of the two professors. It was precisely this eventuality that Rose sought to prevent, and he wrote to Van Mildert[140] to give his opinions on the statutes that had been drawn up and to express his fears on this question of the Royal Prerogative:

> Perhaps the clear indications given in many quarters that the present Government means to take strong measures as to Education, and to build a fresh, or stronger title to popular favour by (so called) Liberal measures on this Subject [i.e., by the admission of dissenters to university degrees], may somewhat increase my anxiety [evidently about the statutes of 1834]. And I find that the conclusions to which I had come as to the concessions likely to be made to Dissent in the Session (viz. as to marriages and Registration) from the hints in the Ministerial and the Dissenting Journals are confirmed by an Independent Source of information, Mr. Arthur Perceval, who collected

> the same from a Son of Ld Grey . . . . I am the more inclined to credit what he adds on the same authority that the Government means to open the Universities also.
>
> . . . And in times like these, when the Government make it a great object to get a place of Education, so founded and so Endowed [i.e., as the University of Durham] into their hands and have to a certain extent the power by advancing some members of Chapter and thus putting their own friends in [i.e., through the operation of the Royal Prerogative], it is the more necessary to look to this [i.e., whether or not to leave the control of the University solely in the hands of such a body--a body made vulnerable on the basis of the Royal Prerogative--as the Chapter].[141]

All of the above is a long history, but it brings us to the point: Rose's estimation of Thomas Arnold. In the same letter, he continues:

> I have also pressed on the Warden the necessity of having some fixed statutes for the divinity department, so as to make it a hard task for mischievous men coming hereafter into the Chapter to counteract the munificent and admirable intentions of the founder. One trembles to think what a person like Dr. Arnold, thrust into the Chapter on the advancement of any member, (and Government would certainly, I conceive, look with eagerness to carry such points,[142] and would think him well calculated for this, though his fearful principles and his open declaration of them have probably done much to prevent his higher advancement) might do, to liberalize an Institution without fixed laws.[143]

Rose's attitude of denunciation was far more typical in his day (though less attractive today) of the partisanship which prevailed than was Henry's reticence. Surely Henry must have strongly disapproved of Arnold's theology, but he

seems to have held such opinions in private. Indeed, Henry reiterates Rose's concern over Arnold and the University administration,[144] but the tone of Henry's remarks is more subdued, and it is not perfectly clear where his opinions lay on the matter.

The last item in the correspondence between Arnold and Jenkyns dates from 1838, and fortunately there remains an undated draft of what was clearly Henry's reply to Arnold. The letters continue to reflect the difference of opinion and a persistent, if interrupted, cordiality between the two men. The letters also provide a further insight into the characters of the two: Arnold, certainly the optimist, probably the idealist; Henry, if not the pessimist, certainly the realist.

Arnold, through his position with King's College, London, had joined the new University of London,[145] 'chiefly in the hope of making it an engine of education at once religious and unsectarian',[146] The University of London wished to grant degrees, but it also refused to demand religious tests of degree condidates and offered no religious teaching whatever to students: this anti-religious attitude emanated from University College, founded by a mixture of dissenters and utilitarians.[147] The dissenters, in keeping with the reforming air of the times, disdained religious tests; the utilitarians, religion absolutely. The question of whether or not dissenters were to be admitted to degrees also agitated events at Oxford and Cambridge, as well as at Durham. The problem arose because the granting of the bachelor degree had hitherto been a matter ecclesiastic:

> The titles of bachelor of arts or master of arts were said to be a sign not only of a certain amount of classical and scientific and <u>theological</u> learning but also of the habits of a gentleman. Counsel for Oxford University was . . . Sir Charles Wetherell. . . . At the hearing before the Privy Council, Wetherell argued that the government of a university is a matter ecclesiastical, and by the law of England a university is subject to the ecclesiastical visitation of the Archbishop of

> Canterbury. The degrees of Oxford [and of Cambridge and, in the event, of Durham] were the indication of a religious profession, and of the habits, education and association of a gentleman. The M.A. was a badge of a Christian education, and a Christian state must not, could not authorize a body without religion to award Christian titles, Church of England titles.[148]

At the last day, people like Wetherell and Arnold were defeated, and Arnold withdrew from the University in London. But before that time, on 30 March 1838, Arnold wrote to Jenkyns, expressing his ambitions and seeking support from Henry and Durham:

> I see that Durham is just made one of the Places which may send candidates to try for our degrees at the University of London. This gives you a certain interest in our Proceedings,--and I want to know what you think the likelihood of any of your men passing our theological Examination [an alternative proposed, in the interest of dissenters (and, it was important to note, not really a question of any utilitarians) to subsrciption to the 39 Articles, the religious test required hitherto at Durham],--and whether you would advise them generally to pass it or not. --You may have heard of my Endeavors to get this theological Examination made compulsory upon every Body; my object was to admit all Christians to degrees, and none but Christians [because of Arnold's broad church aims and because of his view of the necessity of Christian unity among all who are devoted in some sense or another to the Person of Jesus Christ, most churchmen would not have shared his definitions of the sheep and the goats], but this was objected to by an overwhelming Majority,--and they would only admit a voluntary Examination,--with Honours, and Certificates of having passed it.--My object now is to make so much of this Examination, that the Degree

of A.B. without it shall be considered incomplete, and that a broad Line of Distinction shall be drawn in public opinion between those who pass it and those who do not.--The men from the College in Gower Street [University College] will generally I suppose not pass it;--if your men and those of King's College do the same, the Examination will be a dead Letter, and then the Evil which I so dread will be established without Mitigation,-- i.e. that Christianity will be altogether considered as an indifferent Matter in the most extesive of all our National Institutions for Education. ---My own remaining on the Senate after their Decision against the compulsory Examination, was almost entirely on account of King's College, and because I wished to try whether the voluntary Examination could be made in any Degree an Equivalent for what we had lost.--I have not much Hope, and personally should be rejoiced to be freed from a very troublesome and very unsatisfactory office; --but now that you are added to us also, it increases the Importance of the University, and makes me unwilling to abandon lightly even a faint chance of being able to influence so very important an Institution for Good.--However if this last chance fails me, as I fear it will, I shall withdraw immediately;--and only wish that I could persuade our three Bishops to set me the Example.--The I believe, especially if you and King's College would support us, that the Government would take the alarm,--and act as they ought to do.--At present they seem afraid not of the Dissenters,--(for it is not a Question about Dissenters,--most of whom I believe wished my first Proposal to have been adopted,--) but of the Utilitarian or rather unbelieving Part,-- who say plainly that they do not want the University to recognize Christianity at all.[149]

Jenkyns' reply is gracious to Arnold personally and sympathetic to his purposes but offers no real help, for various reasons, for the project in hand:

> I wish you all success in your endeavours to make the University of London a Christian University: but I fear we cannot promise you any assistance from hence--For we do not stand in the same position with King's College, being chartered as a distinct and independent University and conferring our own degrees, and not requiring any aid from [having no desire to be connected with] your establishment in London. It is true that Lord J. Russell has sent us [without any application on our part] a warrant from the Queen for the purpose, as he states, of enabling such of our men as object to the religious tests required for degrees here to obtain them in the University of London. But this warrant has been issued without any privity, and as it is drawn at presnet will probably never be acted on,--For it requires us to certify that the course of study determined by the University of London has been completed and even if such a certificate were granted, it would only enable a student to present him[self] for examination before your worships in London--This we think, would tend to render our course of study dependent on yours, and would also subject the proceedings of [one] University to be revised and set aside by another: a result very objectionable in any case, [1] and particularly so, (pace tua dixerim) [2] where the revising University is in a great degree under the thumb of the Minister of the day [3] --We have accordingly represented to the Bishop [150] (through whom the communication came and who was requested by Lord J. Russell to use his influence for carrying her Majesty's intentions into effect) that we are apprehensive that such Certificates as seem to be contemplated in the Warrant could not

> be issued by us without compromising our independence. But we have suggested another mode by which the same object might be attained: viz. that the University of London should receive our terms and examinations (which have now for some time been before the public) as sufficient for a degree--We should then have to certify compliance with our own regulations only, and not with those of another body: [4] and students who objected to our religious tests might receive these certificates and by virtue of them take their degrees in London instead of Durham--This would in fact be somewhat of the nature of admission ad eundem: every requisite for a degree having been fulfilled here, excepting the religious test. We do not at all know how far this suggestion is likely to be approved--if it is not, I conceive we shall have nothing at all to do with the metropolitan University and the Queen['] s Warrant may as well go into the fire--This being the state of things, you will see that we are not likely to help you in your laudable design of Christianizing the government scheme, for we have no inclination to get entangled in it--With the heartiest wishes for your success, I cannot say I am sanguine about it--For indifference to religion seems to me the fundamental principle of your institution; and it is hard work to give it an impulse in a direction exactly opposite to that with which it starts--It is something like that most delicate and embarrassing operation of pig-driving.[151]

The closing lines of this letter indicate the clear headed realism with which Henry, in contrast to his friend, viewed the situation. The precision with which Henry sets forth Durham's position vis-à-vis the royal warrant accords well with that legalistic turn of mind which is apparent in him elsewhere. Both these qualities served him well, and suited admirably, for his duties as Professor of Divinity and his role in the forwarding of the new University. Some

specific statements in the letter illustrate points already made concerning Henry's character: [1] and [4]--Henry's defence of Durham's integrity and independence is swift and sure. [2] He emphasizes his desire to avoid any implication of quarrel with or insult to Arnold personally. [3] His comments reflect Durham's desire to remain independent of governmental control (and harks back to its fear of coming under such control as it was expressed above by Rose).

Time and event are the test of all decisions, and both have tried the evaluation of Henry Jenkyns as Professor of Divinity at Durham. In the moment of his choosing, he seemed a likely candidate: He carried the recommendation of prominent men who were also interested parties (Gaisford and Rose); his social connections (viz., with Hobhouse) boded well for the interests of Durham; he was committed to the success of the institution, and he was already in situ, so to speak. In his person, he accorded well with the person and desires of Bishop Van Mildert, architect of the project: He was orthodox in his religion and conservative in his politics; he abstained from public controversy and avoided personal attacks in academic and theological affairs, while holding tenaciously to his convictions; he shared the desire to get Durham established midst the theological chaos of the times and to make it a fit nursery for the divines of England at large, regardless of party persuasion--and to this end he devoted himself to the clear, precise, and unbiased (as nearly as can be) statement of Christian doctrine as it had been developed in the Church of England.

Van Mildert was right, whatever his reasons, in the choice of Henry Jenkyns. The University of Durham, at the time, was at least as much in need of a defender and advocate as of a brilliant theologian: indeed, the champion, though not a theologian sans pareil, probably served the best. Richard Jenkyns of Balliol put it well in a prophecy which proved true: Durham, 'the new University which may be rendered a most valuable school for theological instruction in the North of England--Your talents, attainments, and power of general usefulness in such an establishment cannot be unnoticed'.[152]

Chapter II

Some Historical Notes

Jenkyns' solution to the relationship between Church and State (discussed in detail below, Chapter IV) is a fascinating reflection of the complexity of the Church of England's historic involvement with the State and of his own day and age. From the time of Henry VIII, clerical education was to some degree defined and conditioned by the decrees of the secular State; subscription to the Thirty-nine Articles of the Church of England was first demanded and continually imposed at least as much for reasons of State as for the demands of dogmatic clarity and consistency; the question of Church-State relations greatly agitated Jenkyns' own time, and the founding of the University of Durham was very much motivated by the frequently conflicting and always interrelated powers and interests of these two centers of authority.

This chapter is concerned chiefly with the historical background to the founding of Durham University. The first three sections of the chapter discuss the state of clerical education in England before the establishment of Durham, the political circumstances which prevailed at the time of the University's founding, and the possible effect of Oxford Movement theology on the theology taught at Durham. It is the intention of the discussion to shed some light on the historical events which may have contributed to the character of Durham's theological program. The fourth and fifth sections describe the specific program in theology which arose in this historical setting and the nature of the historical documents which remain to give testimony to that program as it was exemplified in the teachings of Henry Jenkyns. The final section of the chapter discusses Jenkyns' introduction to the Thirty-nine Articles. In his prolegomenon, Jenkyns was primarily concerned, in a broad sense, with questions of theological method: He defines the Articles as a confessional document, discusses the history of subscription, and describes the procedure by which he intends to examine each article.

Clerical education in England from the Reformation to the founding of Durham University.

One of the responses to the Reformation, both in the English and in the Roman Communions, was a desire to produce a better educated clergy. Some of the revenue accrued to the Crown as a result of the Dissolution of the Monasteries (1536 and 1539) was evidently intended to contribute to the founding of educational institutions. In 1539, an Act of Parliament (31 Henry VIII, c.9) gave the king the power to nominate and to endow additional bishoprics. The wording of the Act suggests that the new institutions should provide a Christian education, especially for the support and education of the clergy.[1] It had been Cranmer's intention that every cathedral would become a nursery for young divines; it was in the king's interest that all of the people should be of the same, reformed faith: 31 Henry VIII, c.9, supported a design that placed the tutelage of aspiring clergy under the immediate supervision of the bishops, deans and chapters.[2]

In the latter half of the sixteenth century, various further attempts were made to specify the necessary requirements for ordination to the priesthood and to define the conditions under which the clergy were to be educated. The Preface to the 1549 Ordinal stipulated that bishops were to examine ordinands. Only those candidates who demonstrated competence in Latin and sufficient knowledge of the scriptures were to be admitted to the deaconate. Following, however, the vicissitudes of Queen Mary's reign, the ranks of the clergy remaining to the Elizabethan Church had been seriously depleted. The bishops in consequence began to ordain as many candidates as possible as quickly as possible, only to realize as early as 1560 that they had been too indiscriminate: many of the precipitantly ordained clergy provided just cause for scandal in the Church and complaint among the people. The unauthorized Reformatio Legum Ecclesiasticarum (1571) provided that each bishop should be surrounded by a body of men to whom he should teach Holy Scripture and whom he should prepare to instruct the members of his household. The Legum also set forth

rules for the establishment of schools under the supervision of cathedral deans and chapters. Little was done, however, to implement these schemes until the nineteenth century. The regulations for ordinations were strengthened by 1573, and careful rules were made at the Synod of 1575. Unfortunately, exceptions to these rules governing the qualifications for ordination were permissable: where benefices were small, bishops were at liberty to ordain less qualified men--the best that were available in necessity. Canons 34 and 35 of 1604 make it clear that ordinands are required to be of a reasonable maturity and of sufficient intellect. In short, the strict examination of candidates for the priesthood was always intended in the Church of England, and that examination was intended to establish that each candidate who was admitted to ordination was sufficiently educated; however, little was done to specify the limits and nature of an ordinands education, and nothing was done to make uniform the standards of excellency demanded by the various ordaining bishops.

In fact, there was little provision for the education of ordinands and for their preparation for examination. Some notable attempts were made through the centuries by bishops to provide seminary training on a limited basis, but these provisions were made almost without exception for those who were already ordained to the ministry. There were virtually no facilities (apart from private study) for the education of the clergy outside the unversities of Oxford and Cambridge, and, although these universities were meant to be 'nurseries unto the Church of Christ',[3] they provided little or no professional training.

One must remember that a degree from either university was sufficient qualification for a candidate to present himself to a bishop for ordination. The educational situation at Oxford prior to the Reforming Act of 1854 was chaotic. The old system was a scandal: examinations were a trumped up formality.[4] They were improved by the Statute of 1800, and the changes made in it of 1807 and 1832 introduced and finally established the Honours system. But most of the professorial chairs lay outside the course of the schools,

and the lectures given by those who held them were rarely attended by the undergraduates; thus, a graduate was prepared (to the extent that he was exposed to study at all) exclusively by the course of the schools. The program for all undergraduates included only the rudiments of religion--the Gospels in Greek, Old and New Testament History, the Thirty-nine Articles (to which students were required to subscribe on going up to Oxford and on taking degrees at Cambridge), and Paley's Evidences. After the turn of the century, particularly at Cambridge, efforts were made to improve the professional preparation of ordinands by the introduction of lectures on the part of professors of divinity. Unfortunately, even when attendance was required at these lectures, attention frequently could not be commanded; and the giving of certificates which attested to attendance at lectures was often perfunctory in the extreme.[5] Finally, one must recognize that many parochial ministers never had the opportunity of a university education.

The examination of candidates for Holy Orders in the latter seventeenth and throughout the eighteenth centuries was often perfunctory and utterly inadequate, but this was not always the case. The rising education of the laity made the elevation of the educational level of the clergy essential. In the eighteenth century numerous voices rose to plead for correction.[6] The issue of uniformity of preparation and standards remained acute for questions of validity in the teachings of individual clergymen. This situation could only be underlined by factions among the clergy. In the first half of the nineteenth century, the 'clerical age of England' which was paradoxically shot through with anticlerical cynicism,[7] conflicts between Tractarians, Low-Church, and Liberal churchmen bred marked unease among the laity about the integrity of their clergy.[8] At least one coherent expression of the pervading and generalized sense of the need to remedy the neglects of theological education came from the Oxford Movement, itself one of the causes for disquiet among many churchmen in England. The Oxford Movement made plans to establish diocesan theological colleges.[9] Other groups within the Church responded in a similar manner: the establishment of St Bee's

in Northumberland (1816) and of St.David's, Lampeter (1804) was no doubt such a response. To a very real extent, the founding of Durham University may be seen in the same light.

Durham had a long history of concern for clerical education.[10] The department of theology in the University was the first formal department of theology in any university in England. It was evidently Van Mildert's hope and intention that Durham would provide a program of theological education for all the ordinands in England: that is to say, it was hoped that graduates from Oxford and Cambridge would come to Durham to gain more professional training for the ministry. Certainly the bishop hoped to obtain the endorsement of all other bishops in the Church of England for the theological program and to gain their guarantee that they would accept the Durham License in Theology as sufficient qualification for ordination when presented by any candidate to the bishops in various dioceses. On the other hand, the foundation of Durham University was also motivated by political, rather than theological, concerns. It was also a response on the part of religious orthodoxy to growing political pressures of the State which seemed to threaten encroachment on the Church herself.

Some political factors which contributed to the founding of the University.

It must be remembered that political and religious affairs were hopelessly intertwined and mutually complex in this period. Because Durham was traditionally a High Church diocese and her clergy, at least, constituted a Tory stronghold, there were three issues of prime importance in the political sphere which bred the founding of Durham University: Catholic emancipation, the reform of Parliament, and the creation of the Ecclesiastical Commission. Furthermore, these issues to some degree determined the character of the University and the theology taught there, because the philosophy which guided the founders as they framed the program of the University was very much a response to the political pressures of the day.

The Catholic Emancipation Acts of 1778, 1791, and 1793 and the Roman Catholic Relief Act of 1829 removed Catholics

from almost all religious and political disabilities and admitted them to most public offices. Among the unrepealed restrictions, many of which were a dead letter, were the prohibition of public religious celebrations and the validity of marriage before a Roman priest. As a result, English Roman Catholics became a more visible and respectable element in the English population; through the lawful establishment of native sees, Roman Catholics gained the status of a recognized body of Christendom in England for the first time since the Reformation. They, therefore, became a body with whom the Church and the politicians must reckon. The government was Tory in 1829, and headed by Peel. Although most Tories were essentially opposed to the Act, Peel favoured it because he felt it was politically necessary. The Bill was passed because the government feared Irish revolution were it not passed.

The clergy of the Church of England were, at least in the upper eschelons, Tories, and the Tory party was largely the party of the economically privileged, the socially conservative, and the religiously orthodox. This association added fuel to the already existing fires of anticlericalism which burned for various reasons and to some extent at all levels of English society. Because the clergy were associated with the Tories, they were rightly or wrongly tarred with the same brush by the emergent forces for democracy which were cresting the current political tide under the Whig banner. The Whigs championed the Catholic Relief Act as a move toward a more democratic government, that is, one less in the control of the privileged classes. While many Anglican clergy held moderate views on the question, most of those favoured emancipation as a matter of political expediency rather than of political or religious principle: in the event, twenty bishops voted against the Bill in the House of Lords.[11] Van Mildert, who was a bastion of High Church, privileged, Toryism and who headed one of the dioceses seen most to exemplify the abuses of clericalism and privilege, was vehemently opposed to Catholic emancipation. The negative vote of the bench of Bishops was taken to be but one more indication that the Church

favoured the privileged and disdained the common folk: the anticlerical fires were fed by yet another branch.

The Reform Bill of 1832 broadened the franchise and created a much more democratically representative Parliament. When it was first read in the House of Lords in October 1831, twenty bishops and Archbishop Howley voted against it. Popular rage broke over the House, but it was especially directed at the bishops. Some of them were mobbed in the strees or burned in effigy. Hatred of bishops was even reflected in the occasional horror of parsons. Despite the fact that the Bill finally passed the House of Lords on 15 May 1832 with the support of most of the bishpos, popular resentment against the clergy of the Church of England remained unabated.

Catholic emancipation and the reform of Parliament threatened the Church on two counts. Emancipation admitted Roman Catholics to public office; Dissenters, Unitarians and other non-Anglicans, and individuals of no religious persuasion at all were also able to hold public office. Popular representation in Parliament threatened the integrity of the Church of England precisely because it is an established church: it meant that 'Irish members of the House of Commons were elected by Roman Catholics, the Scottish members by Presbyterians, many English members by dissenters'.[13] Because of the union of Church and State under the head of the secular government, popular representation in Parliament meant that non-Anglican legislators were in a position to determine the organization, doctrine, and economics of the Church of England and her related organs.[14] Chief among the concerns of the Anglican churchmen was the fear that a reformed Parliament of the non-privileged (and/or non-Anglican) classes would pillage the Established Church's institutions by dispersing their revenues. The creation of the Ecclesiastical Commission by the Whigs seemed to do just that.

The Whig government of 1835, though headed by the Tory Peel (recalled by William out of the King's desire to protect the Church), was committed to reform of the Church. Amid the pressing demands for democratic government and, at

least so the populace thought, a landlord grown fat on the revenues drawn from the labour of the common man. The Ecclesiastical Commission of 1836 was established 'to review the state of crown patronage and bishop's patronage' and 'to provide for the efficient discharge of the pastoral duties of the Church'.[15] One of the ways the Commission affected 'the effeicient discharge' of those duties was to redistribute Church monies, especially those of Cathedral revenues. It was this Commission which reformed the Chapter of Durham Cathedral and which finally established and organized the revenues supporting the University.

To Van Mildert, Bishop of Durham, and to the Dean and Chapter, it seemed that the diocese of Durham would be among the first to be attacked and stripped of its incomes by the reforms of the Ecclesiastical Commission. Durham, with its so-called 'golden stalls' appeared to be a rich and decadent ecclesiastical plumb. It was notorious for three reasons:[16] (1) Because of the rents Durham collected on leases on lands and mineral deposits, the Chapter expropriated large sums of money from citizens involved in the mining of coal. (2) Its clergy were chief among the exponents of pluralism and absenteeism: every holder of a stall, with the exception of the first and twelfth, held at least one other benefice. (3) The clergy continually drew attention to themselves through political posturing: the "Peterloo Massacre' produced a pamphlet war in the county; the Durham Libel Case brought odium on all concerned. The idea of founding a university at Durham with diocesan funds emerged as a way of countering these causes for popular scorn and, ultimately, for garnering to the see some of the funds of which the Ecclesiastical Commission might seek to rob it. The following excerpt from a letter written by Archdeacon Thorp and Canon Durell bears out this contention:[17]

> It appears to be morally certain that as soon as the Reform Bill is disposed of, an attack will be made on dean and chapters, and as certain that Durham will be the first object. It has occurred to us that it will be prudent if possible to

> ward off the blow, and that no plan is so likely to take as making the public partakers of our income by annexing an establishment of enlarged education to our college.

To sum up then, Catholic emancipation and the Reform Bill resulted in a radical alteration of Parliament. Whereas it had previously been the organ of a government which favoured the aristocracy, it became a body which was more responsive to the popular voice. An aristocratically directed secular government had been seen to be more in the interest of the Established Church because the interests of the privileged and of the ecclesiastical were seen to coincide. A democratically controlled government was seen to pose a threat to the Church: such a Parliament was constituted of other than Anglican legislators who could dictate the policies of the Church of England to the detriment of that Church; it gave direct representation to the non-monied classes and could be expected to attack the wealthy institutions of the privileged classes, the Church looming large among the latter. The reform of Parliament, furthermore, and the victory of the Whigs resulted directly in the creation of the Ecclesiastical Commission. The University of Durham was founded under the guidance of Bishop Van Mildert and at the instigation of the Dean and Chapter of the Cathedral in direct response to the pressures created by religious emancipation, social reform, and politically determined ecclesiastical reform. The creation of the University was meant to mitigate popular scorn for the Established Church, to help nullify the charges of anticlericalism by contributing to a better educated clergy and by offering the opportunity of a university education to members of the less privileged classes, and to protect Church funds from popular despolation.

It is furthermore evident that the theology to be taught at the University was designed to combat the ill effects of the reforms in Church and State. The professors invited or called to the new university came from that High Church Orthodox Party that believed itself under attack in the political, social, and ecclesiastical movements of the time. Dissenters were barred from taking degrees. The

founders of the University and the theology they espoused, as shall be seen from an examination of the teachings of Henry Jenkyns, supported an established Church in an age that clamoured for disestablishment.

The theology at Durham as a counter to the theology of the Oxford Movement.

Finally, a word must be said concerning one more probable influence on the character of the theology taught at Durham. Beyond the contemporary issues of a specifically political sort and at the level of religious sentiment, the quality of the theology at Durham was at least indirectly determined by the Oxford Movement and the responses of and to the Tractarians: The disestablishment attitudes of some of those in the Oxford Movement certainly carried political overtones for the Church of England, and the consistently establishment character of Jenkyns' teachings may be seen as a response to this aspect of Tractarianism. In addition, the neo-Romanism which became the signature of many Tractarians gave aid and comfort to English Roman Catholics and encouraged the 'papal aggression' of the period.[19] The rising tide of Roman Catholicism, coupled with the political emancipation of Roman Catholics in England, certainly contributed to the political as well as religious unease of Orthodox High Churchmen. Again, the foundation of Durham and the character of its theological teaching mirrored these threats.

While it might not have been the specific intention of Van Mildert and his advisors to combat those issues which came to be central to the views of the more extreme Tractarians, the theological teaching which developed at Durham (as shall be seen) provided such a check.

It is impossible to determine the extent to which Jenkyns' theology matched Van Mildert's design for Durham. One must note that Hugh James Rose, not Henry Jenkyns, was the bishop's first choice for the Durham chair in theology. And Rose was a reactionary churchman who espoused several of the principles that Henry rejected: episcopacy as a necessary requisite for the Church; a narrowly defined subscription to the Articles of Religion; an absolute rejection of

liberalizing tendencies in theology; and establishment, if that meant that the Church was subject to the State in questions touching doctrine and spirituality. On the surface, Van Mildert's ideas in these areas would appear to have been more in accord with those of Rose rather than of Jenkyns. On the other hand, Rose was a controversialist who desired to draw up the lines of battle for High Churchmen; Van Mildert was a dedicated moderate who rejected the extremes of enthusiasm and who shunned contorversial debate. Van Mildert had the opportunity to experience the personalities and to compare the principles and effects of Rose and Jenkyns for a year before Jenkyns took Rose's place in the theology chair: Perhaps his choice of Jenkyns, a man of moderate orthodoxy, to replace the radical Rose was merely fortuitous; but it might have been by design. At any rate, Van Mildert's choice possessed wisdom, and it was certainly fortunate for Durham.

Having considered the historical circ mstances in which the University of Durham was founded and by which its theological program was in some degree shaped, we turn to a description of that program. For the most part, it is the License in Theology which is described below. This chapter then concludes with a description of the sources of information on Jenkyns' lectures on the Thirty-nine Articles of the Church of England. It is the corpus of these lectures which forms the heart of this study of Jenkyns' theological teachings.

The Durham License in Theology.

Apparently it was Rose who designed the course of study for theology at the University of Durham--the License in Theology--and, in principle, it was a two-year program. In an office copy of a letter from Thorp to Van Mildert,[20] is found what was evidently Rose's design: There were to be students of three descriptions: (1) Oxford and Cambridge B.A.s, who were allowed--with suitable stipulations--to complete the course in one year;[21] (2) Durham B.A.s; (3) Persons of upwards of twenty-one years of age, who were admitted as Divinity Students, and who were able to pass the

M.A. examination (i.e., persons without previous, formal university education).[22] In classes (1) and (2) the status of B.A. was taken as assurance that the ground work of a professional education had been laid by a liberal education of a general kind. To assure the same ground work in students in class (3), the university would admit only candidates who had been examined by the Professors before the Chapter. This examination related to the grammatical knowledge of Greek and Latin; to the elements of mathematics; and to the elementary divinity required for the B.A. at Oxford and Cambridge, including a knowledge of the Synoptic Gospels. This examination was to be the main point: no one was to be admitted who could not satisfy the Dean and Chapter after having been examined by the Professors.

Students in classes (2) and (3) were required to attend lectures for two years; the course for students in this class was extended to three years in 1841-46.[23] At a rate of two lectures per day, the students completed an outline course in Church history, the Articles, the liturgy, discipline and constitutions of the Church, duties of ministry, and the criticism and interpretation of scripture. The lectures in criticism and interpretation were delivered by the Greek Professor (i.e., Jenkyns). The students were also 'worked through a large portion of the Epistles'. They were to be examined at the end of each year.

Students of class (1), some of whom were able to remain at the University only one year, were required to attend lectures on the Articles, discipline, liturgy, the duties of ministry, and the Epistles. These students were to be examined before they were awarded a certificate.

Another document in the Thorp Papers[24] adds the following details, which presumably reflect the earliest designs of the divinity program:[25] Students were also to attend Sunday evening lectures, given in the Michaelmas and Epiphany Terms by the Professor of Theology. They were to make notes of these lectures after hearing them, and these notes were to be handed in weekly to the tutor.[26] Divinity students were to be examined before the college each term. At the public examination each year at the end

of the Easter Term, the Divinity Professor (or his representative) was always to be one of the examiners. Those students who did not take both classics and mathematics for the M.A., those who had passed the M.A. examination, and those who were B.A.s of Oxford or Cambridge were all also to attend a Hebrew lecture.

There is an undated document[27] which is evidently in the hand of Chevallier and which seems to be a very early statement of the University statutes and requirements for the various degrees to be earned at Durham. It is interesting to note in the following extract the emphasis that is placed on examination. It seems clear that, in contradistinction to the examination policy previously followed in the universities, Durham intended its examinations to be a real test of the students' abilities.

> No one shall receive a certificate of having passed this examination [for the B.A., students in statu pupillari] unless he appears to the examiners to possess a competent knowledge of the History recorded in the Old Testament, of the Evidences of Christianity, of the Four Gospels, and the Acts of the Apostles in the Greek, and of the Doctrines of Christianity as expressed in the 39 Articles of the Church of England. . . .
>
> Divinity Students not being B.A. of Oxford or Cambridge shall be subjected to the examination for the degree of M.A. according to the above regulations.
>
> The time for their passing it shall be at the end of their first year.
>
> They shall also at the end of their first year be publicly examined in the subjects of their Theological studies.
>
> They shall finally be examined as to their proficiency in Theology at the end of the second year.
>
> They shall be examined at these Theological examinations in the subjects of their lectures, and in such other theological learning as the examiners

think fit.

> They shall not be admitted to the final examination unless they produce certificates of having passed the M.A. and the first Theological examination.
>
> They shall not receive Certificates of having completed the Theological Course, until they have passed this final examination.
>
> B.A.s of Oxford and Cambridge shall be admitted to this final examination at the end of one year, and without passing the examination of M.A. . . .
>
> The Examiners in all cases to be nominated by the Warden, and approved by the Senate and the convocation.

Henry Jenkyns, Professor of Classical Greek, assisted by Chevallier, Professor of Mathematics, assumed the duties of the Divinity Professor in 1835; apparently he also assumed Rose's basic outline for the work to be done. Jenkyns did not anticipate any difficulties about the duties of the Divinity Professor, because he believed it to be understood that the nature of the Sunday lectures would be left entirely to his discretion; that he would have the assistance of a tutor; that he should not have charge of the discipline of the students; thus, that he would give the prescribed lectures but would not be responsible for the proficiency or the conduct of individuals. He also assumed that his lectures would be 'as nearly as possible in conformity to the plan submitted by Rose' to Bishop Van Mildert.[28] Jenkyns carried on in this ad hoc fashion until 1839, when the third stall of the Cathedral--which had been appointed to the divinity chair--fell vacant. He then resigned the Greek professorship (the duties of which had been entirely the responsibility of Chevallier after 1836) and became the Professor of Divinity, a position he held until his retirement in 1864. During this period there was little systematic teaching of theology at Oxford and Cambridge; thus, Jenkyns received a steady stream of students from the older universities.[29]

The full cycle of Jenkyns' lectures extended over the two-year period of the License: in one year he treated church history; in the other, dogmatic theology. In the first year lectures, he dealt with ecclesiastical history, chiefly Eusebius;[30] the history of the general councils; the rise and fall of papal power; monastic orders; and the history of the Church of England, especially during the Reformation. The lectures on the councils, papal power, and monastic orders were meant to bridge the gap between Eusebius and the rise of the English Church.[31] The second-year lectures treated the Thirty-nine Articles, ancient liturgies, and the Book of Common Prayer. Lectures on liturgiology were common to the teaching of the time, but Jenkyns introduced the subject in order that his pupils might better understand the Book of Common Prayer.[32] These lectures drew upon the work of Cardinal Bona, a seventeenth-century Roman liturgiologist who numbers among the founders of modern liturgical studies.[33] Jenkyns also looked over a portion of the English composition exercises (the number of essays each week not exceeding 12) required of the theology students. Lectures on the criticism and interpretation of the New Testament 'had originally been assigned to the Greek Professor, but were now undertaken by the Divinity Professor [i.e., upon Jenkyns' becoming, in practise, that professor], provision being made for a change in this respect, if thought advisable'.[34] Jenkyns lectured on one quarter of the epistles in each year, so that, in two years, every student would have heard lectures on half of the epistles.[35]

> In 1840 or 41, it was suggested that it would be for the advantage of the Divinity Students to attend, besides the lectures of the Divinity Professor on the Epistles, an additional Lecture on some of them by one of the Tutors, so as during the two year course to read in lecture the <u>whole</u> of the Epistles instead of half: and it was suggested also, that a portion of the fees placed by the Professor at the disposal of the Senate, might be applied to the payment of the Tutor who undertook the Lecture.[36]

This proceedure was, in due course, implemented. Fowler says[37] that Jenkyns also 'always gave instruction in the composition of Sermons'. Perhaps he had reference to the same process described by Jenkyns thus:

> On Friday each week after lectures, having read the exercises previously, he selected the best for recitation before the class and for being sent in to the Warden; he criticised the whole, and set a subject for the following week.[38]

Jenkyns' lectures on the Prayer Book, Farrar (Jenkyns' successor) tells us, at the time represented 'the newest and most original of Dr. Jenkyns' courses. We know that it was the one on which he especially prided himself'.[39] The lectures were constituted by a history of the forms of prayer and service books from the earliest days of Christianity to the present. They covered the liturgy of the Greek Church, the Ordinary and Canon of the Roman Mass, and, finally, the Book of Common Prayer. Jenkyns gave such a treatment 'not only from the wish to develop the historic basis of the English Prayer Book, but to exhibit in these earlier service books, and eminently in the Roman Mass, the proofs, as he considered, of the abuses of those medieval and modern forms of doctrine on the Eucharist which are emphasized by that Church'.[40]

In the Thorp Papers[41] there is Jenkyns' own description of his duties as professor of theology: He was obliged to deliver one public lecture a year and eight Sunday evening lectures in each Michaelmas and Epiphany term.[42] These latter lectures were open to all students and were required for the students of divinity; they were also open to any other members of the University with the Warden's permission.

Throughout the year, Jenkyns lectured two times weekly on the 'Apostolic Epistles' and five times weekly on such other subjects as were arranged. These lectures were open to all divinity students 'specifically so-called'. The course of study for the divinity students was arranged in this way: In the first year, students attended lectures on

the Thirty-nine Articles for five days a week during the Michaelmas and Epiphany terms; lectures on the liturgy for five days in the week in the Easter term. In the second year, they attended lectures on the ecclesiastical history of the first three centuries and of the Church of England for five days in the week throughout the year. In both years students attended two lectures weekly throughout the year on the epistles.

All of the foregoing makes it obvious what was new in the teaching of theology as it was developed at the University of Durham: It was clearly intended that the students were to be systematically prepared for Holy Orders. It is equally clear, furthermore, that their preparation was to have direct and continuous ecclesiastical supervision. In the department of theology at Durham, one sees at long last the explicit fulfilment of Cranmer's ideals: that the cathedral become a nursery for young divines under the supervision of Bishop, Dean, and Chapter. It is also evident that his ideal of supervision by the Chapter continued at least until 1851. The Thorp Corresopndence contains an essay by a student, J. F. Turner (later Bishop of Grafton and Armidale) which was evidently submitted as an example to the Warden, then Archdeacon, Charles Thorp.[43] Since the topic discussed in the essay is the Prayer Book, it seems likely that it is Turner's notes, which were written up after a Sunday evening lecture; but the essay may as well be an example of one of the assigned student compositions.

In point of fact, the term 'department of theology' is distinctly anachronistic, and the achievement of Jenkyns in the early years is even more impressive when that fact is realized. There was not a 'department'--there was a series of lectures, all of them given by the Professor, and a single tutor to assist him in reading papers. A list of the subjects which were examined for students in the License for Theology in the years 1839, 1840, 1841, and 1844[44] makes the full extent of Jenkyns' repertoire staggeringly clear:

Theological Subjects
Liturgy and Articles of the Church of England
Interpretation of the New Testament

Ecclesiastical History of the First Three Centuries and the Reformation in England
Criticism of the New Testament
History of the Church of England (1841)
Paley's Evidences (1841)
Scripture History (1841)
Butler's Analogy and Sermons (1844)

Bible
Acts of the Apostles
Epistles: Galations; Ephesians; Colossians; James; I and II Corinthians. 1839--Timothy; Titus; Hebrews. 1841--Thessalonians; Philippians; I and II Peter; I, II, and III John; Jude. 1844--Romans
Gospels: St John, St Mark (1839), St Luke (1841), St Matthew (1844)

The Sunday lectures given by Jenkyns in the first six years are listed as:[45]

Gospel of St Matthew (1833-34)
Part of the History of the Pentateuch (1834-35)
Liturgy of the Church of England (1835-36)
Church Catechism (1836-37)
The Communion Service (1837-38)
The Occasional Offices of the Church of England (1838-39)[46]

Farrar says of Jenkyns that he had a 'reputation for learning and power of teaching then unequalled in England, and worthy to be compared with the great Professors of Germany'.[47] His lectures were characterized by clarity and conciseness.[48] His fellow Canon, Dr Townsend, is reputed to have said of him that he was 'cold as ice, clear as ice, and hard as ice'.[49] 'He taught his scholars to take nothing for granted, but to make sure of everything from good authority'.[50] Farrar tells us that Jenkyns' lectures were notable for their fulness of information, especially with regard to liturgical matters, at a time when a modern series of works on the subject had not yet appeared.[51] Jenkyns' method of teaching was Socratic: he first stated

the difficulty and then set about supplying and criticizing the possible answers to it. He is reputed to have demonstrated a complete memory and mastery of the material bearing on the question in hand. Owing to his power of cool self-command, Jenkyns never allowed himself to be diverted from an issue by rhetoric or emotion.[52]

Jenkyns was 'too busy' during his professional career to publish, and he rufused to permit any of the notes from his lectures to be published. Farrar states that, when Jenkyns thought that someone was about to publish notes from his lectures, he made inquiries of Farrar about what legal action could be taken to prevent such publication.[53] This makes the contemporary student of Henry Jenkyns' teachings entirely dependent on the notes taken by students who attended his lectures.

A description of the sources of this study.

Specifically, it is Jenkyns' teachings on the Thirty-nine Articles of the Church of England which are the subject of this study. The articles 'formed the text-book of the system of theology which Dr. Jenkyns expounded to his pupils',[54] and the present research is based on two sets of student lecture notes. These notes are in manuscript and are presently the property of the University of Durham Library. One set of notes is comprised of those taken by John Low Low (Vicar of Whittonstall), a student at Durham who sat Jenkyns' lectures on the Articles during the Epiphany and Easter terms, 1844. The second set comprehends those notes of O. Pickard-Cambridge, who sat the lectures during the Epiphany and Easter terms, 1856. Inasmuch as Jenkyns refused to publish any of his lectures, or to have them published, these sets of manuscripts are the only source of his teaching which is presently available. Clearly, the question arises: How true to and representative of Jenkyns' teaching is the record thereof which remains to us only in the form of student lecture notes? For the most part in this instance, the answer seems to be that the notes represent substantially the actual thoughts of Jenkyns, at least as he expressed himself to his students. This conclusion is based on the following

considerations:

1. The notes of Low Low were the first set to become the property of the University.[55] They were purchased for the Library from the estate of Mr Low.[56] Farrar was a contemporary of Henry Jenkyns and he himself held the Chair of Divinity at Durham subsequent to Jenkyns' tenure. Farrar attests to the accuracy of Low's notes in very strong terms:[57]

> As Mr. Low was both an attentive and intelligent student, the notes seem to be (approximately speaking) a trustworthy record of Dr. Jenkyns' teaching, and the more so as Mr. Low wrote down only what he heard, and did not attempt to intermingle with the report of the lectures material which he had in his own reading collected from other sources.

Farrar was interested in compiling a history of the lectures in Divinity given at Durham during the years 1833-1888; indeed, he evidently wrote up such a history in a manuscript quarto which is now, unfortunately, lost.[58] In 1888, being desirous of obtaining a complete set of notes on all the lecture courses given by Henry Jenkyns, Farrar sent a circular letter to the chief of Dr Jenkyns' former pupils. This letter, subsequently printed in an appendix to Fowler's history of Durham University,[59] asked these students to lend 'for the purpose of being copied, full notes of any of those courses'--that is, any of those lectures not covered in the notes of Low: on 'the Epistles; on Bible Criticism; on the Interpretation of the N.T.; and the lectures delivered on Sundays at 5 p.m.'. It is evidently through response to this letter that the University acquired the lecture notes of the Rev. O. Pickard-Cambridge[60] and transcriptions of those of Mr R. Glover.[61]

2. The notes of Pickard-Cambridge on the Thirty-nine Articles were given to the University by provision of his will.[62] These notes (as well as those of R. Glover) were solicited by Farrar and were apparently accepted by him for the Library only after he had examined them for accuracy and content.[63] Pickard-Cambridge included a letter with

the notebooks when they were given to the Library, which he intended 'should in some way be attached to the volumes of notes now presented to the University Library as a guide to anyone who for one purpose or another may ever look into them as "the Record" they profess to be'. In this letter he describes his student circumstances vis-á-vis the lectures of Henry Jenkyns and attest the quality of witness borne by his notes to Jenkyns' presentation of the material in the actual lectures:

> I was in residence in Univ. Coll. from January 1855 to July 1858 (almost four academical years)--This gave me the opportunity of attending, I believe, the whole of Dr. J's course of Lectures, and some parts of it twice. When this last was so, the notes of the second attendance are in pencil on the opposite sides of the pages. I would here remark also, that the 'notes' are, I believe, strictly and fairly accurately a record of what Dr. Jenkyns said; where anything is not so it is initialed (O.P.C.) by me in pencil or other wise--The 'Notes' on Dr. Jenkyns Lectures (at which I was not present) during the October Term of 1854 . . . are copied from notes of these Lectures, by the late Rev. J. F. Montgomery, Dean of Edinburgh, kindly lent to me by him (and I believe are so headed in my notes, in loco). I would also remark that whenever it was possible the notes actually made in the Lecture Room were copied out fully and carefully, generally the same evening; when this was not practicable the notes are exactly as taken down at the Lecture, and of course are subject to the abbreviations and imperfect writing, though quite intelligible to myself.[64]

It is the Pickard-Cambridge text which is usually quoted in this study[65] because the handwriting of this manuscript is clearer than that of the Low manuscript. Nonetheless, the Low manuscript has been examined and compared with the Pickard-Cambridge text.

3. These two sets of notes taken by two separate people at an interval of twelve years are materially the same: on occasion the ordering of data varies, but the substance of the treatment for each Article remains the same. Such substantial agreement between these two diverse records suggests that they are each in equal part true and accurate representations of that which they are meant to record.

In sum, Farrar bears witness to the accuracy of Low's notes on Jenkyns' lectures; Pickard-Cambridge attests the accuracy of his own notes (and they were evidently examined by Farrar as well); and the notes of Low and Pickard-Cambridge agree. These three considerations make it possible to accept these student records of Jenkyns' lectures as a substantially accurate, although abbreviated, record of Jenkyns' teachings.

Jenkyns' theological method: an introduction to the Articles.

In his prolegomena to the Thirty-nine Articles, Jenkyns is largely concerned with questions of method, including definition. He begins by defining the Thirty-nine Articles as a confessional document and by specifying the function of all confessional documents. He situates the Articles in their historical and theological context vis-á-vis the Church of England at the Reformation and in the nineteenth century. He analyzes the nature, function, and limitations of subscription and provides a justification for the union of Church and State in deciding controversial questions of subscription. Finally, he describes the method by which he will analyze each individual article.

1. History of the Articles (pp. 1-12). The Thirty-nine Articles constitute the English Church's confession of faith (p. 1). Confessions of faith arise out of differences in religions, and they intended to delimit these differences: they may point out differences among sects within the same religion; or they may define orthodox, as opposed to heretical, doctrine (e.g., the Confession of Nicea). Confessions serve three chief functions within (i.e., toward the faithful) and without the church (i.e., toward non-believers) (p. 2): (1) They preserve unity within the communion; (2) they are

tests of orthodoxy; and (3) they make a statement of faith to the heathen. The Anglican confession, the Articles, was so formulated out of the divisive differences of religious opinions prevalent at the time of the Reformation.

The Thirty-nine Articles served two purposes for the Reformed Church of England: (1) At the time that the Church of England established (or re-established) her independence 'by throwing off the yoke of Rome', it might have been considered that she simultaneously 'cast off Christianity itself, the supremacy of Rome and Christian Doctrines being so almost necessarily connected in the public mind, and hence the necessity of declaring her still adherence [sic] to Christianity although Rome had been shaken off' (p. 3). In short, the Articles declared broadly that the Church of England remained a Christian church, though she was no longer a Roman church. (2) The Articles also sought 'to give some account and judgement of the controversies then racking Christendom' (p. 3). In other words, narrowly speaking, the Articles are an attempt to define the nature of that non-Roman, but still catholic, Christianity exposed by the Church of England.

This second purpose was by far the more difficult to achieve since each divine had different opinions on the nature of the departure from the doctrines of Rome which should be pursued in the Reformation. Henry VIII vascillated between the Old and the New Learning, 'hoping to reap worldly advantage from [the] subversion [of the Old Learning], though in his heart he rather adhered to its errors' (p. 3). The three confessions of Henry's reign represent a compromise between the ancient abuses and the tenets of the Reformers. These confessions Jenkyns lists (p. 4) as (1) the Ten Articles of 1536 (inclining toward the Old Learning), (2) The Institutions of the Christian Man, 1537 (inclining more toward Reformed doctrines), and (3) The Necessary Instruction and Erudition of the Christian Man, 1543 (being a regression to the doctrines of Rome). These three documents were all 'published by authority'; two other documents published, but not both by authority, in the reign are also discussed: the Thirteen Articles of 1538 (never officially

imposed or circulated, therefore, not published by authority) and the Six Articles of 1539. All of these documents, except the Six Articles (which constituted a reactionary return to popery--p. 5), contain essentially two structural parts: first, a statement of the main doctrines and fundamental articles of faith; secondly, a list of the abuses of doctrine (Roman or Reform) to be denied.

The introductory lectures continue with a brief summary of the history of the Forty-two Articles of Edward VI (1553) and the Eleven Articles of 1559, arriving at the composition of the Thirty-nine Articles of 1562-63, which were prepared under the direction of Parker, Archbishop of Canterbury. Jenkyns comments that the authenticity of some of the Articles (viz., the first clause of Art. XX and the whole of Art. XXIX) has been questioned, a problem exacerbated by the fact that the records of the Second Convocation of Elizabeth's reign (1562-3) were destroyed in the Great Fire of London in 1666.[66] A further problem with the interpretation of the Articles derives from the fact that they were composed, in various extant editions, sometimes in Latin and sometimes in English. Jenkyns asserts that both the Latin and the English were clearly intended to say the same thing and that, in considering any doubtful point, that version which is clearest is to be taken as authoritative (p. 10).[67] In the course of this general history, Jenkyns touches on the early history of subscription to the Articles. Speaking with regard to the Forty-two of Edward VI, he comments that Cranmer claimed none were to be compelled to subscribe, although Jenkyns feels that compulsory subscription was ultimately intended by the framers of those articles (p. 7). With regard to the Elizabethan Articles, Jenkyns suggests that subscription was evidently not compulsory until an Act of Parliament in 1571 (13 Eliz. c. 12) made it so.[68] This Act was passed at the instigation of the Puritans (later, non-conformists) and was directed at the Romanist party: 'Subscription was only now compulsory on the clergy, and on them only with respect to those Articles which embraceth fundamental doctrines of the Christian faith--for the Puritians would gladly themselves

have got rid of those relating to Church Government' (p. 8).[69] Unfortunately nothing within the Articles themselves indicates which of them were considered by the architects of subscription to embrace 'fundamental doctrines of the Christian faith', nor does Jenkyns at any point clearly distinguish between those articles which are fundamentally binding for subscription and those which are not.[70] This is, of course, precisely the question which has bedevilled the clergy of the Church of England ever since subscription to the Articles was imposed on them.

It is important to note that Jenkyns is implying that episcopacy is not--or at least was not at the time of the Reformation in England--a central doctrine, a 'matter of faith' for the Church of England. This is especially interesting in light of the centrality of the theological doctrine of apostolic succession in the teachings of the Tractarians. While Jenkyns certainly upholds episcopacy, he also makes it clear that the succession cannot be <u>proved</u> from the time of the Apostles, nor can it be shown from scripture that episcopacy was instituted and uniformly demanded by the Apostles in the early Church (see below, discussions of Art. XXXVI, Chapter IV).

Given that the general purpose of the Articles was (1) to establish the fact that the Church of England, despite her rejection of Roman supremacy, remained a <u>Christian</u> and catholic Church and (2) to define the nature of that Christianity <u>vis-á-vis</u> contemporary controversy, Jenkyns believes that certain aspects of the nature of the Thirty-nine Articles as a confession of faith are obvious: (a) Some articles are more important than others--'the Doctrinal articles are of more importance than the rest--and consequently the judgement of the Church in those doctrinal articles, on the fundamental points of [Christianity], will be of far greater importance than on the controverted points' (p. 10). Unfortuantely for the student of these lectures, Jenkyns never indicates exhaustively which articles he considers to treat specifically of the fundamental, as opposed to the controversial, points of Christianity. This lack is grievously felt because it is clear that Jenkyns believes certain doctrines to be matters 'necessary

to salvation' (i.e., not open to dispute for the Christian man), these being plainly and clearly stated in scripture; and others to be of a secondary nature, touching facts and truths which are not central to the salvation of man and which, therefore, are not clearly expounded in scripture.[71] Inasmuch as the Reformation was largely about disputed questions of the necessities of salvation, and since these questions are--at least in some degree--matters of judgment, it would be helpful to an assessment of Jenkyns' place in the Reformation tradition of theology had he made his lines of distinction between these two types of doctrine explicit rather than implicit. Burnet makes a distinction between Articles of Faith and Articles of Doctrine that may shed some light on the generalities here: Articles of Faith are held to be necessary to salvation: that is, they are

> so necessary to salvation, that without believing them there is not a foederal right to the covenant of grace: these are not many, and in the establishment of any doctrine for such, it is necessary both to prove it from Scripture, and to prove its being necessary to salvation, as a mean settled by the covenant of grace in order to it.

Articles of Doctrine, on the other hand, 'are only believed to be true; that is, to be revealed in the Scriptures, which is a sufficient ground for esteeming them true . . .'. It is quite clear that Jenkyns understands the definitions of the Trinity and Godhead, as given in the Articles and in the creeds, to be necessary to salvation in the sense of Burnet.[72] It is equally clear that he consideres the doctrines of transubstantiation and the Roman doctrine of the Church to be among the most grievous errors of Popery and to be so lacking in scriptural warrant as to be ficticious. What is not clear is whether or not Jenkyns actually believes that those who hold such tenets as these latter forfeit salvation, although he probably does not do so.

(b) By the same token, the Thirty-nine Articles cannot be regarded as a body of systematic theology, because they make statements only on fundamental points of doctrine, 'except where any point was controverted' (p. 10). The

precise meaning of 'systematic theology in this context is not clear, but Jenkyns seems to mean by the phrase 'an exhaustive statement of Anglican doctrine'. It is, furthermore, necessary to retain the qualifier 'Anglican' because it becomes clear from subsequent lectures that he means to be explaining those doctrines of Christianity which are espoused by the Church of England in contradistinction to other parts of the Church catholic.

The Articles are organized according to a general plan, 'being divided under four heads':

> I. Those relating to Godhead, its attributes and offices
> II. Relating to the 'Word of God' and herein the three Creeds
> III. Christianity, in its reference to individual Christians
> IV. Christianity, in its reference to Christians collectively i.e. the Church of Christ (p. 30).

Jenkyns observes that in studying the Articles it is helpful to compare them with various other contemporary documents: the Forty-two Articles of Edward VI; the Thirteen Articles of 1538; the Confession of Augsburg (used by Parker with reference to the wording in the revision of the 39 in 1571--p. 11); The Homilies (evidently both Books: of 1547, in the reign of Edward VI, and of 1563, in the reign of Elizabeth I) and the Liturgy, 'as all coming from the hand of one person--viz: Cranmer' (p. 11). Comparison of the Thirty-nine Articles with some of the works preceding them is also recommended: the three formularies of Henry VIII;[73] 'a catechism of Edward VI by [J.] Poynet Bp. of Winchester put forth at the same time as the 42 Articles and bound with them' (p. 11);[74] 'another catechism of later date by [Alexander] Nowell . . . for which the sanction of convocation was attempted [but not] to be attained' (p. 11);[75] the Eleven Articles of 1559;[76] Jewel's Apology (An Apology of the Church of England, London, 1562)--'which is a defense of the Church of [England] for the ground taken in the Reformation, but this though partially sanctioned, was not,

completely';[77] and the '"Reformatio Legum"[78] or revisal of the Ecclesiastical law of Rome--but the committee appointed to revise it did but little, and their recommendations, however good were never carried out . . . still useful for illustration having been drawn up by Cranmer and Parker' (pp. 11-12).

2. The nature of subscription (pp. 12-30). The remainder of these introductory lectures is devoted to a discussion of the extent of the doctrinal obligations incurred in subscription, chiefly clerical, to the Thirty-nine Articles. This section of Jenkyns' teaching is especially interesting because subscription was a burning issue in his day. As Chadwick says: 'The extended awareness of "Catholicity", and of the claim to teach orthodox truth, meant that everyone was more insistent upon the necessity of subscribing to what he believed to be the truth'.[79] The chief questions treated are (1) whether the Articles, as subscribed by the clergy, are held to be articles of 'belief and assent' or 'articles of peace and unity' and (2) to what extent the Articles are patient of latitude in interpretation. Jenkyns arrives at his conclusions by considering the intentions of those who impose subscription (pp. 13-15): Formerly --a voluntary subscription upheld by Cranmer in the reign of Edward VI, that imposed during the reign of Elizabeth in 1571 by an Act of Parliament (13 Eliz., c.12), and that imposed by the decrees of James I (1622) and Charles I (1628)--both of these latter being issued in response to the doctrinal unrest caused by the extreme Calvinists of the age (and which had important political overtones and threatened the stability of the State)[80] and the Synod of Dort; and contemporaneously--that subscription first required by the Acts of Uniformity (13 and 14 Car. II. c.4) of 1662, during the reign of Charles II, and presently imposed by the Church (in the 36th canon), the State, and to a limited degree and by authority of the two former, the Universities.

It is, and always has been, the purpose of the imposers of subscription that the Articles should be seen (1) to assert the fundamentals of the faith of the Church of

England and (2) to convey the Church of England's judgement on controverted questions and errors in doctrine (p. 13). Because these two functions of the Articles reflect varying degrees of dogmatic judgement, it is reasonable to expect that the degree of clarity and precision of statement in the individual articles themselves should vary, and this variation is indeed the case: The statements in Article I, which concerns the doctrine of the Trinity, is clear and precise and admits of no flexibility of interpretation. The language in the articles which touch on controversial (and undecided) points of doctrine--for example, Article III, treating of the descent of Jesus into Hell--is general and 'uncertain', not 'precise or dogmatic, but open' to further interpretation (p. 14). The language of the articles which condemn, on the one hand, the errors of Rome and, on the other, the errors of the 'ultraprotestants' (e.g., the antinomian anabaptists), 'whose errors were very grievous and almost as pernicious to the truth as those of the Romanists' (p. 14), is clear and precise; the judgement distinct.[81]

> Thus we may say that neither did the Reformers intend that every word of the Articles should have the same precise definite and distinct interpretation; nor on the other hand the same uncertainty and laxity of construction (p. 14).

In short, at least some articles are, and were intended to be, patient of some latitude of interpretation.

Because the Articles are by design patient of some latitude of interpretation, the question then arises: are they to be subscribed by clergy as articles of belief and assent or as articles of peace and unity?[82] Reviewing the language of subscription, Jenkyns concludes that the Articles are to be subscribed as Articles of Belief.[83]

If, then, latitude of interpretation is accepted in principle, it remains to ascertain what are the limits of interpretation placed upon those who subscribe the Articles.[84] There have been some historical occurrences which have had an affect on the later understanding of the terms of subscription as originally imposed and, indeed,

may have significantly altered those terms for present comprehension (pp. 17-8): (1) In the reign of Mary I, all Forty-two Articles were repealed.[85] (2) Alterations of some of the articles (viz., to Arts. II, III, and V) affected the interpretations in the direction of greater latitude. (3) 'Again in 1571 greater latitude was to be allowed (than was afterwards the case) with respect to those Articles relating to Church government. Thus the Stat. 13. Eliz. did not require subscription to those [articles touching polity]' (p. 18). (4) In 1595, William Whitaker and John Whitgift (Archbp of Canterbury) attempted to append the Lambeth Articles to the Thirty-nine precisely in an effort to tighten the limitations of interpretation in the direction of Calvinistic doctrine[86]--'Burligh [sic] however and Elizabeth refused to assent to this and thus saved the C. of E. from the galling yoke of being bound to distinct Calvinistic tenets' (p. 19).[87] (5) In the early 1600s, there was a reaction against the extreme Calvinist views of the Arminians, whose opinions had become unpopular 'from its bigotry and fanaticism' (p. 19). James I, in an attempt to supress doctrinal agitations stimulated by the Synod of Dort (1618-19),[88] circulated a declaration, 'Directions concerning Preachers', which had the effect of allowing more latitude of interpretation in the case of articles treating Calvinistic tenets capable of extreme interpretations. (6) The dispute between Richard Montague (Bp of Chichester and of Norwich) and the Puritans on Article XVII, 'Predestination', which came to a head in his publication in 1626 of Appello Caesarem, led Charles I to make a declaration (1628) on the interpretation of the Articles. This declaration contains, says Jenkyns, two main points (p. 21):

> I. The general principle, whether any latitude at all is allowed.
> II. Is any allowed in the particular case, viz., at that time, in articles relating to predestination and grace.

or, as stated more clearly in Burnet, concerning the obligations of subscription, two things are to be inferred:

> the one is, that the subscription does import an assent to the Articles; and the other is, that an Article being conceived in such general words, that it can admit of different literal and grammatical senses, even when the senses given are plainly contrary one to another, yet both may subscribe the Article with a good conscience, and without any equivocation.[89]

These principles, then, governed the understanding of subscription to Jenkyns' day. At the Restoration, the Acts of Uniformity of 1662 (13 and 14 Car. II, c. 4) again demanded subscription to the Articles, apparently in the same sense as that had been understood in the reign of Charles I (p. 22).

Since the Restoration, the Articles have several times been invoked as tests of orthodoxy, and the challenge has always arisen on the point of the latitude allowed under subscription.[90] The first challenges came from the Arians of the seventeenth century (the Deists): those from the early part of the century attempting to show that the Articles would bear an Arian interpretation of doctrine; those from the latter part of the century, that the Articles should be abolished altogether (p. 27). Jenkyns mentions, in particular, William Whiston (1667-1752) and Samuel Clarke (1675-1729) as test cases. In 1710, Whiston was expelled from Cambridge University for his Arianizing views. The case was brought before convocation for judgement and one of the questions raised was whether or not convocation has the right to consider it. A vote of eight to four in convocation carried the opinion that that body did have the right to try the case of Whiston; the Queen sanctioned the opinion and ordered convocation to try the opinions of Whiston as to whether or not they 'were reconcilable with the Articles' (p. 23). Whiston's opinions were condemned by a decision of convocation. This decision was not sanctioned by royal assent; however, it is still useful as a demonstration that 'the words and meaning of the Church in reference to the Articles was clear, distinct, definite and unequivocal' (p. 23). Convocation proceeded against Clarke

because of the opinions he expressed in his book, Scripture-Doctrine of the Trinity, published in 1712. When his opinions were condemned by the lower house, Clarke recanted, and the upper house did not proceed against him. In 1721 [sic], George I affirmed and approved the conclusions of convocation in its case against Clarke. 'Hence we see that the enunciation of the doctrine of the Trinity was very distinct by both the Church and State' (p. 24).[91]

Daniel Waterland (1683-1740), who attacked Clarke, discussed the limits of interpretation allowed by subscription. He showed 'the absurdity of supposing that because some latitude was allowed in some of the Articles, that therefore it was [allowed] in all [of them]'. He argued that were such a uniformity of latitude allowed to the interpretation even the 'Romanists might subscribe them' (p. 25). Such reasoning, on the authority of Waterland, was also invoked in the case of William George Ward (p. 27), which is discussed below. Waterland allows latitude in the interpretation of articles touching predestination but not of those treating the Trinity.

In 1714, Convocation devised a form for admitting penitents and converts from Rome to the Anglican communion. This form required (1) that all penitents renounce all the errors of Rome ('showing that no latitude was allowed in this respect'--p. 26) and (2) that penitent clergy also abjure the Confession of Pius IV, subscribed by all Roman Catholic clergy upon taking orders. The Confession embraces, says Jenkyns, all of the following: tradition; the infallible interpretation of scripture by the Church; the seven sacraments; the teachings of the Council of Trent on Baptism and [justification] as necessary to salvation; the sacrifice of the Mass and transubstantiation; purgatory; the invocation of saints; the veneration of images; the doctrine of indulgences; the supremacy of Rome and of the Pope; the holding of and assenting to the decrees of all Councils and Canons of the Church [presumably prior to the Reformation and, thereafter, in the Church of Rome]; a general profession of sincerity in subscribing this Confession. 'Thus on these 12 points the judgment of Convocation

was distinct and definite' (p. 26).

Jenkyns cites three tests of subscription in his era: the cases of William George Ward and Frederick Oakeley, both of whom were censured Tractarians; and the case of an Evangelical churchman, George Cornelius Gorham. As Chadwick observes, the result of the controversy over the opinions of Ward and Oakeley was to narrow the limits of interpretation of the Articles:

> Conscientious men had once interpreted their subscription to the articles and prayer book with breadth and freedom. But since Tract XC and the contest over Ward and Oakeley and the 'non-natural sense', conscientious men were more anxious in wishing to make a literal subscription.[92]

On the other hand, the case of Gorham threatened the destruction of the Church herself: either the mass secession of the extreme High Church party or of the larger Evangelical party, or the disestablishment of the Church of England.[93]

In 1845, Ward was deprived of his degrees for heresy by a convocation of Oxford University. (Ward was, at the time, a tutor at Balliol, while Richard Jenkyns was Master of the college. Richard Jenkyns was among the signatories who deprived Ward of his degrees.) 'This was only the decision of a Lay Corporation, but still being that of persons who understood the question, it is of importance' for an understanding of the limitations of subscription (p. 27). In the case of Oakeley (formerly at Oxford and much under the influence of Ward; between 1839 and 1845, in charge of the Margaret Chapel in London, which Oakeley made a center of Tractarian worship), judgment was given by the Court of Arches--the high court of ecclesiastical appeal. It was the decision of this court that the Articles are clear in condemnation of Romish errors and, therefore, cannot be subscribed by those who hold them (p. 27).

The case of Gorham (1847) was more complicated because 'no doubt difference of opinion existed among the Reformers on the question of Baptismal regeneration and in such a case they were not wont to speak very definitely or dogmatically'

(p. 28). In other words, this is seen by Jenkyns to be an area that, legally speaking, permits of very wide--perhaps contradictory--variations in interpretation. Gorham denied Baptismal regeneration and taught that Baptism was a mere badge of initiation or a sign of grace to come.[94] 'The question was whether the opinions of Mr. Gorham were consistent with the Liturgy and Articles of the Church of England' (p. 28). The important aspect of this case is that, when the opinions of Gorham were first tried and condemned by the Court of Arches[95] (the ecclesiastical court) in August, 1849, Gorham appealed to the recently formed Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (a secular body). To the great consternation of many churchmen (E. Manning, R. I. Wilberforce, and William Maskell, among others, seceded to Rome over this reversal of verdict), the Judicial Committee overthrew (Jan., 1850) the decision of the Court of Arches. The general purport of this reversal was

> that Mr. Gorham's opinions on Baptismal regeneration were not inconsistent with the Liturgy and Articles, but that the latitude he had taken was no more than was allowed--It did not however sanction any latitude that Mr. Gorham or any other of his party at anytime might choose to claim on any point, but only on two or three propositions which it selected from Gorham's works, and gives no judgment beyond these points (p. 28).

It is interesting that Jenkyns seems to view the case of Gorham with equanimity:[96] first, because he clearly believes that the Church of England, in Articles and Liturgy teaches Baptismal regeneration (see below, the discussion of Art. XXVII); secondly, because, in declaring Gorham's opinions not to be contrary to the doctrine of the Church of England, the judicial Committee 'attribut[ed] to him an opinion he did not hold'.[97]

Having thus summarized the history of subscription, Jenkyns reaches the following conclusions (p. 29):

1. The Articles are to be subscribed as Articles of Belief, but a distinction is to be drawn between those which are and those which are not necessary to salvation.[98]

2. Some latitude is allowed in the interpretation of the Articles, but not to the same degree in every case.

3. Waterland provides the best guide to the application of such latitude:

(a) Where the words are 'clear, distinct, and definite' no latitude is allowed.

(b) The known intentions of the imposers of subscription must dictate the occasion and extent of latitude--interpretations are to be indefinite where doubt existed among the Reformers and definite where no such doubt existed.

Each of the articles must be tried according to its merits in terms of these geneneral principles.

3. Analytical Procedure (p. 30). Having concluded his introductory remarks on the nature, history, and functions of the Articles, Jenkyns describes the procedure whereby he intends to analyze each article. He intends to give a brief history of each article as it appears in the Thirty-nine Articles in relation to various other formularies of faith. He then provides (a) 'some account of the wording whether altered or not since [its] composition in the reign of Edward VI'; (b) explains the article and lays down 'the propositions'; (c) goes into the 'proof' of these propositions; and (d) gives 'where necessary some account of the controversies that have taken place on' it.

The most interesting information concerning the theological views of Henry Jenkyns to emerge from these introductory lectures to the Articles concerns his attitude toward the union of and interrelationship between Church and State. He acknowledges the right of sovereign and Parliament to pronounce upon doctrines and to adjudicate in disputes as a positive force for good in Church affairs. He also supports the decisions in particular cases where such secular power

has been invoked, even with questionable results (as in the way the Judicial Committee dealt with the Gorham case). It is especially noteworthy that such support is not determined by his personal prejudice: that is to say, he supports the decisions whether they agree with his personal views (e.g., the rejection of the Lambeth Articles and the degradation of Ward) or not (e.g., he did not share the opinions of Gorham, though he upheld--because of the Judicial Committee's decision--his right to hold them). Henry was clearly an 'establishment man'. On the other hand, there is a distinction between the Ward-Oakeley cases and the Gorham case which must be considered when one evaluates Jenkyns' responses to the controversies in question. Oakeley and Ward were espousing principles of religion which partook of those Roman errors that Jenkyns believe the Articles specifically condemned. Gorham's views of Baptismal regeneration, while they controverted Jenkyns' understanding of the Article on this point, touched a principle of religion on which Jenkyns believed the Articles to be less explicit.

Jenkyns, in his lectures at least, never recognizes the political implications of subscription: he never acknowledges that instrument of doctrinal conformity might have been endorsed by the State for the sake of social conformity to the secular rule or as a means of the State's control of the Church. Furthermore, he genuinely believes that the Christian man as a political entity has a religious obligation to submit to the State, as his discussion of Articles XXXVII, XXXVIII, and XXXIX makes clear (see below, Chapter IV). But, fundamentally, he believes that the union of Church and State exists for the protection of the Church, as a means whereby the force of the secular arm can defend the purity of the Church. In this relationship, it is only appropriate that the State should enforce the Church's requirements for subscription and that the State should be the adjudicator in disputes over doctrinal questions within the Church. For these reasons, Jenkyns was not among the numbers of churchmen who clamoured for disestablishment in his age. It is also for these reasons that Jenkyns continued to see questions of subscription as largely theological rather than political, as his views on

subscription emerge in his lectures:

(1) There are clearly certain irreducible tenets of the Christian faith, the holding of which is necessary to salvation. (2) It is within the Church's right, indeed it is her obligation, to enforce conformity to these tenets among her clergy (as well as among believers generally, although they are not subscribers to the Articles). (3) The Church of England meets this obligation by requiring subscription to the Articles from her clergy, and such subscription is meant to attest positive assent to the tenets expressed in the articles. (4) But, on the other hand, the precise nature of the obligations of subscription is unclear and each case must be tested on its merits--first with regard to the wording of the article (and presumably with regard to its nature--i.e., whether or not it constitutes an article of faith), and then with regard to particular opinions of an individual concerning that article. (5) Conclusions concerning these particular opinions do not carry implications for other opinions held in other doctrinal areas by the same or other individuals.

Such an attitude toward subscription is very vague and flexible indeed, for the most part, and seems too easily to permit the endorsement of those interpretations one shares and the condemnation of those one does not. Any assessment of Jenkyns' doctrinal stance is made even more difficult since he does not clearly delineate between articles which treat matters necessary to salvation and those which do not; or those which are dogmatic and those which relate to non-dogmatic issues (e.g., Church government), if, indeed, he really feels that there are such.

A subsidiary question to Jenkyns' view of subscription concerns what he understands to be the nature of confessions of faith. If, indeed, confessions (1) describe a faith in contradistinction to all others, (2) preserve unity within the body of the faithful, and (3) test the orthodoxy or conformity of opinions of individuals who count themselves among the faithful; then a document which permits such selection among the articles requiring subscription (which said principle is not stated in the Articles themselves)

and which contains such deliberate ambiguity of statement and latitude of interpretation as Jenkyns attributes to the Thirty-nine Articles serves only a limited, though perhaps a useful, function as a confession of faith.[99] This is especially true since Jenkyns does not here explicitly treat the Prayer Book as part of the Church of England's confession of faith, although his lectures on liturgy generally and the Prayer Book do indicate that he believes the Prayer Book to contain necessary tenets of doctrine (necessary, at least, to the teachings of the Church of England).

Chapter III

Doctrine of Scripture

Having summarized Jenkyns' introduction to a study of the Thirty-nine Articles of the Church of England, one turns to his teachings on the articles themselves. This discussion begins with a consideration of Jenkyns' doctrine of scripture because it is his belief in the sufficiency of scriptures which underlies all his thoughts on Christian theology. Jenkyns believes that the Church of England anchors all her doctrinal teachings in the scriptures and that, therefore, any consideration of doctrine must submit to the dictates of scripture. This discussion begins with Jenkyns' lectures on Article VI, 'Of the sufficiency of the Holy Scripture', wherein the doctrine of scriptural sufficiency is defined. One then must consider Jenkyns' teachings on the interpretation and criticism of the scriptures, since such teachings alone can provide the context in which to situate his insistence on the primacy of scriptural teachings in all theological discussions. Finally, this chapter concludes with Jenkyns' lectures on Articles VII, 'Of the Old Testament', and VIII 'Of the three Creeds'. This last section of the present treatment includes some consideration of Jenkyns' theological method as it relates to the exposition of Scripture.

Article VI (pp. 148-69).

In this article 'Of the Sufficiency of Holy Scriptures for Salvation' the Church of England sought to define (1) the general doctrine of scripture and (2) the canon of scripture. No article to this effect appeared in either the Augsburg Confession or in the Thirteen Articles of 1538.[1] It was inserted in the Forty-two Articles of Edward VI (1553) in response to a canon formulated by the Council of Trent.[2] The Tridentine canon establishes both scripture and tradition as equal and parallel authorities on matters of salvation, and includes in the Old Testament canon certain books not acknowledged by Anglicans to be authoritative. The Church of England felt it necessary to declare her position

in contradistinction to Rome in Article VI.[3] Although the position was not explicitly stated as a confessional issue until the Forty-two Articles, the

> Church of England first took her own line in the ordination Services of 1550. Where the Candidate (for Priests orders) engages to teach nothing as necessary to salvation except what he is persuaded may be proved by Holy Scripture. She adhered to this line in the 42 Arts. of Edwd. VI 1587 and again in the 39 of Elizabeth's reign--setting forth in all the fundamental principle of the 'Sufficiency of Holy Scripture to Salvation' (p. 149).

Jenkyns develops his discussion of the article in two separate parts, corresponding with the two basic definitions in the article.

1. Sufficiency of scripture. The main proposition of the article is that "Holy Scripture containeth all things necessary to salvation' (p. 150). Jenkyns observes that this article follows naturally on the first five of the articles: they have defined the God in whom Anglicans believe; this article sets forth the 'chief means by which we know anything about that God' (p. 150). The first five articles assume a revelation, and Article VI defines that revelation; 'this was very necessary as persons were not agreed what this revelation was, i.e., what were the authorities, for things to be believed' (p. 150). The Council of Trent set forth scripture and apostolic tradition as equal authorities on matters of faith; to these two, some people have added the third, the authority of the Church.[4] Jenkyns argues from the silence of the article on the second and third authorities that, while the Church of England positively asserts only the authority of scripture, she does not deny the value of or the use of the authorities of tradition and the Church. The article denies none of the authority of the Church, which is discussed in detail in Article XX, and probably intends no denial of apostolic tradition either. The clause 'so that whatsoever is not read therein, nor be

proved thereby', merely intends to explain 'the positive assertion in the first clause . . . that whatever is necessary to salvation, can be fairly proved from Scripture, not that we can find every article of faith and practice laid down "totidem verbes"' (p. 151). That is to say, the article means, on the one hand, to guarantee that all doctrines held by the Church of England to be necessary for salvation are biblically based; and, on the other hand, to protect the Church's corpus of doctrine from the strictures of biblical literalism.

The question then arises as to whether or not the article means that scripture is sufficient only in matters of faith. Jenkyns observes that the language is unclear but that the best interpretation of 'all things' includes questions of doctrine, ceremonies, and morals. He reaches this conclusion because (a) otherwise the clause would have ended with 'as an article of faith' and the clause 'or thought to be requisite or necessary to salvation' would have been superfluous and because (b) 'the separative conjunction "or" appears to show other things necessary to salvation besides faith' (p. 151). Furthermore, because the Council of Trent expressly mentioned ceremonies and morals, Jenkyns assumes these things to have been in the minds of the authors of Article VI as well (p. 152).

The meaning of the second part of the article is made more elusive because of the awkward phrasing. It apparently intends to include and to commend both the Old and New Testaments but to draw a distinction between the Old Testament and the Apocrypha. The article commends the Apocrypha as a source of example for Christian life, but not as a source of doctrine. On the other hand, all the books of the New Testament are included in the canon, despite the fact that 'some "doubt" has existed concerning some of the books of the New Testament, which [according to] this clause ought to be rejected [i.e., the doubt is to be rejected]' (p. 152). The source of the doubt to which Jenkyns refers is not clear. Presumably, he refers to doubts that existed at the time of the Reformation, and he may be thinking of, for example, Luther's criticism of the Epistle of

James.[5] It is also possible, though not probable, that Jenkyns also had in mind some of the 'doubt' being cast upon the New Testament as a result of some of the beginning modern biblical criticism.[6] The final clause of the article, however, settles the question: 'all the books of the New Testament as they are commonly received we do receive, and account them canonical'.

The discussion of this article then moves on to the proof of the proposition that 'Holy Scripture containeth all things necessary to Salvation' (pp. 152-6). Jenkyns says that both a priori (deductive) and a posteriori (empirical) arguments may be offered to prove the proposition. By way of a priori argument, Jenkyns makes the following observation: Any revelation by God to man or covenant between God and man would probably come to be written, because all matters of importance in the affairs of men are and always have been committed to writing (p. 152).[7] The a posteriori argument (p. 153) is more complex: (a) God had before and from the beginning given oral revelations, though it is difficult to prove that there was from the beginning any written revelation. (b) If there were not initially written revelations, this situation is to be accounted for by the long lives of the patriarchs: their lives extended over several generations and thus they were able orally to fulfill the primary function of written revelation--that is, to pass on with certainty the revelation to successive generations. (c) However, by the time of Moses it is known that revelation was written: the 'ten commandments were even written by God's own finger--and the rest when given orally to Moses he committed them to writing immediately' (p. 153). (d) The written nature of revelation is much insisted upon 'both in the Pentateuch and in the other Old Testament Books' (p. 153).

It is useful to make some observations here on Jenkyns' understanding of the terms a priori and a posteriori, as well as the light his use thereof sheds on his understanding of revelation itself. When Jenkyns says that a priori arguments are 'deductive', he means chiefly that they are analogical: they extrapolate from human experience

generalities which are then applied to the operation of revelation, and Jenkyns does not make explicit any distinction which modern analysts might wish to make between the spheres of human and divine activity. The 'facts' upon which Jenkyns bases his a posteriori arguments are really assumptions which would be called into question and would themselves demand empirical proof in a twentieth-century argument purporting to be scientific: these assumptions are (a) that there was a revelation from God to man and (b) that the Bible is the accurate, literal written record of that revelation. The manner in which Jenkyns uses both of these types of argument indicates his understanding of revelation and of theology. His arguments are based on a process of logical deduction and they are propositional; they indicate that Jenkyns understands revelation to be largely propositional (i.e., containing a body of essentially logical truths) in nature and that his method of theological argument is essentially scholastic. Such an understanding of theological argument and of revelation was characteristic of English theologians of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, and in characteristic manner Jenkyns supports his arguments with biblical proof-texts.

Two Old Testament texts are cited to confirm the a priori argument: 'The lord said unto Moses write this for a memorial in a book' (Ex. 17.14) and 'And the Lord said unto Moses "Write these words"' (Ex. 34.27). There follow, without comment, several other parts of verses quoted from various other Old Testament books, showing 'how great stress was laid on writing' (p. 154). Jenkyns comments that, in refutation of this proof, some may argue that the Jews valued and relied upon their oral traditions as well as upon the written. It may be answered that this is true

> but how did our Saviour treat these traditions? shewing the relative importance of God's written word and their oral traditions by passing a strong condemnation upon them--thus. Matt. XV.6: 'thus ye have made the commandmts [sic] of God none effect by your tradition'. It is probable that Christ would have entrusted his own revelation

to oral tradition? (p. 154--the answer is evidently No).

The books of the New Testament as a whole are taken to be a posteriori evidence: 'But not to rely on á priori evidence, have we any written documents relating to his own [Jesus'] revelation? Yes! The 4 Gospels, Acts of the Apostles and the Epistles, of his disciples and Apostles--forming what is called the New Testament' (p. 154). Evidently the fact that the New Testament was written at all is meant to be proof from 'matters of fact' that writing was the divinely appointed means of revelation. There follows, again with little or no comment, several citations from the New Testament which attest the authority of the written revelation. In referring to Galations 1.3, Jenkyns comments that 'this does not exactly bear on the question of written documents--but on the question whether the Gospel was originally preached in all its full completeness--and this shews conclusively that it was' (p. 156). One other of the proof-texts (Rev. 22.19) receives a qualification:

> This passage no doubt refers to the book of Revelation only but it is remarkable as standing at the end of the Bible in almost the same words as in the bk of Deut: 4.2. in the beginning of the Bible--thus opening and closing the revelation of Redemption by a denunciation of those who should violate the integrity of it--probably therefore Re. 22. 18.19 refers to the whole of the written word (p. 156).

Jenkyns also grants that some of the verses he has cited here have reference to Old as well as to New Testament Revelation.

Jenkyns concludes his proofs that all that is constitutive of revelation is written, whether these proofs be demonstrated by a priori or a posteriori argument, by saying 'that writing was designedly used in revelation and that what is written needs no adjustments of tradition (p. 156). This concluding remark makes clear what at the beginning of the discussion was not explicit: The statement that 'Holy

Scripture containeth all things necessary to Salvation' is understood by Jenkyns to be a condemnation of the Roman Catholic use of oral tradition, and he defends it as such.

Jenkyns then discusses some of the controversies which have arisen on the question of the sufficiency of scripture (pp. 156-61), and he cites two main objections to the arguments he has presented above. The first of these is that some say the New Testament is deficient because it does not present a systematic code parallel to the Law of Moses in the Old Testament. To this statement the general observation is addressed that 'this is only an objection to the "Form" [of the revelation] which is immaterial. The Substance only is material--the "Form" however of the N.T. is certainly more interesting than the Levitical Code and far better calculated to enlist attention and inculcate its precepts' (p. 156). He adds that the main question concerning the efficiency or deficiency of the New Testament revelation is as to whether or not it contains the teachings of Christ, and this is the aspect of the argument which he chooses to develop (see below). The second objection cited is that the revelation of the New Testament is imperfect (i.e., incomplete) in that it does not contain all the oral teachings of Jesus and the Apostles. Jenkyns observes that the real question is whether or not any unrecorded oral teachings involved matters of faith (i.e., doctrines necessary to salvation) and whether or not this 'fact' can be ascertained; it is to these issues that he addresses himself.

It is interesting to notice in the discussion that follows that Jenkyns' arguments against these objections are not parallel. In the first instance the arguments are designed to show the relative merits of the Old and New Testaments. The method of the argument is propositional: that is to say, it is based on observations of and conclusions drawn from (with the aid of abstraction) the general content of the Testaments. The method of argument is rationalistic. In the second instance the arguments are intended to show the relative merits of written revelation and oral tradition. The method of argument is from authority.

The answers to the first objection proceed thus: The teachings of Christ can be broken down into three areas: (1) doctrine, (2) rites and ceremonies, and (3) morality. (1) Doctrinally speaking, 'the N. T. gives a far deeper insight into the relative parts of Gods [sic] and Man's doings in respect of the scheme of redemption than the Old' (p.157). (2) While it is true that the Old Testament provides more copious and explicit teachings on rite and ceremony than does the New Testament, it is also certain that the purpose of the New Testament 'was avowedly the contrary'. In the instances which are exceptions to this contrary purpose of the New Testament, namely with regard to 'the two great and necessary ceremonies of Baptism and the Eucharist' (p. 157), where distinctness of statement concerning rites and ceremonies was particularly desired, it was provided. (3) Whereas the Old Testament sought to provide a strict code of moral prescriptions, the purpose of the New Testament was to inculcate motives rather than rules. 'The major object of the ethical part of the New T.' was to condemn the inferior morality of the Old Testament code and to raise to consciousness the higher motives which bring about a readjustment of the valuations of particular instances of conduct.

In dealing with the second objection (i.e., that the NT revelation is imperfect), Jenkyns asserts that the only way of establishing 'the fact' that 'matters orally revealed as necessary to salvation, are not in the N. T.' (p. 157)--or not, is to refer 'to those writers who followed the writers of the N. T. and who would naturally allude to any such necessary oral teaching, if it had existed, even though they might not state it at full length' (p. 158). He, of course, has reference to the early Church Fathers, some of whom, according to Jenkyns, were contemporary with the Apostles. It is stated that an assessment of (essential) patristic teachings on the sufficiency of scripture can be gained in one of two ways: either the student can read the entire corpus of ancient writings to ascertain whether or not the Fathers do maintain that there are any matters necessary to salvation which are not stated in the New Testament; or

he may examine a selection of passages from the Fathers which 'may perhaps suffice [and] by which, it may appear that they did not consider anything, orally believed merely, necessary to salvation' (p. 158).[8] Clearly both these approaches constitute an argument from silence. In the first instance, if no additional doctrines are found in the Fathers, then one may argue that the teachings of the New Testament are sufficient to salvation. In the second instance, if the Fathers positively assert that 'that which is written' alone constitutes matters of faith, then one may argue for the exclusive sufficiency of the New Testament. It is the second line of argument that Jenkyns adopts. He offers citations from Irenaeus, Tertullian, Hippolytus, Origin, Cyprian, the Emperor Constantine (under the influence of Hosius of Cordova), Athanasius, Cyril of Jerusalem, Basil, Theophilus of Antioch, Jerome, and Augustine, all to the effect that (a) the scriptures are perfect (p.158, chez Irenaeus), (b) all additions to scripture are corruptions of scripture (p. 158, chez Tertullian), and (c) 'the inspired scriptures are of themselves sufficient for the discovery of the truth' (i.e., to salvation, as Jenkyns--p. 160--interprets this statement from Athanasius).

These proofs from authority are not devoid of difficulty. To begin with, by way of a general reflection, it must be noted that Irenaeus is the earliest authority cited: surely, given that his dates are c. 130 AD-c. 200 AD, it is difficult to assume that even Irenaeus could have been 'contemporary with the Apostles'. But, to move beyond this minor problem (which, perhaps, is only visible to the 20th-century eye), at least three reservations suggest themselves: It is just possible that Jenkyns' reference to Cyprian poses a wrinkle in his argument that he does not recognize: 'Cyprian--uses the word "tradition" for the writings of the New Testament, because they hand down the doctrines of Xt to future generations--he says--"does this tradition come from the Gospels or Epistles . . ." and quotes Joshua 1.8 as applying to the reception of the Old by the Jews' (p. 159).[9] Surely Cyprian is here operating with a distinction between the Gospels and Epistles which Jenkyns would not recognize;

and this suggests that Cyprian's use of 'tradition' might not harmonize with Jenkyns' use thereof as he assumes it to do. Furthermore, the citations are here offered without any reference to the backgrounds and the theological tenor of any of these Church Fathers--some of them, after all, had distinctly heretical leanings (e.g., Tertullian, despite his overall orthodoxy, was a Montanist). Finally, even Jenkyns acknowledges that the Fathers made use of a notion of 'tradition': 'Irenaeus and Tertullian make use of "tradition" but only to confirm Scripture, i.e. using two proofs to decide the same thing--not as appealing to it to prove anything beyond Scripture' (p. 161). But surely there is a problem with a polemic which, in order to prove the superiority of scripture over tradition, uses a form of tradition to authenticate the written revelation.

At this point Jenkyns moves into a discussion of the theory of apostolic tradition, apparently to distinguish between and to demonstrate the erroneous teaching of Rome and the correct teachings of the Church of England. It is interesting to note that he does not seem to recognize the need to justify his own use of tradition and the relationship between his use of it and the discussion which follows thereon. His exposition follows these general lines of development (pp. 162-5): (a) A general definition of the term; (b) a statement of the Roman theory; (c) a discussion of ways to test the theory; (d) a presentation of a theory of 'historical evidence'; and (e) some examples of the application of the two theories (i.e., Rome's teachings in light of 'Apostolic Tradition' and the teachings, presumably of Anglicanism, based on 'historical evidence').

(a) Having illustrated the Latin and Greek etymologies for tradition, Jenkyns gives the meaning of the term as 'the delivery of anything from one to another' (i.e., the process), which came to mean 'that which was passed on' (p. 162, i.e., the object of the process): in time, the term came to be used in both senses. He observes that St. Paul uses the term in the first sense, though it is more frequently used (by St.Paul or by others?) in the second sense. The means of transmission may be oral, although 'most commonly it is

now used of written tradition'. The referent may be secular or, as here, religious. The period over which the transmission occurs may vary, but one is here concerned with transmission from the time of the Apostles[10]--that is, as apostolic tradition is defined by the Church of Rome.

(b) Rome defines this tradition to embrace rites and morals as well as doctrine. The Roman theory is '"that the matters given by Christ to men were partly handed down by writing, partly by word of mouth" and though subsequently they may have been written yet never were written in the N. T. but handed down "continua seccessione" whether orally or in writing' (p. 162).

(c) There are essentially two ways in which to assess the value of transmitted material of this sort which is not clearly anchored in scripture. The first and 'most obvious' method is to examine the transmission of the material to see if its succession is continuous. Rome eschews this method, 'shrinking from an examination into the continuity of the succession' (p. 163), taking a second approach 'She appeals to a decision of some pope or Council as deciding that such and such is an Apostolic Tradition--but in this, they [the Church of Rome] rely not on the traditions of the Apostles, but on the decision of that particular pope or council, which depends on what power or authority the Church possesses to decide these things' (p. 163). The power of the Church in matters of doctrine is discussed in a later lecture on Article XX.

(d) The second method, styled by Rome an appeal to 'Apostolic Tradition', is 'virtually begging the question' (p. 163). The first of these methods provides the only true way by which to establish the validity of historically transmitted material. Such a method is more truly an examination of 'the historical evidence beside Scripture' (p. 163), and scripture, since it dates from apostolic times, is in fact excluded from this second inquiry. Since such a full inquiry into historical evidence would be long and tedious, Jenkyns offers some useful 'general principles'.

(1) Clearly, the historical evidence of the earliest periods is of the most value and import. Indeed, one need

look only at the evidence of this early period because the traditions of all subsequent periods must converge into apostolic times if they are to be considered as of apostolic origin. No amount of proof which shows a tradition to be subsequent to the apostolic period will be sufficient to make such a tradition binding on the basis of an appeal to tradition: 'One link wanting, whether that be of the 4th or ... . . . any other centuries and the whole chain must fall to the ground' (p. 164).

(2) The quality of evidence drawn from the earliest Christian period is uneven; however, the nearer the evidence is to the apostolic times, the better. The difference in quality also depends on the ability, learning, and accuracy of the witness, as well as upon the dating thereof: 'every case must be tried on its own merits, as there is no uniform value as to the worth of this Historical Evidence' (p. 165). It is, indeed, this uneven quality of historical evidence which explains the ambivalence in the attitudes of the Reformers towards tradition. Furthermore, it explains why Irenaeus and Tertullian held tradition in such high esteem: 'their tradition was very close indeed to the Apostolic times and so of very great comparative value--but because that was good to them, all the Historical evidence we can get after a lapse of 1800 years is by no means necessarily so to us' (p. 165). Another difficulty arises because it is not always clear whether a writer is offering merely his opinion on a question or the decision of the Church.

(3) The 'equality of the value of evidence' is also affected by the subject--doctrine, matter of fact, observances--treated in the evidence: 'Doctrine is easily corrupted without exciting suspicion. Matters of fact and observances are not so' (p. 164).

(e) By way of exemplifying the results of the application of the principles of an appeal to historical evidence, in contradistinction to the conclusions of an appeal to the defective principle of 'apostolic tradition', Jenkyns considers the doctrines of transubstantiation and of the observance of Sunday: 'The historical evidence on transubstantiation can be traced satisfactorily up to the 11th century.

The Corporal or Material presence up to the 6th or 7th--But then we find a failure and no evidence exists further back than of a Spiritual presence' (p. 164). On the other hand, historical evidence for the observance of Sunday is traceable in perfect succession up to the earliest times and we can hitch it on[11] to the Apostles themselves--' (p. 165).

2. Canon of scripture (pp. 165-9). Jenkyns now moves on to a discussion of the second part of Article VI, the canon of scripture, which treats of three subjects: (a) the Old Testament; (b) the Apocrypha; and (c) the New Testament. Although it is mentioned last in this list, the New Testament is the first canon to be discussed.

(a) A full discussion of the criteria that are used to judge the canonicity of the New Testament would be lengthy indeed, because it would involve a discussion of the Testament as a whole, as well as of the claims to authority made by each separate book. Such an analysis is too lengthy to be pursued in the course of Jenkyns' lectures; furthermore, it is more properly the subject of a demonstration of the evidences of Christianity. Jenkyns, therefore, indicates only the nature of the points to be established in analysis and the general principles upon which arguments for the authority of the New Testament canon are based.

There are really only two points to be established by investigation: (1) the question of authorship and (2) the question of the reliability (i.e., veracity and inspiration) of the authors. There is also a subsidiary question posed when the author of a book, for example, the epistle to Hebrews, is unknown: under these circumstances, on what grounds can such a book be accorded the status of Word of God? The criteria in such a case are a demonstration that the author, whoever he was, 'was acquainted with the subject [i.e., evidently, with the principles of Christianity]' (p. 166) and that he was inspired.[12] All these particular points on the question of authority can be settled by an examination of the external and internal evidences.[13]

The proofs from evidence are overwhelming by comparison with similar proofs for other (i.e., non-Testamental) books. In the instance of external evidence, this is true for two

reasons: (1) Because the Testament claims to be a mysterious product of the revelation of God to man, the evidence for its validity would have been more thoroughly sifted than is that which has reference to books of lesser import. (2) There are differences of opinion on various questions among Christians themselves, although they all support their opinions by an appeal to the scripture; the differences of opinion held by Christians would guarantee 'greater care in enquiry of the genuineness of what they appealed to as their authority' (p. 166). The weight of the internal evidence derives from 'the peculiarity in the characters and the circumstances of those who wrote [the NT books], who had no knowledge of religion except what was given them by the Spirit' (p. 166).

Even when arguing on these principles, a distinction must be drawn among the books of the New Testament because there is not an equal amount of evidence for each of them. Nonetheless, the great portion of the canon has stood without question until recently, when some portions 'have been impugned by German Rationalists' (p. 167). There are, however, seven epistles the authenticity or authorship of which was questioned in the early Christian era: Hebrews, St James, 2 Peter, 2 and 3 John, Jude, and Revelation.

Jenkyns' reliance on evidences to demonstrate the authority of biblical revelation is typical of English theologians of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. They had been forced back on arguments from evidences by eighteenth-century attacks on proofs from miracle, notably that of Hume. But these demonstrations from evidences were hampered by another characteristically eighteenth-century mode of thought. Theologians of the period were possessed of only a very nascent historical sense and the scientific method of analysis was in its infancy; it was, therefore, habitually assumed that the Bible was a unique form of literature. It was precisely the burgeoning of an historical sense and the concomitant development of scientific method in the historical criticism of the scriptures which led to the rise of the New Criticism among the 'German Rationalists' whom Jenkyns disparages. They reached those

of their conclusions to which Jenkyns objected because they had ceased to treat the Bible as a unique form of literature.

(b) Rome differs from the Church of England in that she includes Apocryphal books in the canon of scripture. There are two standards against which all questionable books can be measured: (1) Any books (presumably from the inter-testamental period) which are quoted in the New Testament must (italics in the text) be accounted canonical. (2) With regard to the New Testament generally, any books which were written during the age of the Spirit's activity--that is, 'while miracles or prophecy continued' (p. 168)[14]--are to be included in the canon. In short, the testimony of the New Testament is to be taken to establish the Old Testament canon; and, as will become immediately apparent, tradition of a particular sort, to establish the New Testament canon. To this latter end, Jenkyns quotes (largely) Patristic authorities.

Josephus, Melito, Origin, and the customs of the Jews down to the present day attest the Old Testament canon as defined by Article VI; none of these authorities testify to the Apocrypha.[15] The conclusion to be drawn, therefore, is 'that the Apocrypha was not considered canonical in the days of Christ, but that what we [the Church of England] now hold to be so, was' (p. 168). The Council of Laodicea (c. 345 to c. 365) 'gives a list of the canonical books exactly the same as we have now' (p. 168).[16] Gregory Nazianzus, Epiphanius, Athanasius, and Jerome are also cited by Jenkyns to the general effect that the Apocrypha was not held to be canonical but was considered to be suitable to be read for edification rather than for doctrine:

> This was then the opinion and belief of the whole Church A. D. 4--and continued to be so down to the Council of Trent A. D. 1545 which is the first authority for placing the Apocryphal books in the Canon of Scripture on a level with the rest of God's word. This was done, no doubt because these books gave some support to some of their [Rome's] peculiar doctrines--in so including them as canonical however they have completely set aside

a pure Apostolical Tradition (p. 169).

(c) The canon of the Old Testament is proved by the grounds provided from miracle and prophecy (which are discussed below). The testimony to miracles done and prophecy fulfilled demonstrates the divine inspiration of and, therefore, the authority of the books of the Old Testament. A second proof of the authority of the Old Testament books is given in the witness to them by Jesus and the Apostles: Christ and the Apostles were 'messengers from God' (p. 167); therefore, their witness is to be accepted without question.

3. Conclusions. This concludes Jenkyns' comments on Article VI, and it is useful to draw out from this lecture some of those traits which characterize the theology of Jenkyns in general. These generalities point to the historical provenance of his theology and serve to mark his orthodoxy, and they apply consistently throughout his lectures.

Despite the fact that Jenkyns was teaching theology throughout the middle decades of the nineteenth century, he was more truly an eighteenth-century theologian: His understanding of the content of revelation is distinctly propositional rather than relational: that is, he understands revelation to contain a series of truth propositions about salvation and the nature of God rather than about the relationship of God to man in Christ. His argument is distinctly logical and rationalistic. Because these two observations pertain, his theological method is essentially scholastic, and his appeal to scripture as the sole basis for doctrines of salvation is neither as exclusive nor as consistent as he believes it to be. The way in which he uses scripture for proof texts and his method of citing the Fathers suggests that he had reference for his authorities to catenae and to Partistic florilegia. The use of such collections of selected passages from previous authors originated in the early centuries of Christian theology and was perpetuated in the scholastic development of sentences and theological loci. Jenkyns uses Biblical proof-texts in the way he does because he accepts the older concept of the plenary inspiration of the scriptures,

whereas nineteenth-century theologians came to reject such a view. His use of patristic florilegia indicates that his teachings did not reflect the more critical knowledge of the Fathers which developed in the nineteenth century. His sense of history is not greatly evolved, nor does it show the modern development in the direction of a scientific method of inquiry; consequently, he tends to assume that the Bible is a unique form of literature and does not treat it critically. He, therefore, derogates the findings of "German Rationalist' theologians, although (as will become evident he is able to esteem the textual criticism of the German scholars whose work formed the base for the emerging New Criticism.

Jenkyns' use of tradition also deserves comment. It is quite clear that he feels free to pick and choose among various traditions as suits his argument and without much regard for the context of a given text or for the general intellectual background of the sources he cites. In short, he does not use his sources with the critical sense that is demanded in the twentieth-century. But he was in fact a pre-critical theologian, and he suffered from the disabilities of his age: the use of patristic florilegia did not incline scholars to develop much critical sense of context; and the indiscriminate piling up of proof-texts, biblical or patristic, is an ancient theological technique which was employed with special enthusiasm by all polemicists in the post-Reformation period.

Fianally, one must note Jenkyns' attitude toward Rome and theological concepts which have their origin in pre-Reformation catholic doctrine. He is neither opposed to all that is Roman, nor is he an adherent of all the attitudes which collected around and so frequently were associated with the Oxford Movement. Such a double vision was not characteristic of the clergy of Jenkyns' period, whose attitudes were tending to polarize around either markedly Protestant or Oxford-Movement, Anglo-catholic positions. The moderation of his position, which is clearly expressed in his concluding remarks on Article VI, is yet another reflection of that fair-mindedness and legalistic turn of

thought which has been remarked in previous discussions of Jenkyns' character:

> This Art: VI is the first one directed against the Church of Rome. In the first 5 on the Doctrine of the Trinity etc, she is in perfect accordance with us--but here we diverge--for we hold that Holy Scripture by and of itself contains all that is necessary to salvation. They consider that 'Apostolic Tradition' (or what they are pleased to call so) is also necessary and of equal authority (p. 169).

But Jenkyns' moderation of view disappears whenever, in the course of his lectures, he has occasion to comment on the supremacy of Rome or papal infallibility. As further discussion will show, while it would not have been appropriate to call Jenkyns' attitudes distinctly anti-Roman, they are certainly anti-papal.

Interpretation of scripture.

Before moving on to a discussion of Article VII, it is essential to consider the hermeneutical principles recommended by Jenkyns. These principles formed the subject of his lectures on Interpretation and Criticism of Scripture,[17] and they are based on the critical work of Johann August Ernesti (1707-81). The lectures provide some of the practical aspects of Jenkyns' theory of scripture. Specifically, they give some explicit indications of his views of the qualifications of preachers; the relationship between doctrine and scripture, and the role of the Church in this connection; his concept of inspiration and its implications for revelation; and his understanding of the relationship between reason and revelation.

Ernesti's theories of interpretation, Institutio interpretis Novi Testamenti (1761) were first translated into English and published in England in 1832 under the title, Principles of Biblical Interpretation, and this is the edition used by Jenkyns.[18] Ernesti was a Lutheran theologian whose chief importance derives from his attempt, through his

critical method, to reconcile the theological traditions of his church with historical biblical criticism. In his critical method he reacted against uncritical rationalism, on the one hand, and allegorical interpretation, on the other. He insisted that the meaning of biblical passages must be determined by philological and grammatical presuppositions. Ernesti was one of those eighteenth-century scholars whose work on the preliminaries in lower criticism formed the basis for the development of the German higher criticism.[19] Ernesti's Principles implements his general convictions.

For the most part Jenkyns' lectures are taken up with the guidelines for interpreting the philological and grammatical data of the New Testament, and these aspects of his hermeneutical system need not detain us here. It is more useful to this study that some understanding be gained with regard to Jenkyns' general concepts of the nature of scripture and the role of interpretation. To this end one needs to consider (1) the general traits required of the interpreter, (2) the general character of scripture, and (3) other non-philologically determined approaches to scripture interpretation.

1. There are six characteristics that Jenkyns considers requisite in an interpreter of the scriptures, three of which concern generally the quality of his Christian life; the other three of which reflect the attitude of the interpreter to his task.[20] Those traits of the first sort are diligence, holiness of life, and prayerfulness. The second three--docility, submissiveness to revelation, and the assistance of the Holy Spirit--require some elaboration. Docility and submissiveness to revelation reflect the student's intellectual stance to revelation: in the first place, the student must approach the interpretation of scripture 'unbiased by bigotted preconceptions':[21] he may not make scripture conform to the dictates of his personal doctrinal persuasions. In the second place and in like manner, he must submit to the truth of scripture and not attempt to override scripture by his personal opinions or those of his party; nor is he free to pick and choose among the truths of scripture. The last trait, the assistance of

the Holy Spirit, means that the student must 'seek and rely much on the inward teaching of the spirit',[22] but he must not assume to himself the personal inspiration of the fanatic. Van Mildert elaborates on this point: the assurance granted to the Christian man of the guidance of the Spirit 'is not to be expected as a special or extraordinary gift; much less as intended to supersede the use of any other helps or means, with which the providence of God has blessed him'. The place of the extraordinary gifts of the Spirit 'is now to be supplied by the use of Holy Scripture, accompanied with such attainments as the light of human learning, bearing some faint analogy to the light of inspiration, enables us to bring to the inquiry'.[23]

2. Having considered the character of the interpreter, it seems good to consider Jenkyns' concept of the material to be interpreted. The first aspect of scripture to be recognized is the nature of its authority: that is, one must consider Jenkyns' theory of inspiration. The second component of his doctrine of scripture derives from Jenkyns' understanding of revelation.

In the main, Jenkyns believes that one approaches the interpretation of scripture very much as one approaches the interpretation of any other book, but, says he, there are a few material points of difference: for example, the interpreter of scripture must have certain moral qualifications, and he must be assisted by the inner workings of the Holy Spirit.[24] These qualifications are necessary because scripture is inspired, that is, because the human scribes who wrote the scriptures were the divinely inspired instruments of God's own revelation of himself. Jenkyns' particular theory of inspiration is one of restricted intervention. God, in the imparting of his revelation, interfered directly with the mental processes and personalities of his human agents only where such interference was necessary to prevent error. Truths which could be obtained naturally, even though they contributed to the divine revelation, were left to the agent to discover.[25] Such a theory leaves room for the contribution of human reason and natural religion,[26] while insuring the inerrancy of scripture. Further, the

concept insures, not only the inerrancy of scripture, but the homogeneity of revelation:

> Since the books of Scripture were written by inspired men, it is clear that no real contradiction can exist in them. For neither can God fail to see what is consistent with, or consequent upon any proposition; nor can he be forgetful so as not to remember that which he has already said. If, therefore, any contradic tion should appear to exist, a suitable method of reconciliation is to be investigated.[27]

This concept of inspiration has certain specific applications in the interpretation of scriptural passages: (1) Sacred writers never write nonsense; they always speak to a purpose.[28] The purpose of scripture is revelation, not concealment.[29] Consequently the interpreter's goal is assured: if he is diligent and holy of life, he will ultimately be led to the divinely intended meaning of the text.[30] (2) Following this basic principle thoughout, Ernesti draws its corollary: each passage intends only one clear meaning, and that the literal one, although the lapse of time between the recording and the interpreting may have obscured that meaning.[31] Therefore, those principles endorsed by some interpreters are to be abjured: (a) that where a difficult passage is patient of more than one rendering, the sacred writer is assumed to have intended to convey all possible meanings; and (b) that scripture intends to convey all possible meanings which may be derived therefrom.[32] Ernesti condemns all allegorical interpretation when it means the rendering of a passage in a forced or mystical sense. The superaddition of a spiritual or mystical meaning to the literal sense of the text was not intended by Biblical authors. (4) In the interpretation of clear allegories or parables contained in scripture, the interpreter is to understand one meaning in the figure itself. The only meaning intended by the writer is the fact or lesson conveyed in the allegory or parable. In such a case the lesson conveyed figuratively is considered by Ernesti to be the literal sense of the allegory or parable.[33] Jenkyns allows that the superaddition of spiritual or mystical senses to the literal

interpretation of a particular text may be justified for the purposes of preaching, if such a liberty is taken sparingly and judiciously: one often hears very powerful moral lessons taught from the pulpit in such a manner.[34]

It is the concept of the homogeneity of revelation, deriving in large part from a pre-critical conception of history,[35] which gives rise to a much used hermeneutical tool: the Analogy of Faith (or Scripture). The Analogy of Faith is the principle of interpreting scripture by scripture.[36] The Analogy, and the concept of revelation which it canonizes, means that no part of scripture can be interpreted so as to be made repugnant to another,[37] or so as to violate any certain articles of Christian doctrine.[38] In the case of a difficult passage which appears to oppose the Analogy of Faith, the interpretation must be accommodated to it.[39] Jenkyns, although he certainly subscribes to the doctrine of the Analogy,[40] qualifies Ernesti's enthusiasm: The Analogy of Faith had been much abused by Calvinists and Arminians to make scripture fit doctrinal preconceptions. Certainly the Analogy is to be used as a hermeneutical tool, but caution must be taken not to abuse it.[41] Jenkyns' caution is the measure of his honesty and of his intellectual endeavour; however, it is not clear to what extent he recognizes the danger of such a tool as the Analogy when it is applied to such articles of faith as may be deduced from the creeds: that is to say, Jenkyns probably does not recognize that interpretation of scripture may become subservient to credal formulations. The Analogy of Faith subsumes three particular types of analogy, verbal, historical, and doctrinal;[42] and all three types of analogy have implications for the use of parallel passages in the interpretation of scripture.[43] It is, however, the analogy of doctrine which chiefly concerns us since, in essence, the other two analogies are subservient to it.

The Analogy of Faith has certain practical implications for hermeneutics; perhaps chief among them is the use of parallel passages to interpret one another. The use of parallels is considerd to be one of the more difficult methods of interpretation but one of the very best modes of

determining meaning.[44] This method, of course, depends on the theory of the homogeneity of revelation and on the non-contradictory character of scripture which is implied in the operative theory of divine inspiration.[45] Terrot, in a note commenting on Ernesti's definitions of the Analogy of Faith, describes the method of implementing parallel passages to deduce articles of faith:

> all the plain texts relating to one subject or article ought to be taken together, impartially considered, the expressions of one of them restricted by those of another, and explained in mutual consistency, and that article deduced from them, all in conjunction; not as has been most commonly the practice, one set of texts selected, which have the same aspect, explained in the greatest possible rigour, and all others which look another way, neglected or explained away, and tortured into a compatibility with the opinion, in that manner partially deduced.[46]

Inasmuch as Jenkyns commends Terrot's notes to his students,[47] it seems reasonable to deduce Jenkyns' approval for the above description of the right use of parallel passages in scripture.

Van Mildert most clearly summarizes the particular principles which form the rules for interpretation by means of parallel passages.[48] In the case of passages of doubtful meaning: (1) obscure passages are to be explained by clear passages; (2) doubtful, by those beyond doubt; (3) passages of minor consideration are to be regulated by the requirements of the great, leading principles of the Christian covenant.[49] Van Mildert also neatly summarizes cautions for this method[50] which are reviewed by Jenkyns throughout the course of his discussion of Ernesti: (1) It is essential not to confound real with seeming analogies. (2) The interpreter is not to rely on mere verbal resemblances when the sense of a passage may require a different application of analogous passages. (3) One must not interpret passages which are parallel in one respect only as being parallel in all senses. (4) One must not accord such weight to parallel

passages as to override the clear and evident meaning of the test under consideration. (5) One must not allow an eagerness to multiply proofs to betray the interpretation of a particular passage by the neglect of the immediate context of the passage in question.

3. There remains to be considered those alternative approaches to the interpretation of scripture which existed for biblical interpreters of the early nineteenth century and which were seen by some to provide, in the words of Jenkyns, 'short cuts' to the understanding of scripture.[51] Of these, Jenkyns treats four which most frequently appear in the current discussions of his orthodox contemporaries:[52] (a) the authority and teaching of the Church; (b) tradition and the Fathers; (c) the claim to an inward light; and (d) the use of unaided reason.

(a) The principle of the use of authority and the teachings of the Church as the determining factor in biblical interpretation constitutes, according to Jenkyns, the position of Rome.[53] Here his insights are certainly grounded in the Reformation tradition. The Roman process, as Jenkyns describes it, is not one in which the Church lays down an absolute sense for each biblical passage. Rather, the Church governs interpretation and orders the understanding of revelation in a negative fashion. She extracts general doctrines from the Word of God and forbids interpretations of passages from scripture which contravene these doctrines. It is difficult, at first sight, to perceive the distinction between such an approach and the application of the Analogy of Faith as it is commended by Ernesti despite the fact that his methods are based on linguistic analyses designed to promote the literal and systematic interpretation of scripture by scripture. It would seem that the key to the distinction is to be found in two aspects of the Roman doctrine:

In the first place, Rome includes in the canon of doctrines not to be contravened some doctrines which non-Roman theologies see as being open to question (e.g., the doctrine of clerical celibacy, or perhaps, the doctrine of episcopacy) because they cannot be proved conclusively and

exclusively from scripture. Rome holds such doctrines to be binding on the faithful as articles of salvation; an interpretation of scripture which contradicted such doctrines would necessarily, therefore, be subversive to the Gospel. A Reformation understanding of such doctrines, in contra-distinction to Rome, cannot hold them to be binding on the faithful; to do so would be to superimpose a human requirement on the divinely revealed necessities of salvation. Such an act amounts, as Jenkyns would see it, to dictating to God and partakes in a form of idolatry because it substitutes human for divine wisdom.

In the second place, there is the question of the Roman use of authoritative oral tradition. The Roman theory of scripture makes use of this principle in the definition of doctrine. The theory of authoritative tradition admits a body of revealed truth which is not recorded in scripture. Doctrines derived from such tradition, therefore, cannot be proved from scripture although they can negatively describe the interpretations of scripture. The use of such traditions, and the definitions of doctrine dependent upon them, were explicitly denied by the Reformation and are abjured, according to Jenkyns' understanding of Article VI, by the Church of England.

Jenkyns understands the proper role of the Church to be, not the confined and infallible interpretation of scripture, but the teaching of the religious truth for which the infallible source of appeal is scripture.[54] What Jenkyns is advocating is what Edward Hawkins describes and commends as the use of unauthoritative tradition: 'unauthoritative tradition serves as an introduction to Christian doctrines rather than as a confirmation or interpretation of them'.[55] The theory is that it may have been

> the general design of Heaven that by early oral, or traditional, instruction the way should be prepared for the reception of the mysteries of faith; that the Church should carry down the system, but the Scriptures should furnish all the proofs of the Christian doctrines; that tradition

> should supply the Christian with the arrangement, but the Bible with all the substance of divine truth. [In short], that the Church should teach, and the Scriptures prove, the doctrines of Christianity.[56]

(b) An appeal to tradition and to the Fathers for the rules of interpretation actually constitutes a longer and less assured route to the truths of scripture. The writings of the Fathers are copious; their statements are often inconsistent; they do not all always agree in their conclusions. For these reasons, they do not constitute a uniformly reliable guide to the scriptures. Furthermore, the language of the Fathers is as difficult as that of the scriptures. For all these reasons, rules of interpretation are necessary for an understanding of the Fathers themselves.[57] To use tradition and the Fathers as the determining factor in interpreting scripture is to compound one complicated and rule-bound exercise with another.

Beyond all these objections rests the basic fact that the Fathers are themselves but interpreters of revelation. They are useful to modern interpreters only insofar as their understanding of scripture bears out the truths therein: the conclusions of the Fathers cannot themselves be normative for scripture but must be continually referred back to and confirmed by their basis in scripture.[58]

Some of Jenkyns reservations concerning the use of tradition and the authority of the Fathers may have been intensified by the excesses of the Tractarians. They virtually made a doctrine of patristic authority, with the concomitant error of according definitive authority to the opinions of the fourth century to the subordination of those of earlier centuries, or even of scripture itself.[59]

(c) The claim to the guidance of an inward light as the rule of scriptural interpretation is nothing less than a claim to divine inspiration itself. Such a claim requires proof for its authority in the witness of prophecy and miracle. Such proofs are lacking for all interpreters but the Apostles.[60] The extraordinary gifts of the Spirit (viz., that of divine and direct inspiration) ceased with the death

of the last Apostle.[61] Jenkyns' views on this point no doubt reflect the antipathy and fear which characterized the attitudes of establishment orthodoxy toward all forms of 'enthusiasm',[62] as well as the English Reformers' rejection of anabaptist fanaticism.

(d) The use of reason alone in the interpretation of scripture is the denial of the validity of revelation altogether.[63] If human reasoning were sufficient to the acquisition of all biblical truth, there need never have been a revelation in the first place. The disastrous implications for Christianity of such a theory of human reason are made very apparent in the results of the Deist controversies of the eighteenth century.[64] If, furthermore, an interpreter is permitted to pick and choose among the tenets of revelation, accepting those which accord with human wisdom and rejecting all others, the validity of revelation is again impugned: 'In investigating the contents of revealed religion, some things may and will be found difficult and obscure; but they are not to be rejected on that account, for if we could see everything clearly, a revelation would be unnecessary'.[65] If revelation is made thus subservient to reason, it is the god and truth of the human mind that are served, not the God of Abraham, Issac, and Jacob. The true role of reason in the interpretation of Scripture is 'to investigate Scripture and truth diligently, and when it has found the meaning of the Word then implicitly to receive and obey it'.[66] In another place, Jenkyns says:

> If the deductions of Reason contradict revelation, what is to be done?
>
> 1st Real truths of both natural and revealed religion will never be at variance . . .
>
> If the deductions of reason cannot after repeated examination be found faulty--the evidence for the revelation must be reexamined and then if no flaw can be detected there, the deductions of reason must give way--for the revelation depends on the actual evidence we have for it, while the deductions of reason depend on the capacity for reasoning, and Man is far better able, to

> judge of the truth of the evidence of facts, than to trace true deductions by his reasoning powers.--
>
> An unshaken body of evidence therefore, for the revelation must overbear the deductions of reason.[67]

The good interpreter of the scriptures will make use of all of the above approaches to his study, taking the influence of the Spirit to be the inward teaching of the Holy Spirit. He will discipline himself properly to subordinate all of these tools to the scriptures themselves.[68]

4. Conclusions. It is clear from Jenkyns' exposition of the interpretation and criticism of scripture that he intends to commend in his students a thirst for the truths made available through consistent and unbiased scholarship. One can see why the student is to approach the scriptures without bigoted preconceptions, on the one hand, and that he is to submit to the dictates of revelation, on the other: indeed, it is assumed that true submission to revelation will and ought to break the intellectual chains of doctrinal prejudice. Such intellectual feedom can only derive from and be assured by the internal guidance of the Holy Spirit. The endurance of such a tension as is created by a commitment to scholarly honesty and, at the same time, to the conviction of Christian truth (which must always be conditioned, to a greater or lesser degree, by the system of denominational doctrine one espouses) surely requires that diligience and docility inform the interpreter's perceptions of scriptural truth. Jenkyns' critical acumen was modified by the disabilities of his time--a pre-critical or merely nascent understanding of history and an approach to scripture which was untempered by the results of the beginning New Criticism; but he was clearly committed to the principles and necessities of intellectual honesty as he understood them.

Indeed, Jenkyns could be said to have participated, if only in a limited way, in the modern dilemma: the dual claims of a belief in revealed truth and the acknowledged validity of rational inquiry. Perhaps it is only the

smugness of hindsight which makes him appear less successful in his efforts, or less committed to the freedom of intellectual inquiry, than his twentieth-century counterparts. Certainly some of his contemporaries (e.g., Hampden and Arnold) broke the mold of eighteenth-century thought more completely; certainly Jenkyns' approach to the interpretation of scripture, the definitions of doctrine, and the interrelationship between faith and reason represents the mainstream of High Church orthodoxy. But each man must labour according to his own capacity, and Jenkyns' capacity was not insignificant; nor is orthodoxy in theology to be despised.

Article VII (pp. 169-78).

The essential purpose of this article, 'Of the Old Testament', is to assert the non-contrariety of the scriptures (p. 170). From the beginning of Christianity--that is, from the early days of Jesus' ministry--the continuity between the Old and New dispensations has been disputed, on the one hand, and proved, on the other. The scribes and Pharisees accused Jesus of abrogating the Law; of being a blasphemer and a false prophet. The writers of the New Testament went to great lengths to demonstrate that Jesus in his personal mission was the fulfilment of the Law; the Epistles are full of references intended to show that the Christians of the New dispensation are the true people of God, the true Israel, the inheritors of the Old Covenant. The problem arose because it appeared that the two approaches to salvation--that advocated by the Old Testament and that preached by the Gospel--were contradictory: the one asserting salvation through the Law; the other, through the person and message of Jesus Christ. The Jews were the first to assert this radical discontinuity of message, and they, therefore, proclaimed the invalidity of the Christian Gospel. There were groups who felt themselves to be within the New dispensation who also insisted upon a radical discontinuity of revelation between the Old and New Testaments. Some such of these were, at an early date, the antinomians of 2 Corinthians, the Marcians of the second century, and Manicheans of the fourth century; at a later date, among others, the

antinomian anabaptists of the post-Reformation period.[69] These Christians, in their turn, rejected the validity of the Old Testament. But there were also Christian groups who argued that the full demand of Mosaic Law continued to be made upon those of the new dispensation: the Judaising Christians condemned by Paul in Acts and elsewhere are an early example of such an emphasis; the more extreme Puritans (according to Jenkyns), a post-Reformation example in the Anglican Communion.

Article VII records the Church of England's judgment in this dispute: 'If the Old and New Testaments are independent and unconnected we can easily imagine they would disagree, but if we look on them as closely united and forming the two parts of one great scheme we cannot imagine so' (p. 172). That is to say, the Church of England asserts that the Old and New Testaments convey the same message of salvation, although each Covenant had its own emphasis: the Law in the Old, Jesus Christ in the New. Thus this article states two propositions: (1) that the Old Testament teaches salvation through Christ (i.e., that everlasting life is offered among the promises of the Old Covenant and that Jesus Christ is the mediator thereof--p. 172) and (2) that, while the New Testament does not bind Christians to Jewish ritual and civil law, it does bind them to the moral law as it is revealed in the Old Testament (p. 175).[70] The article also gives two corollaries to these propositions: (a) that the Old Fathers (i.e., Old Testament patriarchs) looked to the Covenant for more than merely transitory promises (p. 172);[71] and (b) that the moral law commended by English Reformers is (as Jenkyns interprets the article) greater in scope than the tenets summarized in the Decalogue.

1. The Old Testament teaches the Gospel. Jenkyns offers as proof of the first proposition and its corollary many citations from both the Old and New Testaments, but only the general observations of his argument are treated here. (a) Eternal life is offered under the terms of the Old Covenant: 'In the Old Testament there is abundant proof that it was intended to lead to something else-- [the OT] was by no means complete in itself but connected with some great

deliverance that was to follow' (p. 172). Burnet provides a lengthy discussion of the evidence from the Old Testament which shows there to be a continuous thread of the hope of eternal life running through its history.[72] (b) The article does not deny that the rewards offered by the Covenant in the Old Testament were chiefly temporal,[73] but it does assert that the reward of eternal life was also offered therein (p. 170). The fact, however, that eternal rewards were offered under the Old Covenant does not necessarily mean that they were comprehended, as indeed they were not, by the majority of the people who lived under that Covenant (p. 170).[74] Article VII does not mean to say that the Old Fathers comprehended the whole scheme of salvation, but only that they looked beyond the merely temporal blessings promised by a literal understanding of the Mosaic Covenant (p. 171). (c) Finally, the article affirms that the only purveyor of salvation and eternal reward in both Old and New Testaments is Jesus Christ (p. 170). For proof of this assertion, Jenkyns cross refers to his lectures on previous articles, presumably to his discussion of Article II. The basic premise of such proof is summarized by Burnet: 'that the Messiah for whom the Jews looked is the Lord Jesus Christ'.[75] The substance of the Scriptural passages to prove the above three propositions (pp. 172-4) intends to show that the Old Testament and the New are parts of the same whole; that parts of the Old Testament refer to a life after death; that redemption by Christ was preached to Abraham; and that 'there is no doubt that at Christ's coming the ordinary faith of the Jews was, a belief in a future state[76] of rewards and punishments. The Sadducees were an exception, proving the existence of the rule' (p. 174).

2. The Christian obligation to moral law. Jenkyns moves on to the proof of the second major proposition in the article, which he subsumes under three points (p. 175): (a) the abolition of the ceremonial laws, (b) the abolition of the civil laws, and (c) the continual obligations of the moral law. He argues that points (a) and (b) may be coalesced, since Scriptural proofs of the one will also prove the other (p. 175). To whit, Old Testament passages are cited

first which prophesy, while the Law is still in effect, the eventual abolition of the system;[77] then New Testament passages are cited to show that such prophecies of the abolition of the Law had been fulfilled.[78]

Before discussing Jenkyns' third point, the continuing obligation of the moral law, it is necessary to consider his discussion of the nature of moral law and its relationship to the Decalogue (corollary 'b' above). Jenkyns acknowledges that various definitions of the moral law exist, none of which is really sufficient. The first problem, then, is to arrive at a definition of the moral law sufficient to the discussion of Article VII, and he suggests that the best way to do so is to collect several opinions on the subject (p. 171):

> I. That it is that which is written in the Conscience.
> II. That it is found in the eternal distinction of right and wrong, instead of on expediency.
> III. That it is that law of which we can see the reason (Butler).
> IV. Those laws which are universally applicable to all men, not confined to one time or nation.

The second problem is to determine whether or not the article means 'moral law' to be synonymous with the 'Ten Commandments' and 'whether each separate Commandment was looked upon by the Reformers as a moral law' (p. 171). The interpretation that Jenkyns endorses is that (1) the Reformers used the words 'moral law in a signification which is wider than that of the Ten Commandments; that they meant to signify 'that which is written on the conscience, and that founded on the distinction between right and wrong' (p. 171-2). (2) He further concludes, therefore, that the article does not point to the Decalogue as the exclusive source of Christian moral tenets (p. 172).

(c) To return to the question of the continuing obligations of the moral law for Christians: Jenkyns observes that it may be argued that the passages he has cited to prove from scripture that the ritual and civil laws of the Old Testament are abrogated for Christians may also be

adduced to prove the abrogation of all law (p. 176). He concedes that the onus probandi rests with the Church to show that the moral law was excepted from the general abolition of the Old Testament system of Law in the New Testament. To this purpose, two arguments are offered: (1) Jesus Christ himself corrected and amended the moral law to the effect of enlarging and enforcing it. The examples from scripture which provide the warrants for this statement are the Sermon on the Mount and the Summary of the Law. (2) The Apostles and disciples appealed to the commandments of the moral law: for example, in Ephesians 6.2; Romans 13.10; and James 2.8. One must conclude, therefore, that the moral law continues to bind Christians (p. 176).

How then, askes Jenkyns, does it happen that the moral law is maintained under the New Covenant while the ritual and civil laws are abandoned? The answer lies in the fact that the obligations of the ritual and civil laws do not rest upon the same foundation as that of the moral law. The foundation of the former is the positive law;[79] whereas the latter has an antecedent foundation in the nature of things: it

> was founded on the distinction between right and wrong, written in the conscience etc. and existed long before Moses, in fact was from the beginning of Creation--and so not receiving its sanction from Moses it did not share the fate of his law. As it had stood before, so it stood after and will stand forever. This therefore forms the distinction between that part of the law which is abrogated and that part which is still binding on Christian men (p. 177).

Burnet has a good discussion[80] of this distinction, in which he points out that one of the chief criticisms made by Jews against the New Testament is that, while acknowledging that the Old Testament comprehends God's revelation, it repeals most of the laws enacted therein.[81] Burnet goes on to observe that the positive law of the Old Testament, though ordained by God and protected by divine interdict

from alteration or repeal by man, did not 'rob the Lawgiver' of 'all the authority that naturally belongs to him, over his own laws':[82] that is to say that God, in the person of Jesus Christ and in the message of the Gospel, remains free to change his own prohibitions as he deems fit. It is really this consciousness of the sovereign free will of God which underlies the arguments of both Jenkyns and Burnet on this question of the abrogation of the Law.

Jenkyns concludes his discussion of Article VII with the observation that it is one of the articles which is directed against Protestant, rather than Roman, errors. The errors against which it points--namely, against those of the antinomians who asserted, on the one hand, that Christians were free from all obligations of the Law; and those of the Puritans (among others) who asserted, on the other, that the entirety of the Mosaic Law pertains in perpetuity--were not among those errors perpetrated by Rome.

3. The Christian use of the Old Testament. Before moving on to Jenkyns' discussion of Article VIII, it is useful to consider what hermeneutical purposes the Old Testament served in Jenkyns' understanding of Christian doctrine. Specifically, it is necessary to ask to what extent Christian doctrine was seen to repose on the authority of the Old Testament.

One begins with some preliminary observations: (1) The theology course at Durham nowhere includes a consideration of the Old Testament per se as a field of study, although it presumably provided the text for those students who were required to study Hebrew. (2) The study of Hebrew did not come under the purveyance of the Professor of Divinity, nor did Jenkyns include a treatment of the Old Testament among those lectures which were explicitly required of him by the theological program. (3) He considers only the New Testament in his lectures treating of the interpretation and criticism of the scriptures, and his specifically exegetical lectures embrace only the New Testament epistles. (4) The only series of Sunday Lectures given by Jenkyns which seems specifically to deal with the Old Testament was entitled 'The History of the Pentateuch'.[83] Since there are

no surviving notes of these lectures, it is impossible to know their content: they may have dealt with the emerging source criticism of the Old Testament; or, which is more likely, this title may simply have been an alternative title for the series of Sunday Lectures attested in the corpus of student notes under the title of Prophecy (and Miracle)[84] or in the week-day lectures on Evidences.[85] If this latter suggestion is indeed the case, then these lectures did not properly concern the Old Testament itself, but rather had as their goal the demonstration of the Old Testament as a ground for the authority of and claim to divine inspiration in the New Testament.

All of these considerations lend support to the contention that the theology of the Old Testament as such was not seen to be important in the early nineteenth-century English understanding of Christian doctrine in general or in that understanding as it was comprehended at the University of Durham in particular. Between the years 1800 and 1825 there was among the English clergy a general indifference to learning (which said indifference it was the hope of the founders of Durham to rectify), an ignorance of German and the rejection of the rising new criticism in Germany. Under the influence of the French Revolution, theologians tended to rally traditional teaching against the rising tide of infidelity. One of the chief blocks to scholarship was the theory of the plenary inspiration of the Bible.[86] The result of these attitudes was to make a critical treatment or an historical understanding of the Old Testament virtually impossible; the chief purpose to which considerations of the Old Testament (viz., treatments of miracle and prophecy) were put, was to provide evidence of the truth of Christianity and proof of the inspiration of Scripture.[87] It was, of course, necessary to prove that the Old Testament was true and inspired in order to support such claims for the New Testament, inasmuch as the latter claimed a dependence upon and succession to the former. One demonstrated the truth and inspiration of the New Testament by showing that the message and events therein contained had been foretold in the Old Testament. To close the circle, one demonstrated the truth and

inspiration of the Old Testament by arguing that the validity of its prophecies was borne out by the fulfilment of the New Testament events.[88]

Scholarly ground in the area of a critical approach to the Old Testament was perhaps first broken by the publication of Alexander Geddes' Critical Remarks on the Hebrew Sriptures, corrseponding with a New Translation of the Bible (1800). Geddes argued that the Pentateuch in its present form could not be of Mosaic authorship,but rather was the result of editorial compilation. He also argued that the claim to inspiration could not be limited to Jewish scriptures, and that many of the difficulties of the Old Testament would disappear if scholars ceased to treat it as an absolutely unique piece of literature which was fenced about with divine prohibitions.[89] But Geddes' work had little influence on English scholarship.

John Davidson gave the Warburtonian lectures of 1819-20, entitled The Nature of Prophecy. In these lectures he contributed to the break down of pre-critical attitudes to the Old Testament: (1) He attacked the fanciful treatments of the prophets which frequently typified evangelical exegesis. (2) Most important, he made a careful study of the structure and scope of Old Testament prophecy, and he concluded that prediction was only one element of prophecy, not its sole end and purpose. He therefore concluded that it was a mistake to try to find a Christian reference in every Old Testament prophecy. Twentieth-century theologians feel that Davidson continued to lay too much stress on prophetic prediction and its fulfilment as a test of inspiration; nevertheless, his understanding of prophecy as an organic movement, distinct unto itself and with an internal integrity, was a great step forward for Old Testament criticism in England.[90]

Finally, a consideration of Thomas Arnold's innovations in the field of Old Testament study brings the history of such scholarship into direct parallel with the period in which Henry Jenkyns was teaching at Durham. It must be borne in mind that Arnold and Jenkyns had at one time been close friends; that Jenkyns was chosen for the post at

Durham because his scholarly views agreed with those of mainline orthodoxy, while the views of Thomas Arnold were greatly feared in and condemned by that camp (as well as in others).

Arnold had learned from Niebuhr the principles of scientific, historical criticism, and he saw that these principles had to be applied to biblical criticism if the discipline were to have any integrity in the general field of contemporary scholarship.[91] His understanding of prophecy as it developed under the influence of the critical method is of particular interest here: Prophecy is not an anticipation of history; it is a process the intention of which is to fix attention on the interaction of certain general principles in the nature of man and the world--good and evil, truth and falsehood, God and the Devil.[92] Prophecy, rightly understood, is the voice of God speaking to mankind of the issues that engage all men at all times;[93] it is, therefore, impossible to trace historically the fulfilment of prophecy: (1) Prophecy 'was not properly applicable to any earthly nation, from the imperfection of all human things'. (2) 'Even that character of imperfect good and evil which made certain nations the representatives, so to speak, of the principles of good and evil themselves, was not and could not be perpetuated'; therefore, where in successive generations a change occurred for good or evil, there prophecy could not be fulfilled, as in the case, for example, of Jonah and Nineveh.[94]

Arnold came under severe attack because, to the orthodox party, he seemed in his views to impugn the divine authority and inspiration of the scriptures. Because he denied the principle of plenary or verbal inspiration, he was credited with denying that the Bible, in this case specifically prophecy, was the record of God's converse with man. To deny such a strict connection between scripture and the Word of God seemed tantamount to denying that Jesus <u>is</u> the Word of God. Arnold steadfastly maintained his understanding of prophecy despite its misinterpretation in the mouths of his critics; and, for all the apparent unorthodoxy of his critical method, his conclusions were

certainly orthodox: Jesus Christ is the real subject of all prophecy for good because he alone fulfills the condition of unmixed goodness in manhood. He alone is the vindication in the affairs of men of the goodness of God: the resurrection is the justification of all prophecy.[95]

4. Conclusions. Against the flowing tide of such innovative scholarship, Jenkyns rode the high water of the traditional interpretation of the Old Testament and its place in the study of Christianity. The chief purpose of the lectures on Prophecy is to demonstrate the authority and inspiration of the New Testament, and prophecy is seen to be a species of historical prediction.[96] After a brief introduction, the lectures are devoted to tracing the promised New Testament dispensation in the forecasting and foreshadowing of the prophets. 'Prophecy is a pillar of divine truth'. A series of prophecies sets forth the fact that a future revelation is to be made; such a revelation is recorded in the New Testament, thus showing that the prophecy has been fulfilled. Two consequences result: (1) a revelation thus attested is demonstrably a true revelation (because a fulfilled revelation); (2) a revelation thus attested as true must be demonstrably a revelation from God.[97] A proper understanding of prophecy, therefore, assures the validity of the Christian message while at the same time showing its authority to be firmly based in divine inspiration.

It was the rise of scientific inquiry in the eighteenth century which forced the proofs of Christian truth claims and claims to divine inspiration back upon prophecy.[98] The rise of biblical criticism in the nineteenth century seemed to reinforce the attacks of the physical sciences on the authenticity and unity of the Bible.[99] And Hume's attack on miracle had entirely vitiated that line of argument for the purposes of authenticating the Christian message. It is interesting that Jenkyns says that the Christian claims to authenticity cannot be made to rest (or to rise or fall) on any single kind of evidence, and that the validity of Christianity does not depend on the evidence of miracles.[100]

It is perhaps indicative of a nascent critical awareness in Jenkyns that he does not attribute all prophecies to the prediction of the Christian revelation; certainly it relieves him from some of the more fanciful interpretations that were prevalent in his era. He says that prophecy can be 'divided into two heads, 1st, those which relate to Christianity, and 2nd, those which do not. The first confirms our faith as they did that of the holy men of old. The second belonged to them [the holy men] alone'.[101]

In his discussion of the evidence for Christianity, Jenkyns makes these general comments on the Old Testament:

> The contents of the O.T. books plainly agree with what was given by [Christ], they are in fact preparations for it--The Founders of [Christianity] appealed to them--from then the coming of [Christ] may plainly be seen foretold and prefigured by a chain of Types and prophecies, so circumstantial that the searcher of the O.T. must conclude that a Saviour was to come--
>
> To see this clearly, the Types and Antitypes must be compared and then we shall see that the [Christian] scheme was figured and has been preparing from the beginning.
>
> From this Enquiry both the Old and New dispensations are proved true--for
>
> The Jewish Scheme is true else its predictions would not have been fulfilled and
>
> The [Christian] Scheme is true else it would not have been foretold.
>
> [Some of the underlining in this passage probably reflects the revision of the student, rather than the particular emphasis of lecture delivery.][102]

Jenkyns summarizes the relationship between the Old and New Testaments in this way: 'Thus we have from the O.T. successive revelations commencing with the beginning of the world--and finally from the N.T. the concluding and principal revelation--i.e. of Christ' (again, the underlining in the passage probably reflects student revision).[103]

The point to this excursus is to demonstrate that, while the advances to theological scholarship made available

by the use of modern biblical criticism were just beginning to percolate through English theological endeavor, Jenkyns' more conservative approach was in the main line of the dominant orthodox opinion on biblical exegesis. He was on the cusp of waning and waxing eras of scholarship. It is possible with hindsight to chafe at the fact that he did not seem much to participate in the theological pioneering of his day, especially when one considers the degree of his personal acquaintance with some of the innovators among his contemporaries. But it is also necessary to reflect that he lived in uncertain times when the winds of changing theological thought and religious insight blew in contrary directions: it is difficult for the most gifted helmsman to steer a true course in a whirlwind. And we may recall the albeit prosaic wisdom of Pope's couplet:

> Be not the first by whom the new are tried
> Nor yet the last to lay the old aside.

Furthermore, it must be acknowledged that Jenkyns' lectures on biblical criticism (of either Testament) were in a degree innovative in themselves, and the decision to offer them at all was a matter of his personal choice: The lectures on Prophecy and the Evidences of Christianity were among the series of Sunday Lectures, of which the chosen content and subject was left entirely to his discretion.[105]

Article VIII (pp. 178-80).

Before one can truly appreciate Jenkyns' theological position with regard to the scriptures, one must first understand his attitude toward the ancient symbols of the Church. While he insists throughout his lectures on the Thirty-nine Articles that scripture is the controlling principle of Anglican dogmatics, his use of scripture is frequently made to serve theological concepts which at least stand apart from if they are not external to the scriptures. He is, of course, essentially unconscious of this hierarchy in his thinking, as well he should be: he stands at the end of a long line of theologians who, while proclaiming the absolute authority of the scriptures, have knowingly and unknowingly allowed non-biblical concepts to govern their perceptions of scripture. In order to understand the nature

of this tradition, it is necessary to give some consideration to the phenomenon of neo-scholasticism before turning to Jenkyns' lectures of Article VIII.

1. Jenkyns' neo-scholasticism. All Christian theology is, in a sense, hermeneutics: it is a continual proclamation of the Word of God in Jesus Christ, and the New Testament is the written repository of that Gospel. But because there are ambiguities in the recorded message; because the Christian community was early confronted with the task of proclaiming that message to peoples of a culture which did not participate in the Hebraic context of the written revelation; because the transcription of the Gospel did not contain, indeed, could not contain explicit responses to questions that arose in post-apostolic generations of Christians, it became necessary that the record of the scriptures be interpreted and reinterpreted in successive ages in order that the Gospel might be proclaimed afresh. As a matter of course, this necessity for interpretation gave rise to varied and divergent renderings of the Gospel; and, where post-apostolic understandings of given aspects of New Testament teachings conflicted, it became necessary that the Christian community discover some authority for doctrine with the voice of which disputes could be settled and divergent interpretations be harmonized. The Bible alone could not be such an authority because it contained within itself the very ambiguities and apparent contradictions which gave rise to doctrinal conflicts. The Church, therfore, looked to the oldest traditions of biblical interpretation. When the traditions failed her on specific points, her leaders came together in councils to reason among themselves in the company of the Spirit, seeking the will of God in doctrinal contention and forging pronouncements which they believed to conform thereto. The creeds, which to the Reformation were recognized as being normative for Christian hermeneutics, are the result of just such councils, and they in time were assimilated to the body of tradition governing the interpretation of scripture. In other words, almost from the beginning of the faith, it was found necessary to bring reason to bear on revelation

and to establish some authority external to the Gospel by which to regulate the conclusions of reason.

In time, the collected tradition of the pronouncements of individual interpreters and of general councils coalesced around an authority parallel to, and frequently independent of, the scriptures: the Church. By the time of the Reformation, it was frequently the case that the Church, rather than the scriptures, was the authority which determined doctrine, and this sometimes to the derogation of the Word and the detriment of the salvific proclamation. The Church, who was born the handmaiden and servant of scripture, had become mistress of the Gospel. Such a reversal in the hierarchy was not the intention of the pre-Reformation Church, but it was the de facto situation in the Church which had developed with the accretions of time.

It was the function of the Reformers to right again the ark of salvation and to bring the people of God back into a proper relationship with the Gospel: to make the faithful subservient to the Word and only to the Word. In order to break the bonds in which Church and tradition held the Gospel, the Reformers insisted that scripture alone provided the normative authority for all Christian life and doctrine. It was Luther's intention that believers be able to confront the scriptures in radical freedom, but he never allowed himself to recognize that it was possible for scripture to be read in different ways; he, therefore, refused to suggest any guidelines whereby to relate the truths contained in scripture to the truths which are apparent elsewhere.[106] He provided for those who followed him no checks against the obscurantism which must arise if revealed truth must be held in isolation from the truths of human reason, and he refused to recognize that such obscurantism is damaging to the Christian faith.

Melanchthon, Luther's disciple, was sensitive to this problem in his master's demand for sola scriptura, and his attempts to deal with it resulted in yet a new rationalizing of the radical Reformation faith. Melanchthon continued to insist, as Luther had done, on the absolute authority of scripture, but he altered the concept. By arguing

that Christian theology and the scriptures, if not rational, are at least understandable and openly intelligible to reason and, therefore are open to the judgment of reason; Melanchthon blurred Luther's distinction between faith and doctrine, between scripture and the statements in which faith is expressed. Authority once again came to be viewed doctrinally and was once again subjected to a rigorous systematization.[107] The result of this process was Protestant neo-scholasticism.

In neo-scholasticism, as in medieval scholasticism, reason establishes its own rule of thumb, and this rule is to be found in the creeds. The creeds, in combination with a corpus doctrinae which may be variously defined (one calls to mind Van Mildert's 'basic elements of the Christian Gospel), are placed along side the scriptures are a doctrinal authority. The scriptures become assimilated to the creeds, and the creeds which were formulated as a summary of the scriptures become themselves the rules by which the interpretation of the scriptures is controlled.[108]

It is within the context of a neo-scholastic tradition that Jenkyns considers the three creeds--the Nicene, the Athanasian, and the Apostles--which are endorsed by the Church of England in Article VIII. This use of the creeds as a controlling factor in the definitions of theology is most apparent in Jenkyns' exposition of the first five of the Thirty-nine Articles (pp. 33-148). Although he supports his arguments in these expositions with the usual biblical proof-tests, the doctrines touching God the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost which he defends are those defined in the ancient creeds rather than in scripture. His understanding of the Trinity is controlled by the tradition of theological definition, and he has recourse to scripture more often to defend than to determine these definitions. The relationship is generally true for all of Jenkyns' teaching. It is for this reason that Jenkyns' discussion of Article VIII is treated here as part of his doctrine of scripture. In order to complete one's understanding of Jenkyns' doctrine of scripture, it is necessary to consider his explanation of the function of the creeds. But, while his intention in theory

to make all doctrine subservient to scripture must be recognized, it is apparent that in practice his treatment of the scriptures frequently serves doctrine.

2. Article VIII, 'Of the Three Creeds'. Jenkyns begins his discussion of this article with a comment on the order of its appearance among the Thirty-nine: 'An article on the Creeds comes in very naturally after one asserting the all sufficiency of Scripture' (p. 178), since the authority of the creeds derives from their dependence upon scripture. Some Christians reject the creeds because of the principle of the all sufficiency of the scriptures, but this is not the position of the Church of England. She continues to acknowledge the authority of the creeds, not because of any authority intrinsic to them or because of their antiquity, but because they 'can be proved by scripture': 'A creed is not inconsistent with the absolute authority of scripture, because it depends not on itself but on Scripture of which it is merely an abstract'.[109]

The creeds contain all the particulars of the doctrine of the Trinity,[110] the proof of which need not be rehearsed in this lecture since it has been treated in the discussions of the first five articles (p. 179). For this reason, Jenkyns devotes himself here to some general comments (a) on the interpretation of the creeds and the strictures placed on their interpretation by Article VIII. (b) He also discusses the presuppositions of the creeds, in some of the Sunday Lectures, thereby tacitly acknowledging the contribution of rational theology ('natural religion') to the formulation of the creeds. (c) Finally, he gives some brief account of the three creeds acknowledges by the Church of England and concludes with some remarks on the anathemas of the Athanasian Creed.

(a) The creeds are tangentially useful to the Protestant position on doctrine in terms of the light they shed on the question of oral tradition.[111] They indicate that no doctrines requisite to salvation were omitted from the written record of the New Testament. Jenkyns supports this assertion with these arguments: Any articles of faith which might have been orally committed to the Apostles

would surely have been included in the creeds. Since the creeds contain no articles of faith (indeed, nothing at all) which are not also found in the New Testament, it is clear that there are no articles essential to salvation which are not contained in the written record of the Gospel.[112]

Article VIII says that the creeds are to be received by the faithful because 'they may be proved by most certain warrants of Holy Scripture'. The article does not say that the creeds are to be received only 'so far as they are agreeable to Scripture--but because they are agreeable' to scripture.[113] They are not, therefore, 'to be explained away according to any man's notions of Holy Scripture':[114] the position of the Church of England is that the creeds are proved by scripture, and anyone who otherwise interprets article VIII perverts its meaning (p. 178). It is helpful to recall at this point Jenkyns' discussion of Article VI, and the explanation he gives there of the concept of doctrines which are 'agreeable to Scripture': The clause 'so that whatsoever is neither read therein, nor proved thereby' does not mean that every article of faith or Christian practice must be found totidem verbes in scripture, but rather that 'whatever is necessary to salvation, can be fairly proved from Scripture by inference and argument' (p. 151). Wherever the meaning of the creeds is obscure, however, 'we may notwithstanding [Article VIII], take what we believe to be the Scriptural meaning' (p. 178).

(b) 'The creed presupposes some knowledge of God, for it does not explain him'.[115] It is the student of natural religion who is best able to provide some account, though an imperfect one, of the nature of God:

> He will say that God must be Eternal--else he must have had a beginning, in [which] case he must have been 'self created'--the idea of self-creation contradicts reason, but the idea of the Eternity of God is only beyond reason--and Revelation here supports the conclusion of reason.[116]

Jenkyns continues his discussion of the creed in terms of the relationship between natural and revealed religion as

it touches the nature of God: The relationship conveyed in the phrase 'God the Father' is not suggested by natural religion but derives from revelation. God is the father of all men inasmuch as he created (but did not beget) them; he is the father of Christians ('our father') because 'we are begotten to a lively hope of salvation'; but in the creeds God is considered only in his capacity of the father of Our Lord Jesus Christ.[117] Natural religion teaches the unity of God (which is discussed by Jenkyns in the lectures on Article I), but the creeds (which are based on revealed truth) teach the trinity of God.[118] God is not revealed to man in the fulness of his nature; he is revealed only 'as is necessary for man's attainment of salvation--God has revealed himself only as far as concerns his relation and doings with men'.[119] Terms which are meant to be descriptive of God--such as 'Father', 'Son', 'Holy Ghost', 'begotten', and 'proceeding'--are inadequate, even though they are 'given by inspiration', because they are drawn from human language: only revelation can teach the Trinity in unity.[120]

(c) The exposition of this article concludes with some brief consideration of the three creeds which it acknowledges: the Apostles', the Nicene, and the Athanasian. Jenkyns recommends Joseph Bingham's Origenes Ecclesiasticae, or the Antiquities of the Christian Church (10 vols, 1708-22) as the best source of information on the creeds.[121]

The Apostles Creed is the creed of the Church of Rome, and its form, though altered in minor details at some point, is of great antiquity (p. 179). The earliest attestation of this present form dates from Rufinus the Presbyter of Aquileia (8th century), although its roots stem from about 400 AD.[122]

The Nicene Creed was composed at the Council of Nicea in 325 AD, enlarged at Constantinople in 381 AD, and was later amended by the Latins (i.e., the Western Church) in the addition of the Filioque (p. 179). Whereas the Apostles Creed is only the statement of a particular part of the Church (because it was used only in the West, and especially in Rome), the Nicene Creed is a creed of the Church Universal because it was drafted by a universal council and

endorsed and used in both the East and West (p. 179). Jenkyns notes that only the Nicene Creed was sanctioned by the Council of Trent, and he finds this curious inasmuch as the Apostles Creed is peculiarly the creed of the Roman Church (p. 180).

The Athanasian Creed is the latest creed, but it certainly is not the composition of St Athanasius. It was composed in Latin rather than in Greek. Waterland (A Critical History of the Athanasian Creed, 1732) attributes it to Hilary of Arles (403-49). The creed is also commonly attributed to Vigilius, Bishop of Thapaus (fl. c. 500). Jenkyns says that the author of the creed was clearly familiar with the Nestorian and Eutychian controversies, which were adjudged at the Council of Chalcedon in 481, and therefore he attributes the date as 'probably beyond doubt . . . some time in the 5th century' (p. 179).[123] The Athanasian Creed has never been sanctioned by a general council (p. 179), nor has it ever been used as a standard faith in the East.

The anathemas or 'Damnatory Clauses' which conclude the creed had long made Anglican theologians uncomfortable, and Jenkyns does his best to alleviate their force. This discomfort arose, at least in part, because the anathemas would seem to condemn to perdition out of hand those who are naturally ignorant of Christianity (through lack of exposure) or who truly could not understand and accept the Christian message.[124] Burnet says of the anathemas:

> There is one great difficulty that arises out of several expressions in this Creed . . . where many explanations of a mystery hard to be understood are made indispensably necessary to salvation; and it is affirmed, that all such as do not so believe must perish everlastingly. To this two answers are made: 1. That it is only the Christian faith in general that is hereby meant. . . . 2. The common answer in which the most eminent men of this Church, as far as memory of all such as I have known could go up, have agreed, is this, that these condemnatory expressions are only meant to be understood to relate to those who, having the

> means of instruction offered to them, have rejected them, and have stifled their own convictions, holding the truth in unrighteousness, and choosing darkness rather than light.[125]

Jenkyns' comments are equally tentative:

> The Damnatory Clauses, are only to warn people that it is a matter of importance what sort of belief they hold--and whatever limitations are to be put on general denunciations against errors of practice, the same limitations are to be placed on these damnatory clauses, against errors of opinion and doctrine. As for instance sin through ignorance, idiocy, etc [p. 180].

Low's lecture notes say that the clauses 'may be taken as merly an affirmation of what is said [in Article] XVI ['Of Sin after Baptism'].[126]

3. Conclusions. Some of the contrasts which Jenkyns draws here between the roles of natural and revealed truth (religion) in (b) above are illuminating for an analysis of his method generally and of the characteristics of Anglican theology through the first part of the nineteenth century in general. The bespeak the Church of England's commitment to the use of reason in the attainment of religious truth, but they also reflect the essentially unacknowledged perpetuation of scholasticism in post-Reformation theology.

The contrast drawn here between the concepts of the here between the concepts of the self-creation of God and the eternity of God is based on the nice distinction between what is 'agreeable to or non-contradictory of reason' and what is 'beyond reason'. It is a distinction that is certainly as old as Aquinas, but it was revified and given a new emphasis in the Reformation. Whereas Gregory of Nazianzus believed the rational deductions from nature to be a part of God's revelation of himself, and Aquinas believed that the theology of revelation built upon the theological truths gained by reason; Luther and Calvin rejected the proposition that natural religion could contribute in any way to the salvific knowledge of God.[127] The scholastics

posited in principle a continuity of being and knowing in God and man. The nexus of natures lay in the moral conscience[128] of man, and the difference between God and man was thought to be one of degree rather than of kind. The Reformers, on the other hand, insisted upon a radical discontinuity of man and God, on an ontological and epistemological distinction between man and God which established a great chasm separating God's knowledge and man's knowledge. God alone is able to know God as he is in himself; man knows God only as God relates to him, and that exclusively from revelation. There is in the Reformation view, especially as developed by Calvin, no place for a contribution to theology from natural religion. Because it maintains a continuity between natural and revealed religion, with its implications for ontology and epistemology, Anglican theology to the time of Jenkyns in this sense retained its origins in pre-Reformation thought. On the other hand, of course, Jenkyns' methodology is neo-scholastic and, thereby, strongly rooted in one form of the Protestant tradition.

Herein Jenkyns exhibits one of the paradoxes of the development of Christian doctrine: the Reformation, archetypically in Luther, adamantly rejected scholasticism, as a consequence of which came the schism with Rome, only to see scholasticism superseded by neo-scholasticism in the second-generation reformers. The extent to which this situation pervaded but went unrecognized in Jenkyns' theological scene is reflected in the opprobrium directed against Renn Dickson Hampden with the publication of his The Scholastic Philosophy, considered in its relations to Christian Theology (Bampton Lectures, 1832).[129]

Again, the succession of the two statements that 'natural religion teaches the unity of God . . .' and that God is revealed only 'as is necessary for man's attainment of salvation . . .' witnesses to the curious intermingling of pre- and post-Reformation attitudes in Anglican theology: on the one hand, the claims for natural religion, that is for the contributions of reason to the knowledge of God; on the other hand, a typically Calvinistic statement concerning

the nature of God's revelation, which in Calvin is intended to deny any real contribution from natural religion.

Recollections and Prognostications.

Jenkyns' beliefs concerning the all sufficiency of scripture, and his understanding and interpretation of that concept, form the basis for all his further theological reflections. It is, therefore, useful here to pause and to recollect the major characteristics of his theological disposition before proceeding to an examination of his teachings in other areas of doctrine. Furthermore, such a recollection will provide a predictive context in which to view Jenkyns' statements concerning other theological themes, such as the role of the Church, her traditions, priesthood, and sacraments; and the means by which the faithful are justified.

To begin, it must be recognized that Jenkyns' theological method stemmed from a neo-scholastic attitude toward religious endeavour. He believed that the content of revelation was propositional, therefore, that Christian truth was available to the virtually exclusive pursuit of reason. Certainly the operations of God were mysterious; clearly his ways and means were beyond man's understanding; but assuredly those truths which he chose to impart concerning his nature conformed to the limitations of the most noble tool with which he had endowed his creatures: reason. And students of the Divinity could be equally certain that God would be patient with their errors and correct their stumblings, by guiding the limited tool of reason if and only if it remained subject to the promptings of his Spirit.

This being the case, the rational pursuit of religious truth was the only means available to man which carried a guarantee of success; but the guarantee pertained only so long as the practitioners recognized the limitations placed on their instrument. In other words, grace was vouchsafed to the Christian community indefectibly in direct proportion to the degree to which that community recognized that its rationalizations were fallible and showed itself prepared to adjust past conclusions in the light of new insights. This

duality of knowing touched all aspects of human religious endeavour, but it did not apply to the clearly revealed 'facts' about God and his salvation as they were recorded in scripture. Therefore, it was necessary continually to reassess all pronouncements of the Church and her traditions which were extrapolations on scripture and to resubmit them to the canon of revelation: the creeds, the decisions of councils, the writings of the fathers, and so on. And the salvation of Christians obliged them to acknowledge and to correct error where it was found. Unfortunately, the process of re-evaluation was handicapped in Jenkyns and his predecessors by an uncritical view of the scriptures (as being homogeneous) and by a precritical understanding of history which resulted in their picking and choosing among the traditions of the Church with less objectivity and thoroughness than they supposed.

Finally, it must be remembered that Jenkyns was an essentially eighteenth-century theologian and the eighteenth century in England was the hey-day of natural religion. Such a disposition naturally resulted in an exaggerated exultation of the rational process in theological inquiry and in a concommitant tendency to submit revelation to the canon of reason. This reversal of canons can hardly be avoided when it is assumed that revelation is, at least, not contradictory to reason and, generally, agreeable to reason. Surely this is the pitfall which confronts all theological endeavour, since theological statements are always an attempt to give coherent intellectual expression to supernaturally revealed truths.

It is a credit to Jenkyns' intellectual honesty, however, that, while he continually commended consistent and unbiased scholarship to his students, he also unfailingly insisted upon the disjunction of human and divine pronouncement and function. Because he feared arrogantly to confuse the frailty of human judgement with the certainty of divine grace: He stresses the human nature of Church, priesthood, and tradition, almost to the apparent exclusion of the possibility of certain divine agency in these spheres. He ruthlessly demands that all traditions of the Church be

measured, judged, and accepted or rejected by a canon of revelation which is rationally conceived as being propositional in content; and he continues to underline the fact that the operation of tradition in the Church, including her confessional statements and offices, is a human process which must be made to submit to the authority of scripture. He sees the justification of man before God as a mystery, the agency of which belongs only to God in Christ; therefore, he disavows all human works in the achievement of salvation, while maintaining that the good works of Christ in men help to sustain them in justification. Ultimately, his attitude toward the sacraments is rather ambivalent: certainly they are a means to grace, channels of grace, and as such they participate in the mystery of revelation. But this much can be said only of the two dominical sacraments: those clearly set forth in scripture. On the other hand, they cannot be explained in a manner which is contradictory to the criteria of reason; therefore, he tends to see the presence of Christ, especially in the Eucharist, in subjective and receptionist terms.

Chapter IV
Doctrine of the Church

Having considered Jenkyns' understanding of the doctrine of scripture (which subsumes, in his view, the creeds), one turns to his account of the doctrine of the Church. His views in this area are developed in his lectures on the following articles of the Thirty-nine Articles of the Church of England: XIX 'Of the church'; XX 'Of the authority of the church'; XXI 'Of general councils'; XXXIV 'Of the traditions of the church'; XXIII 'Of ministering in the congregation'; XXXVI 'Of consecration of bishops and ministers'; XXXVII 'Of civil magistrates'; XXXVIII 'Of Christian men's goods, which are not common'; and XXXIX 'Of a Christian man's oath'. Specifically, the present discussion of Jenkyns' teachings on these articles treats the general theory and definition of the body of the Church and the limits of her authority and action; the theory and practice of general councils; the traditions of the Church; the ordering of Church ministers; and the relationship of Church and State, including the relationship of individual churchmen to the secular state. The chapter concludes with some observations on Jenkyns' doctrine of the Church.

Article XIX (pp. 288-97).

This article, 'Of the Church', gives the Church of England's judgment on the constitution of the catholic Church and the relationships of particular branches of Christendom to that Church. In this context the article defines the visible Church (in an assumed comparison with the invisible Church), the notes of the Church, and the fallibility of the Church. Jenkyns' discussion treats first the Anglican doctrine of the Church, then, more briefly, the Roman doctrine. There are four propositions in the article to be proved (p. 292): (a) God has formed Christians into a body, the Church catholic. (b) The characteristics of this body are (1) the preaching of the pure Word of God and (2) the due administration of the sacraments. (c) The body of the Church catholic is subdivided into parts. (d) The Church of Rome has erred, as have other Churches, in matters of life,

ceremony, and faith.

1. Anglican doctrine of the Church. (a) The Church catholic: It is assumed in the article that God has formed Christians into a body (p. 292), and that the Church is provided for men by God as one of his means for bringing men to salvation (p. 289). The article specifically addresses itself to the visible Church in contrast to the invisible Church, although the concept of the invisible Church is implied in the article (p. 289). There are several senses of invisible Church, any one of which may have been assumed in the article, but the definition which probably pertains is 'all those who will be saved, whether living in time past, present, or future' (p. 289). In any case, the invisible Church consists exclusively of the 'Holy' (i.e., the Elect), and it is not perceivable to the sense (p. 290): this is the Church which is defined in the article 'De Ecclesia' of the Confession of Augsburg as 'all those under [Christ] their head--and this Church is known to God alone' (p. 292). In contrast, the visible Church consists of both good and bad men alike (p. 290) or, again refering to 'De Ecclesia', 'of all who are baptized into [Christ] and have not denied [Christ] and been turned out of this congregation' (p. 292). 'This is the Catholic and Apostolic Church' which embraces all particular branches of the Church in the world (p. 292).

As proof of this proposition, Jenkyns observes that the New Testament records the fact that the Apostles converted people to Christianity and formed them into groups and that such a procedure was ordained by God (p. 292). The Apostles admitted converts to the congregation by Baptism, and the communities 'kept up a memory of [Christ] in the administration of the Lord's Supper' (p. 293). Even in the lifetime of Jesus a kind of order was observed in the communities: 'first the 12 were chosen then the 70' (p. 293).

(b) The notes of the Church: The characteristics of the Church catholic (and, indeed, of any particular community which is a member thereof--p. 291) are the preaching of the 'pure Word of God' and the due administration of the

sacraments (p. 290). 'The whole of the N.T. every page bears witness that it was [Jesus'] revelation that was preached' (p. 293): that is, the Testament itself is proof that the preaching of the Gospel was the 'first great characteristic of this Church' (p. 290). The repeated reference in the New Testament to the iniation into the community by Baptism and to the continual practice of the 'breaking of bread' (p. 293) proves that these two rites at least were among the activities that constituted the 'second' characteristic of the Church (p. 290).

Jenkyns remarks that some of the chief difficulties for the interpretation of Article XIX, however, derive from the questions left open which are tangential to this second proposition. There are possible ambiguities with regard to the precise definition of both of these notes of the Church (pp. 290-1):

(1) The article does not stipulate what constitutes the preaching of the 'pure' Word. It does not indicate whether or not purity is meant to convey the absolute absence of error; or, if there is some error in the preaching such that the Word preached is not 'pure', the article does not determine whether or not such erroneous preaching nullifies the Church. Jenkyns concludes that this latter is evidently not intended by the article to be the case, since the quality of absolute freedom from error cannot possibly accrue to an institution composed of men. The word 'pure', therefore, must be understood to mean 'pure in the main'. Even if such an interpretation is correct thus far, some ambiguities must remain: it is impossible to deduce from the article the limits or degree of error which can be tolerated if the Church is to remain valid.

(2) The article does not stipulate the number of sacraments, and even Article XXV does not deny that there may be more than two. The Thirty-nine Articles define only Baptism and the Eucharist as the 'two great Sacraments', but the Articles nowhere insist that the other five normally recognized by Rome are not also sacraments. This ambiguity makes the Articles, in this respect, patient of either of two extreme interpretations: the ultra-Protestant

understanding which admits only two sacraments and the more catholic understanding which admits of seven. Furthermore, the article does not delimit the 'due administration of the Sacraments': it does not describe what constitutes Christ's ordinance, nor does it define what 'of necessity' pertains thereto. Finally, Article XIX does not indicate by whom--the clergy or the layity--the sacraments are to be administered. If the clergy are intended to be the administrators, the article does not declare how those clergy are to have been set apart for their ministry. If the article assumes a clergy ordained by the authority of an episcopally ordered hierarchy, it does not make clear whether or not such an episcopacy need partake or is understood to partake of apostolic succession;nor does the article indicate that such a succession need or need not to be communicated through Rome.

(c) **Subdivisions of the Church catholic:** The universal Church is subdivided into particular (originally local) communities, each of which may be called a (as opposed to the) Church catholic because it participates in the universal Church: these particular communities are distinguished by the same notes as those of the catholic Church (p. 291). This proposition is proved from the witness of the New Testament, which speaks of the Churches of, among others, Corinth and Ehpesis. Ecclesiastical history also supports the proposition in attesting Churches in such places as Rome, Jerusalem, Antioch, and Alexandria. Both the witness of the New Testament and of ecclesiastical history indicate that these separate communities were all called Churches and that each seems to have managed its own concerns: 'It does not appear that these various Churches acknowledged one central authority, but managed their affairs, for the most part entirely independently, but never, under one authority to which all submitted' (p. 293).

(d) The Church of Rome has erred (p. 294): The main purpose of the last sentence of Article XIX is to insist upon the errors of Rome. If Rome has erred, then her claim to infallibility is defeated. Instead of offering specific proof for the fallibility of Rome,[1] Jenkyns observes that

it rests with Rome to prove her infallibility. The only thing that would constitute such proof would be the clear and evident existence of some special promise given by Jesus Christ to Rome which exempted her from the error which is necessarily entrained in her human frailty. In the obvious and clear absence of such a proof, Rome's claim to infallibility is vitiated, and she is shown to be one individual among other equal individual churches of the body catholic. All promises contained in scripture are addressed to the universal Church, not to the particular Church of Rome.

2. Roman doctrine of the Church. The remainder of Jenkyns' discussion (pp. 294-7) is devoted to the Roman theory of the Church, which is best deduced from the decrees of the Council of Trent. The decrees themselves do not make mention of the doctrine, but the catechism of the Council (summarized in Jenkyns from the 'Douay' edition, published at Newcastle) defines the Church to be 'the congregation of all the faithful under Christ the head and his vicar on earth, the Pope' (p. 295, italics mine). The English Church agrees with the first part of this definition but denies the portion here italicized on two counts: (a) It adds to the notes already agreed upon in the Church of England (i.e., the vicarship of the Pope). (b) It consitutes only one, and that a different one, characteristic of the Church; whereas the Anglican formularies stipulate that there are two. In fact, this single characteristic is invalid as a note of the Church catholic because it is neither revealed in the New Testament, nor is it attested in ecclesiastical history. Indeed, 'the notes or marks of the Church as given by the Romanists are founded on human authority . . . though not all [of them are] objectionable if taken by themselves, yet the explanations given are often such as we could not agree to' (p. 295).

The Douay catechism enumerates four notes of the Church, as do the decrees of the Council of Trent, but the catechism and the Council do not precisely agree (pp. 295-6). The notes listed in the Douay catechism are these (p. 296):

1. The Church is one because all the members are of one faith, communion, and authority.

2. The Church is holy in doctrine and in the teachings which pertain to the principles by which one lives.

3. The Church is catholic because it is universal and to be distinguished from all separate and particular congregations.

4. The Church is apostolic because it is governed by pastors lawfully ordained and successively sent by the Apostles.

The Council of Trent adopted St Augustine's definition of the Church, which is also reflected in the Church of England's 'prayer for all sorts and conditions of men, and in the Bidding prayer' (p. 296): 'The whole congregation of Christian people dispersed throughout the whole world' (p. 297).

Jenkyns also lists the fifteen notes of the Church which are mentioned by Bellarmine.[2] Jenkyns comments (p. 296) on a few among these notes: sanctity of doctrine--'questionable as applied to Rome'; holiness of life--'very questionable'; confession of adversaries--'this is awkward'; temporal felicity of the popes--'? how far the Present Pope has enjoyed it'.

Jenkyns concludes his discussion of Article XIX with this observation (p. 297): There is a distinction to be drawn between a belief in God and a belief in the Church. To believe in God means to believe in his truth as well as in his existence. To believe in the Church means to believe that Christ has a Church on earth and that the members of that Church are bound to believe her in all things on earth.

3. Conclusions. The source of the disagreement between Anglican (chez Jenkyns) and Roman doctrines of the Church is really anterior to the issues Jenkyns has explicitly raised. For practical purposes, Rome identifies the invisible and the visible Church: to a large extent, what is true of one is true of the other; certainly, in questions of faith and morality, the visible, earthly Church of Rome participates in the perfections of and freedom from error enjoyed by the invisible Church. Thus, her theologians can speak of the 'infallibility of the Church'. On the other hand, Jenkyns in this article is always and only talking

about the visible Church. While he asserts the existence of an invisible Church and would probably grant her infallibility, he would never identify the invisible and the visible Churches. He would admit that the invisible Church participates in the visible Church: that is to say, the godly are mingled with the ungodly; but he would never say, as Rome essentially does, that the visible Church is comprehended in the invisible Church. For this reason, the virtues which might be assumed for the invisible Church can not be asserted for the visible Church under any form of the Church catholic: namely, infallibility. Beyond all this, man can never know what pertains to the invisible Church in any event because its character is beyond his ken; therefore, he should not speculate about it. Man can discuss in theology only that which is known: that is, that which is within the realm of human experience; and experience attests to the fact that all parts of the human Church have erred.

Article XX (pp. 297-303).

Just as Article XIX defines the nature of the Church, Article XX, 'Of the authority of the Church,' defines the sphere of her action and the limitations placed on her authority. When this article speaks of the 'Church', it has reference both to the Church catholic as well as to particular Churches and to the Church as she exists in any and all ages. The 'power' of the Church connotes her legislative right Her 'authority' may be with respect to her witness in controversies or to her judicial authority as the adjudicator between litigants: Jenkyns favours this latter understanding of 'authority'.

1. The propositions to be proved. The article contains two propositions to be proved (p. 298): (a) It is the proper function of the Church to issue decrees regarding the regulation of ceremonies and rites. (b) The Church has a proper authority (i.e., a power committed to her) to decide on matters of faith which are disputed between contending parties, but she may not 'make laws on matters of faith'. (c) There are further delimitations on these propositions (p. 298): (1) The clause 'and yet it is not lawful . . .'

limits the powers of the Church to the bounds of what is contained in scripture. That is to say that the Church, even in exercising her proper legislative powers, may not decree ceremonies and rites which contradict the clear dictates of scripture. (2) The clause 'neither may it so expound one place of Scripture, that it be repugnant to another' is probably directed against the Roman doctrine of transubstantiation. (3) Finally, the clause beginning 'wherefore although the Church be a witness and a keeper of holy writ . . .' admits that the Church is a witness to the genuinness of scripture, but she may not assume to herself rights parallel to that of scripture: she may enforce nothing as necessary to salvation except what is contained in scripture. As Jenkyns observes, there is a close association between Articles VI and XX; whereas the former protects scripture from the encroachments of 'Apostolic tradition', the latter protects it from those of the authority of the Church (p. 299).

2. Things asserted in the article. The proof of the article touches the points of the rites and ceremonies of the Church (which Jenkyns treats in his discussion of a subsequent article) and matters of faith. Concerning matters of faith, the article contains three positive and two negative assertions (p. 299). Positively, it asserts that (a) the Church is a witness to the authenticity and integrity of scripture, (b) she is the custodian of scripture, and (c) she has authority to adjudicate in controversies. Negatively, the article asserts that the Church can neither determine anything against scripture, nor can she go beyond scripture in decreeing anything to be necessary to salvation. The first two positive claims are mentioned only incidentally and, therefore, do not need to be proved. The first or the negative assertions 'need not be proved because it is not disputed by Romanists or others,[3] though it is not kept by Romanists; (p. 299). For these reasons Jenkyns proceeds directly to the proofs for the statements (a) that the Church has authority in controversies and (b) that she can enforce as necessary to salvation nothing beyond that which is contained in Holy Scripture.

3. Proofs of the article. One may argue a priori that because the Church is a society 'she must have the ordinary powers that all societies possess [as being] necessary to keep it in existence and to prevent quarrells [sic] etc. from breaking it up . . . Practically we find 'that the New Testament bears witness to the legislative rights of the New Testament Church (p. 300). The Council of Jerusalem is an instance of the New Testament Church exercising this legislative power 'but this Council was composed of inspired members, and so it is objected, that it is not a good precedent' (p. 300). There are, however, 'a number of other instances' of a similar exercise of authority in the New Testament.

One may argue a posteriori from the evidence of ecclesiastical history. As in the case of Montanus, the Churches sometimes called upon their neighbors to assist in adjudication, but for the most part they settled their own disputes. This principle of the local council (i.e., as in the settlement of the Montanist heresy) was later expanded to the convening of general councils.

The proposition that the Church's authority is confined by scripture is really a corollary to the statement in Article VI 'that Holy Scripture contains all things necessary to salvation'. Consequently, the proposition that the Church can enforce nothing beyond scripture has already been proved (p. 301), but it is useful to pursue the question a little further by considering the nature of the inspiration of the scriptures.

4. The nature of inspiration (pp. 301-3). Divine inspiration is necessary to the validity of decrees concerning matters of faith because the truths touching salvation are accessible only through revelation. If God himself does not speak directly to man (presumably through visions, etc.), then he must address man through the medium of human agency. That the founders of Christianity were inspired of God is witnessed in their possession of extraordinary gifts of the spirit: for example, in the ability to work miracles, to prophesy, and to speak in tongues.

The Church can claim an authority and inspiration equal to the Apostles only if such a claim is supported by miracle and prophecy, which is, in fact, not the case. It must be noted that not even Rome claims for the Church an authority equal to that of the Apostles: she claims, not the authority to alter revealed truth, but to interpret and to add to the body of truth revealed in scripture. Her justification for this claimed authority arises from the argument that, inasmuch as the revelation of Jesus was incomplete (p. 302), it is the Church's task to supplement the revelation recorded in the New Testament. The New Testament does record the fact that Jesus said his revelation was incomplete; but he also said that, after his departure, the Apostles would be led into all truth. Such 'language [is] quite inconsistent with the idea of something [of revelation] being left for the [Church to] supply' (p. 302).[4] The Church, therefore, cannot claim to herself even the inferior sort of inspiration for which Rome contends: albeit that she may enforce matters of faith as terms for communion with the visible Church, she may not so assert them as terms of salvation.[5] The Church's judgments carry no more than human authority, and they are therefore limited; nonetheless, they are valuable within the qualifications of the individuals making the judgments: that is to say, considerations such as the universality of base and appeal of the adjudicating body (e.g., local or general council); and the degree of detachment with which decisions are taken (i.e., whether or not decisions are taken with undue reference to party interests, e.g., as in the Latrocinian Council) (p. 303).

5. Conclusions. Jenkyns concludes his discussion of Article XX by reviewing the variations in opinion among Churches of the Reformation on the question of the Church's authority: Some communions accord no authority to the Church in controversies of faith. Others have developed rules defining the authority of the Church which are as dogmatic as those of Rome. The Roman theory of the Church is 'higher' than that of the Church of England because she feels that the Church may add to the truths revealed in

scripture and because she exercises the doctrine of apostolic (oral) authoritative tradition.

Once again, the factor which controls Jenkyns' discussion of authority in the Church is the distinction between the visible and the invisible Church, and it is the visible Church to which he has reference throughout. The visible Church is a human institution. As such, she has no claims to extraordinary divine guidance and inspiration, and she is subject in her activities to the dictates of scripture. While Jenkyns must certainly have believed that God superintends the activities of his Church, he was unwilling on that account to credit the institution with the sovereignty owing only to its author. As a result of his radical commitment to the Lordship of God and his firm belief in the frailty of God's creation, Jenkyns is unwilling to admit anything extraordinary or extramundane in the activities and judgments of the visible Church.

Article XXI (pp. 303-12).

This article, 'Of the authority of general councils', follows in good order on that which defines the authority of the Church, because it is chiefly through the operations of general councils that the Church has exercised her authority (p. 304). In fact, the authority of general councils is limited precisely in the ways in which the authority of the Church herself is limited, because a general council is but a body of the Church. For this reason, the real substance of Article XXI is proved in Article XX; however, Article XXI does make some observations on the specific nature of general councils. The article contains two propositions to be proved: (1) concerning the theory of general councils and (2) concerning the practice of general councils.

1. The theory of general councils. Jenkyns never explicitly states the propostion concerning the theory of general councils, but it may be summarized in a statement such as this: The Church does not have the authority to convene a general body to settle disputes, the decisions of which body are guaranteed by divine inspiration against error. Jenkyns actually discusses this propostion in terms

of the following three assertions (p. 305):

(a) 'General Councils cannot be assembled without the will of princes'.

(b) When they meet, they are fallible.

(c) Because they are fallible, they cannot enforce anything as necessary to salvation except that which is taken from scripture .

The arguments offered as proof of these assertions are developed along these lines (p. 305): (1) Subjects owe allegiance to their sovereigns above all other men.[6] This being the case, such subjects cannot be summoned from the jurisdiction of their sovereign by the authority of another human power. Nothing in the New Testament indicates that the Church was given divine authority to summon councils. General councils can hardly be necessary to the divinely ordained functioning of the Church, since none were convened for the first three centuries after the New Testament period. When general councils were first convened, they were summoned and supported by the authority of the princes. (2) When general councils are convened, they are composed of men, who are, by definition, subject to error; therefore, the decisions of general councils are fallible (p. 306). (3) Articles of salvation must be decreed by infallible authority; therefore, the decisions of a general council cannot bind the faithful as matters of faith which are necessary to salvation (p. 306). It is precisely on these grounds that the Church of England, in the form of John Jewel's Apologia Ecclesiae Anglicanae (1562), defended her refusal to participate at the Council of Trent.

2. The practice of general councils. In practice, general councils have erred (p. 307). In the course of proving this proposition, Jenkyns makes some general observations. (a) There actually has never been a general council which represented all Christendom. (b) But if we accept the premise that there have been some councils which are said to be general, these councils are generally acknowledged by the Churches of East and West: Nicea, Constantinople (381), Ephesus, Chalcedon, Constantinople (553), Constantinople

(680), and Nicea (787). The Church of England is committed by the Act of Uniformity of 1662 to accept the decisions of the first four general councils as binding in questions of heresy: 'Nothing is to be adjudged heresy which has not been determined by express and plain words of Scripture--or by the decisions of any of the first 4 Councils' (p. 308).

3. The Roman teachings on general councils. Jenkyns concludes the discussion of general councils by summarizing the Roman views on the subject: Rome asserts that if a general council is summoned by the Bishop of Rome, all bishops are bound to attend and that the decisions of such a council are infallible (p. 308). While this general theory is held by all Romanists, there is some degree of variation in the opinions of individuals on particular points thereof. Touching the nature and composition of general councils, some argue that all Christian bishops must be summoned thereto; others, that a number sufficient to represent the views of Christendom must be called to attend. Neither of these conditions has been met by any general council (p. 309). Some argue that the proceedings of a truly general council must 'be "conciliariter" that is, regularly and properly carried on, so as to arrive at the true judgment of the members'; others, that 'the decrees should be accepted by Christendom' (p. 309). This seems to mean that, if the decrees are generally accepted by Christendon, whether or not they represent the true judgment of the members of the council, they are infallibly binding on the faithful. With regard to the question of the infallibility of general councils, three different views are maintained: (a) that councils are infallible per se; (b) that councils are infallible if sanctioned and presided over by the Pope; and (c) that councils are infallible only if the decrees thereof are confirmed by Christendom in general (p. 309). On the other hand, the so-called ultramontane opinion of infallibility believes the quality to reside in the Pope himself: 'that any decision to which the Pope gives his sanction is the decision of a general council and infallible' (p. 310). Finally, there is a question concerning the degree of infallibility which is thought to grace any particular council or

Pope (p. 310). Not all decrees of all councils are held to be infallible; nor are all judgments of all popes held to be so: 'there are many loopholes by which the decision of a council or of a pontiff can be evaded' (p. 311).[7]

4. Conclusions. It has been said that, although Article XXI clearly denies the infallibility of the Church of Rome and of general councils, the Church of England does not absolutely deny the infallibility of the Church (p. 311). This position is maintained by some who point out that the article in question does not explicitly make such a denial. But Jenkyns believes that the Church of England does deny the infallibility of the Church. She is defined by Anglicans to be a human institution--certainly an institution ordained by God, but one composed, nonetheless, of fallible men; therefore, having no guarantees of divine inspiration, the decisions of the Church must be subject to error. As Burnet observes, it is clear that the Church is vouchsafed in the New Testament (e.g., in Matt. 28.20; 2 Cor. 6.16; Heb. 13.5) the promise of divine assistance and protection; however, no guarantee of infallibility can be infered from these promises. They 'signify no more but God's watchful providence, guiding, supporting, and protecting his people'.[8]

Article XXXIV (pp. 404-6).

One of the powers which the Church has authority to exercise is the right to establish her own services and rites. These rites need not be the same in all places and times, and it is the prerogative of each particular communion to order these to meet her needs, so long as such determinations do not contravene scripture. The article, 'Of the traditions of the Church', uses the word 'tradition', not in the sense of a doctrine which has been established by divine authority, but in the sense of ritual observances which have been handed down from generation to generation (p. 404). The second paragraph of the article asserts that those ceremonies and rites decreed by a communion must be obeyed by its members if the rituals are not contrary to scripture and that individual members of the communion do not have the authority to alter such rituals. The power to ordain and to

abolish rituals rests with 'every particular national Church' (p. 405).

The assertions of the article are directed against the Romanists, on the one hand, and against the Puritans, on the other. Rome has maintained that rites and ceremonies of the Church must be identical in all times and places and that no individual (national) Church has the authority to alter ritual without the consent of Rome. The Puritans refused to conform to the rituals prescribed by the Prayer Book, believing that it fell within the authority of individual congregations within a communion to establish their own rituals.

The assertions of the article can be proved by both a priori and a posteriori arguments. A Priori (p. 405): (a) Human institutions may be changed. If the Church is a human institution, as the Church of England says that she is, then its ritual observances--which have been established by men--may be changed. (b) The notes say cryptically 'the same argument applies', and this seems to refer to the above point that 'individuals have not authority to change them'. It seems that what is meant is that, because the Church is a society she has the right of societies to demand that members conform to the regulations laid down for the maintenance of the society. Were individuals able to alter regulations at will, the society would soon be destroyed. (c) 'If a Nation is independent, it has undoubted right to alter its temporal laws, and so it has a right to change its religious ritual observance, established by men' (p. 405). A posteriori (pp. 405-6): (a) A study of ancient liturgies (treated in a separate set of lectures by Jenkyns) shows that ritual observances have, from time to time, been changed. (b) 'In the Jewish Church obedience was paid to religious rituals and observances, and Christ ordered obedience to be paid to them' (p. 406). (c) When changes were made in religious ritual, such changes were made in individual churches by their own authority. The New Testament bears witness that each individual church 'managed its own concerns'.

The Church's ministers.

Having established that national Churches have the authority to determine their own rites and rituals, the Church of England seeks to define, to some extent, the call and ordering of ministers in accordance with the ceremonies she has established. Articles XXIII. 'Of ministering in the congregation', and XXXVI, 'Of the consecration of bishops and ministers', concern the ordering of ministers; they thereby supplement Articles XIX and XX.

1. The necessity for an outward call. Article XXIII (p. 341-3) still leaves many questions open concerning the nature of the calling and ordering of ministers (p. 341): among others, How is 'public authority' to be conveyed to persons of the ministry? Does the call of ministers come from men or from God? If ministers are appointed in a line of succession, is that succession to be through bishops or through presbyters? In short, the article does not say how a body of ministers is to be called, but it does say that the Church of England (a) must have ministers and that (b) such ministers 'must have a lawful, regular, outward appointment'(p. 341).

There are two types of argument adduced to support the assertions of this article: First, it is argued from the general nature of things that the Church is a society and, as such, she needs officers who are appointed by some regular system to administer the affairs of her society. Secondly, and more fully, it is argued from the evidence of the New Testament and of ecclesiastical history (pp. 341-2) that the appointment of such officers was made by the Church community. The New Testament attests to offices in the community which surrounded Jesus in his lifetime: the twelve Apostles and the seventy disciples. After the Ascension, the Apostles seem to have encouraged the Church to continue to have officers who were especially set apart: one was chosen to replace Judas; deacons were chosen (Acts 6.5); and elders were appointed in every Church (Acts 14.23). In each case, the appointments were made or confirmed by the outward community, that is, by some part of the society of the Church. Ecclesiastical history reflects the same process of

appointment to and confirmation of the offices of bishop, priest, and deacon: 'Then that they were regularly appointed--though a difference in the manner of appointment' (p. 342). Jenkyns does not indicate the nature of the 'difference' to which he refers. Judging from what follows, he may have meant that, whereas the appointments were at first made by the community at large, they later came to be made by a separate and self-perpetuating hierarchy: 'It seems that the Consecration was in Bishops and that they paid attention to preserve the succession. And this remained the practice down to the time of the Reformation. The 3 orders were preserved, though others were added' (p. 342). In his discussion of Article XXXVI, Jenkyns observes that although episcopacy per se is well attested by ecclesiastical history in the early centuries of the Church's life, it can not be deduced as a uniform and fully established practice in the New Testament era.

At the Reformation, the practice of maintaining an episcopally ordered ministry was rejected by many and in varying degrees. Some groups rejected the concept of community appointment entirely, deeming that the sense of a personal call was sufficient to set apart a minister (p. 343). The more general opinion, however, was 'that ministers must have an outward as well as inward call' (p. 343). Some groups believed this outward call to repose with the whole congregation, while others attributed it to only a part of the congregation. At any rate, Article XXIII does not pronounce on these differences beyond saying that ministers must be duly and regularly appointed by the Church community.

2. Episcopacy. Article XXXVI (pp. 407-8) seems to establish episcopacy as the Anglican means of appointing and ordering ministers. Originally, those who subscribed the Articles assented to the Edwardian book of consecration. All those who subscribe them after 1662, however, assent to the ordination services established by the Act of Uniformity of Charles II, although the difference between the two services is not material (p. 408).

Article XXXVI makes two assertions concerning the Anglican rite of ordination. Contra Rome, it claims that all

things essential to ordination have been retained in the rite; contra the Puritans, that the things retained as essential to the rite are not in themselves superstitious or ungodly. The service retains those material parts of the ordination rite which have been 'most anciently used . . . such as imposition of hands--succession of Bishops', but 'it is not asserted that these things are absolutely necessary' to ordination (p. 408). It has been the decision of the Church of England, however, that such material parts of the rite should be retained (p. 408).

3. Conclusions. It is important to notice two things about Jenkyns' discussion of these articles. In the first place, he is discussing ministers of the Church as that is defined by the Church of England, that is, by this particular part of the visible Church: Because the Church of England is a human society, she has the right to decree the particular ordering which will govern her as such a society. She may do this in the manner she deems best wherever specific prescriptions are not given in scripture and as long as her decrees are not in contradiction to any principles which are decreed in scripture. In the second place, Jenkyns is expounding the particular requirements for church government as the Church of England has defined them. Because the Church may order her government as she chooses, she has the authority to impose her decisions touching ministry upon her members as Anglican Christians. That is to say, she may demand compliance to her regulations as a matter of communion but not as a matter of faith.

So far as the specific nature of the offices of ministry are concerned, the Church of England requires that her ministers be outwardly called and established in their offices by the body of the Church communion; and that they shall be so established within the three orders of ministry which are attested by and maintained in the historic episcopate. It is important to notice that Jenkyns is talking about the historic episcopate, not Apostolic succession: He is saying that episcopacy is defined to be essential to the ministry of the Church of England but not that it is essential to the constitution of any valid ministry within the body of the

Church catholic. That is, episcopacy is constituative of Anglicanism, but not necessarily of Christianity.

Church and State.

In his lectures on the foregoing articles, Jenkyns has been discussing the doctrine of the Church in terms of her relationship to scripture and to God and in terms of the relationships she sustains within herself. In particular, he has implicitly considered the relationship of the invisible and the visible Church; of individual bodies of the visible Church to the whole of the Church catholic; and of ministers to the particular part of the Church catholic to which they were ordained. That is, he has discussed the doctrine of the Church as it pertains to her activities in the sphere of the sacred. In treating Article XXXVII, 'Of civil magistrates', Jenkyns discusses the doctrine of the Church as it touches the sphere of secular activities in the relationship of Church and State. Finally, his lectures on Articles XXXVIII, 'Of Christian men's goods which are not in common', and XXIX, 'Of a Christian man's oath', he completes the consideration of the relationship between Church and State as it pertains to the duty of individual Christians to the secular state.

1. Article XXXVII (pp. 409-19). This article, 'Of the Queen's majesty,' makes three basic assertions: (a) The sovereign is the chief power in the realm in both its ecclesiastical and civil estates, and the sovereign is not subject to any power outside the realm (i.e., to the pope). (b) Capital punishment is lawful in a Christian state. (c) It is lawful for Christian men to bear arms at the command of their sovereign. All three points are rooted in the precept that, by Christian obligation, all citizens (including officers of the Church) are subject to the regulation of the state because God is the source of all civil authority. This precept is also the central plank of Article XXI, which asserts that general councils cannot be convened without the consent of the prince. Cragg points out that 'the necessity of non-resistance to constituted authority early became a fixed element in the teaching of the English Reformers'.[9]

This attitude is given early codification in the homily 'Of Obedience' in the First Book of Homilies (1547):

> Let us learn also here by the infallible and undeceivable word of God, that kings and other supreme and higher officers are ordained of God, who is Most Highest; . . . all rulers are appointed of God, for a godly order to be kept in the world; and also how the magistrates ought to learn how to rule and govern according to God's laws; and that all subjects are bounden to obey them as God's ministers, yea, although they be evil, not only for fear, but also for conscience sake.[10]

Jenkyns' discussion of points (b) and (c) above need not detain us here: it consists chiefly in establishing that the imposition of capital punishment and the making of war have warrants in scripture and are supported in history (pp. 415-7). The arguments he adduces to show that the sovereign is not subject to the authroity of the pope (pp. 113-5) follow the same lines as those he has presented elsewhere to refute the claims of papal supremacy and infallibility: such claims can be neither proved nor adequately deduced from scripture. His discussion of the first point, however--that the sovereign has chief power in both the ecclesiastical and political estates, is of interest primarily because of the light it sheds on Jenkyns' understanding of the doctrine of the Church. Of the article, Jenkyns says:

> In all states there must be one supreme authority or other, it may exist in the shape of a constitutional monarchy, or an absolute monarchy--and the question is whether the Church is to be superior to the state or the state superior to the Church--here it is asserted that the State is superior to the Church (p. 411).

He proves that such a relationship is valid by demonstrating that it is attested in scripture and history. He concludes this discussion with the observation that 'if the Canons of

the Church are contrary to the Law of the land, they are invalid' (p. 413).

2. Articles XXXVIII (p. 420) and XXXIX (p. 421). Inasmuch as the whole Church is subject to the secular authority, so also are individual Christians in the sphere of their secular duty. Indeed, it is the Christian obligation of individual Christians to submit to their sovereign. Thus, they may bear arms at the sovereign's behest; their goods, which are held in the light of secular exegencies, are not to be held in common; and they may swear oaths when they are required to do so by the civil authority.

3. The mutually authenticating authorities of Church and State. The Church of England's theory of the relationship between Church and State, as Jenkyns understands it, has been determined by two concepts: the medieval definitions of kingship and divine right, on the one hand, and the definitions of modern Erastianism, on the other.

In the first instance, the sovereign has chief power over both sacred and secular estates because he, in the words of Burnet, 'comprehends virtually the whole body of the people in him'.[11] Such a definition of the sovereign reflects an Old Testament and medieval (if also a later Hobbesian) view of kingship in relationship to society; the Church is the expression of the people under God and at prayer; the State, of the people in the world and at work. These two aspects of human society are comprehended in the person of the ruler or magistrate. Nevertheless, the administrations of the sacred and secular estates are not amalgamated.[12] The ecclesiastical estate possesses its own government and officers (p. 409); its particular and sacramental functions can be carried out only by those who have been duly ordained by the Church to those functions. Article XXXVII does not, therefore, empower the sovereign to preach or to administer the sacraments, unless he is also an ecclesiastic (p. 410). In this sense, the Archbishop of Canterbury is the head of the Church of England (p. 410).

On the other hand, the sovereign rules by divine right, and all citizens are subject to his authority. His political power derives from the appointment of God's

Providence, and the Christian is, therefore, duty bound to recognize the sovereign's authority in all earthly matters. As Burnet points out, and in accordance with the theory of divine right, the sovereign's power 'does not depend upon the Prince's religion; whether he is a Christian, or not; whether he is of a true or a false religion: or is a good or a bad man'.[13] The magistrate can neither void the law of God nor alter doctrine,[14] but he exercises 'that prerogative which we see to have been given always to all godly princes in holy Scripture by God himself, that is, that they should rule all estates and degrees committed to their charge by God . . . and restrain with the civil sword the stubborn and evil doers'.[15] In short, the sovereign may be called the head of the Church inasmuch as he is the fountain of all earthly order, government, protection, and conduct.[16] In this sense, the Archbishop of Canterbury (and all other ecclesiastics), being a citizen of the earthly realm of England, is subject to the sovereign's authority; and the Church is subject to the State (p. 410). For this reason, in a Christian state, the magistrate has all the proper coercive and punitive power; therefore, 'heresies, and all enormities of the Clergy, civil as well as ecclesiastical, were brought under the civil government by Act of Parliament at the time of the Reformation' (p. 410). The Acts of Uniformity (1549, 1552, and 1662) to which Jenkyns has reference here all embodied the basic assumption that 'there can be only one ecclesiastical expression of the life of a united nation. Consequently, outside that one church no rights can be recognized and no concessions granted', because division in the nation's religious life was thought to foster weakness in the nation's political life.[17]

4. The modern Erastian state. At the time when Burnet wrote his commentary on Article XXXVII, the English state was Erastian in the original sense of the term: the state being Christian and professing but one religion (because religious dissent was not recognized),[18] the civil authorities had 'the right and the duty to exercise jurisdiction in all matters whether civil or ecclesiastical, and to punish all offences', including the exercise of ecclesiastical sanctions such as excommunication'.[19] It is on this

basis that Jenkyns claims for the Crown's supremacy, on the authority of Article XXXVII, that 'its power extens over all sects and denominations of persons within the realm' (p. 410). By the time that Jenkyns was commenting on the article, however, the religious and political situation in England had altered: religious dissent had found a recognized expression in religious organizations separate from the established church. Whereas Burnet would have felt that the Crown's authority to appoint bishops and other church officials reposed in Article XXXVII;[20] Jenkyns believed that it did not do so, but rather derived from the intrinsic relationship between Church and State--that is, between the Established Church and the State (p. 411). This being the case, the Crown's authority to make ecclesiastical appointments extended only to the administration of the Established Church (p. 411). Jenkyns' view on the relationship between Church and State is determined by the fact that the religious tradition from which he speaks is Erastian.[21]

The immediate political context for Jenkyns' view is that of the secularized state of modern Erastianism: it is a concept of the medieval belief in the divine right of kings as it was modified under the influence of Hobbes.[22] Hobbes taught that sovereignty was transferred from the people to the monarch by implicit contract; thus, the authority of the sovereign was absolute but not of divine right. The supremacy of the state over the church, therefore, became an explicitly political principle which still seemed patient of theological support. Curiously enough, the combined effect of the medieval and catholic notion of divine right, supported by the Protestant theory of a ruler sustained by a Calvinistically defined providence and[23] modified by a Hobbesian concept of political absolutism, gave rise in England to a much more Lutheran or Zwinglian, rather than Calvinistic, concept of the church as 'in practice largely controlled by the civil power' and 'practically regarded as a phase of the state, not as a corporate entity'.[24]

In such a state the civil representatives, though themselves professing any or no religion,[25] retained the right to legislate on matters concerning the Established

Church. This situation led many High-Church, orthodox churchmen to clamour for disestablishment; indeed, some of the party (e.g., Maskell), in the event of continuing establishment and its results for church policy, seceded to Rome. But, somewhat remarkably, Henry Jenkyns did not swell the ranks of the adherents of disestablishement: he remained a Church-and-State rather than becoming a Church-above-State man. The explanation for Jenkyns' continued acceptance and defense of establishment resides in his understanding of the doctrine of the Church.

Conclusions.

It is helpful to review Jenkyns' teachings concerning the definition of the Church as he discusses the relevant articles. Under Article XIX Jenkyns observed that God had formed Christians into a body which is the Church and that the Church was provided by God as one of his means to bring men to salvation. But all discussion of the Church in the Thirty-nine Articles is related only to the visible Church; it is the visible Church which is comprehended in the phrase 'Catholic and Apostolic'. In discussing the Roman Catholic doctrine of the infallibility of the Church, Jenkyns observes that error exists in the Church necessarily because the Church is human--Rome cannot support her claim to infallibility unless she can demonstrate from scripture that she has been given a special exemption from her human frailty. Jenkyns defends Article XX's assertion that 'the Church hath power to decree Rites or Ceremonies, and Authority in Matters of Faith' on the basis of the fact that the Church is a human institution. She, therefore, 'must have the ordinary powers that all societies possess [as being] necessary to keep it in existence and to prevent quarrells etc. from breaking it up' (p. 300). The Church cannot claim an authority and inspiration equal to that of the Apostles because her decisions are not guaranteed by the extraordinary gifts of the Spirit which attended the Apostles (pp. 301-3). Her authority in the Spirit does not exceed that of any Christian individual. For this reason, the authority of general councils (Article XXI) is only that accorded to the

decisions of any body which exists to regulate human affairs. This is true in all cases except where the decision of a council affirms scripture, and in that case the binding authority of the conciliar decision derives from the authority of scripture, not from the council.

For Jenkyns, the Church is always and absolutely a human institution. It is one among many human societies which functions within the sphere of the body politic. In fact, the human condition in the world, as Jenkyns comprehends it, is always essentially secular; therefore, all human activities, including those of a specifically religious nature, are defined for him in basically secular terms. Thus he finds it theologically appropriate that the Church be subject to the State. This conclusion is borne out by the claims Jenkyns makes for the right of the national Church to determine its own rites and ceremonies, to stipulate a particular form of ecclesiastical government and the ordering of ministers, to discipline its clergy under the demands of subscription and of canon law, and to refuse to have its clergy participate in church councils summoned without the consent of the nation's rulers. As long as the dictates of the sovereign (or the government represented in the person of the sovereign) do not contravene clearly understood prescriptions of scripture, scripture itself demands that the Established Church and her ministers submit to the civil authority. As Burnet says, in all matters indifferent to salvation itself, such as the determination of the canons and rules of the church, the magistrate has the ultimate authority.[26] Whereas Rome finally places all authority in the pope, the Church of England places it in the sovereign:[27]

> When the body of the Clergy comes to be so corrupted that nothing can be trusted to the regular decisions of any synod or meeting, called according to their constitution, then if the Prince shall select a peculiar number, and commit to their care the examining and reforming both of doctrine and worship, and shall give the legal sanction to what they shall offer him; we must confess that such a method as this runs contrary to the

> established rules, and that therefore it ought to be very seldom put in practice; and never, except when the greatness of the occasion will balance this irregularity that is in it. But still here is an authority both in fact and right; for if the Magistrate has a power to make laws in sacred matters, he may order those to be prepared, by whom, and as he pleases.

Viewed politically, the attitude toward the relationship between Church and State as defined by Royal Supremacy in Article XXXVII derives originally from the theory of the divine right of kings. The interaction of political and religious interests in English history over the passage of time resulted in a practical relationship between the two estates which permits of the description of modern Erastianism. Such a description could still be seen by Jenkyns to be comprehended under Article XXXVII; furthermore, he could find the relationship of Church and State to be theologically acceptable as therein defined because he was doctrinally committed to an understanding of the Church primarily as a human institution. He treats the Church so heavily in terms of the justifiability of particular social arrangements that he looses sight of it universality.

Chapter V
Doctrine of the Priesthood

It is difficult to decide in precisely what context to discuss a doctrine of the priesthood as it may be inferred from the teachings of Henry Jenkyns. Although he never develops the subject explicitly, it is clear from his lectures, especially on the Prayer Books and Liturgy, that he held definite views on the subject.

At first thought, it seemed good to discuss the priesthood in the previous chapter, because priests are the particular ministers of the Church of England and their function is very much defined by the Anglican doctrine of the Church. Yet Jenkyns' understanding of priesthood seems very much influenced by his beliefs concerning the sacraments, especially with regard to concepts of sacrifice and transubstantiation; therefore, upon reflection, it seemed wise to include a treatment of priesthood in this discussion with the exposition of Jenkyns teachings on the sacraments. However, Jenkyns' treatment of the sacraments is very much controlled by his understanding of justification and its relationship to the Church; and all of his thinking is determined by his understanding of the scriptures and of faith. It being the case that Jenkyns' thoughts concerning the priesthood were no more or less conditioned by other doctrines which are more largely developed in his lectures than his views on other doctrines, it seemed, in the last analysis, best to devote a separate chapter in this discussion to that subject. Nevertheless, his consideration of the role of the priest is most directly subsidiary to his understanding of the Church.

Although he never discusses a doctrine of priesthood <u>per se</u>, it is possible to reconstruct Jenkyns' views thereon from his remarks on related subjects. (a) These subjects--episcopacy and apostolic succession, the doctrinal obligation of subscription, the question of the worthiness of ministers (Article XXVI), the appropriateness of the married state for the clergy--are all discussed below with regard to Jenkyns views as they compare with the views of others: notably, with those of Burnet, on the one hand, and of Hugh

James Rose, on the other. (b) The purpose of such an analysis is to ascertain the view which Jenkyns held of the priesthood: his attitudes toward apostolic succession and the duties peculiar to the office of priesthood (including here, especially, his attitudes toward celebration of the Eucharist and preaching)will, in the end determine the conclusions of the analysis. (c) Jenkyns' view of priesthood is largely determined by the nature of the relationship between his doctrine of the Church and his doctrine of the priesthood.

A reconstruction of Jenkyns' doctrine of priesthood--constituent parts.

1. Episcopacy. Jenkyns makes a distinction between the tradition of episcopal government and apostolic succession: The one is a particular form of church government which is historically attested and which has been elected by a particular expression of the universal Church (i.e., by a national church). The other is a theological doctrine seen by its adherents as having been ordained by Christ and (or) his Apostles to be universally imposed and necessarily binding on all forms of the true Church. The doctrine of apostolic succession includes the idea that the episcopal form of government maintained within the historic episcopate is constitutative of any part of the Church catholic. Jenkyns lectures on Articles XXIII and XXXVI make it clear that he understands the Church of England to adhere to episcopacy. His remarks here and elsewhere make it clear that he does not believe that the historically attested episcopate is sufficient grounds upon which to construct a theological doctrine of apostolic succession. He, furthermore, does not think that the Church of England's adherence to episcopacy can be so construed as to prove that the doctrine of the Church of England includes apostolic succession as a necessary doctrine of the Christian faith, or that she insists that episcopacy and only episcopacy is the only valid form of Church government. Nor does he include episcopacy among the notes of the Church. In this respect, Jenkyns is certainly in essential agreement with the majority of Anglican

divines from the Reformation to the Oxford Movement.[1]

In his lectures of Article XXIII, Jenkyns observes that, while the New Testament provides some evidence for the fact that the Early Church had officers, there is no clear picture of a consistent number and type of offices in all churches or of the nature of the selection and appointment of officers to these offices (pp. 341-2). Furthermeore, it is to ecclesiastical history (i.e., to the post-New Testament period of the Early Church) that one can trace the three orders of episcopacy and the careful preservation of episcopal succession (p. 342). It is equally clear from this discussion that Jenkyns believes that episcopacy reflects a very ancient form of Church government and that it is therefore to be recommended; he is not, however, prepared to say that it was the form of Church government ordained by Christ or the Apostles.

In the lectures on Article XXV, 'Of the Sacraments', Jenkyns discusses (p. 350) the sacramental nature of Orders in terms of matter (the material element of a sacrament--in ordination, the delivery of the sacred vessels) and form (the particular verbal formula or action which effects consecration--in ordination, the imposition of hands). The Church of England does not deliver the sacred vessels to the ordained; therefore, ordination lacks the matter of a sacrament.[2] Furthermore, the delivery of the sacred vessels was not enjoined by Christ, and one of the necessary characteristics of a sacrament is that it be 'given and ordained by Christ himself' (p. 348); therefore, the 'matter' of ordination in the Church of England cannot be said to be constitutive of a sacrament. While the Church of England does ordain by the imposition of hands, thereby preserving the defined 'form' of sacrament in ordination, and while the imposition of hands may have been enjoined by Christ himself; it was not a form peculiar to the ordination of ministers. The imposition of hands was an action which was also performed in confirmation. Therefore, the imposition of hands cannot be the validating constituent of a sacrament. Moreover, this action is not the 'form' used by Christ for the ordination of ministers: the New Testament relates

that 'he breathed on them'. The New Testament does not show that the Apostles followed Christ in perpetuating this form of ordination: therefore, the form was not enjoined by Christ as an essential to ordination.

From these circumstances, Jenkyns would conclude that ordination is not a sacrament. From this conclusion, he would argue that a doctrine of apostolic succession cannot be insisted upon in the theology of the Church of England. The precise form of such an argument is not attested in the notes of Jenkyns' lectures, but it would probably take this line: (1) Sacraments are essential to salvation. (2) The doctrine of apostolic succession (a particular definition of episcopacy) depends upon a view of ordination which sees the conferring of Orders as a sacrament. (3) But ordination is not a sacrament. (4) Therefore, the fact that the Church of England acknowledges the historic episcopate and takes to herself that form of Church government cannot be taken to mean that the Church of England upholds the doctrine of apostolic succession.

By good fortune, there exists corroborative evidence for these conclusions from a source other than Jenkyns himself. In 1837, the Reverend George Stanley Faber, an Evangelical divine and Master of Sherburn House in Durham,[3] was one of the examiners for the Durham University examinations in theology during the Easter Term.[4] Faber wrote a letter to Jenkyns[5] in which he offers some remarks on one of the questions for the consideration of Jenkyns and Chevallier (Prof. of Mathematics and assistant to Henry Jenkyns). The fact that Jenkyns was at this time the acting Professor of Theology and that he may, therefore, be assumed to have personally selected Faber as an examiner lends credence to the idea that he shared at least some of Faber's views on doctrine. The question upon which Faber offers remarks is described in the letter as 'Question 3 on Ancient Ecclesiastical History'. Faber was in possession of the examination papers, but he evidently did not possess the questions themselves because he reconstructs this question in the letter: The question '(I suppose) runs: How was the Church governed during the first centuries, with respect

both to particular communities and the whole Body of Christians'.[6] Because Faber's remarks are so interesting and relevant here, the bulk of his discourse on this examination question is given below:

> If you will allow me to keep the papers a little longer, I will study them more diligently than I have hitherto done. . . . I will, however, following the example of yourself and our friend Chevallier, offer a few remarks for your joint consideration.
>
> I. Question 3 on Ancient Ecclesiastical History . . .
>
> It strikes me that unless this subject be fully entered into on both sides, our young divines may perhaps turn out to be armed with a sort of Don Quixote's pasteboard helmet, which looks well to the eye, but is not prepared to abide a hard controversial knock from those who differ from us. I allude particularly to the vexata quaestio of Episcopacy: and I rather allude to it, because I do not think that the real sticking point is commonly touched upon--for instance, it is easy to establish, by historical testimony, the government of the Church by Bishops up to the Apostolic Age: it is also easy, I think, to establish, even from Scripture, their appointment and recognition by the Apostles. But the problem remains behind. Were the Bishops and Presbyters distinct orders: or was the Bishop only appointed (by the Apostles, I grant) as primus inter pares; so that certain powers, properly belonging to all Presbyters, were conceded to him for the good government of the Church merely? This, I take it, is the real point of discussion between the Episcopal Church of England and the Prebysterical Church of Scotland. If the first part of the alternation be true; the Kirk is a communion without legitimate authority; a sort of Samaria, as some high churchmen have called it: if the second part is true; the Orders

> of the Kirk are valid; because, Episcopi and Presbytori being originally one order, the temporary appointment of Episcopi even by Apostles does not do away the previously inherent rights of the Presbytori should Episcopi be discontinued and a government by Presbytori without and Arch-Presbyter resumed. There lies the real sticking place: I doubt, whether we shall wisely turn our young men out, satisfied that an assertion of the divine right of Bishops is enough to meet the Presbyterians, and without letting them hear the per contra. You are aware, I conclude, of the ugly testimony of old Jerome. . . .

The two central points that Faber is making agree with Jenkyns' reservations on episcopacy: (a) The precise nature of the orders of clergy and their hierarchical relationship is not clear from scripture. (b) Episcopacy per se is clearly attested in history only in the post-New Testament period of the Early Church. The first point is, as Faber sees it, critical to the training of contemporary clergy because it must bear on any existing controversy between the Church of England and the Presbyterian Church of Scotland. Clearly, neither Jenkyns nor Faber are prepared to declare the orders of a non-episcopally ordered church invalid. And they are not prepared to do so precisely because they can not assert that episcopacy is a necessary doctrine of the Church, an essential to her salvific ministry. Burnet's understanding of the validity of presbyterian church government went far beyond the tentative confirmation accorded it by Jenkyns and Faber.

Burnet, in the best Latitudinarian form, admits a positive presbyterian aspect to the due ordering of ministers within episcopacy. He says[7] that ministers must be ordered by 'lawful authority' and that such authority is defined by certain rules: these rules must (a) not conflict with the record of scripture and they must (b) be executed by 'particular persons' to whom that care belongs'. The 'particular persons' to whom he refers are the clergy and the laity, as represented in the person of the prince or

representative of supreme political power. In fact, he understands Article XXIII to permit of a ministry and church government determined solely by the laity,[8] if need be. He argues[9] that if a company of Christians find their ministers to be utterly corrupt, they may elect from their own numbers persons to minister. If a regular constitution of ministry should develop from such an election, the ministry so ordered is to be considered valid: 'if the necessity is real and not feigned, this is not condemned or annulled by the Article . . .' because the Church of England has and does acknowledge the foreign Churches so constituted to be true Churches.[10]

A consideration of Rose's attitudes toward episcopacy provides a striking contrast to the views of Jenkyns, Faber, and Burnet:

> Upon the subject of episcopacy, different, and far higher ground would have to be taken. It is indeed with sincere regret that one so often finds such inadequate and low views of our church government taken even by those who mean to be its defenders [Rose refers specifically to those views described in Encyclopedia Metropolitana, Sect. I.1]. The one and only correct ground is, that episcopacy is the originally appointed and the sole way of transmitting the commission to teach mankind, and administer the Christian ordinances; a commission which is essential to the Christian ministry, and which to be valid, must proceed from the great head of the Church through that channel in which his apostles, whom he authorized for the purpose, originally placed it. Earnestly, very earnestly indeed should it be recommended to those about to enter the ministy to study this subject fully; for the deep conviction of being entrusted with a divine commission, and not one which is the first of mere human views of expediency, is of all considerations, the one most calculated to excite a spirit of lively zeal, in the discharge of professional duty, and an entire devotion to professional feelings,

and studies.[11]

No quarter is given the Presbyterian or Free Churches here. It is instructive to recall here that it was in Rose's rectory at Hadleigh in June 1833 that the fateful meeting of Rose, Froude, Palmer, and Perceval took place. From this meeting, it may be said, sprang what was to become the Oxford Movement. Rose was a High-Church Anglican; he believed in the establishment, but he probably held the Church to be superior in its claims to the dictates of the State: his concept of the priesthood is correspondingly high. Certainly, his understanding of episcopacy equates with the doctrine of apostlic succession as described in this analysis.

2. Subscription. Some additional evidence concerning Jenkyns' views on the requirements for ordained ministers is found in his lectures on the ordination services of the Church of England.[12] Ministers of the Church of England are bound (a) to teach nothing necessary to salvation except what is contained in scripture and (b) 'to take that view of scripture taken by this Church and the realm of England and that he cannot set up the alleged doctrine of one against the other, nor his own peculiar doctrine, but binds himself to all three--Bible, Church, and State'.[13] This second obligation is essentially that contracted in subscription. Clearly, Jenkyns understands that, at least for the clergy, the Church of England reserves to herself the right to delimit individual interpretations of doctrine.

In this respect, Jenkyns was in agreement with Rose, although the former might not have stated the case so firmly as does the latter. The whole of Rose's first lecture in The State of the Protestant Religion in Germany is designed to demonstrate that the evils of the German rationalizing school of theology were effected because of the failure of the German Church to demand subscription to its prescribed doctrines. According to Rose, clergy ordained in the Church of England and under the obligations are forever divorced from the exercise of freedom in theological opinion:

> He who has become the minister of a form, which professes to be apostolical, has both set to the solemn record of his belief, that that claim can be justified, and has assumed every obligation, which such a profession implies. Before he does so, he may, if he pleases, become the minister of another form, or the minister of Christianity under no form; but when he has done so, he has declared, that in his belief, the one only true and effectual way of carrying on his Master's work on earth, is that way, to which he has declared his adherence, is the form approved by his Master himself. He is therefore become now the minister of a church, and as such, must pursue the road which that church dictates. He must no longer think his own thoughts, or form his own plans, but he must teach what the church commands in the sphere which she assigns. He may think that at some time, something is left in that church undone, which should be done, something done, which should be left undone--but he will know also that it belongs not to him to remedy the error, or supply the deficiency. He will know, that God, under whose especial guidance he believes the church to be, may indeed permit evil; but that his good spirit will rectify what is wrong, and supply what is wanting in the appointed way, and at the due season. His one aim will therefore be to understand fully what the spirit of the church is--his one aim to fulfil it, to unite with, not to separate from his brethern, to yield a ready and cheerful obedience to his superiors, not to endeavour to escape from it.[14]

Jenkyns would have dissented from Rose at least with regard to the extent of the doctrines which the Church of England commands that her ministers must teach.

3. Article XXVI (pp. 355-8). At the Reformation certain of the anabaptists sects, in response to the clerical profligacy then current, began to teach that the sacraments

were invalidated when they were celebrated by evil ministers. Such a doctrine implies a direct relationship between the quality of the man who fills the ministerial office and the effects on the nature of the acts performed through that office. The Church of England drew up Article XXVI, 'Of the worthiness of ministers', to counter this anabaptist error. The article teaches that it is the ministerial office itself, not the minister, which determines the validity of the sacraments administered as a function of that office. In this view the Church of England agrees with Rome (p. 355).

The Church of England allows that the visible Church contains among its numbers both the elect and the degenerate; therefore, it is possible that degenerate men are to be counted among her ministers. However, the objection that the wickedness of ministers hinders the effect of the sacraments is invalid because the effect of the sacrament derives from its author (i.e., Jesus Christ), not from its administrator (i.e., the celebrant). The acts of wicked clergy remain good acts because they are, in actuality, the acts of God, performed in the name of Christ, rather than the acts of the administering clergy. Indeed, 'we may use their ministry [i.e., the ministry of wicked clergy] with advantage' (p. 356). But, certainly, the article allows, wicked clergy should be sought out, punished, and deposed (p. 356). 'The article does not assert that a bad minister is equal to a good one, for in other things, as preaching and private exhortation, the moral character of the minister makes all the difference in the effect of his ministration' (p. 358).

The only question which really pertains in the relationship between the character of the minister and the validity of the sacrament administered is one of commission: has the minister been duly commissioned by God to administer the sacraments? 'This is a question we should naturally ask in relation to the bearer of a pardon in wordly matters or in relation to an ambassador "whether he is duly authorized and commissioned to bring the pardon, or transact the business of an ambassador"' (p. 358). The effectiveness of the pardon does not depend on the forgiving nature of the

ambassador. Jenkyns observes that the New Testament attitude, for example as in 1 and 2 Corinthians, supports these conclusions: Paul and the Apostles were 'nothing but ministers' and 'nothing depended on them as of themselves'; the ministers were worthless clay vessels; the sacraments they carried; the treasure (p. 357).[15]

Burnet[16] agrees with Jenkyns that due ministry depends on due appointment; that the office carries the efficacy, not the officer. Ordination is one of those things 'necessary because they are commanded', but not necessary to salvation. It is necessary not by virtue of any real efficacy to reform human nature but simply 'as a means to preserve the order and union of the body of Christians, and to maintain the reverence due to holy things'. Men should enter the ministry only after being duly chosen and called by such as are in authority; but even the precise nature of this 'lawful authority' is open to a wide degree of liberty in definition.

In summary: It is the office of ministry, under due authority, which insures the validity of the sacraments. This is true because the acts performed in the course of the office, the due administration of the sacraments, are the acts of God, not the acts of the minister. The person on whom the office of ministry is conferred is not altered in his nature or character by the conferring of the office.

4. Article XXXII (pp. 398-401). Clergy are not commanded in scripture to a celibate life; therefore, they may marry if they choose to do so. Scriptural passages which have been adduced to support the concept of a celibate clergy, in fact, commend the celibate life to all men, clergy and lay alike.

There are two obvious objections to an understanding of scripture which commends a uniformly celibate life: (a) Under the uniform implementation of such a percept the 'world would soon end'; furthermore, (b) 'it throws a reflection on God as the creator of the universe making male and female, ordained for marriage as a state of highest holiness (p. 399). In other words, a command obliging mankind to celibacy would seem to suggest that God had made a

mistake in the creation of a two-sex species. In fact, there is no merit in the practice of celibacy itself; the merit thereof depends on expediency rather than upon some intrinsic value (p. 400).

These teachings on the appropriateness of marriage to the clerical life add support to the idea that priests remain like other men even after ordination: at least with respect to their domestic behavior, ordination does not imply or demand any radical conversion. Inasmuch as the demand for a celibate clergy cannot be defined from scripture, it cannot be imposed. But Jenkyns does not deal here with the real crux of the issue. Traditionally, in the pre-Reformation Church and in the continuing Church of Rome, a vow of celibacy was an act of supererogation and a work unto salvation. The Church of England, and Jenkyns, condemns the requirement of celibacy because of the Anglican doctrine of justification: in the Church of England, Christians are justified--saved before God--because of their faith, not by their works.

A reconstruction of Jenkyns' doctrine of priesthood--the nature of Holy Orders.

1. Ordination and grace. It is clear that Jenkyns believes ordination to be an act of duly authorizing ministers to administer the sacraments. Beyond this, it is very difficult to determine precisely Jenkyns' theology of ordination. Certainly he does not wish to be seen to contradict the teachings of the Ordinal, which make it clear that the ordinand receives the Holy Spirit in ordination. On the other hand, it is equally clear from an extensive study of Jenkyns' theological lectures that he finds it very difficult to accord any extraordianary character to what takes place in ordination or to the activities (or person) of a priest. In discussing the rite of ordination, Jenkyns makes these observations:[17]

At the time of ordination, several bishops lay hands on the candidate, saying: '"Receive the Holy Ghost for the office and work of a priest in the Church of God now committed unto thee by the imposition of our hands . . . whose sins

thou dost forgive they are forgiven . . . retain . . . retained . . . be thou a faithful dispenser of the word of God and of his holy sacraments in the name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost"'.[18] Do these sentences, Jenkyns asks, constitute a prayer or an act of authority, and he concludes: 'Without doubt an act of authority for the Bishop is here actually conferring orders by virtue of his power and authority to do so'.[19] By this act of authority, the bishop confers the order of priesthood and 'a certain portion of the holy spirit--what portion cannot be said, but certainly as much as is necessary to assist him in the due execution of the work and office of the priesthood'.[20] Jenkyns makes no further comment about the nature of the gift of the Spirit as it effects the priest but turns immediately to the question of the bishop's authority to convey the Holy Spirit in the act of ordination.

The question is whether or not the ministers of the Church have the power at all to convey the Spirit, and it can be argued that ministers certainly do have such a power in the administration of the sacraments--at Baptism and in the Eucharist; therefore, the bishop can be seen to have such a power in ordination.[21] Jenkyns admits this argument, but with some reservations:

> but this must be said, that with respect to Baptism and the Eucharist we have the institution of the outward sign by Christ himself for the express purpose of conveying grace which is not the case in ordination.
>
> But although the cases differ in this, and it is an important difference, we have good reason to suppose that the Bishop <u>is</u> authorized by scripture to convey grace apart from the two sacraments because we follow the example of Christ and his apostles in the rite of ordination and so may humbly trust that he will bless our endeavours and complete what we believe we are faithfully doing, and so that he will grant that measure of grace sufficient for the execution of the office conferred.[22]

The 'power and authority' conveyed by the bishop in ordination extends to (a) 'absolution' or 'forgiveness of sins', (b) the 'dispensing of the word of God', and (c) 'the dispensing of the "holy sacraments"'.[23] One thing, at least, seems clear: Jenkyns wishes to avoid an understanding of the priesthood that is in any sense sacerdotal.

One of the factors which makes it difficult to grasp Jenkyns' views on ordination is that nowhere is the theory explicitly stated <u>against</u> which he would argue: the Roman theory of ordination. Rome teaches that Orders are a sacrament, and Jenkyns believes that the Church of England dissents from this position; nonetheless, the Ordinal clearly says that the Holy Spirit or grace is conferred in ordination, and one of the characteristics of a sacrament is that it confers grace. Jenkyns, therefore, wishes to interpret the Ordinal in such a way that the commutation of grace in ordination does not invest the rite with the value of a sacrament, and this can be accomplished if the grace is understood to serve some other purpose than that of sanctification. A related issue is the relative quality of the Christian nature of priest and layman. According to the Roman theory there is a distinction to be drawn between the clergy and the laity, and this distinction derives from their differing levels of sanctification: At ordination, a quantity of grace is conferred on the candidate over and above that amount of grace which is made available to the ordinary layman in the two dominical sacraments. Each successive ordination--as deacon, priest, bishop, cardinal, and so on--confers an additional portion of grace, so that at each stage of clerical profession the life of the clergyman is progressively more sanctified than that of his lay counterpart. Jenkyns, by contrast, clearly maintains that there is no necessary qualitative difference between the clergy and the laity. For these reasons, Jenkyns wishes to say that the Holy Spirit is conveyed by the imposition of hands in ordination for the purpose of conferring an office, but not for the purpose of granting additional grace. That is to say, the Spirit in ordination enables the priest to perform his duties, but it does not sanctify his life

in any manner additional to that sanctification which is available to all believers in Baptism and the Eucharist. Before examining in more detail the three areas into which the power and authority of the ordained priest does extend, it is helpful to pause and consider Jenkyns' remarks on the term 'priest'.

When making a comparison of the First and the Second Prayer Books of Edward VI,[24] Jenkyns observes that in the rubrics directing the priest's communion, the word 'priest' (First Book) has been changed to 'minister' (Second Book) because of the notions of sacrifice which have been associated with the term 'priest'.[25] This change was effected because the English Reformers wished to obviate support in the liturgy for Romanist beliefs concerning the sacrifice of the mass. Romanists believed that in the celebration of the mass the sacrifice of Christ was made by the priest and because in the rites of the Jews and the heathens the priest was 'empowered' (in the sense of having within himself a supernatural power) to make the sacrifice. Jenkyns wishes to disavow the idea that an Anglican priest is empowered in any supernatural sense to make any such offering. The sacrifice necessary to salvation has already and only once been made by Christ: the priest who administers the Eucharist merely makes available--parcels out--the effects of that sacrifice to the faithful believers. The priest and the rite are the medium of conveyance through which God has chosen to operate. Jenkyns observes that Romanists teach that ordination is a sacrament because they believe that powers are conferred on the minister thereby: specifically, the power '"to offer the unbloody sacrifice of Christ's body and blood" . . . the power to work the transubstantiation of the elements' (p. 354). Jenkyns admits a kind of power that is authority, but not a power that participates in creative action: 'we admit the power to consecrate, but not to transmute the elements--which is, to work a miracle' (p. 354).

The first area to which the power and authority of the priest extends, as these are defined above, is the authority to grant absolution. Jenkyns says that there are some difficulties here: there is no indication of the extent of the

priest's power in this capacity or of how the authority is to be exercised.[26] In effect, Jenkyns does not believe that the ability of the priest to grant absolution is a separate function at all but is only peripheral to his function as minister of the sacraments:[27]

> It extends to the two Sacraments, in which remission of sins is conferred and besides these he is authorized on one other occasion to remit the sins of those who 'truly repent and believe etc' (absolution at beginning of daily service). But it must be observed that though this is so, yet it is quite clear that the absolution here in this case is in no wise different or fuller than in the sacraments {in fact it may well be doubted if it goes as far, because Sacraments were specially instituted for the purpose--} and the same conditions, namely 'Repentance and faith' are required in the sacraments as on the other occasions.[27]

The other difficulty that Jankyns sees with regard to the question of absolution is the question of whether or not the particular sins of an individual penitent are remitted in the general absolution of the liturgy, or in any other context, for that matter. In speaking of the Eucharistic rite of 1662, he says: 'on the question of absolution in it, it is doubtful whether the penitient is to receive specific absolution or not'.[28] He continues:

> Had this been intended we should have expected some direct expressions to that effect as in the 1st book--which says 'that of us (as of the ministers of God, etc) he may receive comfort and absolution' whereas now [1662] it is 'that by the ministry of God's word he may receive the benefit of absolution'. Or else we should have expected some form of absolution as in the communion of the sick (which of course could not be used here).
>
> Absolution 'by the ministry of God's word' is certainly not equivalent to absolution by the minister himself--the one being direct the other

indirect.

> On the other hand if no real absolution was intended why was the term 'absolution' used?--perhaps it was used as meaning the spiritual absolution consequent on the ministry of God's word, by it, as its due and proper effect.
>
> On the whole however it is not very clear or satisfactory.[29]

Jenkyns concludes that the Prayer Book of 1662 states that the minister is 'to pronounce this absolution' and that this change from the Second Book of Edward VI was made manifestly for the purpose of giving more authority to the absolution'.[30]

In the last analysis, Jenkyns' remarks on absolution must be seen in their proper historical context: he is defining these concepts against the background of the Roman Catholic doctrine of penance and the practice of auricular confession, and this specific frame of reference is dealt with in Jenkyns' comments on the sacraments per se (see below, Chapter VII). But one may reach certain conclusions here. After considering Jenkyns' theological frame of mind, it seems clear that the real source of his difficulty in accepting orders as a sacrament and in according to the priest the power to absolve sins stems from his understanding of the relationship between God and man. In good Evangelical fashion, he is concerned to let God be God and man be man. The efficacy of the sacraments reposes in God's mighty acts of reconciliation, in the sacrifice of Jesus Christ upon the cross. The forgiveness of sin lies only in the power and glory of God, in the mercy of God's justification worked out in the atonement. The power of these works is God's alone: they cannot in any way be effected by the power of men, even when the works of men are ordained by God. And it is because of Jenkyns' jealous desire to protect the power of God that he is inclined to reject any understanding of priestly or ecclesiastical function which might seem to impinge upon that divine power and grace.

2. The peculiar office of the minister. If orders are not a sacrament; if the priest has, in effect, no special grace, no special power, and no particular quality or form of life, how is the minister different in obligation and function from any other Christian? In an earlier statement, the priest was said to have two other areas of 'power and authority': the 'dispensing of the word of God' and the 'dispensing of the "holy sacraments"'. An analysis of these functions of priesthood now falls due.

It is, says Jenkyns, the 'peculiar office of the minister to increase the worship of God' through the administration of the sacraments and the conduct of the liturgy.[31] Of course, preaching is also a special duty of the minister, but this activity does not really increase or constitute the worship of God: 'the worship of God is more important than the teaching of man and it would be very hurtful if man's teaching replaced just that which it is the minister's peculiar office to increase'.[32] In other words, there is no sense in Jenkyns in which proclamation approaches anything like the Protestant 'Sacrament of the Word', and preaching does not participate in the saving acts of God. The center of worship is the liturgy, never the sermon, even when the Eucharist is not celebrated.[33] What then, it seems good to ask, is the function of preaching?

The sermon, says Jenkyns, always occupied a place of secondary importance in the practices of Christianity in ancient times.[34] In support of this contention, he cites Chrysostom[35] on sermons. '"The need of having a preacher at all arose only out of our own negligence, for all things necessary for our salvation were clearly and distinctly laid down in scripture"', but some said they could not understand the scripture. This then is the function of preaching: to expound the essentials of salvation as they are permanently and all-sufficiently laid down in scripture--to teach 'right doctrine' as it is commanded by God and codified in his written word. While, on the one hand, Jenkyns' view of preaching is not in agreement with the usual Protestant attitude because he feels it fulfills a secondary role in the life of the Church; on the other hand, his belief that the

chief function of preaching is to teach right doctrine does accord well with the attitudes of Protestant confessionalism.

This concept of the sermon is borne out in Jenkyns' treatment of Article XXXV, 'Of the Homilies' (p. 407). The Homilies are recommended by the Church of England, not because of any desire to enshrine the sermon or to recognize any special merit in preaching, but because they were expedient to the needs of their day. 'The times were controversial and it was necessary to instruct the people on the matters in controversy' (p. 407)--that is, to teach right doctrine. 'Again the clergy were [inadequately educated] and in many instances unable to preach their own sermons, or else would not preach satisfactory doctrine' (p. 407, italics mine). Nineteenth century subscribers to the article are not obliged to take every word of the Homilies as matters of faith but merely to acknowledge that the doctrine therein contained is generally 'godly and wholesome' (p. 407).[36]

Conclusions: The doctrine of the Church and the doctrine of the priesthood.

It is because Jenkyns sees the Church as being a human institution or society and the priesthood and episcopacy as merely the duly appointed governors of the institution (see the discussion of Arts. XXXIV, XXIII, and XXXVI) that he is ill-disposed to comprehend the concepts of a doctrine of apostolic succession and any view of priesthood which is other than functional. His understanding of the priesthood is also very much conditioned by his understanding of the sacraments. It is true that he refers his arguments to the primacy of scriptural dicta in the definition of episcopacy and priesthood, but it is also true that he interprets scripture as it touches these definitions in a particular way; and the structure which is lent to the scripture by this particular interpretation has as its cornerstone a conception of the Church as a human institution which attracts to her sphere certain divine influences, perhaps, but certainly no divine prerogatives. For these reasons,

it is appropriate to subsume Jenkyns' doctrine of priesthood under his doctrine of the Church.

Chapter VI
Doctrine of Justification

Jenkyns' doctrine of justification may be pieced together from his treatment of the following articles among the Thirty-nine: IX, 'Of original sin' (pp. 180-96); X, 'Free will' (pp. 196-211); XI, 'Of the justification of man'(pp. 211-220); XII, 'Of good works' (pp. 220-35); XIII. 'Of works before justification' (pp, 235-7); XIV, 'Of works of supererogation' (pp. 237-40); XV, 'Of Christ alone without sin' (pp. 240-3); XVI, 'Of sin after baptism' (pp. 243-65); XVII, 'Predestination' (pp. 265-86); XVIII, 'Of obtaining salvation only by the name of Christ' (pp. 286-8); and XXXIII, 'Of excommunicate persons' (pp. 401-4). For the most part, these articles constitute what Jenkyns calls (p. 30) division III of the Thirty-nine Articles: those which treat of Christianity 'in its reference to individual Christians'. While it is possible to extract several of these articles from a discussion of justification and to treat them under the headings of different doctrines (e.g., of creation, of works, man, etc.), it is the contention here that Jeknyns' overriding concern (reflecting that of the English Reformers who framed the Articles) is with justification; his treatment of the concepts of creation and works, and so forth, is to a large extent determined by his understanding of justification. This analysis, therefore, considers Jenkyns' interpretation of the conditions of creation and of the value of works as tangential to the central issue of justification and treats it accordingly.

The following discussion treats these theological concepts: original sin; free will, including the nature of grace and predestination; justification; sanctification; and a consideration of the relationship between faith and works in the justification of man. Finally, some attempt has been made to situate Jenkyns' views on justification vis-á-vis the various post-Reformation theologies; therefore, this analysis concludes with some consideration of Arminianism as a school of theological thought.

For the most part, justification is here given that signification which predominates in Protestant theology: 'the act whereby God, in virtue of the Sacrifice of Christ,

aquits a man of punishment due to his sins and in his mercy treats him as though he were righteous'.[1] On the other hand, the active sense of the word as 'the act whereby God makes a man just'[2] may also be understood in some contexts; although this understanding of justification pertains to a greater degree in Jenkyns' discussion of the sacraments (see below, Chapter VII). This analysis proceeds with a presentation of Jenkyns' teachings; a comparison of his concepts with those of dominant Protestant and Tridentine theologies, where this seems helpful; and concludes with an attempt to place the doctrine as expounded by Jenkyns in a particular school of theological thought.

Original sin.

A discussion of justification proceeds naturally from an understanding of original sin: it is because man is a sinner that he needs to be justified before God. Jenkyns defines original sin as 'a fault and corruption of nature in every man engendered as the offspring of Adam' (p. 182). Jenkyns does not discuss the precise nature of the Fall or the nature of its consequences for mortality but concerns himself only with the ontological result of the Fall and the ensuing relationship in which man stands before God: (1) Fallen man is no longer in his originally created state, but he is not totally removed therefrom. Although the corruption of his nature is extensive, the struggle for good and evil continues in man, and some principle for good remains in his nature. Nevertheless, (2) man is of his own nature inclined to evil. All men are tainted by original sin; therefore, (3) all deserve and are actually under the wrath of God at the time of their birth, because 'original sin per se deserves God's wrath' (pp. 182-3). These three characteristics describe the state of natural man and are presented in 'the first part' of Article IX (p. 183).

The 'second part' of the article deals with the state of regenerate man, that is to say, with baptized Christians. Jenkyns identifies baptism and regeneration: 'The context shows this, in saying "there is no condemnation for them that believe and are baptized", for such are Christians'

(p. 183). Three characteristics pertain to man in the regenerate state (p. 191): (1) The innate inclination to evil (i.e., 'original sin', p. 184) inheres in his nature, but (2) it no longer, through the efficacy of Baptism (p. 184), deserves condemnation. Nevertheless (3), this unremoved inclination to evil in the nature of regenerate man continues to have '"of itself the nature of sin"' and 'corruption then still remains corruption' (p. 184). Jenkyns observes that the article is cautiously worded and deals only with original, rather than with actual, sin: 'It is only asserted that no-one will be condemned for his inclination to sin alone, i.e., for "original sin"' (p. 184).

According to this description of regenerate man, the Christian is accounted rather than made righteous before God in justification. In other words, justification in Baptism does not alter the essential being of the Christian--the taint of original sin remains, but it places him in a Godward orientation despite the taint. In this respect, says Jenkyns (p. 184) Article IX develops the assumption of a basic alienation between God and man which underlies the concepts expressed in Article II. The reconciliation of God and man which results from justification is wrought in the atonement of Jesus Christ, 'who truly suffered, was dead and buried, to reconcile his father to us, and to be a Sacrifice not only for Original Guilt (original sin), but also for actual sins of men'.[3] This reconciliation was made necessary by man's guilt and was accomplished by the sacrifice (certainly propitiatory,[4] and probably vicarious) of Jesus Christ for both the original and actual sins of men (p. 63). Thus, it is clear that, as Jenkyns understands it, the justification achieved by the death of Jesus Christ and communicated to Christians in Baptism extends to actual as well as to original sin.

It is, then, the view of the Church of England as expressed in Article IX that the Fall of Adam resulted in a change in human nature (p. 189). Adam was created in original righteousness, but his nature was disordered in the Fall, and this disorder was and is transmuted to all successive generations of man. Jenkyns observes (p. 190) that a powerful

objection has been raised to this understanding of original sin: according to this view of the Fall, the sins of the father are visited on unoffending sons; therefore, the justice of God seems to be impugned. Jenkyns recognizes the gravity of the problem, but he feels that:

> the reconciling of this with our ideas of God's justice may be and indeed is an inexplicable difficulty, but this does not disprove the fact . . . 'our ways are not as his ways'. But in fact this doctrine is easier of belief than many other parts of God's providence, because here a remedy, a complete one and coextensive with the evil, is provided in Christ.

The proofs of this article can be drawn from both experience and revelation. Our experience demonstrates that men are uniformly inclined to evil; all passages from scripture which may be adduced to show the general and innate wickedness of man constitute proofs of the article's description of natural man (pp. 185-8). The testimony of the Fathers indicates that they all held, in some sense or another, the doctrine of original sin (p. 193). All passages from the New Testament which attest to God's pardon or favour toward, and justification of man in Christ go to prove Article IX's description of the state of regenerate man (p. 192).

Jenkyns asserts (p. 195) that, contrary to popular opinion, the Church of England and the Church of Rome are in essential agreement on the doctrine of original sin. Many people are of the mistaken opinion that, while Anglicans believe that the taint of original sin remains after Baptism, Rome maintains that no blot remains in the nature of the regenerate. However, the Council of Trent states that in Baptism '"all that has the true and proper nature of sin is remitted"' (p. 195), but that concupiscence and lust remain (p. 196). The misunderstanding between Anglicans and Romans exists because the Roman Church does not understand concupiscence 'to be truly and properly sin, but evil, because of sin, and inclining to sin' (p. 196). Jenkyns observes that:

> the distinction here drawn is subtle, but it leaves the Romish doctrine not far removed from that of our article and the main difference seems to be that what we call 'sin' they call 'evil because of sin', or 'inclining to sin' i.e. Lust. But if it [lust] is allowed to exist, it appears immaterial what name is given to it--which is in fact a fight about the name not the thing--(p. 196).

There is, of course, another difference between the teachings of Rome and England with regard to baptism, which Jenkyns notes elsewhere (p. 63): Rome teaches that baptism removes the guilt of original sin only and that each Christian must purge or expiate his own individual sins, whereas the Church of England teaches that baptism expiates the guilt of both original and actual sin.

Finally, in comparing Anglican and Roman attitudes on original sin, some mention must be made of the Roman doctrine of the Immaculate Conception of the Blessed Virgin Mary. Article XV (pp. 240-3) states that Jesus Christ, though fully human in all other respects of his nature, is the only descendent of Adam to be born without the taint of original sin. The doctrine of the Immaculate Conception, as decreed by Pope Pius Ix (1854), states that '"the Blessed Virgin Mary, in the first moment of her conception, by a singular grace and privilege of Almighty God, in virtue (intuitu) of the merits of Jesus Christ the Saviour of the human race, was preserved immune from every stain of original guilt"'.[5] Jenkyns observes (p. 196) that the Council of Trent left the question of Mary's sinfulness open, but Pope Pius IX, 'taking the bull by the horns',[6] decreed the Immaculate Conception as an article of faith.

Jenkyns does not consider the Immaculate Conception in relation to his discussion of Article XV. His failure to do so may derive from the fact that he evidently understands Article XV to be concerned with the actual, rather than the original, sin of man. The article was directed against the Pelagians, who asserted 'the peccability (liability to sin) of Christ', in some cases, or the actuality of sins committed by Christ, in other cases (p. 242). The article may

also be seen to counter the opinions of other groups (pp. 242-3). Some Pelagians and Socinians believed that especially pious men could escape actual sin through the exercise of natural strength (i.e., without the assistance of grace). Wesley taught the doctrine of the possibility of Christian perfection, 'though with many qualifications'. Various of the antinomians believed that for the elect all things were pure.

Free Will

Article X (pp. 196-211) is an elaboration of Article IX and describes the result of man's departure in the Fall from original righteousness (p. 197): although the Fall has not resulted in the destruction of man's total potential for good, it has perverted his will to such an extent that, of his own natural strength, he cannot turn from evil and prepare himself for good works. To remedy the effects of the Fall, God in Christ has provided for man's sanctification through His own free gift of grace, the 'power of correcting inclination to evil' (p. 199) in man. '"Grace"', as the term is used in Article X, 'does not mean merely God's favour, but a particular manner in which it is exerted and intends that spiritual influence that comes from God and affects the human heart' (p. 197). It is not clear whether the article refers to natural or regenerate man. In any case, the article may be applied to man before conversion (i.e., 'in his State of Heathenism', p. 198); at his conversion ('for he cannot receive or entertain [Christianity when it is preached to him] without God's grace assisting him', p. 198); or in his post-baptismal, regenerate state ('for he cannot retain it [the state of regeneration] without the divine influence of God's grace', p. 198). Thus, Article X makes two definite assertions (p. 198): (1) Unaided, man cannot turn God-ward. (2) The divine gift of grace is necessary to remedy this inability.

1. Grace. The extent and nature of this grace which is necessary to good works is not precisely defined in the article: it is at least prevenient and cooperating (p. 198), but it is neither irresistable (p. 198 and p. 202) nor

indefectible (p. 202). That is to say, grace does not negate the free operation of the will of man: previenient grace 'leads the way, not drags [man] along' to good, while the nature of cooperating grace suggests that 'the exertions of man as well as [of] God' are necessary to the performance of good works (p. 198).

Article XVI (pp. 243-65) develops the Church of England's teaching on the question of final perseverance or the indefectibility of grace. This article contains two propositions (1 and 2 below) and their corollaries (a and b below):

(1) It is possible to fall from grace after being admitted to the Christian covenant (i.e., after baptism--p. 245); therefore (a), those people are to be condemned who say that Christians can sin no more after baptism (p. 246).

(2) After falling away from grace, Christians may be reinstated to favour by the grace of God (p. 245); therefore (b), those people are in error who deny repentance to the truly penitent (p. 246).

The implication of (2) is also that Christians may fall from grace, never to be restored (p. 245);[7] such a situation can only result, however, from the failure of man to exercise properly his free will to choose for good against evil (p. 202).

For proof of this doctrine of grace, Jenkyns adduces four classes of scriptural texts (pp. 201-2):

(1) Those which speak of the necessity of grace after conversion.

(2) Those which demonstrate the operation of grace, in both the Old and the New Testaments.

(3) Those which attest to preventing as well as to assisting grace, especially Phillipians 1.6 and 2.13.

(4) Those which assert the necessity of man's cooperation and the exercise of his free will.

Within these categories, all Bibiblical passages bearing on original sin, denying justification by works, and speaking of a spiritual influence in the lives of believers are relevant (p. 199). 'For the slightest mention of the working

of the Divine Grace proves the first proposition'--that, unaided, man cannot turn God-ward--'for God never interposes unnecessarily' (p. 200). Furthermore, all Biblical exhortations, promises, threats, and statements of the possibility of man's rejecting grace demonstrate:

(a) that man has the free will to choose or to reject salvation, and

(b) that he may, through his own fault, fall irretrievably from grace (p. 200).

Jenkyns observes (p. 204) that some objections to the doctrine of free will have been raised on the grounds of certain Biblical texts. For instance, passages which speak of a 'new creation' seem to leave no room for the operation of free will, at least in the regenerate, baptized Christian. But Jenkyns objects that these passages must be considered in the light of other passages, such as those which contain exhortations to holiness in the believer: 'either set of passages [treated in isolation from the other] will surely mislead'[8] (p. 205).

2. Controversies concerning the nature of grace. The remainder of Jenkyns' discussion of Article X is devoted to the history of the controversies which have arisen as a result of the tension which exists between doctrines of grace and of free will (pp. 206-8). Of particular interest are the questions which he notes as being at issue at or since the time of the Reformation and which have generally agitated the peace of Christendom since Pelagius (pp. 208-9). Of the following questions, the first two relate to the extent of corruption in post-lapsarian man and the remainder relate to the nature of the grace offered to him:

(1) Is the corruption of human nature in original sin partial or total?

(2) If it is partial, what is its extent?

(3) Is grace universally offered to all men?

(4) If it is universally offered, is it given on the basis of merit or by election?

(5) Is grace, or is it not, irresistible by the human will?

(6) Is grace, or is it not, indefectible?

(7) Is grace, or is it not, perceptible?

At the Reformation, the question of the relative roles played by grace and free will in the justification of man led to great controversy in Rome. The Council of Trent reached no conclusions on the question, although the results of the later controversy between the Jansenists and the Jesuits asserted the role of the operation of free will rather more strongly than did Trent (p. 210). The Church of England adopted a moderate view, which asserted the mutual operation of grace and free will in the justification of man. This moderate view is that held in general by most Reformation churches, with some notable exceptions among individuals: both Luther and Calvin asserted the operation of grace almost to the exclusion of the operation of free will (p. 210).

As one might expect because of the controversy related to it in England,[9] Jenkyns devotes some little space to an exposition of the Synod of Dort (1618) and the dispute between the Calvinists[10] and the Arminians. He lists the Articles of Dort, which define the doctrine of the double, arbitrary decrees of predestination and the irresistibility of grace:

(1) Election is by the arbitrary and unknowable decree of God. Such decrees are conditioned neither by God's foreknowledge, nor by the merits of the elect.

(2) The limited atonement of Jesus Christ: the benefits of the atonement extend only to the elect.

(3) Post-lapsarian man is totally depraved and unable in any way to cooperate in his own salvation.

(4) The grace of God granted to the elect for their salvation is irresistible by the will of man.

(5) The grace of God in the elect is indefectible: the saints may be assured of final perseverance.

Jenkyns observes that these articles were incorporated in the Westminster Confession (1646) and persist to his day as the doctrine of the Presbyterian Church of Scotland. It is helpful to consider here, by way of contrast and for later reference, the Arminian statement of doctrine on these

points as it appeared in the Remonstrance (1610):

(1) Election is conditionally determined by God's foreknowledge of faith in the elect and of unbelief in the damned.

(2) The atonement of Jesus Christ is universal, its benefits being intended for all mankind although not actually efficient for the damned.

(3) Post-lapsarian man is unable, without the regeneration accomplished by the Holy Spirit, to accomplish anything good.

(4) The grace of God is indispensible to the elect, but not irrisistible.

(5) The grace of God is sufficient for the continual perseverance of the elect in goodness, but the necessary final perseverance of the elect remains open to question. (This statement was later modified to assert the possibility that the elect might finally fall from grace.)

Jenkyns discusses his particular views on predestination under Article XVII (pp. 265-86).

3. Predestination. Article XVII discusses God's predestination of the elect, or his predetermination to make some humans Christian (p. 266). This decision of God is 'constantly decreed' but 'secret to us'. Jenkyns says that the decree is 'secret to us' in either of two senses: it may mean 'for a long time secret to us, but partially revealed by the gospel, whence it may still be said to be secret to us', and this is the meaning Jenkyns favours; or, it may mean, 'we do not know why God saves some and not others'. The aspect that Jenkyns wishes to protect here is the sufficiency to salvation of the revelation contained in scripture. He recognizes that the full-blown doctrine of eternal and secret decrees of double predestination cannot be fully defended from scripture.

The article asserts that it is God's purpose to do two things (p. 266): (1) To save some of mankind--the elect--from eternal damnation, and to destroy others of mankind, and (2) to bring the elect he chooses to everlasting life. The ways revealed in scripture by which God accomplishes

this purpose are rehearsed in the article (p. 267).

(1) He calls the elect to the gospel.

(2) He grants them the grace to obey the gospel.

(3) He justifies them freely.

(4) He makes the elect his sons by adoption.

(5) He makes the elect 'like the image of his only begotten son--that is, he causes them to be pure and holy in their human nature'.[11]

(6) The elect walk in good works.

(7) At length, the elect attain 'everlasing felicity', that is, life eternal in Christ.

The article, however, does not indicate the grounds for God's election, nor does it state whether or not the elect are assured of final perseverance.[12]

The Church of England's view on predestination does not agree, says Jenkyns, with those of either the Calvinists or the Arminians (p. 268). The Church of England believes the 'elect' to be 'some people out of all mankind' (p. 268), that is, to be all Christians (p. 280); the Calvinsits and the Arminians believe the 'elect' to be some few among the earthly body of baptized Christians (p. 268). The Church of England refrains from defining the grounds for God's election; the Calvinists and the Arminians disagree with each other on the definition of these grounds: the Calvinists insist that election is by the arbitrary pleasure of God; the Arminians, that it is by God's foreknowledge of faith or unbelief in the individual (p. 268). The Church of England does not assert the final perseverance of the elect; the Calvinists do assert it; and the Arminians leave this question open and hesitate to give an opinion on it (p. 268).

The second and third paragraphs of Article XVII consist in cautions against the various errors into which Christians may fall on the subject of predestination, and they attempt to indicate the limits of acceptable latitude for opinions in this area. Such an indication is made necessary by the vagueness of definition which is given in the first paragraph of the article (p. 268). In particular, the second paragraph warns against an excessive preoccupation

with a predestination determined by eternal, double decrees. The last paragraph intends to guard against too exclusive an adherence to the double decrees because they 'do away with the "universiality" of [God's] promises' (p. 270). It is also an attempt generally to soften the conviction of double decrees because they 'are not certainly known', and it is better that the believer 'keep to what is plain and clearly known: i.e., God's written word' (p. 270).

Jenkyns says that there are three main tenets advanced by 'the second part of the article' (p. 270), by which he seems to mean the last paragraph: (1) God's promises are universal; (2) it is God's will that all men should be saved; and (3) it is God's will that all men should keep his commandments. Jenkyns attributes the language of this paragraph to a passage from the writings of Melanchthon, which he renders thus (p. 279): 'We are not to judge his [God's] will otherwise than from his revealed word . . . God wills the salvation of all men . . . as far as his will or purpose or intention are concerned'. Melanchthon 'also shows clearly the difficulties and contradictions of upholding a secret will, in opposition to his revealed will'.[13] Jenkyns offers these responses to those (p. 280) objections which might be raised to this understanding of predestination (i.e., from those who understand the doctrine of double decrees, e.g., the Supralapsarians): While it is argued that the decree to damnation must pertain, since clearly not all men are saved: (a) All Christians may be saved, and damnation comes only to those Christians who by their own choice fall from grace. (b) Furthermore, it is not absolutely certain that even Heathens are under eternal damnation:

> It is possible that Christ's atonement may extend to them as well, though no doubt they are not as well off as Christians. This only shews an inequality in spiritual advantages, which exists also among Christians . . . both in spiritual and temporal advantages according to the mode of God's working here.
>
> This inequality is wholly different from that

asserted by Calvinists in the doctrine of 'Absolute Election and Reprobation'.

Jenkyns concludes his discussion of predestination by tracing some of the history of the doctrine (pp. 281-4), attributing it originally to Augustine and commenting that most of the Reformers followed Augustine's teachings. He observes that the Reformers adhered to Augustine in varying degrees and that it was Calvin who most fully developed the tenets of Augustine's teachings and systematized them under the doctrine of double decrees. Jenkyns observes that no Reformation confession of faith is definite on the question of predestination, but the Gallican confession drawn up by Beza is the most dogmatic (p. 282).

As to the development of doctrinal statements on predestination in the Church of England: both Cranmer and Ridley held moderate views on the subject of predestination, as did most of the English Reformers, and neither of them were Calvinists. They left the question open in the formulation of the Thirty-nine Articles because 'neither would they be likely to condemn Calvinism directly, as it was held by many English Divines at that time and the measure would have been unpopular and impolitic' (p. 282). Jenkyns concludes with some references to the Lambeth Articles, the Hampton Court Conference, the Articles of Dort, and the Remonstrance. He remarks that the Council of Trent did not reach a final judgment of the question: its decrees agree with the Church of England's teachings on predestination, 'only treating the matter generally' (p. 284).

Justification.

1. Definition. The central article of this group dealing with the salvation of individuals is Article XI (pp. 211-20), and it is chiefly concerned to state the grounds upon which the sinner is justified and the means whereby this justification is appropriated to the individual sinner. Jenkyns observes that there are two senses of 'Justification', one a theological and the other a logical,[14] and it is in the former sense that this article uses the term. Accordingly, the justification (equated with 'Salvation', p. 212)

of the sinner is opposed to the condemnation of the sinner: on the one hand, he is treated as innocent of sin; on the other, as guilty thereof. In other words, 'justification' is used in the article in the Protestant, forensic sense: the sinner is accounted righteous before God, though he is neither found to be nor made to be so (p. 212). Justification is 'for Christ's sake' (p. 212) and takes place at baptism. The condition of justification as discussed in this article is applicable to Christians in all states of their life: at conversion, during their post-conversion, earthly life, and at the time of final judgment before the throne of God. This article, however, specifically deals with Christians at the time of conversion, whereas Article XII treats them as members of the Church Militant (p. 212).[15]

The article contains three propositions (p. 213): (1) Christians are not accounted righteous for their works. (2) Christians are accounted righteous for the merits of Jesus Christ. (3) Christians benefit from the meritorious works of Christ by faith--'i.e. [by] a reliance on his merits'.

One of the chief purposes of the article is to set the works of man in opposition to the works of Jesus Christ (p. 213). Because of their innate and inescapable imperfections, the best of human endeavours after righteousness, the best works of man, are insufficient to accomplish justification before God. Yet God in his mercy accounts men just in accepting, on behalf of sinners, the good and perfect works of Jesus Christ. In this way, the atonement of Jesus Christ accomplishes the justification of Christians, and it is through the instrumentality of faith that the benefits of Christ's merits are appropriated to the believer--'non propter merita nostra, sed propter merita Christi per fidem' (Art. XI, as quoted by Jenkyns, p. 213).

2. Faith. Before one can fully comprehend the article, it is necessary to understand the meaning and nature of the 'faith' to which it refers. There are two definitions of faith which underlie the article: the 'general' definition--'a reliance, or firm belief, in the Gospel revelation of Christ, on the testimony and assurance of God through Christ'; and a 'particular' definition--'The acceptance of

the Gospel revelation' (p. 213). Thus, there are two components of faith: trust, which is characterized by a belief in all the promises of God in the scripture and a reliance on the merits of Christ; and assent, which is characterized by 'an engagement [on the part of the individual Christian] to fulfill the conditions of that Gospel' (p. 213). When all the components are taken together, one is to understand the faith spoken of in Article XI to be 'faith working by love' (p. 213).

The fact that the faith herein understood is to have a moral counterpart is underlined by the article's injunction concerning 'the Homily of Justification' (which, as Jenkyns recognizes, p. 211, must surely be Cranmer's homily, 'Of Salvation')--'Wherefore that we are justified by faith only, is a most wholesome Doctrine, and very full of Comfort, as more largely is expressed in the Homily of Justification'.[16] The homily makes it clear that a mere intellectual recognition of the truth and reality of the Gospel revelation is not sufficient to salvation; indeed, such a defective 'faith' results in condemnation rather than in justification.[17] Faith must issue in good works, or else it is inefficacious. Thus, in its reference to the homily, Article XI 'modifies the supremacy of faith to disallow solefidianism: the Homily clearly recognizes the connection between justifying faith and good works' (p. 214). Furthermore, the justification which ensues by faith on baptism must continue throughout the life of the believer, 'for at all times, justification is required, however good a Christian we may be' (p. 219).

There is a subtlety of thought which pervades Jenkyns' arguments, both here and in the later lectures on Article XII, touching the relationship between faith and works in the justification of Christians. It is important to make his thinking in this area clear because it marks his departure from the orthodox, Protestant Reformation doctrine of works which he seems to be advocating. Certainly, he wishes to disavow the extreme and essentially amoral faith of solifidianism which he attributes to Luther; at the same time, he wishes to disallow the justification of man through

his own efforts which is condemned in Luther and Calvin alike.

Jenkyns comments (p. 219) that justification by faith is 'wholesome' because 'it puts down pride', by which he evidently means that it prevents men from assuming to themselves the agency that is rightly God's alone. Such justification is also 'full of comfort' because 'it is the only means to salvation . . . we cannot do anything of ourselves, but by Christ we can and so it gives us hope, and freedom from despondency' (p. 219). That is to say, Jenkyns rejoices with Luther in the freedom from the fear of condemnation and the blessed assurance of salvation that depends on the perfect works of Christ rather than upon the uncertain and imperfect works of man. Nonetheless, his insistence on the necessity of good works that follow on justification (p. 222), his firm belief that Christians may fall from grace if their faith does not issue in good works (p. 222), and his understanding of faith as an 'acceptance of the terms of the Gospel covenant' (p. 215) and as '<u>an engagement to fulfill [its] conditions</u>' (p. 213, italics mine) indicate that he is really confirming a species of justification-by-works doctrine.

3. <u>Covenant relationship</u>. It is probable that the determining factor in his thinking is his understanding of justification in the terms of covenant. A covenant is a legal agreement into which two parties enter and whereby these parties undertake a reciprocal commitment, an exchange of obligations or of goods. This is certainly the Old Testament concept of covenant, at least as it was understood by Jenkyns and his contemporaries. If, therefore, justification is 'an engagement to fulfill the gospel covenant', it constitutes a kind of exchange between God and man; God provides his saving action for the justification of man; man, in exchange,[18] offers his good works to God for justification. If a man reneges on his part of the bargain, God withdraws his saving action; therefore, it may be said that man is, in effect, justified before God on the basis of his own merit. While it is thus far true, then, to say that Jenkyns really believes in a species of justification by

works, rather than by faith alone, such a statement receives further modification when one comes to understand what Jenkyns means when he considers the 'good works' of man which constitute the effects of 'faith working by love'. The important feature to be seized in this context is that characteristic in the works of man performed after justification which constitutes them good. And that nettle can be grasped by the hand, assuredly gloved, on the strength of Jenkyns' remarks concerning Article XII.

Article XII, says Jenkyns, discusses the sanctification of Christians: Article XI says that Christians are released from a state of bondage, 'having accepted the Gospel Covenant' and Article XII assumes that 'having accepted it we keep it, i.e. that justification is followed by Sanctification, or a holy life--this being assumed, this present article [XII] discusses the question as to the value of the works by which we keep that Covenant' (p. 211). The good works discussed, therefore, are necessarily those of Christians rather than those of 'Heathens' (p. 221).[19]

Sanctification (i.e., righteousness confirmed by good works).

The article contains two sets of propositions and their corollaries: (1) Good works do not expiate or atone for sins: even the good works of the justified cannot endure the judgement of God; therefore (corollary), the good works of the converted cannot maintain Christians in a state of justification (pp. 221-2). (2) Nevertheless, because the Christian is a member of the body of Christ, his works are done in virtue of his incorporation--are pleasing to God 'in Christ': these works are a necessary consequence of a true and lively faith; therefore (corollary), the good works of the converted are necessary to salvation (i.e., to the maintenance of justification, p. 223). Jenkyns allows that the corollaries appear to be contradictory, but he asserts that they are not: 'There is no real contradiction for it is said (a) that they do not retain [our justification] perse [sic], by their own virtue but (b) that they do retain it by [Christ] in as much as they are done in accordance with Christ's command, and as the result of faith in him' (p. 222).

1. Anglican definitions. The first set of propositions

and its corollary has already been proved from scripture under Articles XI and II: man is justified only by the sacrifice of Jesus Christ (p. 223). Similarly, the argument of Article IX proves that even regenerate man retains the taint of original sin, which renders all of his works imperfect; they, therefore, can not work his justification. Jenkyns develops the proofs of the second set of propositions and its corollary by reference to scripture: In discussing Romas VI, he states (pp. 225-6):

> The whole of this is to the purpose--here it is said it will by no means do for us to continue in sin even on the pretence of exciting God's grace towards us.
>
> The general import is to prove that if Christians do not continue in their state of justification they will lose all benefits of it by their evil works, and that good works will continue them in a state of justification, not perse [sic] but in Christ.

Jenkyns' remarks on other New Testament passages[20] continue the argument for the necessity of works:

> Works are thus pronounced as the condition of a continuance in justification in God's sight, works done from faith working by love, and producing its proper fruits (p. 226).
>
> If no works follow faith, out faith is no true faith . . . if we have good works they prove and exhibit our faith to be true and lively . . . He that had not these fruits of faith had forgotten his conversion and reception of the gospel covenant, i.e., had lost the benefit of his justification. . . . Works are the test of faith; without them, it is worthless and void (p. 227).

A collection of views such as these is hard to categorize in terms of a distinct school of theological thought. They represent, in fact, that blend of essentially protestant percepts that one has come to expect from Anglican theology. Strands of the orthodox thought of both Luther and Calvin are present.

2. Protestant Reformation views. Luther believed that it is the role of the Church and her ministers to evoke and strengthen faith in the believer, not to exhort him to good works.[21] Certainly Luther, with Calvin, recognized that love and good works were the natural consequence of faith: indeed, the phrase 'faith working by love' might have been coined by him.[22] One might say that 'Luther had an almost morbid fear of human presumption in quest of virtue. . . . Luther's faith did good works before it thought them, since he feared that to think of them would at once vitiate them as fruits of faith'.[23] Jenkyns' comments that the doctrine of justification by faith is wholesome because it puts down pride sits well in such a Lutheran context. Because Luther feared a lapse from radical faith and a reversion to the scholastic legalism of the pre-Reformation doctrine of justification by human merit, he refused to consider or to develop a doctrine of works at all: his refusal issued in the extreme solefidianism of his followers which Jenkyns abhors.

Calvin, on the other hand, while he was convinced of the truth of the doctrine of justification by faith to the exclusion of works, was somehow equally commited to the necessary connection between faith and good works: there is an ineluctable, if not explicit, element of perfectionism in Calvin's understanding:[24] and this despite his insistence upon the total and continued depravity of human nature. Calvin would have said with Jenkyns that 'works are the test of faith'. This characteristic in Calvin's thought may stem from several sources:

In the first place, his doctrine of the knowledge of God may contribute because it understands faith to be knowledge. As the believer grows in faith, he comes to know more and more of God and he grows nearer the Divinity, at least in the sense of companionship.[25] Secondly, his doctrine of the sacraments also involves the idea of the elevation of the human spirit. In the sacrament of the Eucharist, the Lord Christ is present to the believer, not because Jesus descends to the elements, but because the Holy Spirit working through the elements lifts the spirit of the believer to communion with the heavenly enthroned Christ.[26] The implications of such teaching are that the holier the believer,

the nearer he is drawn into the company of and community with God, the more holy the believer becomes. But the chief element in Calvin's thought which tends toward the idea of a growing perfection in the believer probably issues from Calvin's concept of the bodily incorporation of the elect into the Body of Christ. Calvin said of the spiritual unity of being twixt the believer and Christ 'that he wills to have a common life with us, that what he has should be ours: nay, that he even wishes to dwell in us, not in imagination, but in effect'.[27] Such a spiritual union extends to the whole person: 'The spiritual union that we have with Christ belongs not only to the soul, but also to the body, so much so that we are flesh of his flesh and bone of his bone'.[28] If such a union exists in the believer, then he will necessarily produce good works, because Christ works through his actions. Where faith does not issue in good actions, clearly the union of Christ and believer does not exist and his faith is only nominal. On the other hand, although Calvin probably considered the production of good works to be the mark of justification, he did not believe that such good works contributed to or maintained that justification, and this is a point at which Jenkyns departs from Calvin: 'Works are thus pronounced as the condition of a continuance in justification' (p. 226). As far as Calvin was concerned, any moral amendment which accrues to the lives of the justified is purely secondary: The purpose of the necessary works of faith is to show forth the glory of God in his righteousness; and the evil works of the so-called Christians are to be punished by the Church because they provide a stumbling block to the manifestation of God's glory.[29]

It is this kind of understanding which underlies, according to Jenkyns, the Church of England's article (XXXIII) on excommunication (pp. 401-4). Jenkyns says (p. 401) that Christians guilty of immoral conduct are 'rightly', that is, 'according to due form of Law', rather than 'justly or fairly'--'cut off' from the body of the Church (i.e., the visible Church), and that they may be restored thereto by public penance. The article stipulates: (1) that the Church has the authority to expel some from among its members; (2) that

she has the right to make the excommunicate to feel the effects of expulsion; and (3) that she has the power to restore the penitent to her company (pp. 401-2). The truth of the article is demonstrated by reference to the argument that the Church (i.e., the visible Church) is a human society, and she possesses all the rights understood to pertain to a society to discipline its members in the interest of good order (p. 402). Furthermore, the scriptures attest that such disciplinary powers have always resided in the community of believers (p. 402). The objects of such excommunication are (1) the preservation of the Church from pollution, and (2) the reformation of offenders. These arguments suit well Calvin's views on Church discipline, with the understanding that Calvin always held reformation to be of a purely secondary interest.[30] However, Jenkyns does not understand the Church of England to impose the severe ostracisim upon the excommunicate that was the rule in some of the extreme Puritian communities. The excommunicate are to be treated as 'Heathens and publicans', but we are to follow the example of Jesus in treating them kindly. Furhtermore (p. 403):

> The Epistles of St. Paul tell us that a slave is to serve well his heathen master--a wife her heathen husband--and so being treated as a heathen etc. was only to affect his [the excommunicate's] relations as regarded his membership in the Christian Church and to debar him from its privileges [presumably, from the sacraments] -- not to sever natural and social ties and relations.

Above all, the decision to excommunicate is to be understood as the judgement of the earthly Church: it is not necessarily the judgement of God on sin, nor does it bind God to condemnation.

3. Jenkyns' views on faith and works. To return to the question of the theological provenance of Jenkyns' understanding of justification, one notes that strands of pre-Reformation and Tridentine teachings are also present. Jenkyns says (p. 228) that man is released from condemnation through faith and through the acceptance of Christ: '1. by faith in embracing Christ's covenant,

2. by works, i.e., the keeping [of] Christ's covenant by a course of a Christian life of holiness'. In other words, the Christian is justified initially by faith alone in conversion, but he is sustained in justification by works. This is substantially the 'double righteousness' doctrine pronounced by the Council of Trent; Jenkyns is not unaware of the essential agreement between Roman and Anglican positions on justification, although he feels that it is difficult to compare them accurately because the Council of Trent uses the word 'justification' in a different sense (evidently from that of Paul, which Jenkyns understands to be the sense intended by the Church of England) (p. 234).

St Paul made these assertions concerning the relationship between faith and works in the justification of man (p. 231):

(1) Human merit is insufficient to warrant the justification of man before God.

(2) The merits of Christ are sufficient to warrant his justification before God.

(3) The believer, by his faith, partakes of the sufficiency of the merits of Christ: therefore, the faith of the believer works his justification before God because it transfers to him the benefits of Christ's merit.

(4) The works of the believer as the fruits of his faith are also necessary to his justification.

The Church of Rome also recognizes these four elements in justification, but she lays more stress on the fourth point than on the third (p. 234). Jenkyns understands the position of Rome to be the following (pp. 234-5):

> That the Meritorious Cause of justification is Christ by his sacrifice: the Instrumental Cause is the Sacrament of Baptism which is the sacrament of faith. The sole Formal Cause is the justice or rather 'righteousness' of God, by which he makes us righteous, by which we are renewed in the Spirit of our Mind.
>
> Faith unites hope and charity in us with God--all this may be reconciled with our doctrine, though

> even here 'works' are rather upheld, but what follows in the decree 'Of the fruits of justification' ['value of good works'] shows the difference--here works are said to earn justification, as a recompense quoting St. Paul 'affliction which etc. worketh an exceeding weight of glory [!], in support of it, but this is again qualified--though on the whole a great difference does not really exist between England and Rome in theory, in practice Rome goes considerably beyond her theory while we constantly recede from it--and so the difference in the practical teaching of the two Churches is far greater than in the theoretical.

It is the mark of Jenkyns' perspicuity that he recognizes that the difference between the Anglican and Roman teachings is functional rather than doctrinal.

The key to the difference between Rome and England is, of course, to be found in the Aristotelian-scholastic doctrine of habitual or sanctifying grace. This doctrine teaches that 'the grace conferred on man in justification' allows him to attain abilities 'which were not in themselves present by nature, yet which, once they were obtained, represented a natural condition from which equivalent acts proceeded as though automatically'.[31] Thus, while meritorious works in man are nothing more than a consequence of grace, they are also a consequence of grace that has in a practical sense become man's own. The goodness, then, of human works after justification inheres in their proper nature, and they may, therefore, serve to expiate and to atone for sin--that is, the good works of man contribute to his justification before God. Anglicanism, as Jenkyns understands it, teaches on the other hand that although the justified man can and does necessarily produce good works, the goodness of the works inheres not in themselves but in the merit of Jesus Christ. Viewed from the standpoint of human action, then, such works are (1) not good in themselves and (2), therefore, cannot contribute to the justification of man through the expiation of or atonement for sin. Consequently, even the good works of the justified, which

are said to be necessary to maintain him in justification, are still the merits of Christ as they are appropriated to the works of man by faith.[32] Such an understanding resolves the apparent dilemma of the two corollaries in Article XII--'good works cannot keep us in a state of justification' and 'good works are necessary to salvation because they maintain us in justification'.

> If works are so absolutely necessary, why in Article XI is justification said to be by faith alone?
>
> Because works are only acceptable by virtue of faith by the merits of Christ appropriated to the individual Christian by faith that Christ, his love and power to save and efficiency of the way he has chosen to save, and so salvation may properly be said to be by 'Faith only' because the works though absolutely necessary have in themselves no saving power (p. 228).

Earlier in this discussion, it was said that Jenkyns really believed in a species of justification by works, but this statement needs now to be modified: He believed in neither a doctrine of justification by faith alone, nor in a doctrine, but in a doctrine of justification by faith and works. Clearly, such an understanding of justification cannot be seen to represent, in effect, any departure from Luther's doctrine of radical faith: but it also participates in the Christian perfectionism implicit in Calvin and decidedly absent from Luther. Perhaps Jenkyns would agree to say that both the Anglican and the Roman Tridentine doctrines of justification represent the ancient Christian understanding of the saving relationship between works and faith in the atonement of Jesus Christ as it was corrected and modified by the insights of Luther and Calvin from the effects of scholastic distortion.

4. Roman doctrines of purgatory and satisfaction. It is at base Jenkyns' belief in the doctrine of justification which is expounded above, with the cardinal emphasis on the role of faith, which governs his criticism of all the Roman

errors denounced in Article XXII (pp. 312-40). The Aristotelian-scholastic concept of the nature of grace and the nature of man, in conjunction with the pre-Reformation development of the sacrament of penanace which had been extruded from it, had become so elaborated as to include the notions of indulgences, intercessary prayers for the dead, and works of supererogation. As a result, the Church, rather than the direct faith of the believer in Jesus Christ, had become the means to grace: it was the operation, first and foremost, of the Church which justified a man before God; a man justified himself, in the second place, by means of his own merits--that is by good works. Furthermore, the use of indulgences and of masses for the dead, in particular, were widely and badly abused because they were sold by the Church as a means to earn revenue. When the Church thus interposed herself between God in Christ and the heart of the individual believer as a mediatrix of grace, she made of herself a 'work', an antichrist who destroyed the saving efficacy of radical faith.

The purpose of Article XXII is to give the Church of England's judgment on certain of the doctrines and practices endorsed by the Church of Rome: purgatory, pardons, the worship and adoration of relics, and the invocation of saints. These doctrines and practices, all of which were rejected by the major branches of the Reformation, are rejected with similar reason by the Church of England. All of them are founded on human reason rather than on the truths of revelation; none of them can be proved by scripture; all of them actually contradict scripture;[33] nor can any of the practices be supported from ecclesiastical tradition (p. 339). These doctrines and practices constitute the particular errors of Rome and of general councils, and she imposes them on believers as articles of salvation despite the fact the fact that to do so exceeds her authority. Jenkyns devotes the whole of his lectures on Article XXII to a discussion of these errors: he gives the Roman definition and proof of the doctrines; states the Anglican basis for refuting them; and traces the history of each.

The detail of Jenkyns' lectures need not be rehearsed here, but the general premises of the criticisms directed against these errors are of interest. Generally speaking, the doctrines of purgatory, pardons, and indulgences are rejected because they impugn the all-sufficiency of the atonement of Jesus Christ.[34] They are also rejected, at a secondary level, because they depend for authority on the human exercise of prerogatives belonging only to God. The practices of the invocation of saints, the adoration of images, and the veneration of images are rejected because they contravene the first and second commandments.

The doctrines of purgatory, pardons, and indulgences are all really based on a prior doctrine of satisfaction. The doctrine of satisfaction teaches that 'after the pardon of sins, some punishment is to be gone through which if not undergone in this life, must be undergone in another state' (p. 314). Closely allied to the idea of satisfaction or reparation for sin is the secondary concept of purification. Rome has taught that the sinner must be purified from the effects of sin through some work done or punishment endured by him, if he is to enjoy the fruits of salvation (p. 314). Purgatory is the place where, somewhere between this life and the attainment of heaven, satisfaction is made and purification is accomplished (p. 314). A Christian may be dispensed from some of the satisfaction due for temporal sins through the granting of pardons and indulgences; ultimately and in practice, the satisfaction required by the Church for breaches of discipline came to be viewed as the satisfaction required by God; the pardon of the Church, as the pardon of God (p. 322).

The Church of England will and does admit:

> that God often punishes sin, in this world, and also that many sins have a natural tendency to produce punishment--but this is quite different from holding that God apportions the suffering to the sin in this life, and exacts a certain amount of punishment to be gone through as a satisfaction (p. 315).

The Church of England rejects the doctrine of satisfaction because not only can it not be proved from scripture, but it is also repugnant to scripture. It contradicts all of the general promises of forgiveness, which nowhere in scripture (i.e., in the New Testament) exacts satisfaction for sin by means of personal punishment (p. 316). The doctrine is, furthermore, derogatory to the perfct satisfaction made by Jesus Christ (p. 316). Jenkyns observes, too, that even if the doctrine of satisfaction could be proved as necessary to salvation, it would not necessarily entrain the doctrine of purgatory; however, the doctrine of purgatory, conversely, does virtually entrain the doctrine of satisfaction (p. 316).

The Roman Church's practice of granting pardons and indulgences to expiate sin is also repugnant to scripture: such a practice impugns the all sufficiency of Jesus' atonement (p. 319). Its proof depends, not on scripture, but on the non-scriptural doctrines of satisfaction and works of supererogation (p. 320).

The doctrines of satisfaction, pardons, and indulgences are all, furthermore, rejected by Anglicans because they impute to the Church powers which belong exclusively to God (p. 322). They are also, and chiefly, objectionable because they contravene the Reformation doctrine of justification by faith and confirm the Roman doctrine of justification by works.

The Church of England condemns the invocation of saints (p. 326), the adoration of images (p. 332), and the veneration of images (p. 337) because all of these practices tend to transgress the first and second commandments. In each instance, the religious honour due only to God is paid to human beings or to objects made by human hands. In the case of the invocation of saints, the blessed are asked to intercede with God on behalf of the sinner. Such a concept denies that Jesus is our 'only mediator' (p. 329). Furthermore, in practice, the saints are frequently thought to aid sinners 'of their own powers'. When images are adored, they are paid religious homage; they are used as objects to excite devotion: both of these activities are constitutive of a species of idolatry (p. 334). Relics are venerated

because they are believed to possess miraculous powers (p. 337). Such veneration ascribes to objects a power which pertains only to God. All of these practices tend to create and to perpetuate an idolatrous turn of mind, and they all encourage superstition (p. 330): such tendencies turn the mind of the Christian from God to man and the objects of man. They are, therefore, positively dangerous to salvation.

5. The apparent faith-works opposition. Jenkyns admits that Article XII is patient of interpretations other than the one he has presented (p. 231), but he also believes that definitions of justification which he has given are generally agreed upon by all Christians (p. 227). Particular expressions concerning justification vary, however, and this variation results in apparent differences between and contradictions among the definitions of justification which are provided by individual Church bodies (i.e., denominations): 'Faith' can be used in several different senses (pp. 228-9) to mean:

(1) Acceptance of, or assent to, the gospel covenant.

(2) A continuous fulfilment of the covenant, which issues in good works. This is the sense that Jenkyns attributes to Paul.

(3) A mere recognition of the fact that a revelation was given by God in Christ, with no concomitant engagement in the covenant.

(4) An acceptance of the conditions of the covenant which does not issue in its effects--that is, a faith without works.

'Justification' may have at least two different referents (p. 229):

(1) The condition of man at conversion.

(2) The condition of man after conversion.

Of course, justification may be considered from at least two different perspectives, as well: from the point of view of God's action or from the point of view of man's response to God's action (p. 231):

> It is also observable that in these articles [XI and XII] that though mention is made of faith and works, and their relative office in the salvation of man, none is made of the Christian sacraments--and this is because it is the object of these articles to state how man grasps the benefits offered by Christ's death; while the sacraments are the positive instruments provided by God, about which there could be no mistake.

In other words, the sacraments concern God's movement manward, while justification (at least as it is discussed in these articles and understood by Jenkyns) concerns man's movement God-ward. 'Works can be seen to be either the 'fruits of faith' (and as, therefore, of a non-expiatory nature) or as the 'works of merit' (which do expiate sin) (p. 229).

All of these various interpretations of 'faith', 'justification' and 'works' arise from the apparently opposing teachings of St James (and Sts Peter and John) and of St Paul; furthermore, there are opposing teachings on faith and works within the writings of Paul himself (p. 230). Jenkyns' interpretation of the doctrine of justification is given in an attempt to reconcile the apparent contradictions which are evident in the scriptures (pp. 230-1):

> The mode of salvation was identically held by both St. James and St. Paul (i.e., 'faith working by love') . . . [but] why then should so much stress be laid on salvation by faith . . . probably there were 2 reasons:
>
> 1. Because faith is the foundation on which the whole rests it leads to the acceptance of the gospel covenant, and so it is not inapplicable to say 'by faith alone'.
>
> 2. Because it wholly puts down the notion of human merit which the Jewish Christians were very prone to advocate.

Conclusions: The Arminian character of Jenkyns' theology of justification.

Jenkyns gives his own recapitulation of Articles IX-XVI or the 'Gospel scheme of man's redemption' (p. 264):

> IX and X: Man comes into the world in a state of condemnation, with no power to do anything good of himself.
>
> XI: Shews how he is transferred from that state into a state of grace, by the merits and for the sake of Christ.
>
> XII: Shews the nature and value of the works Man is able to perform in this new state.
>
> XIII: Relates to heathens and persons not within the pale of Christianity and so of no consideration here.
>
> XIV: Shews that although we may do good works, yet we can never do more than enough for our own salvation nor than we are bound to do in duty to God--and in fact can never do enough.
>
> XV: shews that though Christ truly came to take away sin yet that no one but Christ himself, has no sin in him and so all do sin and offend in many things.
>
> XVI: Shews that this sin may be so deadly as to endanger salvation but might be repented or pardoned.

It is curious to the twentieth-century analyst of Jenkyns lectures, in the wisdom of hindsight, that he so consistently disavows an association in the development of Anglican doctrines with the doctrines of Calvinism (Supralapsarianism) and Arminianism. On the other hand, his position is understandable: He did not view Calvinism and Arminianism with the detachment and breadth of view which may accrue with the passage of time: that is to say, his account of Anglicanism tends to be made in the absence of an 'historical sense'. For example, although Jenkyns recognizes and notes the elements of Christian perfectionism in the teachings of John Wesley (p. 243), he does not connect

Methodism with the classic Arminianism of the eighteenth-century Evangelical Revival, nor does he acknowledge Wesley's theological roots in Anglicanism. But then, such a sense of history as it is currently understood was only just awakening in Jenkyns' contemporaries and immediate forebearers. Furthermore, it was clearly Jenkyns' intention to give an account of Anglicanism as a distinct and reasonably coherent body of Christian doctrine in contrast with all other bodies of doctrine. As a result, his expositions quite naturally take up a we-in-contrast-to-them stance in relation to the statements of other denominations. Consequently, Jenkyns does not recognize that the statement of the doctrine of justification which he has presented in his lectures is essentially Arminian, as well it should be since the leading lights of the Church of England through the eighteenth century were 'Arminians' before and after the fact of Arminius.

The Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics[35] observes: 'In England, where there was a presage of Arminian thought long before the time of Arminius and his system, its principles found an interesting development, and their profession an unusual environment. The influence was seen in the ambiguity or comprehensiveness of the Articles of the English Church'. Latimer, Hooper, Andrewes, and Hooker were 'Arminians' before the advent of the system, as was Laud, although his sacramentarianism would have been unacceptable to Arminius and his followers. All of the Restoration theologians, including Burnet, were Arminians,[36] but at their hands Arminianism tended to loose its fine balance between Calvinism and Pelagianism and blended with the tendencies toward Latitudinarianism and Rationalism.[37] The cardinal points of Arminianism are presented in the Remonstrance which is outlined above. A comparison of these points with the comments of Jenkyns demonstrates the affinity between the two, but a general description of the post-Remonstrance development of Arminianism makes this relationship clearer.[38]

The leading principles of the Arminian system are the insistance on the universality of the atonement and on the

real freedom of the human will in the operation of the divine decrees. It is in the delicately maintained tension between the sovereignty of God and the freedom of man that the system works out the relationship between God and Man. The concept of prevenient grace established beyond doubt that Man is entirely dependent upon God in all matters concerning salvation. The universality of the atonement renders the salvation of all men possible but the salvation of no man actual. By insisting that the depravity of fallen man was a bias in his nature, the will of man was left free: he, thereby, was entirely responsible for his own destiny in the choice of good or evil. The inherited tendency to evil (original sin) is met and neutralized in the free and universal grace provided in the atonement. Grace is the primary cause of salvation, but not the sole cause: it is the primary cause which results in the due cooperation of the human free will.

For both Calvin and Arminius conversion comes as a work of the Holy Spirit in the communication of grace, but for Calvin grace is irresistible. Arminius taught that the action of grace was mediate, moral and persuasive, rather than physical and necessitating; and, in the end, this effective grace may be finally resisted. The faith which justifies must include obedience; therefore, the Arminian system tends to identify faith with intellectual assent borne out in behaviour rather than with trust as the simple reception of the doctrines and laws of God's revelation. The call of faith to obedience and the belief in the effective nature of grace made latent a tendency toward Christian perfectionism in Arminianism, which was developed, for example, in the teachings of Wesley. The same characteristics contributed to the degeneration of Arminianism into Socinianism, on the one hand, and into Pelagianism, on the other, when the human contribution to salvation was overemphasized.

The essential agreement between Arminianism as it is described here and that system of justification which is described by Jenkyns is clear. Jenkyns, however, never gives explicit consent to Christian perfectionism, if that is understood to mean that a growth toward goodness inheres

in the actual nature of the believer. It has been said of Arminius that he 'found his place as the interpreter of the ethical relations between God and man. His system recognized and expounded the developed doctrine of God and man, which the Church had long accepted as established positions, but which her theologians had never satisfactorily related'.[39] If this appraisal is true, it is quite understandable that one should find the same principles being endorsed at the Council of Trent as were advanced by Arminius. Concomitantly, one might expect that Jenkyns should find himself more at home with the teachings of Rome on justification than with the teachings of the primary Protestant Reformers, and this is indeed the case.

Chapter VII
Doctrine of the Sacraments

The Anglican doctrine of the sacraments is treated in the Thirty-nine Articles under five separate articles: XXV, XXVII, XVIII, XXIX, XXX, and XXXI. This chapter presents the teachings of Henry Jenkyns on the sacraments under three separate headings: a general definition of 'sacrament'; a discussion of baptism; and a discussion of the Eucharist, including the Church of England's statement on presence, transubstantiation, communion under both species, receptionism, and sacrifice. The chapter concludes with a summary of Jenkyns' view of the sacraments. This treatment of Jenkyns' theology of the sacraments is brief and rather flat because his lectures on the relevant articles are in themselves rather tame: Jenkyns does not believe that these articles (with the possible exception of Art. XXVII) deal with theological questions which are capable of controversy, despite the fact of the Gorham case and of the burgeoning controversy on Eucharistic sacrifice.

He did not take exception to the final outcome in the Gorham case because Gorham's opinions fell within the interpretive latitude appropriate to Article XXVII (and because Jenkyns did not dispute the Church-State relationship which allowed a secular court to give judgment in a question of doctrine). Article XXVII exemplifies one of those doctrinal areas in which the statements of the Church of England have not been strictly delimiting, clear, and precise; therefore, although Jenkyns personally disagrees with Gorham's view on baptismal regeneration, he recognizes the right of the latter to hold those views under the terms of subscription.

Even though Eucharistic sacrifice became a controversial question during Jenkyns' lifetime, he denied that there was in the Church of England any grounds for debate on the issue. He believed that the Church of England consistently denied all the errors of Rome (although she did <u>not</u> insist that all that was Roman was erroneous) on all occasions for confessional statement, including Articles XXV, XXVIII, XXX, and XXXI. And Jenkyns was convinced that chief among the errors of Rome which are condemned in the Church of England are the doctrines of transubstantiation and the sacrifice

of the mass; he, therefore, treats these articles on the sacraments and the Eucharist simply as a flat denial of the Roman doctrine. His understanding of Eucharistic presence is largely controlled by his considerations on transubstantiation and sacrifice; his conception of grace in the sacraments is modified by his beliefs touching justification: the subtlties of doctrine Jenkyns might in another context have brought to bear on discussions concerning the sacraments he has already developed when treating the theology of justification.

Article XXV 'Of the sacraments' (pp. 346-55).

1. Definition. Article XXV does not define the term sacrament, but Jenkyns draws upon the definition in the catechism: 'the outward visible sign of an inward and spiritual grace, given unto us, ordained by Christ himself, as a means whereby we receive the same, and a pledge to assure us thereof' (p. 347). The sacraments are effectual signs rather than mere tokens of Christian profession: that is to say, besides being marks of profession, they convey grace which enables the Christian to fulfill the obligations of his profession--they convey, 'at least, divine influence whereby "He doth work invisibly in us"' (p. 347). From the catechism definition, one may deduce four characteristics which are essential to a sacrament (p. 348):

a. There must be an outward and visible sign;
b. The rite must have been ordained by Jesus Christ;
c. They must convey an inward and spiritual benefit;
d. They must be 'a pledge or witness that we shall receive that benefit'.

According to this definition, only the rites of baptism and the Eucharist are sacraments properly so-called. The other five rites considered by the Church of Rome to be sacraments (confirmation, penance, orders, matrimony, and extreme unction) cannot be sacraments because 'they have no outward visible sign or ceremony ordained by God' (p. 348). In other words, the rites do not include actions performed by Jesus Christ. Although the Church of England does not recognize these five rites as being sacraments, she does not

reject them altogether (p. 351). Indeed, the article does not limit the total number of sacraments to two, but merely states that only the two dominical sacraments can be considered as essential elements of Christian faith and practice.

Finally, Article XXV makes two prohibitions concerning the sacraments (p. 348): they 'must not be gazed upon', and they must be worthily received. Both of the prescriptions are condemnations of Roman practices. The first condemns the Roman practice of the adoration of the host. This practice was condemned at the Reformation because it relies for its justification on the doctrine of transubstantiation. Since the Reformers, in the main, denied that the consecrated elements of the Eucharist were the natural body and blood of Christ, they condemned the adoration of the host as an idolatrous practice. The second prescription attacks the Roman belief that grace operates in the sacraments ex opere operato. The notion of grace in the sacraments operating ex opere operato was condemned at the Reformation, not because the Reformers denied that the sacraments were vehicles of grace,[1] but because they condemned a mechanical view of sacramental action and the superstition it bread. The notion of ex opere operato encouraged the faithful to see the sacraments as some magical incantation, the efficacy of which reposed in the right utterance of the charm itself. It was because the Reformers, the Anglicans among them, wished to emphasize that grace acts in the sacraments because of and only because of God's promises (which depend also on a faithful response in the people), not because certain things are said or done by an duly appointed functionary, that they rejected the ex opere operato notions of grace.

2. Roman and Anglican attitudes toward the five 'sacramentals'.[2] The Churches of England and Rome agree on the definition of 'sacrament' (p. 350), and for that reason both communions agree that baptism and the Eucharist are sacraments.[3] England and Rome do not agree, however, about all of the rites and practices which are said by Rome to meet the definition. The basis of the Anglican critique of the Roman view of sacraments is that 'every practice of the

apostles is not to be looked on as ordained by God, or if so, that it is intended necessarily for universal and everlasting obligation' (p. 351). In other words, Jenkyns believes that the description 'sacrament' should be reserved to those rites which are absolutely essential to the salvation of each soul; such rites as are essential because they are universally imposed and perpetually demanded of Christians. Generally speaking the Romans include several rites which are thought to be of apostolic origin among those practices which they hold to be universally imposed and perpetually demanded of Christians:

(a) Confirmation or the 'laying on of hands': The Church of England imposes confirmation on its communicants as 'merely an ordinance of the Church' (p. 351). England agrees with Rome that confirmation 'gives Christians a fresh supply of grace and strength' and that it is a ratification of baptismal vows.

The Church of England desists from calling confirmation a sacrament, according to Jenkyns, because the origin of the rite of the laying on of hands is not absolutely clear in scripture or history. It is clear that the apostles did lay their hands on some people after baptism, but it is not clear that this action was for purposes of confirmation. In the passages in Acts which recount the imposition of hands, however, such activity is usually associated with conveying special, extraordinary gifts of the spirit (pp. 349-50).[4] On the other hand, Hebrews 6 suggests that Paul considered the imposition of hands to be required in the case of all Christians.[5] All this indicates that neither the purpose of nor the universal need for the imposition of hands is clear from the New Testament. And the Fathers are not helpful in settling the question either. They generally attest confirmation (with or without the accompaniment of chrism) as a rite arising out of the application of a second unction after baptism,[6] but opinion as to the necessity of confirmation is very divided among the Fathers.[7] Even if confirmation originated with the apostles, clearly it was not imposed by them as a necessary and universally binding act.[8]

(b) Penance: It is certainly true from the New Testament that Jesus required true penitence from all believers and that the power of absolution was given to the ministers of the Church, but no particular form for this penitence (i.e., public or private) is prescribed in scripture (p.350). For this reason alone the Church of England shrinks from accepting a sacrament of penance. Beyond this, there are marked differences between Roman views of penance and Anglican views on penitence.

The Roman doctrine of penance includes the following four elements (p. 352) some of which are completely rejected by England:

1. Contrition.
2. Confession (which is to be private and oricular; it serves as a 'means to discovering of sin').
3. Satisfaction (punishment appointed to particular sins).
4. Absolution (remission of eternal punishment).

The Church of England certainly agrees that contrition and confession are required of Christians, but she disputes the manner of confession. It should usually be general and public (as it is in the liturgy). In fact the only formal provision for anything approaching private confession in the Church of England is in the service for the sick. 'And though private confession is useful under some circumstances, we discourage it as a necessary and general practice' (p. 353). The Church of England denies the need for satisfaction entirely (because full satisfaction for sin was made on the cross)[9] and differs radically from Rome in her understanding of absolution (p. 353). Rome takes a 'judicial' view of absolution: the priest acts as a judge, evaluating sin, appointing punishment, and assessing the degree of contrition in the penitents. According to these judgments, the priest decides to pronounce (or not to pronounce) absolution. The obvious Anglican objection to such a procedure is that it appears to place the forgiveness of sins in the judgment of the priest, rather than in the hands of the Father. By contrast, the Church of England takes a 'ministerial [evidently 'pastoral'] ' view of

absolution. The priest pronounces an absolution which is conditional because it 'depends on the actual qualification of the person of whose fitness he cannot judge',[10] and whatever pardon is granted is clearly granted by God because of the faith and penitence of the believer (p. 353), and not because of the judgement of the priest.[11]

(c) Holy orders: Orders are considered in the Church of England to be only an ordinance of the Church (p. 354): that is to say, they are conferred by the Church of England in a particular form only as a consequence of this particular Church's chosen form of organization. England agrees with Rome that ordination confers on the priest 'the power to consecrate' the Eucharist; but not, as Rome does, 'the power to transmute the elements'. The Church of England rejects holy orders as a sacrament for precisely the same reasons that she rejects confirmation (p. 350).

(d) Matrimony: The Church of England believes that matrimony differs from other purely secular and civil contracts but that it also is different in nature from the other rites discussed here: 'It is not founded on any relation between God and man, but between man and man only, yet it is a contract on which God sets his seal peculiarly and ratifies and so it differs from other ordinary contracts' (p. 354). Thus, marriage is highly esteemed in the Church of England, but it is not thought clearly to be a sacrament (evidently because it is 'not founded on any relation between God and man').

(e) Extreme unction: The Church of England rejects this rite altogether 'as a corrupt following of the Apostles' (p. 355). While the scriptures attest to anointment of the sick with oil (James 5.14-15), it is not at all clear that this practice was ordained by God for the purpose of forgiving sins: In James the rite is used to heal the sick (p. 351). In the Church of England the Eucharist is given to the dying, neither to heal the ills of the body nor to remit sin in any other way than is the usual case in the Eucharist, but 'as the viacticum to another world' (p. 355).

Article XXVII 'Of baptism' (pp. 358-71).

Article XXVII defines Baptism as one of the two dominical sacraments of the Church universal, and it also establishes that the Church of England retains the practice of infant baptism. The central concepts discussed by Jenkyns are (1) the effects of baptism, (2) the nature of baptismal regeneration, and (3) the validity of infant baptism.

1. The effects of baptism (p. 361). There are two effects of baptism: (a) Faith, which is 'a reliance on God's promises', is confirmed in the believer. The fact that the article says faith is 'confirmed' shows that the Church of England teaches that faith exists in the believer before he is baptized.[12] (b) Grace, or 'the fulfilment of his [God's] promises, in the gifts of the spirit', is increased in the believer: that is to say, baptism is a means to grace. These effects are evidently stated to protect the Anglican doctrine from at least two deviant positions. The fact that the 'faith is confirmed' by baptism, rather than being a result of baptism, protects the Protestant claim that man is saved by faith alone, on the one hand, and avoids difficulties presented by the death of an unbaptized believer, on the other. Broadly speaking, this provision is directed against the Roman doctrine of baptism, which makes eternal life depend upon it. Because Article XXVII asserts that 'grace is increased' in baptism, the Anglican doctrine is protected from Zwinglian interpretations of the sacrament: that is, baptism is an effectual sign, not a mere badge or token of profession. Furthermore, baptism results in spiritual regeneration, because it makes man '"a member of Christ, Child of God, and an inheritor of the Kingdom of Heaven"' (p. 361).

2. Baptismal regeneration (pp. 365-6). The problems if interpretation for this article arise over the sense of 'regeneration', because the word may be variously interpreted and the article does not indicate a particular interpretation. In general, the metaphor means an 'introduction to a new life' or being 'grafted into the Church' (p. 359). By virtue of being grafted into the Church, the Christian begins a new life and receives the benefits thereof, gaining

the privileges of the Christian community (p. 360): (a) forgiveness of sins, (b) adoption to spiritual sonhood, and (c) the inheritance of eternal life.[13]

There are, however, several more specific senses of 'regeneration' which can be deduced from scripture[14] and applied to the article:

> a. The change that takes place in the individual on entry into the Christian covenant.
>
> b. A reclaiming of an individual after baptism, and restoring him to the Church and the same as is now called 'conversion'.
>
> c. Applied to a person . . . after he has attained a considerable degree of holiness (p. 366).

Both the first two senses are more or less appropriate to the use of 'regeneration' in the article. However, the third sense, says Jenkyns, is less appropriate because it seems to refer to a point in the life of the believer which is far removed from the 'time of spiritual birth' or baptism. Another reason (which Jenkyns does not mention) some might feel this an inappropriate sense of 'regeneration' is because it tends to emphasize the personal merit of the believer rather than the saving activity of God. Jenkyns also notes that the Fathers use the term 'regeneration' most frequently in connection with baptism (p. 366). Finally, there is a 'Calvinistic sense' which may be deduced for 'regeneration'—'A person in such a state of holiness that he is assured of salvation, i.e., cannot fall from grace' (p. 366)--but this rendering is completely inappropriate to the article in question. Jenkyns does not elaborate here about why the sense is inappropriate, but he does so when he discusses justification and grace. He takes this sense of regeneration to be a derivation from the Calvinistic doctrine of the indefectibility of grace in the elect, which Jenkyns denies. Of course, such a sense could, at least in theory, be defended from any doctrine of Christian perfection: it is actually the foundation of the Roman teachings concerning sainthood.

3. Infant baptism (pp. 369-70). Jenkyns takes this opportunity to deal with the objections to infant baptism.

The first two objections arise from the fact that the faith is considered to be a condition of baptism. (a) A baptized infant cannot be a worthy recipient 'because of original sin' (p. 369). One obvious difficulty with this objection is that baptism is precisely the means to the cleansing of original sin.[15] (b) Baptism is a federal act, and infants are incapable of fulfiling the requirements of faith and of performing the duties imposed by the covenant (p. 370). To both of these objections Jenkyns makes the same answer: the worthiness of the recipient in baptism is a matter for the judgement of God (regardless, in fact, of the ages of the people concerned). Therefore, 'if it is according to his institution to baptize them,[16] we cannot doubt that they are worthy to be baptized' (p. 369). (c) It is also objected that, even if infants are capable of receiving the remission of sin in baptism, they cannot receive 'the gifts of the spirit' because they are 'too young for the spirit to have any influence on their minds' (p. 370). To this he answers that man knows neither the time nor the mode of the Spirit's working; therefore, 'we cannot assert that an infant is incapable of it'. To this observation, he adds the practical observation that, in the course of human affairs, 'an infant may have a right to an estate, by birth, and have a title, and so it may be in reference to the gifts of the Holy Spirit in Baptism--to which he may have a right as soon as he is capable of benefitting by them' (p. 370).

Despite the fact that Jenkyns' comments on infant baptism are couched in conditional terms, he is positively asserting that baptism is efficacious in infants. Were this not the case, some provision for a second, conditional baptism would have to be made since baptism provides the only means to the removal of the taint of original sin. Perhaps it is because of an unexpressed feeling for the need of such a conditional baptism that the Church of England adheres to confirmation. On the other hand, confirmation, while it might confer the 'gifts of the Spirit' which an infant could not receive in baptism, makes no provision for original sin.

'Of the supper of the Lord' Article XXVIII (pp. 371-87).

This article is the Church's general statement on the Eucharist, and that general statement is supplemented on particular points by Articles XXIX ('Of worthy reception, pp. 387-8), XXX ('Of communion in both kinds', pp. 388-90), and XXXI ('Of the sacrifice of the mass', pp. 392-8). Each of these articles states the positive position of the Church of England and condemns certain erroneous doctrines held to be true by other communions. The chief errors that are condemned are transubastantion and the sacrifice of the mass, communion in one kind, and, less directly, the Zwinglian view of sacraments. This presentation of Jenkyns' lectures will follow the main lines of his treatment of Article XXVII, supplementing that material with his remarks on the other articles where it is relevant.

The Eucharist is a true sacrament. As such it conveys grace by making the Lord Jesus Christ present to the congregation. Jesus Christ is truly present in the Eucharist, but his presence is spiritual rather than material. The celebration of the Eucharist is not merely a commemoration of the Passion, but a communication of Redemption (p. 372). The benefits communicated by the presence of Jesus Christ in the Eucharist are those of his Passion and not those which might derive from any different sacrifice of Jesus at the hands of a priest in the mass.

The specific benefits communicated to the people at the Eucharist are the same ones which are communicated in baptism (p. 373): the forgiveness of sins, the adoption as sons of God, and the gifts of the Spirit.[17] The general difference between baptism and the Eucharist is 'that Baptism introduces us to these good things--the Lord's Supper, confirms them to us and keeps us in possession of them' (p. 373). Specifically, whereas baptism communicates forgiveness of those sins existing before the application of that sacrament, the Eucharist communicates the remission of sins committed after baptism. Adoption to sonship is the peculiar benefit of baptism, but the Eucharist retains the privileges of that state to the believer. Baptism confirms and quickens eternal life in Christians; the Eucharist

confirms and strengthens it.

1. Spiritual presence. Jenkyns gives his fullest discussion on Eucharistic presence in his lectures on the Prayer Book.[18] The question of presence was one of the chief controversies at the Reformation. There were those who asserted that there was no presence at all in the Eucharist (Zwingli); those who asserted a material presence, either as a result of transubstantiation or consubstantiation (the Romans and Luther); and those who asserted a spiritual presence (Calvin and, ultimately, the Anglicans). Among those who believed in a spiritual presence, some located it in the elements themselves, or in the hearts of the believer (this latter division being called receptionists); and there were some in this group who refused to assert the ways and means of presence beyond saying that it existed.[19]

The Anglican position on presence is not, says Jenkyns, absolutely clear:

> From a careful consideration of both the 1st and 2nd books [of Edward VI] it will appear that a spiritual presence was taken for granted. The 1st book was more favourable to the idea of its being in the bread and wine. The 2nd to its being in the heart of the receiver. Some however assert that the conclusion to be drawn from the 2nd book is that there is no presence at all, but this is not a fair statement.[20]

Article XXVIII clearly states that the Lord Jesus Christ is present in the Eucharist, but 'it is not stated whether the body and blood of Christ are [spiritually] in the bread and wine, or in the heart of the receiver. The language of the Article does leave this open, and different opinions are held in the English Church' (p. 374). Jenkyns himself prefers the receptionist position: 'Other parts of the English Service seem to show that it is in the heart of the receiver' (p. 374). In support of this position, Jenkyns cites the prayer beginning 'Almighty and Merciful God' in the Second Book, which says 'that thou dost vouchsafe

to feed us, who have duly received these holy mysteries' instead of 'for that thou hast vouchsafed to feed us in these holy mysteries' (1st Book of Edward).[21] The problem with asserting that the presence is localized is that it means the Lord is 'necessarily conveyed to everyone worthy or unworthy, who receives this sacrament'.[22]

The problem for the Reformers was that they wished to retain the primacy of faith in all activities touching salvation (contra the Roman concept of the activity of grace ex opere operato), while at the same time maintaining that the Eucharist was a vehicle of grace. In order to preserve both of these principles against any understanding which vitiated the sacrament, it was necessary for the Church of England to make some pronouncement on the unworthy reception of the Eucharist in Article XXIX. This article also provides, says Jenkyns (p. 387), a further safeguard against concepts of 'material or carnal' presence. The article states (a) that the unworthy do not partake of Christ in the Eucharist because 'one cannot eat spiritually without faith'; but (b) that they 'eat and drink to their damnation' because 'one who comes without faith calls God a liar, for he has no reliance on his promises, and so denies their truth' (p 388). Jenkyns says that Roman and Anglican teachings are similar on this point: 'Romanists say that in a certain sense, the wicked do partake of Christ, yet they obtain no benefit from it' (p. 388). Finally, Jenkyns makes a distinction between three types of reception: Reception by the wicked is 'sacramental reception', which seems to mean that they receive the physical sign of the sacrament but not the spiritual content. Those worthy Christians who are present at the Eucharist but do not receive the elements partake of a 'spiritual reception' by eating the heavenly bread by desire' (p. 388). Finally, the worthy who actually partake of the elements have a 'sacramental and spiritual reception' at the Eucharist.

The Church of England decrees in Article XXX (pp. 389-90) that the faithful shall receive the Eucharist under both species. The article does not say that no other reception is valid but that this form of communion is to be preferred.

Jenkyns comments that communion in both kinds is the form of administration that is attested in both scripture and tradition. The Roman tradition of administration under one species only developed because of the false doctrine of transubstantiation.

2. Transubstantiation. Jenkyns sums up the Roman doctrine, as it was stated by the Council of Trent (p. 379):

> 'the Eucharist is the visible form of invisible grace--immediately after consecration, the very body and blood of Christ, as well as his human soul and Godhead, exist under the species of bread and wine . . . by consecration, a conversion takes place of the whole substance of the bread into the whole substance of Christ's body' and likewise with the wine and blood.
>
> It is difficult to see why Romanists should assert so often that the 'bread' is changed into Christ's body, separate, from the wine being changed into his blood, when they hold that the whole of Christ, Godhead, Manhood and all, are equally present under either bread and wine by itself.

The practice of administration under only one species, of course, makes it necessary to assert that Christ is wholly present in either of the elements. Article XXVIII condemns the doctrine of transubstantiation on four specific counts.

(a) The doctrine cannot be defended from scripture because it is based on the literal interpretation of passages that are rightly interpreted metaphorically. That a metaphorical interpretation is the correct one is shown from these circumstances (p. 388): (1) The figure of eating and drinking is a common Jewish metaphor for spiritual matters. (2) The Jews continually spoke of eating the 'Lord's Passover', but the feast was only commemorative; therefore, the figure is intended as a metaphor. (3) Christ speaks of eating manna (John VI) when he clearly has reference to spiritual matters. (4) The Jews has a horror of drinking blood. (5) A literal interpretation of New Testament

references to the Eucharist involves a logical absurdity: 'Christ would have been holding the whole of himself in his hands'. (6) It is clear that at least one New Testament passage, 'This cup is the New Testament', must be taken figuratively.[23] Therefore, says Jenkyns (p. 376), it is clear from the New Testament accounts of the institution of the Eucharist that it was (a) a commemorative rite, (b) from which spiritual benefits derive and (c) which constituted an act of profession on the part of adherents to Christ.

(b) The doctrine is repugnant to scripture. Because the elements of the Eucharist are repeatedly referred to in scripture as 'bread' and 'wine' even after they have been consecrated, it is clear from revelation that the elements retain their natural state (p. 381).

(c) The doctrine of transubstantiation 'overthrows the nature of a sacrament'. If the outward and visible sign (the elements) of the sacrament are transmuted or converted in their substance, the sign is coalesced with the 'invisible grace' of the sacrament; thus, the two-part nature of the sacrament is destroyed.

(d) The doctrine has given rise to many damaging superstitions (p. 374), among them adoration of the host. Such superstitions incline toward idolatry and tend to invest the rites of religion with the trappings of magic. Both these effects impugn the dignity of God.

To the four objections which are specifically raised in Article XXVIII, Jenkyns adds 'one very obvious objection': 'Transubstantiation is contrary to our senses' (p. 374).

3. Sacrifice of the mass. In his lectures on the Prayer Book, Jenkyns gives his fullest discussion of attitudes toward the concept of Eucharistic sacrifice at the Reformation: 'Previous to the Reformation the sacrifice of Christ [in the mass was generally believed to be] a repetition of his sacrifice on the cross or a continuation of it . . . ; and that this repetition or continuation was equally propitiatory, equally atoning [as was the actual crucifixion]'.[24] These views were denied at the Reformation and such an understanding is not applicable to the Eucharistic rite in the Edwardian Prayer Books. The

Reformers acknowledged that other concepts of sacrifice were applicable to the Eucharist, but they 'seeing the lengths to which the Doctrine had been carried, and considering the ideas with which it was necessarily associated [i.e., transubstantiation, and the tendency to make a good work of the Eucharist], were justly jealous of its use and wished to guard it [the Eucharist] against even the possibility of error'.[25] The Reformers, therefore, ceased to apply the term 'sacrifice' to the Eucharist at all.

Article XXI (pp. 392-8) condemns the doctrine of the sacrifice of the mass and refuses to apply the term 'sacrifice' to the Eucharist. Instead the offering in the Eucharist is called by these names (p. 392): (a) redemption --that is, 'the deliverance from the bondage of sin'; (b) propitiation--that is, 'the appeasing of God's wrath'; and (c) satisfaction--that is, 'the punishment due from man for sin'. The essential points made in the article are that there is only one sacrifice of Christ and that is the Passion on the Cross, that the sacrifice of the crucifixion was perfect and complete, and that any idea of a sacrificial offering of Christ by the priest in the Eucharist is 'blasphemous and false'. The central fact that is at issue in the article is that no satisfaction other than that given by Christ on the cross can ever be offered to God for the sins of man and that any rite of the Church which professes to make such a satisfaction 'is a deceit and a mistake' (p. 392).

The Roman doctrine of sacrifice claims that the bloodless sacrifice of Christ in the mass confers on the faithful all the benefits of the crucifixion and also remits the temporal punishment due to the particular sins of individuals (p. 394). Such a doctrine is 'false' because 'Christ's sacrifice was unique and perfect'. The doctrine was rejected by the Reformers because it tends to make a work (in the Lutheran sense) of the Eucharist and because it impugnes the Passion of Jesus Christ; the doctrine is blasphemous because it attributes more salvific effect to the offering of the mass than to Christ's sacrifice on the cross (p. 396). Furthermore, the Reformers rejected (or at least refused to pronounce upon) the question of temporal punishment for sins

altogether: if the propitiation for sin made by the crucifixion of Christ was 'full and complete', then there could be no question of further propitiation being made by temporal punishment. Following this line of argument, Protestants generally reject all notions of purgatory. Romans and Anglicans agree (according to Jenkyns) that it is those sins committed after baptism which are remitted in the Eucharist, but they disagree on the origin of these benefits: Romans attribute it to the sacrifice of the mass; Anglicans, to the sacrifice of Calvary as communicated in the Eucharist. Jenkyns says that the objectionable aspects of the Roman doctrine cannot be overcome by saying that the sacrifice of the mass is identical to the sacrifice of Calvary: the sacrifice of the mass must be understood to be 'either by continuation or repetition' of Calvary (p. 394). Jenkyns supports this argument by reference to 'Bishop Kaye's dilemma' (p. 395):

> 'Christ either does suffer or he does not, if this is a sacrifice of him (for without it [suffering] there is no redemption).
>
> 1. He does suffer--but scripture says he is at the right hand of God.
>
> 2. He does not suffer--but without suffering there is no atonement--therefore there is no sacrifice of Christ in it.

Furthermore, the Roman doctrine depends entirely on transubstantiation and material presence (p. 395). It is 'dangerous' because 'it gives false notions as to how to obtain salvation . . . and because these masses may be bought for money' (p. 396).

4. Anglican notions of sacrifice. There are at least seven ways in which Anglicans apply a concept of sacrifice to the Eucharist (p. 396): (a) as it commemorates the Passion; (b) 'as it is a feast that follows on Christ's sacrifice'; (c) as it is a feast that conveys the benefits of the Passion. Furthermore, the Eucharist is in several senses truly the sacrifice offered by the people to God: (d) alms

are offered to God; (e) the elements are 'set apart' and offered; (f) praise and thanksgiving are offered; and (g) 'we set apart and offer ourselves to God for his service'.

Conclusions.

Jenkyns' doctrine of the sacraments is characteristically moderately catholic. Only the two dominical sacraments are sacraments properly so called. They are both a means to grace and a badge of Christian profession, but their efficacy for the believer depends chiefly on the pre-existence of faith. Baptism results in spiritual regeneration and removes the taint of original sin, and infants are elligible for baptism. In this last instance, Jenkyns suspends the question of the necessity of faith in the receiver of the sacrament. Such an attitude toward infant baptism is very much in line with the teachings and practice of both Luther and Calvin, though it departs from the practices of second-generation Reformers. Luther did not devote much consideration to a justification of infant baptism, but Calvin was more systematically attentive to the question, and Jenkyns' views may have been influenced by Calvin's teachings: Calvin saw no reason why the seed of grace communicated in infancy should not come to fruition in adult life.[26] Furthermore, Calvin held it to be most significant that a child be born within the Church: the children of believers are already born under the covenant of grace; therefore, the 'curse of nature' or original sin has already been removed from them before baptism and the sacrament may be bestowed on them with confidence.[27] The Eucharist is a commemoration of the Lord's Passion whereby the benefits of that single sacrifice are applied to the post-baptismal sins of the worthy recipient. Jesus Christ is spiritually present in the Eucharist. The Anglican Church refrains from precisely locating this presence in the elements or in the heart of the believer, although Jenkyns favours the latter. On this basis, Jenkyns seems by some definitions to deny an objective presence in the Eucharist, but this cannot truly be the case since he does clearly believe that Jesus is actually present in the Eucharist in some way that is

distinct from a general presence of Chist in the believer at large. Although Roman concepts of the sacrifice of the mass are specifically denied in Anglicanism, other concepts of sacrifice are affirmed by the Church of England: chiefly, the sacrifice of praise and thanksgiving, the consecration of material gifts, and self-oblation.

General Conclusions

The Church of England in the first half of the nineteenth century was less an ark of salvation than a battered boat adrift in tempestuous seas. She was aristocratic and conservative; as such, she frequently failed to meet the needs of a populace who raised the banners of economic and political democracy. The predominance of eighteenth-century rationalism had vitiated her piety, and the advances of science seemed to bankrupt her revelation of its truth. Fearing to be broken on a wave of irrational enthusiasm, she battened down the hatches of the status quo in an effort to protect her cargo of privilege and orthodoxy. Her Erastianism made her seem more often the servant of the State than of the Gospel. But even in the heart of her establishment she carried many devoted churchmen and Christians, learned and sober and committed to her right reformation. One such of these was Henry Jenkyns.

He was himself a product of the lower orders of the aristocracy: High Church, orthodox, educated at one of the Old Universities, and Tory. He was schooled in the theology of the eighteenth century and suffered from its defects, but he was also committed to the gains of intellectual inquiry, objective scholarship, and dedicated Christian belief. Above all, he was of a legal turn of mind, conscientious, and a man of moderation who sought a balanced solution to church reform which preserved the truth between the extremes wrenching his time, among these the radical Protestantism of the Evangelicals and the Anglo-catholicism of the Tractarians. As an advocate of sober reform, he sought the first competent benefice he could obtain (at Durham)[1] and settled himself to the life-long task of steadfastly serving his Church and faith as best he could and at whatever opportunities presented themselves. In this capacity, he educated countless members of the clergy over a period of some thirty years.

His exposition of the doctrines of the Church of England, though it did not constitute a systematic theology, was propositional and logical; and it was

characterized by that interrelationship between the various areas of Christian doctrine that one has come to expect in modern systematic theologies. At the heart of his understanding lay the concept of the all sufficiency of Holy Scripture and the supremacy of its authority in all questions of doctrine and practice. His method was essentially neo-scholastic and suffered from some of the disabilities of that school: He assumed a homogeneity of scripture. He was too unaware or uncritical of some of the propositions underlying his analyses, and, as a result, he frequently confused theological and scriptural statements. He accorded to the Bible an external authority which led him to underestimate and to devalue the operations of the Spirit in the earthly Church, in the community, and in proclamation. That is to say, for Jenkyns the Word was only the written word of Scripture. And his analyses were extremely rationalistic. But his neo-scholasticism was also redeemed by the very authority which he, in the name of the Church of England, accorded to scripture: where the results of the rational process contradicted scripture, they were wrong; where scripture clearly overbore the dictates of reason, one adhered to revealed truth. Furthermore, his theology was saved from obscurantism by his openness, albeit cautious, to the advances of modern criticism and scholarship. As a result, his teachings did not forever stop the ears of his students to the new voices which might arise from the scholars of their time, but he did try to provide them with a true rod against which to measure the changes that might be heralded as progress.

Jenkyns was quintessentially a theologian of the Church of England: he was true to her faith and to her heritage. Although he had probably never read Luther or Calvin, but only Anglican writers on these and other Reformers, Jenkyns bore witness to the truths of the Reformation in the Church of England. He believed that it had been valid and deliberate; but he also believed that the last word had not yet been spoken in Cranmer's day. The Thirty-nine Articles were one of the Reformation confessions, and they were a guide to all generations of the clergy; but they needed to

be considered in conjunction with other documents, not least among them the Book of Common Prayer.

John Henry Newman said of the Church of England: 'There is but one way towards a real reformation,--a return to Him in heart and spirit, whose sacred truth they have betrayed; all other methods, however fair they may promise, will prove to be but shadows and failures'.[2] For some churchmen in the first half of the nineteenth century, such a reformation could be effected only by a return to Rome; for others, by a return to radical Protestantism. For Henry Jenkyns, it was to be achieved by a return to the true Church of England; a church he understood to be, as it was recently described by the present Bishop of Durham, 'Catholic and Reformed; part of the universal Apostolic Church but renewed by the Word of God, spoken at the Reformation. This twin inheritance is part of its genius'.[3] The lectures of Henry Jenkyns consistently provided an anti-Roman polemic, especially with regard to papal supremacy and infallibility. At the same time, Jenkyns was scrupulous to show the debt the Church of England owed to pre-Reformation Catholicism and to notice those areas in which Roman Catholic and Anglican doctrine agreed. The effect of such theological vision was to counter the neo-Romanism of the Oxford Movement, on the one hand, and to stem ultra-Protestant reactions to it, on the other. In like manner, his moderate views on episcopacy and apostolic succession curbed the narrowing influence of Tractarian views on the validity of non-episcopally organized ministries and encouraged Anglican toleration for the ministries of the free churches. His relatively high view of the sacraments (i.e., the dominical sacraments) helped to preserve them as channels of grace and the means to the objective presence of the Lord Jesus Christ in the communion of Anglicans. His consistent justification of the union of Church and State provided an answer to the demands for disestablishment which were being made on all sides. Finally, the deliberateness and moderation which characterized him in all his dealings, his dedication to precision and clarity of statement, and his consistent condemnation of

'enthusiasm' must have served to mitigate the effects of the religious extremism which flourished in all parties of the Established Church and among other religious (or even atheistic) persuasions in his day.

Henry Jenkyns remains a puzzle to the twentieth-century mind, perhaps because we credit too much and too universal a sway in the nineteenth century to those of its trends, among the many and divergent ones, which emerged dominant in the last half of the century and have exerted such influence on the twentieth. Because the theological thinking of men such as Coleridge eventually routed the theology of Paley's Evidences, we forget the degree to which evidence-theology penetrated the theological thinking of the nineteenth century. When, for instance, Coleridge's Aids to Reflection appeared, in 1825, Jenkyns was a man of some thirty years of age, his religious commitment already made and the structures of his theological thought firmly established. The question then arises: Why did Jenkyns and others like him (for surely he was not alone) remain impervious to the influence of the liberalizing tendencies which began to develop in early nineteenth-century theology, while the better-known theologians of the period responded to the invitation of new approaches and thought forms?

In the first place, the recognition and operation of insights like Coleridge's depended, by definition, on the operation of the creative imagination, and this is the intellectual characteristic which is singularly void in Henry Jenkyns. Jenkyns evidently lacked in his very nature a capacity for imagination, and from this very trait one of his chief strengths developed: because his intellect did not comprise imagination, he was the ideal, cold-blooded, arbitrator in dispute and analysis. Beyond what may have been Jenkyns' native capacity, he had been trained by and was committed to a system of thought which denied and deliberately quelled the imagination: the evidence-theology of Paley. And Jenkyns' abhorrance of enthusiasm and devotion to rationality reinforced his submission to Paley's type of theology. It is for this reason that Jenkyns fails to recognize the barrenness and to acknowledge

the inadequacies of some of his arguments. To an intellect unillumined by imagination, his analyses do not so readily appear to partake of intellectual gaming, but the twentieth-century reader is puzzled to find so many traces of apparent (but surely unconscious) intellectual dishonesty in a man of so notable integrity as Henry Jenkyns.

Furthermore, the parochial nature of English theology between the Reformation and the mid-nineteenth century tended to support and to reinforce the kind of closed system in which rationalistic evidence-theology flourished and was perpetuated. It is a truism that English theology has been characterized by the fact that English theologians have tended to read only other English authorities. It seems reasonably clear that Henry Jenkyns never read, for instance, Luther and Calvin, but only what other Englishmen had said of them. His access to the patristic fathers and to pre-Reformation theologians may have been, as the access of his successors had been, almost exclusively through florilegia, the chief characteristic of which is that passages are displayed only in necessary isolation from their contexts and thus are readily susceptible to the slanting and distortion of parochial argument. Clearly, he at least wielded his proof texts in the same manner in which the neo-scholastics, and the scholastics before them, argued "from authority" by using quotations in isolation from their contexts. A system of scholarship so restricted in the early nineteenth century naturally remained closed to new ideas from the continent, especially for that majority of students who were, as Jenkyns evidently was, ignorant of German. And we must recall that Jenkyns believed he was preparing his students to be Anglican ordinands, that his teaching was aimed at the theological training of the parochial clergy, and that the Theology Department of Durham was founded with this purpose in mind.

Finally, it must be remembered that Paley's evidence-theology was closely linked with the particular concepts of the plenary inspiration and the external authority of the Bible. The one was likely to remain where the other continued to pertain, and the mold of plenary-inspiration Biblicism was not broken until the publication of Essays and Reviews in 1860. Despite the fact that Jenkyns was

somewhat aware of and endorsed the results of the German lower criticism (e.g., Ernesti), he never freed himself of the concept of the plenary inspiration of the Bible. It was precisely the release from this concept which resulted in the real breakthrough of English liberal theology at the end of the nineteenth century, allowing the triumph and perpetuation of the theological insights and methods which were dependent upon and originally stimulated by the work of a few scholars at the beginning of the century. This breakthrough came in 1860; Henry Jenkyns retired from the Durham chair in theology in 1864.

In conclusion, it is necessary to say one more word about the relationship between Jenkyns and Van Mildert. Froude said that Van Mildert had made a gaffe in thinking Henry Jenkyns a High Churchman, and the Tractarians in general came to look back on Van Mildert as the theological grey-eminence of their movement. But this study has dedicated a considerable space to pointing up the similarities between Jenkyns and Van Mildert. Froude's remarks, and Jenkyns' failure to conform to Tractarian notions, seem to suggest that Jenkyns was not a High Churchman, but this study maintains that Jenkyns was one such. It must be recalled that, prior to the rise of the Oxford Movement, there were two strands to the High Church party: following Storr's analysis, there was the Church-above-State strand, from which the Tractarians developed; and the Church-and-State party, which did not participate in the Oxford Movement. The Tractarians looked back on Van Mildert as incipiently one of their ilk, and Henry Jenkyns showed himself to be absolutely of the Church-and-State turn of mind. This study suggests that Froude and the Tractarians may have misappropriated Van Mildert. Froude's statement means that he believed Van Mildert was of the Tractarian variety of High Churchman, and Henry Jenkyns was not. Yet, Van Mildert died before Tractarianism had really declared itself, and it is at least possible that Jenkyns and Van Mildert, rather than Van Mildert and Froude, shared a common strand of High Churchmanship. Van Mildert abhorred enthusiasm at least as much as Jenkyns. He actively compaigned against Catholic Emancipation and feared the encroachments of Rome. He, too, had been trained in Paley's school and had

promulgated his methods. One of the chief reasons for identifying Van Mildert with Tractarianism is because of his view of episcopacy as of the essence of the Church, a view that Jenkyns did not share, although he clearly thought episcopacy to be the best form of church government. Jenkyns' view conformed with the original and traditional Anglican view of episcopacy, with the view of the pre-Tractarian High Church party. Furthermore, Van Mildert defended the episcopacy against a background of presbyterianism, not as a desirable point of commonality with Rome. There is much to suggest that Van Mildert, had he lived to see the use to which Tractarians put their teachings on apostolic succession, might have modified his views more clearly in the direction of Jenkyns' understanding of episcopacy. Froude's remark would have been truer to the reality of the case had he asserted that Jenkyns was not his kind of High Churchman; this study suggests as a possibility that Van Mildert was not either.

FOOTNOTES

Chapter I

[1]Balliol College, Oxford, Jenkyns Papers III.9. Letter, 12 May 1779: Charles, Bishop of Wells to John Jenkyns. These papers include correspondence of several members of the Jenkyns family, Richard of Balliol and Henry Jenkyns of Durham among them.

[2]Jenkyns Papers XVII.12.Extract of the Jenkyns (or Jenkins) family tree, prepared by John Jones, Dean of Balliol, from a detailed pedigree 1639-1854.

[3]Jenkyns Papers II.7. The correspondence dates ca. 1800. Richard Jenkyns was a distant uncle (d. 1806) of Henry Jenkyns and godfather of his brother, Richard. Of particular interest are references to the exchange of books between the two families.

[4]It is not clear precisely when Henry assumed the tuition of the Manners-Sutton boys, Charles John and John Henry. An account written by Jane Jenkyns (sister of Henry, later wife of Thomas Gaisford) in 1824 of the death of John Jenkyns states that Henry was at that time attending the sons of Manners-Sutton at Eton: Jenkyns Papers IV.1b(i). At this period it was customary for the sons of the aristocracy to be accompanied at public school by their tutors. A letter from Thomas Arnold, 19 July 1818 (Jenkyns Papers Va. 3.), congratulates Henry upon being 'settled at Eton'.

[5]Jenkyns Papers Va.3. A letter from Thomas Arnold, 19 July 1818, congratulates Henry upon being settled at Eton; in another letter dated Rugby, 21 June (n.d.) (Jenkyns Papers Va.3.), Arnold thanks Henry for the 'Eton Questions'; presumably examination questions, which Arnold used with his boys at Rugby.

[6]Jenkyns Papers VI.A.1a9. Draft of a letter, September 1833, Henry Jenkyns to the Speaker (C. Manners-Sutton). Henry found it necessary to ask Manners-Sutton to continue his stipend, which Henry evidently would have expected to be discontinued when he assumed his post at Durham. He made the request because his salary as Professor of Greek was insufficient to keep him, especially as a married man. Manners-Sutton replied, 3 November 1833 (Jenkyns Papers V.B.9.): 'I assure you it never occurred to me that you could afford to relinquish the £200 p.a.--and still less so, as I may congratulate you now upon becoming a married man--The real happiness of settled life, depends upon it'.

[7]Jenkyns Papers Va.3. Letters from Thomas Arnold to Henry Jenkyns, especially 4 March and 16 July, 1821. The edition in question was, presumably, Thucydides: The History of the Peloponnesian War, text according to Bekker's

edition, with some alterations, with notes by Thomas Arnold, 3 vols, Oxford, [1830] 1832-5.

[8]Jenkyns Papers V.B.4. Letter, 19 November 1830, William Selwyn to Henry Jenkyns.

[9]Henry Phillpotts, made Bishop of Exeter in 1830, was not popular with the peasants or the gentry in his cure. Tory to a degree, yet he delighted in offending the aristocracy. He was also a canon of Durham and created problems for the new University. Owen Chadwick, The Victorian Church, I (1971), 217-8, draws Phillpotts' character admirably.

[10]Jenkyns Papers V.B.4.

[11]Jenkyns Papers V.B.7.

[12]For the three canons of Whitgift, see Edgar C. S. Gibson, The Thirty-nine Articles of the Church of England (1906), pp. 58-9.

[13]Gilbert Burnet, The History of the Reformation of the Church of England (1816), I, 575.

[14]Preface to Postils on the Epistles and Gospels compiled and Published by Richard Taverner in the year 1540, ed. Edward Cardwell (1841), p. x.

[15]Jenkyns Papers V.B.7. Monday Night, 1831.

[16]Jenkyns Papers V.B.7. Letter, 2 March 1831, John Lonsdale to Henry Jenkyns. Henry evidently had sent Lonsdale, also one of the examiners, some of the papers he had prepared in order for Lonsdale to comment on them.

[17]Jenkyns Papers V.B.9. Letter, 27 February 1833, J. Keate (Headmaster, Eton, 1809-34) to Henry Jenkyns, asking Henry to serve as examiner, along with Henry Coleridge, for that year.

[18]Jenkyns Papers V.B.8. 3 May 1832.

[19]Geoffry Faber, Oxford Apostles: a Character Study of the Oxford Movement (1933), p. 109.

[20]Joseph Thomas Fowler, Durham University: Earlier Foundations and Present Colleges (1904), p. 126.

[21]The Remains of Thomas Cranmer, D. D., Archbishop of Canterbury, 4 vols (1833). Correspondence relative to the

preparation and publication of this work is found in Jenkyns Papers V.B.5., as well as in 4., 7., 8., and 9; also in V.A.1c.

[22]For a discussion of the Thirteen Articles, see Charles Hardwick, A History of the Articles of Religion (1859), pp. 60-4.

[23]Jenkyns Papers V.B.4. Letter, 27 December 1830, William Selwyn to Henry Jenkyns: 'I wish Rose or [_____] would give us a volume or two with the view of opening a path for young divines into the Sylva of the Fathers, and make them more accessible than they are now . . . . Your studies in Clemens Alex. will be useful here--'.

[24]Jenkyns Papers V.B.4. Letter, 9 May 1830, Edward Burton to Henry Jenkyns: 'From what you say, I am afraid we must consider Clemens put aside, at least for the present'.

[25]University of Durham, Palace Green Library, MS Jenkyns LV. 34-49 (hereafter, MS Jenks): Analysis Abstracts and Councils/Papacy--Biblical Criticism (MS Jenks LV. 39 and 46).

[26]Tutor of Oriel: January 1827-December 1831, eds. Ian Ker and Thomas Gornall, II (1979), 235, in The Letters and Diaries of John Henry Newman, ed. with notes by C. S. Dessain, et al., Oxford:Clarendon Press, I-V, IX-XXXI, 1961-. Hereafter, Newman II. Newman's letter to Jenkyns lends support to this conclusion. Jenkyns' original letter is not to be found, but Newman's response dates from 'Lumley, 1830': 'I hardly know what answer to make to your inquiry without knowing more of particulars. For instance, what I feel most clear about is this: I never would undertake to write lightly on any subject which admits of being treated thoroughly. I think it is the fault of the day. Now this probably will be a great objection to my engaging in a professedly popular work. Not that it is necessary to compose a long treatise, but more time (I feel) ought to be given to the subject than is consistent with the dispatch of booksellers, who must sacrifice everything to regularity of publication and trimness of appearance. An Ecclesiastical History, for example, whether long or short, ought to be derived from the original sources, and not be compiled from the standard authorities. [My 'Arians' was the result of this application--J.H.N.] '.

[27]Durham (1846). The original mss of this Correspondence are to be found in Jenkyns Papers V.A.1c.

[28]Jenkyns and Maskell, p. 16.

[29]Ibid., p. 26.

[30]A clarification of some of the facts at issue in the dispute between Jenkyns and Maskell may be found in The Ox Dictionary of the Christian Church (hereafter ODCC), eds. F. L. Cross and E. A. Livingstone (1977): 'Common Prayer, Book of' and 'Ordinal (2)'. The information there, though hardly exhaustive, seems adequate to the needs of this discussion.

[31]Jenkyns and Maskell, p. 12.

[32]Ibid., pp. 7, 12-4, 19, note on p. 27, and 30-1. See especially, p. 14: 'I was engaged in the proof of a very important point, viz., the history of "the Prymer in English". Dr. Burton's book, and your own, on which he relied, were stumbling blocks: whether worthily or not, is another question; but there they were there, and were to be removed: an object not to be attained, without shewing that Dr. Burton at any rate, who wrote a long Preface to "the Three Prymers", knew nothing about the matter'.

[33]Jenkyns and Maskell, p. 20. Henry referred to 'Wilkins, Concilia, vol. iii. p. 873'. 'Wilkins, David', in ODCC allows that Wilkins was a 'versatile, though by modern standards somewhat inaccurate scholar'.

[34]Jenkyns and Maskell, p. 9.

[35]Ibid. Hereafter page references to this Correspondence will be made in the text of the discussion.

[36]In the second edition of Maskell's work (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1882), the exclamation point does not appear in the text. Furthermore, at another point (III, xlii), Maskell has taken pains to make explicit his largely positive estimate of Jenkyns work in The Remains.

[37]The precise statement from Henry's Preface which is in dispute appears on p. 22 of the Correspondence (also, The Remains of Thomas Cranmer, 'Preface', p. xl): 'In 1544 the first step was taken towards the introduction of English into the public worship, by an order from Henry for the use of a Prayer of Procession or Litany, in "our native tongue", differing but little from that which still forms part of our service. Other prayers of the same description for festival days were also translated by Cranmer in pursuance of the King's command, but were probably never published. The principle, however, that the people ought to follow the devotions of the priest, nad been already admitted by the protection given to the sale of Primers, in the Act of 1543, For the advancement of the true religion; and it was still more fully established in 1545, by the appearance of one of these useful compendiums [i.e., primers] under the sanction of a royal authority [i.e., the Prymer of Henry VIII]. For Henry VIII's Primer was much more than a collection of

prayers for private use. Besides an English Litany, it contained also translations from the Matins, Vespers, and other parts of the Breviary; and thus supplied the means of joining in some portion at least of the public worship with the understanding as well as with the spirit'.

[38]Vernon F. Storr, The Development of English Theology in the Nineteenth Century: 1800-1860 (1913), pp. 79-80.

[39]See below, Chapter IV.

[40]Maskell was examining chaplain to Henry Phillpotts, Bishop of Exeter, As such he examined G. C. Gorham when the latter was presented the vicarage of Bampford Speke in 1847.

[41]Jenkyns Papers V.B.5. Letter, 9 May 1830, E. Burton to Henry Jenkyns.

[42]John William Burgon, Lives of Twelve Good Men, I (1888), 400. Letter, John Keble to Edward Hawkins, 28 December 1827.

[43]Jenkyns Papers V.B.2. Letter, 7 December 1827, J. Dornford to Henry Jenkyns. Dornford clearly favours Hawkins and indicates that Pusey and Newman are of the same opinion, while Wilberforce and Froude reserve their opinions until they have consulted with Keble. Also, Jenkyns Papers V.B.3. Letter, 1 January 1828, Awdry to H. Jenkyns: Awdry had received a letter from Keble in which Keble had withdrawn from consideration for Provost.

[44]Jenkyns Papers V.B.2. Letter, 7 December 1827: Hawkins conveys to Jenkyns the news of Copleston's resignation. Letter, 10 December 1827: Hawkins, referring to the eventuality of Henry's residence, says to Jenkyns: 'I heartily wish I could relieve you from your uncertainty about the time of your coming here'. In his letter of 19 December 1827, Hawkins conveys to Jenkyns the former's gratification at the news of so many supporters among the Oriel fellows; Hawkins cannot feel that the matter of election 'is one of personal merit between K[eble] and me; for I should in many respects be quite ashamed to hear myself put side by side with him. But many considerations come in here of a different kind'.

[45]The conflict between Newman and Hawkins is discussed in detail in Faber, especially pp. 159-238. The presentation here follows closely Faber's account.

[46]Ibid., p. 159.

[47]Ibid., p. 165.

[48]Burgon, I, 410.

[49]Faber, p. 160.

[50]Ibid., p. 166.

[51]Ibid., p. 235f.

[52]Letter, (n.d.) 1828, from Newman to Rickards, as quoted in Faber, p. 184. The letter, dated 'Oriel College, 6 February 1829', appears in Newman II, 117-19.

[53]Jenkyns Papers V.B.4. Letter, 2 April 1830.

[54]Ibid. Letter, 10 June 1830.

[55]Faber, p. 238. Letter, Hawkins to Newman, 'Oriel College, June 9th 1830', Newman II, 239-41.

[56]"Memorandum: The Office of the Dean", 24 August 1875, New Bearings: January 1832 to June 1833, eds. Ian Ker and Thomas Gornall, III (1979), 58, in The Letters and Diaries of John Henry Newman. Hereafter, Newman III.

[57]Ibid., p. 278, 'Rome, Easter Day, 1833'.

[58]Jenkyns Papers V.B.8. Letters, 9 June and 30 June, 1832, E. M. Rudd to Henry Jenkyns.

[59]Newman III, 58.

[60]Ibid., p. 59. Letter, 28 June 1832, Henry Jenkyns to Newman.

[61]Ibid., p. 60, 29 June 1832. An undated draft of this letter is found in Jenkyns Papers V.B.6.

[62]Ibid., p. 61. Letter (n.d.) from Newman to Jenkyns, written on or after 29 June 1832.

[63]Jenkyns Papers V.B.8. Letter, 9 June 1832, E. M. Rudd to Henry Jenkyns.

[64]Burgon, I, 412.

[65]Newman III, 63. Letter (n.d.), written before 4 July 1832.

[66]Ibid., pp. 61f. Letter, 30 June 1832, bracketted italics are mine. A draft (n.d.) of this letter is in Jenkyns Papers V.B.6. Henry is responding to Newman's letter

(n.d.), written on or about 29 June.

[67]Ibid., pp. 63f. Letter, 4 July 1832, Jenkyns to Newman. A draft (n.d.) is in Jenkyns Papers V.B.6.

[68]Ibid.

[69]At a later stage of the Newman-Hawkins conflict at Oriel, Newman indicated that he felt Jenkyns' arbitrations to have been binding even after the latter's departure from Oxford. In June 1834, Newman decided to announce his intentions to inaugurate the practice of reading Morning Service in the chancel of St. Mary's. He resolved to do this regularly, every morning, when in Oxford whether or not others joined him. The practice would mean that he thereby absented himself from the college chapel, which he felt he could do without impropriety, 'it having been ruled by Jenkyns that the Dean had no more to do with chapel than another fellow'. The Oxford Movement: July 1833 to December 1834, eds. Ian Ker and Thomas Gornal, IV (1980), 274, in The Letters and Diaries of John Henry Newman (hereafter, Newman IV). The diary entry (ibid., p. 173) for Sunday, 12 January 1834, indicates that upon that day Henry Jenkyns had made his final departure from Oriel and the Common Room.

[70]Jenkyns Papers V.B.9. Draft of a letter, 20 October 1833, Jenkyns to The Speaker: 'But still, finding myself superannuated at College and feeling that I am arriving at an age, which if I ever think of preparing another [mode of existence, i.e., as a married man], admits of no further delay in fixing on one, I am very reluctant to refuse the offer [of the Durham professorship]'.

[71]The social, ecclesiastical, and academic connections of Henry Jenkyns were impressive: The Speaker, Charles Manners-Sutton, was the son of Charles Manners-Sutton, Archbishop of Canterbury (1805-28); Henry Hobhouse--permanent under secretary of state for the home department (1817-27), intimate of Peel, Keeper of State Papers (1826-54), member of the Ecclesiastical Commission (1835-48)--was Henry's uncle and, in 1834, became his father-in-law; Richard Jenkyns, Henry's older brother, was Master of Balliol and an intimate friend of Charles Atmore Ogilvie (Bampton Lecturer, 1836; first Regius Professor of Pastoral Theology in 1842), who was for a time the domestic and examining chaplain of Howley, Archbishop of Canterbury; Thomas Gaisford--Dean of Christ Church, canon of Durham, admired friend and advisor of Van Mildert--married Henry's older sister, Jane Catherine, ca. 1832. The list of people with whom Henry was educated, acquainted, or friendly goes on at length: e.g., John Lonsdale, Edward Hawkins, Richard Whately, Thomas Arnold; John Keble, Richard Hurrell Froude, John Henry Newman, and others of the Oxford Movement; Edward Coleridge and Christopher Wordsworth, to name but a few.

[72]Jenkyns Papers V.B.7. Draft or copy of a letter (n.d.) from Henry to John Lonsdale, then Rector of St. George's, Bloomsbury. Judging from a letter from The Speaker to Henry, dated 5 April 1831 (Jenkyns Papers V.B.7), it seems that Henry wrote identical letters to Lonsdale and to Manners-Sutton.

[73]Jenkyns Papers V.B.7. Letter, 5 April 1831.

[74]Ibid.

[75]Jenkyns Papers VI.A.22. Letter, 20 April 1833.

[76]Newman IV, 112. Letter, 17 November [1833].

[77]Jenkyns Papers IV.B. Letter, 5 January 1832, Gaisford to Van Mildert.

[78]Ibid. Letters from Gaisford to Van Mildert: 5 January 1832, 26 December 1831, 27 November 1831, and 5 November 1831. Gaisford's first wife was Helen Douglas, niece and foster-daughter of Van Mildert.

[79]Ibid. Letter, 15 August 1833, Gaisford to Jenkyns.

[80]Ibid. Plan of 28 September 1833, enclosed in a letter (15 October 1833) from Van Mildert to Jenkyns.

[81]Ibid., letter.

[82]Ibid.

[83]Ibid. Letter, 19 October 1832 [recte 1833], Jenkyns to Van Mildert.

[84]Jenkyns Papers IV.B. Letter, 28 October 1833, Jenkyns to Van Mildert.

[85]Ibid. Letter, 29 October 1833, Van Mildert to Jenkyns.

[86]Jenkyns Papers IV.B. Copied extracts from a letter, 18 February 1834, Van Mildert to Charles Thorp.

[87]Jenkyns Papers V.A.1c. Draft, 'Case for the opinion of Mr. Hobhouse', treating of the question whether or not Henry could resign the Professorship of Theology at Durham University while continuing to retain the third stall of the Durham Cathedral Chapter.

[88]Jenkyns Papers V.B.9. E.g., Letter, 2 November 1833, Lonsdale to Jenkyns; 22 October 1833, The Speaker to Jenkyns. Manners-Sutton is sure that Henry's acceptance will commend him to the 'New Archbishop', Howley, who 'speaks most highly' of Henry, although he has so far failed to offer the latter preferment (despite the urgings of Manners-Sutton, Henry is to understand). 18 November 1833, Dornford to Jenkyns.

[89]Jenkyns Papers IV.B. Letter, 9 December 1833, Thorp to Jenkyns; draft of a letter, 14 December 1833, Jenkyns to David Durell.

[90]Ibid. Letter (n.d.), early in 1834, Thorp to Jenkyns.

[91]Ibid. Draft of a letter (n.d.), early in 1834. Jenkyns to Thorp.

[92]Ibid. Letter, 30 March 1834. Thorp writes to Jenkyns 'to wish you joy of your marriage'.

[93]Jenkyns Papers VI.A.1a. Letter, 17 March (n.d., but must date from 1836), Richard Jenkyns to Henry Jenkyns.

[94]Newman II, various diary entries for 1830-2.

[95]Jenkyns Papers V.A. Newspaper clipping of an article by Henry Jenkyns, son of Henry of Durham, on the appearance of Thomas Mozley's Reminiscences, Chiefly of Oriel College and the Oxford Movement (1882). The book was reviewed in the Times, 15 June, 1882, p. 4, column 5.

[96]'On the Advantages of Classical Studies', 25 February 1834.

[97]Jenkyns Papers IV.B. Letter, February 1835.

[98]Ibid. Letter, 6 February 1835.

[99]Fowler, Durham University, p. 255.

[100]Ibid.

[101]Jenkyns Papers V.B.10. Letter, 26 October 1834. Jenkyns to Hobhouse.

[102]Jenkyns Papers IV.B.

[103]Jenkyns Papers IV.B. Minutes of Evidence Taken before the Durham University Commissioners, 27 February 1862

(hereafter, Commissioners, 1862), para. 562, p. 23.

[104]Jenkyns Papers V.A.1e. Certificate of collation signed and sealed by Edward Maltby, Bishop of Durham.

[105]Jenkyns Papers IV.B. Letter, 6 February 1835, Van Mildert to Jenkyns. Van Mildert refers to the 'new' commission because he had been a member of the first commission of inquiry into Church reform, established by Lord Grey in 1832. The Parliament of 1834 ended without effecting any reform of the established Church, or in any of the related areas--e.g., affairs in Ireland, the question of Church rates and the Universities. The Whigs fell in 1834, to be succeeded by the Tories under Peel, who established the Ecclesiastical Commission of 1835. For discussion of the reforms proposed by the commission of 1832-4, and related questions, see Chadwick, I, pp. 39-100, but especially pp. 40-7.

[106]For details on the formation and functions of this commission, as well as of the ecclesiastical revenues reform in general, see G. F. A. Best, Temporal Pillars: Queen Anne's Bounty, the Ecclesiastical Commissioners, and the Church of England (1964).

[107]Chadwick, I, 39f.

[108]Jenkyns Papers V.B.10.

[109]Not to mention letters from Thorp to Jenkyns, regarding the Commission and the affairs of Durham vis-à-vis the University.

[110]Jenkyns Papers V.B., especially 10, 11, and 12.

[111]Durham, University Library at Palace Green, Correspondence of Charles Thorp, arranged and indexed with abstracts by Canon Joseph T. Fowler, 5 vols (hereafter, Thorp Correspondence).

[112]Jenkyns Papers IVc. Statement prepared by Jenkyns, November 1851, concerning the history of the divinity chair.

[113]Ibid.

[114]Jenkyns Papers IV.B. Commissioners, 1862, para. 586, p. 24.

[115]Jenkyns Papers V.A.1c. Draft of case (n.d., sometime in 1863) prepared by H. Hobhouse (for Henry Jenkyns to retain the third stall of Durham Cathedral Chapter).

[116]Jenkyns Papers V.A.1e. Letter, 1878. Jenkyns to Bishop of Durham.

[117]Jenkyns Papers IV.B. Letters concerning Henry's appointment to the Greek Chair: Gaisford to Van Mildert, 26 December 1831, and 5 January 1832.

[118]Storr, especially Chapter V, 'The Early Orthodox', pp. 79-81. This description of the High Church party follows closely that of Storr, unless otherwise indicated.

[119]Hereafter, the discussion follows that portion of Storr which describes the Orthodox High Church Party, since it is that group rather than the incipient Oxford-Movement group that is of interest here.

[120]If systematic is taken to mean 'the formal study of the defined beliefs of the Christian Church'. In this sense, the teachings of Henry Jenkyns may be said to constitute a systematic theology: the definition accords well with his approach to and treatment of his subject.

[121]Among these, e.g., Van Mildert of Durham (d. 1836), Marsh of Peterborough (d. 1838), and Horsley of Rochester (d. 1806). Other bishops of intellectual eminence in the group were Tomline (Worcester), Kaye (Lincoln), Lloyd (Oxford), Middleton (Calcutta), Jebb (Limerick), and Mant (Killaloe). Among those numbered among the 'lesser clergy' (Storr, p. 82) who are of interest are Manners-Sutton (d. 1828), Archbishop of Canterbury; Christopher Wordsworth, Master of Trinity College, Cambridge; and Hugh James Rose, one-time Professor of Divinity, University of Durham.

[122]An Inquiry into the General Principles of Scripture Interpretation (Bampton Lectures, 1814) (1815).

[123]Storr, p. 84.

[124]MS Jenks LV. 34 and 37, Articles and Liturgies. See below, especially Chapters V and VII.

[125]Obituary notice for Henry Jenkyns, 'Local Necrology: Canon Jenkyns', Durham Directory and Almanack, 1879, p. 43f.

[126]Here used in the sense of 'a declared policy of a political party'. The limits of Henry's theological views were distinct but not so precisely drawn as to provide parameters for the demarcation idelogical camps.

[127]For a detailed discussion, upon which this treatment is based, see Storr, Chapter IV, 'The Early Liberals, pp. 92-114.

[128]See MS Jenks LV.34, Articles, especially the discussion of Art. I (pp. 31-58), Art. II (pp. 59-116) and Art. V (pp. 128-48).

[129]See below, Chapter V.

[130]See below, ibid., especially discussion of lecture on Art. XXIII. For a discussion of Copleston and Hawkins, see Storr, p. 95. Copleston's lectures were never published in full, but lectures X and XI appear in Remains of the Late Edward Copleston, with an introduction by Archbishop [Richard] Whately, 1854.

[131]See MS Jenkyns LV. 34, especially his discussuion of the first five articles and Article VIII 'Of the three creeds'.

[132]See Storr, p. 96. Also, Edward Hawkins, A Dissertation upon the Use and Importance of Unauthoritative Tradition, as an Introduction to Christian Doctrines (1819).

[133]Renn Dickson Hampden, The Scholastic Philosophy considered in its Relation to Christian Theology (1837), p.357.

[134]Jenkyns Papers V.A.3. Letters from Thomas Arnold to Henry Jenkyns, 1819-33.

[135]Ibid., 25 September 1820.

[136]Ibid., 15 April 1833. Jenkyns was to go to Rugby as the Oxford Examiner.

[137]Ibid.

[138]Fowler, Durham University, p. 27.

[139]Ibid., p. 29.

[140]Van Mildert was to go to London in 1834 to present a bill in Parliament which would grant the University a charter. The charter was to be based on the statutes framed by Chapter in 1831 and 1834.

[141]Jenkyns Papers IV.B. Letter, 16 July 1833, Rose to Van Mildert. In the event, the Bill which Van Mildert was to present was never put forward in Parliament for that year. Van Mildert tried to get it amended so as to make an exception to the Royal Prerogative in the case of those stalls held by University Officers. Lord Grey, who had, evidently, initially agreed to support the proposed Bill, apparently bulked over its amendment on this issue: Jenkyns Papers V.B.10. Letter, 8 May [1834], Harriet and Henry Jenkyns

to Henry Hobhouse; 6 May 1834, H. Hobhouse to H. Jenkyns; 17 May 1834, H. Jenkyns to H. Hobhouse. In addition, it was not clear that such a change could in fact be made outside of Chapter to a Bill framed by Chapter and bearing its seal.

[142]History testifies that Rose's fears expressed here and elsewhere concerning the government's desires to usurp the Church--here through undermining one of her loyal institutions for the preservation of privilege and orthodoxy--were exaggerated. Nonetheless, such fears were common to many High Churchmen at the period.

[143]Jenkyns Papers IV.B. Letter, 16 July 1833, Rose to Van Mildert.

[144]Jenkyns Papers V.B.10. Letters, 8 and 17 May 1834, H. Jenkyns to H. Hobhouse.

[145]On 28 November 1836 a charter was granted to the University of London, the examining body to which University College, Gower Street; King's College, The Strand; and others, to be approved thereafter, should belong. Chadwick, I, 95.

[146]DNB.

[147]Chadwick, I, 94.

[148]Ibid., pp. 94-5, italics mine. Similar arguments were offered against the admission of dissenters to Durham. See Jenkyns Papers IV.A, Broadsheet, 'Durham University', by William Clayton Walter, July 1832 (an article reprinted from Durham Advertizer, 15 April 1836, which is a re-issue of the broadsheet, is also to be found in this place). See also, Charles Edwin Whiting, The University of Durham: 1832-1932 (1932), pp. 41-2.

[149]Jenkyns Papers V.B.3. 30 March 1838.

[150]'The Bishop' is presumably Maltby, then Bishop of Durham--a Whig and Evangelical Churchman. It is significant that Ld Russell made his approach through Maltby: their politics agreed and, besides being Bishop, Maltby had an actual determining power in the government of the University. Under the Acts 2 and 3 William IV (1832), which established the University, it was said 'to consist of such Warden or Principal, Professors, Readers, Tutors, students, and other officers and persons, as the Dean and Chapter, with the consent of the Bishop, shall from time to time under their seal prescribe' (Fowler, Durham University, p. 26, italics mine). Further, the University Statutes prepared for and passed by Chapter in 1834 stipulated the Bishop of Durham as the Visitor of the University (ibid., p. 27).

[151]Jenkyns Papers V.A.1e. Undated draft. Those phrases in italics and in brackets are the crossed-out originals of the phrases they follow. They are included here because they seem to represent deliberate efforts on Henry's part to soften the tone of the thoughts being expressed.

[152]Jenkyns Papers VI.A.1a. Letter, 17 March [1836]. Richard Jenkyns to H. Jenkyns.

Chapter II

[1]Frederick William Bagshawe Bullock, A History of the Training of the Ministry of the Church of England and Wales from 1800-1874 (1955), p. 1.

[2]Ibid., p. 2.

[3]The Works of that Learned and Judicious Divine Mr. Richard Hooker: with an Account of his Life and Death by Isaac Walton, ed. with additions and arranged by John Keble (1836), Bk 7, 15.4, p. 296.

[4]John Sparrow, Mark Pattison and the Idea of a University (1967), p. 68.

[5]Bullock, especially Chapter I. '1800-1831', pp. 27-48.

[6]Ibid., p.13f.

[7]For a general discussion of anti-clerical, anti-establishment views in the age, see Chadwick, I, 24-40.

[8]Notably, Tracts for the Times, especially Tract XC (1841) and the responses it evoked; radical pamphlets; vestment and baptismal controversies; Catholic emancipation and Church rate; issues of Royal supremacy and Church autonomy.

[9]The college at Chichester (1839) was the first of these.

[10]Fowler, Durham University, esp. pp. 1-21.

[11]Chadwick, I, 11.

[12]Ibid., p. 26.

[13]Ibid., p. 29.

[14]See Chapter I of the present study. The concern expressed by Hugh James Rose about the effect of the operation of the Royal Prerogative on the government of the University of Durham exemplifies the fears of government control over Church institutions.

[15]Chadwick, I, 103.

[16]D. Heesom, 'The Founding of the University' (1979).

[17]Thorp Corresponsence, I, 5. Letter, 27 July 1831, Thorp to Van Mildert.

[18]Jenkyns Papers IV.B. Commissioners, 1862, paras 564, 565 (p. 23), 591 (p. 24).

[19]Chadwick, I, 271-309.

[20]Thorp Correspondence, I, 138. 5 December 1833.

[21]For example, subjects for examination for the License in 1840 (Durham University Calendar, 1839, viii) were listed as follows: Criticism of NT; *Interpretation of NT; *Gospel of St John; *Acts; *Epistles to Thessalonians and Philippians; *Epistles to Timothy, Titus, and the Hebrews; Ecclesiastical history of the first three centuries (Eusebius); History of the Church of England; *Liturgy and the 39 Articles; *English composition. To this list is appended the notice: 'Those subjects only which are marked with an asterisk are requisite for Bachelors of Arts of Oxford and Cambridge, who have resided but one year'.

[22]Whiting, Durham, p. 61.

[23]Ibid., p. 260.

[24]IV, 626. Undated, but apparently in the hand of Henry Jenkyns.

[25]For a good summary of the content and conduct of the program see Jenkyns Papers IV.B, Commissioners, 1862, para. 579, p. 23.

[26]These Sunday Lectures were given 'immediately after Cathedral Service, and both service and Sunday lectures were attended by Arts men as well as by theological students, all the men at that time being supposed to be Churchmen. I am afraid that [in later years] some of the arts men behaved as badly as they dared to do at the lectures'. Joseph Thomas Fowler, 'Senilia: Recollections of University Life in Durham, 1858-1917', Durham University Journal,

XXII, 1 (Dec., 1918, new series), p. 12.
Under these circumstances, Fowler says, it was impossible for any but those students seated near the front to hear the lectures at all. Evidently, contrary to his usual procedure in week-day lectures, Jenkyns wrote out the text of these lectures in full and read them.

[27]Thorp Correspondence, IV, 606.

[28]Jenkyns Papers IV.C. Statement prepared by Jenkyns in November 1851.

[29]Whiting, Durham, p. 91.

[30]'One feature in his lectures was that he used to give out portions of Eusebius's Ecclesiastical History for us to construe during lecture. I had a copy of Eusebius with the marked passages of manuscript interlineary glosses passed on to me by a friend who had completed his theological course, and when I had done the same I passed it on to a junior in like manner. The glosses were highly valued as a help to viva voce construing, and they often represented the Doctor's renderings given in lecture'. Fowler, 'Senilia'.

[31]Adam Storey Farrar, 'The Lectures of the Late Dr. Jenkyns' (originally printed in the Durham County Advertizer, 29 June 1888, p. 7), in Fowler, 'Appendix VI', Durham University, p. 252.

[32]Whiting, Durham, p. 91.

[33]Giovanni Bona's work on the mass, Rerum liturgicarum libri duo (Paris, 1672), treats the origins of the mass and the different ways of celebration; its structure and constituent elements. Durham University Library (Palace Green) owns two copies of this work: one, in the Cosins collection, which Durham owned when Henry came to the University; the other, in the Routh collection, which Durham acquired during Henry's tenure.

[34]Jenkyns Papers IV.C. Statement of November 1851.

[35]Ibid.

[36]Ibid.

[37]Fowler, 'Senilia'.

[38]Jenkyns Papers IV.C. Statement of November 1851. In the Thorp Correspondence, II, 195, 'Michaelmas 1835', there is a fuller description of the process, written

in the hand of Henry Jenkyns. Twelve essays per week were to be reviewed by the Professor 'in such a manner as to bring the composition of all Divinity Students before him. . . . The Professor shall select 1 and the Tutor shall select 1 in each week to be read before the Chapter. Those which have been thus selected, shall be sent to the Warden, who shall fix on 2, monthly to be read in public'.

[39]Fowler, Durham University, p. 252.

[40]Ibid., p. 253.

[41]Thorp Correspondence, II, 195, 'Michaelmas 1835'.

[42]Jenkyns Papers V.A. Draft prepared by Henry Jenkyns concerning the duties and fees of the Divinity Professor, 1851-59. In 1859, these lectures were assumed by an assistant, the Rev. James Barmby.

[43]V, 672, 15 March 1851.

[44]Durham University Calendar 1837, p. 10; 1838, p. vii; 1839, p. viii; 1840, p. ix, x; 1844, p. x.

[45]Ibid., 1837, p. 10; 1839, p. 10; 1839, p. 10.

[46]To this list, Farrar (in Fowler, Durham University, p. 254) adds 'Evidences' (presumably Paley) and 'Davison on Prophecy'.

[47]Ibid., p. 251.

[48]Whiting, Durham, p. 92.

[49]Fowler, Durham University, p. 126.

[50]Ibid., quoting J. L. Low, p. 126.

[51]Ibid., p. 254. Also, Fowler, 'Senilia': 'The lectures of the Professor of Divinity, Dr. Jenkyns, were admirable in their way; notes of them could easily be taken . . .'.

[52]Fowler, Durham University, p. 254.

[53]Farrar, in Fowler, Durham University, p. 255.

[54]Ibid.

[55]J. Low Low was a student in 1842-3 (Farrar, in Fowler, Durham University, p. 252). The four volumes of his notes

are MS Jenks LV. 44; 45; 46; 47: 39 Articles (1844); Eusebius/Ecclesiastical History (1842-3); Councils/Papacy (1843); Forms of Worship (1843).

[56]Farrar, in Fowler, Durham University, p. 252.

[57]Ibid.

[58]MS Jenks LV. 15, Sunday Lectures on Prophecy (1849), Notes of R. Glover, transcribed for the University at the direction of A. S. Farrar in 1888. Introductory memorandum by Farrar.

[59]Farrar, in Fowler, Durham University, p. 253f.

[60]Ten vols in MS Jenks LV. 34-43: Articles, Eusebius, History of the Church of England; Liturgies; Sunday Lectures and Evidences; Analysis Abstracts (which are revision notes); Epistles I, II, and III; and Criticism of Scripture.

[61]Two vols in MS Jenks LV. 48 and 49. Sunday Lectures-Prophecy (1849) and Lectures-Interpretation and Criticism (of scripture) (1949).

[62]Glover, Prophecy (MS Jenks LV. 48), Farrar's Introductory memorandum.

[63]For example, Farrar decided not to have some of the notes offered by Glover transcribed because 'they seem to be so entirely an abridgement of a part of Dr. Jenkyns' week day Lectures on Office Books and Forms of Worship (contained in one of the 4 vols of Mr. J. L. Low's Notes) that it is unnecessary to have them transcribed'. Ibid.

[64]Appended to MS Jenks LV. 34. Dated 23 July 1915, Bloxworth Rectory, Dorset.

[65]Parenthetical page references made hereafter in the text of the present discussion are to the Pickard-Cambridge notes on the 39 Articles, unless some other indication is provided.

[66]Charles Hardwick, A History of the Articles of Religion: to which is added a Series of Documents, from A. D. 1536 to A.D. 1615; Together with Illustrations from Contemporary Sources, revised ed. (1859), pp. 143-7. Hardwick discusses the issue of authenticity, especially with regard to the disputed clause of Art. XX, and concludes that there is more than adequate support for claims for the validity of Arts XX and XXIX in the form in which they are presently accepted.

[67]Hardwick, pp. 142-3, would seemingly disagree with

this observation: 'There is consequently little or no doubt, that in the absence of the manuscript which had been finally accepted by the Crown, the most authentic representation of the Articles of 1563 exists in the Latin text, as printed under the direct authority of Elizabeth herself'.

[68]Ibid., pp. 141-2. Evidently subscription to the Articles of 1563 was encouraged, by a suggestion of compulsion, and they were evidently gradually subscribed by nearly all the members of the lower house of convocation. See also, ibid, pp. 148-50.

[69]Cf. ibid., p. 152.

[70]Paul Elmer More and Frank Leslie Cross, eds, Anglicanism: The Thought and Practice of the Church of England, Illustrated from the Religious Literature of the Seventeenth Century (1935), p. xxv. More and Cross argue that, ultimately, Anglicanism recognizes only one fundamental matter of faith which is necessary for salvation: the belief that Jesus Christ is the Son of God.

[71]Gilbert Burnet, An Exposition of the XXXIX Articles of the Church of England (1819), p. 8.

[72]Van Mildert, pp. 147-51, lists the fundamental doctrines of the Christian system, on the one hand, and the fundamental articles of faith, on the other. Jenkyns was no doubt in accord with Van Mildert's views on this subject.

[73]Presumably, the 10 Articles of 1536, the 'Bishops' Book' or The Institution of the Christian Man (1537), and the 'King's Book' or A Necessary Doctrine and Erudition for any Christian Man (1543).

[74]Probably a reference to the Prayer Book Catechism of 1549.

[75]That is, the 'Small Catechism', published in 1572.

[76]Compiled under the direction of Parker with the agreement of 'the northern metropolitan and other English prelates; and of it the clergy were required to make a public profession, not only on admission to their benefices, but twice also every year, immediately after the Gospel of the day'. Hardwick, p. 120. For discussion of the doctrinal content of these articles, see ibid., pp. 121-3.

[77]For a complete description of this document, see Garnet Lee White, Anglican Reactions to the Council of Trent in the Reign of Elizabeth I (1975).

[78]Reformatio Legum Ecclesiasticarum, presented to Parliament in March, 1553. 'By an Act of 1549 (3 and 4 Edw. IV, c.11) the King had been empowered to appoint 32 persons to compile a corpus of ecclesiastical laws for use in the English spiritual courts. The work was actually taken in hand in 1551 by a body of eight persons . . .'. The death of Edward VI in 1553 made it impossible to proceed with the project. 'Reformatio Legum Ecclesiasticarum', ODCC.

[79]p. 250.

[80]Whom Jenkyns labels 'the Arminians', but this is an error. The Arminians were the moderate Calvinists of the period against whom more orthodox Calvinists reacted.

[81]Jenkyns does not here mention specific articles, but presumably he has reference to, e.g., contra Rome, XXII 'Of purgatory' and XXXII 'Of the marriage of priests' and, contra the Anabaptist, XXVI 'Of the unworthiness of the ministers'.

[82]That is to ask whether the Articles are the statements of doctrines necessary to salvation--and Jenkyns says (p. 16) that some are and some are not--and do they require the active agreement of the clergy who subscribe them; or are they 'Articles of Church Communion' containing opinions in 'matters of religion, which a man may believe to be false, and yet may esteem them to be of so little importance to the chief design of religion, that he may well hold communion with those whom he thinks to be so mistaken'. Burnet, Arts, p.8.

[83]Conversely, to the unsubscribing majority of believers they are (by the 5th canon of James I) articles of peace and unity (p. 16) or 'Articles of Church Communion', chez Burnet. 'These things [the 36th canon and the statutes of Elizabeth I] make it appear very plain, that subscription of the Clergy must be considered as a declaration of their own opinion, and not as a bare obligation to silence'. Burnet, Articles, p. 10.

[84]It should be borne in mind that this was a live and burning issue during the years when Jenkyns was lecturing. Some of those who held extreme Tractarian views were condemned as heretics because their Rome-ward inclining interpretations of the XXXIX Articles were judged to exceed the limits allowed by subscription. On the other hand, controversial judgements were given as to whether or not certain Protestant interpretations--viz., Gorham's on baptismal regeneration--fell within the limits of subscription.

[85]From this, Jenkyns infers that Rome held all the doctrinal statements of these articles to be distinctly condemnatory of Rome (p. 17).

[86]Jenkyns asserts that the repeated attempts by the

Puritans to ammend the XXXIX Articles in order to make explicit the doctrine of predestination indicates that the dicta of the Articles were 'very indefinite on this point' (p. 22).

[87]At this point Jenkyns gives an interesting glimpse of his view of establishment: 'it is observable that the State saved the Church--in fact the clergy are far more likely to go to extremes in cases of controversy, than the civil power which almost always takes a moderate view of religious differences and so at times interferes with great effect in preventing the clergy from pulling each other in pieces--in consequence of a refusal of the Royal Sanction, the Lambeth Articles came to nothing' (p. 19).

[88]For a discussion of the Quinquarticular disputes, the Synod of Dort, and the responses of the establishment, see Hardwick, pp. 191-207.

[89]p. 10. This summary of inferences is in Burnet appended to a quotation which he seems to attribute to the declaration of James I, but the passage he quotes and from which his inferences are drawn is clearly from the declaration of Charles I.

[90]This is one point at which the notes of Low Low (MS Jenks LV.44) and those of Pickard-Cambridge (MS Jenks LV. 34) diverge. Disputations concerning the latitude of interpretation allowed by subscription are discussed on pp. 10-15 in Low Low, and the treatment is notably different: (1) the cases of Whiston and Clarke are treated much less elaborately; (2) there is, of course, no mention of Ward or Oakley, or the final outcome of the Gorham case, because the controversies concerning these men had not yet arisen; (3) nor do these notes anywhere contain the strong defense of the State's authority to legislate in matters of doctrinal controversy that appears in Pickard-Cambridge (quoted above, n. 87). These differences between the two texts suggest that Jenkyns developed his comments on subscription to the Articles as a response to contemporary theological controversies on the question.

[91]Jenkyns describes the relationship of Church and State in matters of doctrine in the following terms: The powers of Elizabeth I to declare on matters of doctrine were virtually unlimited, although she was free to seek the advice of Council, Parliament, or Convocation. Her powers extended, as did those of James I, to abolishing, ordaining, or confirming any religious canon. 'But Charles I gave up some of this power and limited [the Crown] (by binding himself to call in the advice of convocation) . . . , at the same time the power of convocation, which is still under the law of this declaration viz. that convocation cannot discuss doctrine except under the seal of the king, nor could any act of convocation become binding except by the assent of

the king, and moreover the discussion [of convocation] was not to go to the lengths of making any change in the doctrine but was only to settle and make it plain' (p. 20).

[92]p. 255. Also, see above, n. 90.

[93]Chadwick, I, pp. 255-71, passim.

[94]If members of the evangelical party were orthodox Calvinists, 'they were able to attribute saving grace to sacraments administered to the elect, but to none others'. However, at this time, 'most English evangelicals were not orthodox Calvinists. But they preferred to think of the sacrament less as a vehicle of regenerating grace than as a sign or pledge or promise of a future regeneration, itself under the conditions of growth in penitence and faith'. Ibid., p. 255.

[95]The Court of Arches seems to have done its homework before reading its decision: 'The doctrine of Baptism was hunted through the liturgy and articles, through Luther and the Augsburg Confession, through the fathers of the ancient church and the fathers of the Reformation, through the English divines of the Protestant centuries'. Ibid., pp. 253-4.

[96]Jenkyns was probably sanguine because 'Langdale [who drafted the public statement of the committee's judgement] insisted again that they were not attempting to define the truth of a doctrine. They were not satisfied that this single clergyman contradicted the formularies of the Church of England'. Ibid., p. 261.

[97]'Gorham Case', ODCC. On the other hand, Chadwick (I, 260) says: 'The arguments of counsel before the judicial committee repeated in substance the arguments alleged in the court of arches'.

[98]Hardwick, p. 277, says in a note that 'the Articles relating to faith and doctrine (so far as these may be distinguished) are 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 22'. It is not, however, clear whether or not he regards the 'articles of doctrine' as 'articles of salvation'.

[99]In his Theology of the Lutheran Confessions (1961), Edmund Wilhelm Ludwig Schlink gives a more rigid definition of doctrinal confessions: 'Confessions are primarily expositions of Scripture . . .'; they summarize the statements from Scripture in doctrinal articles which are designed to protect the correct proclamation of Scripture (p. xvi). That is to say, Schlink believes confessions to be more specifically prescriptive than Jenkyns would allow to be the case for the Thirty-nine Articles. Schlink says that 'confessions . . . are the church's normative exposition

of Scripture' (p. xix), which assumes that there is a clear, ascertainable norm.

Chapter III

[1]Hardwick, p. 373: 'the clause relating to the testimony of the Church in determining what books are canonical, derived in 1563, from the Wurtemburg Confession'.

[2]Ibid., p. 374: 'The Roman Church, since April 8, 1546, has included the books of Tobit, Judith, Baruch, Wisdom, Ecclesiasticus, and 1st and 2nd Macabees, in the Old Testament canon, (Council. Trident. Sess. IV): and the same decree (which was the work of five cardinals and forty-eight bishops) after declaring that the Christian revelation is transmitted "in libris scriptus et sine scripto traditionibus", orders both to be received "pari pietatis affectu ac reverentia"'.

[3]According to Hardwick, p. 373 and p. 99, the article was also directed against 'the errors of spiritualists or anti-book-religionists'--this was true of the article as it first appears among the 42 of 1553: i.e., it is directed against the Illuminati of that period. The second clause ('not proved thereby . . .') is also intended to guard against some of the extremist Reformation views (viz., those of Zwingli), which 'maintained that all the usuages of the Church must be deducible from the directions of Holy Scripture'. Cf. Burnet, Articles, p. 101.

[4]Jenkyns consistently makes a distinction between tradition--i.e., apostolic tradition, which is evidently the pre-Nicene tradition--and the authority of the Church in matters of faith--i.e., evidently, the post-Nicene Church. Jenkyns' distinction is maintained throughout this discussion of Article VI.

[5]'Preface to the Epistles of St James and St Jude 1546 (1522)', translated by Charles M. Jacobs and revised by E. Theodore Bachmann, in Word and Sacrament, I (Luther's Works, vol. 35), edited by E. Theodore Bachmann (1976), pp. 395-7.

[6]For example, Herbert Marsh's criticism of the New Testament, The History of Sacred Criticism (1809) and the English translation of Michaelis' Introduction to the New Testament (4 vols, 1793-1801), showed that the Gospels were, at least, not all of a piece Jenkyns' comments later in this lecture indicate that he was at least aware of the rise of the new criticism, though it is not likely that he took it seriously.

[7]This is also the argument of Burnet, Articles, p. 96: Even in the days of Methuselah and Sem, when 'the tradition of those very few things in which religion was then comprehended, was so universally and entirely corrupted, that it was necessary to correct it by immediate revelation to Abraham'. Burnet continues (p. 97): 'yet in every matter of fact such additions are daily made [to matters of doctrine] . . . that if religion had not a more assured bottom than tradition it could not have that credit paid to it that it ought to have. If we had no greater certainty for religion than report, we could not believe it very firmly, nor venture upon it'.

[8]This second approach is indeed that taken by English theologians until the revival of patristic studies which was initiated by the Oxford Movement. The habit of citing florilegia of the fathers was especially current among 18th-century theologians.

[9]The passage from which Jenkyns seems to have quoted is to be found in 'Epistle LXIII: To Pompey, against the epistle of Stephen about the baptism of heretics', The Writings of Cyprian, Bishop of Carthage, Part I Containing the Epistles and Some of the Treatises, trans. by Robert Ernest in Ante-Nicene Christian Library, eds Alexander Roberts and James Donaldson (25 vols, 1867-72), VIII (1868), 277-8. The relationship between Cyprian's use of Joshua and Jenkyns' statement, 'and quotes Joshua 1.8 as applying to the reception of the Old by the Jews', is not immediately clear. Cyprian was greatly influenced by Tertulliam (see 'Book III, Chapter XVI, "The Sacred name Jesus most suited to the Christ of the Creator. Joshua a type of him"', The Five Books of Quintas Sept. Flor. Tertullianus against Marcion, trans. by Peter Holmes, in ibid., VII [1868], 151-2), and evidently the former based his understanding of Jos. 1.8 on the interpretation thereof by the latter.

[10]One difficulty in this lecture is that Jenkyns seems to use the concept of 'Apostolic times' to cover two distinct periods of history: on the one hand, the lifetime of the Apostles; on the other, the period of the early Church, extending beyond the life of the Apostles and possibly well into the patristic period.

[11]A note in the text indicates that these are the ipsissima verba of Jenkyns.

[12]Jenkyns, like most of his contemporaries, assumed that, if an epistle was attributed to a named author, then (a) the identity of the author was assured and (b), the author being known from testimony elsewhere in the Testament, his knowledge of his subject and his claim to inspiration were a matter of course.

[13]Jenkyns provides here no definition for external and internal evidences, but he did deliver a series of Sunday lectures on the subject. These lectures (MS Jenks LV. 38) will be discussed below. Generally speaking these definitions apply: External evidences are the corroboration of

the New Testament from independent, external sources (Leslie Stephen, History of English Thought in the Eighteenth Century, 1881, I, 414). Internal evidences are those 'arising from that excellence, and those clear marks of supernatural interposition, which are so conspicious in the religion (John Martin Creed and John Sandwith Boys Smith, Religious Thought in the Eighteenth Century, 1934, p. 83, quoting Soame Jenkyns' View of the Internal Evidence of the Christian Religion, 1776).

[14]Jenkyns thinks of the activity of the Holy Spirit almost exclusively in terms of the conferring of the extraordinary gifts of the Spirit, and he believes that such activity ceased with the death of the last apostle.

[15]Jenkyns gives the impression that few of the fathers accepted the books of the Apocrypha as canonical, but this is not indeed the case. They were widely accepted among both the Greek and Latin fathers, but the Greek fathers of the 4th century began to make a distinction between those books which were included in the Hebrew canon and those which were exclusive to the Septuagint.

[16]The 60th canon of Laodicea 'contains a list of the Canonical Scriptural Books closely akin to that of Apostolic Canons, can. 85 (84), e.g. it omits the OT Apocrypha and Revelations' ('Laodicea, Canons of', ODCC).

[17]MS Jenks LV. 49. These are the lecture notes of Robert Glover, taken in Michaelmas Term, 1849.

[18]Translated by Charles H. Terrot (1832).

[19]Storr, p. 172.

[20]MS Jenks LV. 49, p. 4. The notes indicate that these are Jenkyns' requirements as distinguished from Ernesti's.

[21]Ibid.

[22]Ibid., p. 7.

[23]Van Mildert, p. 129.

[24]MS Jenks LV. 49, p. 22.

[25]Ibid.

[26]Such an understanding as this has been conditioned by 18th-century rationalism and concern with natural religion, but it also reflects a typically Anglican bias toward faith

expressed by reason. The tendency in 18th-century rational theology was to see the truth contained in scripture, although warranted by a scriptural authority derived from divine inspiration, as being directly related to reason and to the truth reason yields. For rationalization in theology and its effects, see J. K. S. Reid, The Authority of Scripture (1957), especially p. 93.

[27]Ernesti, Principles, Pt I, Sect. 1, Chapter 1, para. XXIII. If any two passages of scripture cannot be reconciled, one must assume that one text has been corrupted (MS Jenks LV. 49, p. 48).

[28]MS Jenkns LV. 49, p. 21.

[29]Ibid., p. 10.

[30]A dictum such as Ernesti's is meant to combat the evils of allegorical interpretation of the type first systematized by Origen and perfected by the Scholastics. It was an unfortunate reflex of such a dictum that scripture came to be viewed more as being itself a mystery whose truth needed to be revealed than as the record of a revelation. See Reid, p. 97. And Jenkyns evidently recognized the danger, for he comments that it was the intention of the sacred writers to convey a revelation, not a concealment (MS Jenks, ibid.).

[31]MS Jenks LV. 49, p. 21.

[32]Ibid., p. 11.

[33]Ibid., p. 13.

[34]Ibid.

[35]Stephen, I. 186-93. See also MS Jenks LV. 49, p. 21, summarizing Ernesti, loc. cit.: Since scripture is inspired and, therefore, infallible, one has no right to criticize scripture as one does other books.

[36]Van Mildert, p. 180.

[37]Article VI.

[38]Van Mildert, p. 189.

[39]MS Jenks LV. 39, p. 22, summarizing Ernesti, loc. cit.

[40]It is interesting that in Low Low's notes on the

introductory lectures to the Articles (MS Jenks LV. 44), where the general arrangement of the Articles is described, the second division--*i.e.*, that including Articles VI-VIII--is called the 'Rule of Faith'. For a comparison with the Pickard-Cambridge text at this point, see MS Jenks LV. 34, p. 30.

[41]MS Jenks LV. 49, p. 46.

[42]These are discussed in Glover (*ibid.*) *passim*, but they are best summarized in Van Mildert, pp. 182-204.

[43]MS Jenks LV. 49, p. 28.

[44]*Ibid.*

[45]*Ibid.*, p. 21.

[46]Ernesti, *Principles*, Pt 1, Sect 2, Chapter 3, para. XXXV, n. quoting Gerard.

[47]MS Jenks LV. 49, p. 2.

[48]p. 189.

[49]For a list of these principles, see Van Mildert, pp. 147-51.

[50]p. 215.

[51]MS Jenks LV. 49, p. 5.

[52]cf. Van Mildert, pp. 73-91.

[53]MS Jenks LV. 49, p. 5.

[54]*Ibid.*, p. 6.

[55]Hawkins, p. iii.

[56]*Ibid.*, p. 18; p. 22.

[57]MS Jenks LV. 49, p. 6.

[58]For the use of and limitations on patristic authority, see Van Mildert, pp. 115-8.

[59]Storr, pp. 108-9.

[60]MS Jenks LV. 49, p. 6.

[61]cf. Van Mildert, p. 129.

[62]Elizabeth Varley, 'The Excellency of the Liturgy: High Church Loyalty in 1800' (1980).

[63]MS Jenks LV. 49, p. 7.

[64]Stephen, on the Diests, I, 74-90.

[65]MS Jenks LV. 38, p. 25.

[66]MS Jenks LV. 49, p. 7.

[67]MS Jenks LV. 38, pp. 25-6.

[68]MS Jenks LV. 49, p. 8.

[69]Hardwick, pp. 87 and 103.

[70]cf. Burnet, Articles, p. 121.

[71]As Jenkyns points out, Art. VII of the Thirty-nine is a conflation of two Edwardian articles, the 6th and the 19th. Hardwick (pp. 99-100), in discussing the 6th of the Edwardian articles, says that it 'was manifestly levelled at the Anabaptist emissaries, many of whom denied, as did Servetus, that the Jewish system was vitally connected with the Christian, or that worthies of the introductory oeconomy had the faintest expectation of a life beyond the present'.

[72]Burnet, Articles, pp. 129-34.

[73]Ibid., p. 192.

[74]Burnet comments (ibid., p. 134) that the hope of eternity which runs through the Old Testament was but 'a light shining in the darkness' until the Gospel of Christ brought it to full revelation.

[75]Ibid., p. 127. For a full discussion of the Old Testament expectation of the Messiah as it is interpreted to be an expectation of Jesus Christ, see ibid., pp. 122-7.

[76]Jenkyns seems clearly to mean a state of life after death. He shows no awareness of a concept of the eschaton as it is sometimes understood (by modern NT scholars) to be a future state of rewards and punishments in a temporal

world converted (or re-converted) to God's law.

[77]Namely, Gen. 59.10; Jer. 31.31, 32; Dan. 11.27.

[78]Namely, Gal. 5.1; 3.24, 25; 6.9, 10; 5.2, 18. Col. 2.14; Eph. 2.15.

[79]Burnet, Articles, p. 136: Positive laws are those made by men out of 'consideration of human society, what is necessary for the peace and order, the safety and happiness, of mankind'.

[80]Ibid., pp. 127-8.

[81]Ibid., p. 127.

[82]Ibid., p. 128.

[83]Durham University Calendar [1836], p. 10.

[84]MS Jenks LV. 48.

[85]MS Jenks LV. 38, pp. 22-35.

[86]Storr, p. 177.

[87]Ibid., p. 178.

[88]Although the outlook of a few individual scholars may have been exceptions to this rule, it remains true that the Christian view before the dawn of critical theology saw the Old Testament exclusively 'as a book of ancient prophecies about the coming of Jesus Christ' (Clements, p. 2). English theologians did not begin enthusiastically to embrace the critical approach to the Old Testament until the 1870s. For a development of critical Old Testament scholarship in England, see Ronald E. Clements, A Century of Old Testament Study (1979).

[89]Storr, p. 182.

[90]Ibid., p. 187.

[91]Ibid., p. 190.

[92]Thomas Arnold, 'Sermons on the Interpretation of Prophecy (1939)', Sermons Chiefly on the Interpretation of Scripture 1832-1840 (1878).

[93]Ibid., p. 336.

[94]Ibid., p. 342.

[95]Ibid., p. 343.

[96]MS Jenks LV. 48.

[97]Ibid., p. 7.

[98]Geological studies suggested that the Biblical record of creation and the progress of geological events was inaccurate; Newtonian physics and causality seemed to undermine the theological accounts of divine providence.

[99]Reid, pp. 17-8.

[100]MS Jenks LV. 48.

[101]Ibid.

[102]MS Jenks LV. 38, pp. 31-2.

[103]Ibid., p. 33.

[104]Alexander Pope, An Essay on Criticism, II, l. 135.

[105]Jenkyns' lectures on criticism do indicate that he had an awareness of that excellent lower criticism on which the New Criticism was built. He makes reference to Johann Jakob Griesbach (1745-1812), Johann Leonard Hüg (1765-1846), Thomas Hartwell Horne (1780-1862), Johannes Albrecht Bengel (1687-1782), Constantin Tischendorf (1815-1874), Samuel Prideaux Tregelles (1813-75), Henry Alford (1810-71), Angelo Mai (1782-1854), Richard Bentley (1662-1742), Johann Jakob Wettstein (1693-1754), Johann Salomo Semler (1725-1791), and Karl Lachmann (1793-1851), among others.

[106]Reid, p. 79.

[107]Ibid., p. 80.

[108]Ibid.

[109]MS Jenks LV. 38, p. 36. Cf. Burnet, Articles, p. 144: The doctrine declared by the creeds is contained in scripture.

[110]MS Jenks, ibid., p. 34.

[111]That is, the Roman doctrine of oral tradition.

[112]MS Jenks LV. 38, p. 35.

[113]MS Jenks LV. 44, p. 89.

[114]Ibid.

[115]MS Jenks LV. 38, p. 42.

[116]Ibid., p. 90.

[117]Ibid., p. 42.

[118]Ibid., p. 43.

[119]Ibid.

[120]Ibid., pp. 43-4.

[121]Ibid., p. 37. The ODCC says this work 'with its wealth of systematically arranged information on the hierarchy, organization, rites, discipline, and calendar of the early Church, was the fruit of some twenty years' labour and has not been superceded'.

[122]MS Jenks LV. 38, p. 38. Cf. Burnet, Articles, p. 44: It is impossible to trace the creed to the Apostles themselves: 'Rufin was the first that published it'.

[123]The ODCC dates the creed between 381 and 428 A.D. The Dictionary contradicts Jenkyns' attribution of the heresies therein comprehended: 'The doctrine defended and the terminology used point to a time when the controversy of Appollinarianism was acute and before the outbreak of the Nestorian and Eutychean heresies to which no reference is made'.

[124]A growing enlightenment which began in the eighteenth century made Anglicans reluctant 'to limit the mercies of God towards those who are under such darkness as not to be able to see through it, and to discern and acknowledge these truths' (Burnet, Articles, p. 144.).

[125]Ibid., pp. 142-3.

[126]MS Jenks LV. 44, p. 90.

[127]See 'The Disputation Concerning the passage: "The Word was Made Flesh" (Jn 1.14)', trans. by Martin E. Lehman, Word and Sacrament, IV, 237-85, passim, in Luther's Works, XXXVIII (1971). For a discussion of Calvin's views on natural theology, see T. H. L. Parker, Calvin's Doctrine of the Knowledge of God (1969). Both Luther and Calvin would agree that faith is constituted in the knowledge of God toward man, although Luther would diverge from Calvin in insisting that no knowledge of God can be in itself salvific.

[128]Walther von Loewenich, Luther's Theology of the Cross (1976), p. 52.

[129]At least at one level, Hampden thought he was condemning a practice he believed to have been repudiated in the Reformation and, therefore, in Anglican theology. There is an account in the Jenkyns Papers (VI.a. 1a) of the furore at Oxford over Hampden's appointment as the Regius Professor of Divinity (letter, March 14 [1836], Richard to Henry Jenkyns). A second letter (17 March [?1836]) gives some account of one of Hampden's lectures. Richard's comments are far from complimentary.

Chapter IV

[1]In fact, Jenkyns gave a separate set of lectures on the History of Church Councils (MS Jenks LV. 45), the whole purpose of which was to demonstrate that Rome has erred and has contradicted her earlier decrees by later ones--i.e., that she is indeed fallible.

[2]Presumably in his Disputationes de Controversiis Christianae Fidei adversus hujus temporis Haereticos (3 vols, Ingolstadt, 1586-93). Bellarmine seems to have been Jenkyns' chief authority on Roman Catholic dogma.

[3]This is a rather curious statement. Surely Jenkyns cannot mean that in general it is only necessary to justify theological tenets if they are disputed by others. Perhaps he conceives either of his task in these lectures or of the task of the Thirty-nine Articles as being only polemical.

[4]From the perspective of twentieth-century understanding of the New Testament, the problem here with Jenkyns' point of view is that he does not recognize a point of identity between the Apostles and the Church. Implicitly, Jenkyns believes that the Church as such is an entity apart from the Apostles, created by their efforts, and not truly in full existence until the close of the Apostolic age.

[5]Cf. Burnet, Articles, pp. 274 and 275.

[6]Burnet cites Rom 13.1 ('Let every soul be subject to the higher powers') as the scriptural warrant for such a position.

[7]MS Jenks LV. 37, p. 60. In these lectures on the liturgy, while discussing the question of infant reception at the Eucharist, Jenkyns deduces an argument against the Roman claim to infallibility in Pope and councils: 'Here then we have a Pope [Innoscent I, who favoured infant communion] and a council [Trent, which condemned infant reception]--both infallible according to Romish doctrines--contradicting each other flatly, which is inconsistent'.

[8]Burnet, Articles, p. 287.

[9]G. R. Cragg, From Puritanism to the Age of Reason (1966), p. 157.

[10]The Two Books of Homilies Appointed to be read in Churches (1859), p. 107 and p. 109. It is interesting to note that the same sentiments are borne out in the Second Book, 'An Homily against Disobedience and Wilful Rebellion, in six parts'.

[11]Burnet, Articles, p. 346.

[12]In his introduction to Cranmer's Remains (p. xxxii), Jenkyns sanctions Cranmer for once having held the erroneous opinion that to the King was '"committed immediately of God the whole cure of all his subjects, as well concerning the administration of God's word for the cure of souls, as concerning the ministration of things political and civil governance": and as the Lord Chancellor and other civil magistrates were appointed by the sovereign to discharge one part of this office, so were the Archbishop of Canterbury and the rest of the clergy appointed to discharge another'. Fortunately, says Jenkyns, Cranmer later abandoned this view in the interest of truth, but these views 'exposed him to no little amniadversion'.

[13]Burnet, Articles, p. 527.

[14]Ibid., p. 528.

[15]Article XXXVII, as given in Hardwick, p. 325, spelling modernized.

[16]Burnet, Articles, p. 529.

[17]Cragg, p. 195.

[18]Ibid., p. 74.

[19]'Erastianism', ODCC.

[20]Burnet, Articles, pp. 528-9.

[21]For a discussion of the Erastian development in England, see Cragg, op. cit.

[22]'Hobbes, Thomas', ODCC.

[23]John T. McNeil, 'The Democratic Element in Calvin's Thought', Church History, XVIII (1949), 164: 'In the framework of a biblical conception of authority, both Bucer and Calvin referred all political power to God. It is God who sets up, and directs, elected magistrates no less than kings'.

[24]Herbert D. Foster, 'Calvin's Programme for a Puritan State in Geneva', Harvard Theological Review, I (1908), 403.

[25]From the Reformation to 1828, members of Parliament had had to be, at least nominally, communicants of the Church of England. In 1828 and 1829, however, the repeal of the tests and Corporations Acts and the passing of the Relief Act admitted Dissenters and Roman Catholics to public office and, therefore, ultimately to Parliament.

[26]Burnet, Articles, p. 528.

[27]Ibid., p. 347.

Chapter V

[1]See G. K. A. Bell, Christian Unity: The Anglican Position, especially Chapter I, 'The Wisdom of the Church of England'.

[2]In fact, the Church of England delivers the Bible to ordinands, so in this sense the rite does involve a material element such as is required by the definition of a sacrament as having two validating parts: matter and form. The real point, as will become evident, is that the New Testament does not witness to the fact that Jesus ordained by means of an action comprised of sacramental matter and form.

[3]Chadwick, I, 512.

[4]Durham University Calendar, 1837, p. 31.

[5]Jenkyns Papers VB. 12: Letter, dated Sherburn House, 13 April 1837.

[6]The actual question is to be found in the Durham University Calendar (1837), p. 82. It is question 4 under Part VI of the Theological examinations: 'How was the Church governed during the first three centuries, with respect both to particular communities and the whole body of Christians?'.

[7]Burnet, Articles, p. 346.

[8]And, thereby, asserts a parity of degree to all believers.

[9]Burnet, Articles, p. 347.

[10]Ibid.

[11]Rose, The State of the Protestant Religion in Germany (1825), p. 173.

[12]MS Jenks LV. 37, pp. 219-36.

[13]Ibid., pp. 229-30.

[14]Rose, pp. 107-8.

[15]This very moderate attitude toward the ministry and commission of the Apostles is not completely reconcilable with Jenkyns' insistence elsewhere on the absolute distinction to be made between the general authority of the Apostles as opposed to the very limited authority of all post-New-Testament ministers.

[16]Burnet, Articles, p. 245.

[17]MS Jenks LV. 37, p. 231-4.

[18]Ibid., pp. 231-2, elisions and italics in the text.

[19]Ibid., p. 232.

[20]Ibid.

[21]Ibid., p. 233.

[22]Ibid., pp. 233-4.

[23]Ibid., p. 234.

[24]Ibid., p. 208.

[25]He also observes, ibid., that there is no necessary connection between concepts of 'priest' and 'sacrifice'.

[26]MS Jenks LV. 37, p. 234.

[27]Ibid., pp. 234-5.

[28]Ibid., p. 199.

[29]Ibid.

[30]Ibid., p. 202.

[31]MS Jenks LV. 38, p. 113.

[32]Ibid.

[33]Ibid.

[34]MS Jenks LV 37, p. 70.

[35]Ibid.

[36]See Burnet, Articles, p. 512f.

Chapter VI

[1]'Justification', ODCC.

[2]Ibid.

[3]Article II, as quoted from Burnet, Articles, p. 56.

[4]Jenkyns defines propitiatory sacrifice as one which is 'calculated and intended to remove the anger of God' (p. 63).

[5]'Immaculate Conception of the Blessed Virgin Mary', Dictionary of Christian Theology, ed. Alan Richardson, 5th impression (1977).

[6]The notes of Pickard-Cambridge ascribe this phrase to Jenkyns as his ipsissima verba.

[7]It is important to notice that Jenkyns insists that the 'pardon' to be extended to the penitent according to Article XVI--'Wherefore the grant of repentance is not to be denied to such as fall into sin after Baptism'--is the pardon of the Church, not the pardon of God: 'There is no question, that the pardon of man, i.e., of the Church is meant, not the pardon of God' (p. 243). Jenkyns makes the point (p. 247) that if God pardons the penitent, as scripture bears witness, then men (i.e., the Church) must also pardon them.

Jenkyns would also insist that neither the pardon nor the condemnation of the Church (as this is discussed in the lectures on Article XXXIII, pp. 401-4) is binding upon God.

[8]Such a comment on the part of Jenkyns reflects his commitment to the principles for expounding scripture as explained above in Chapter III; viz., that 'Scripture must be used to interpret Scripture' and that 'no part of Scripture should be expounded so as to contradict another part'.

[9]That is, the Quinquiparticular Controversy. For some discussion of this controversy, see Hardwick, Chapter IX.

[10]It is clear from his use of this term throughout his lectures that Jenkyns has reference to the extreme Calvinists of the Supralapsarian persuasion. Certainly it was the Supralapsarians who dominated the Synod of Dort. That Jenkyns should understand Calvinism in the context of its more extreme forms is reasonable, since it was in those forms that it figured most distinctively in English controversy and theology, e.g., Whitgift; the Lambeth Articles. Jenkyns does not seem to distinguish very clearly, at least in the records of his lectures, between the tenets of Calvin and those of his successors (or, indeed, between those of Luther and of his followers); nor does he appear to recognize Arminianism as a modified form of the Calvinism which is at least its historical context.

[11]This seems to contradict Articles IX and X, which assert that regenerate man retains the taint of original sin, and is a strong statement for the positive sanctification (perfection) of the Christian; nonetheless, it seems to be the language of Article XVII.

[12]Jenkyns does observe (p. 268 and p. 279) that the conclusions to be drawn from Article XVI and elsewhere indicate that God does not always succeed in his purpose to bring the elect to life, that they may fall from grace never to be restored.

[13]This last paragraph reads (as quoted from Burnet, Articles, p. 201): 'Furthermore, We must receive God's promises in such wise, as they be generally set forth to us in holy Scripture: And in our doings, that Will of God is to be followed, which we have expressly declared unto us in the Word of God'. Hardwick, p. 383, agrees that this paragraph intends to say that God's promises are 'general' or 'universal' and that the language is traceable to Melanchthon. Hardwick cites 'Laurence, Bamp. Lect. p. 179' as the source for his remarks.

[14]Jenkyns does not indicate what the 'logical sense' of the term is, but, from the development of the discussion, he would seem to mean thereby 'the demonstration of the actual fitness or righteousness of a person' or 'the creation of actual righteousness in a person'. The second option seems less likely because his later remarks, especially on Article XII, suggest that to such a sense he would assign the term 'sanctification' (although, in that context, he would certainly have some reservations about the meaning of 'actual').

[15]Jenkyns does not actually use this phrase, but he has reference to the condition thereunder subsumed. He nowhere makes particular reference to the state which is encompassed by the term 'Church Expectant'.

[16]Article XI, as cited in Burnet, Articles, p. 168.

[17]'A Sermon of the Salvation of Mankind by Only Christ Our Saviour from Sin and Death Everlasting', Part III, Homilies, pp. 33-34.

[18]Certainly the good works of man which are offered 'in exchange' also constitute and derive from man's response to God's saving activity. Equally as certainly the responsive aspects of these good works qualifies the notion of an exchange which is the chief component of a legal covenant.

[19]In fact, Article XIII, at least as it is interpreted by Jenkyns (pp. 235-7) makes it clear that the phrase 'the good works of heathens [i.e., the unconverted] is anomalous: (1) The works of the unconverted are not pleasing to God because they are imperfect. (2) They do not deserve God's pardon as a matter of fitness. (3) On the contrary, they have the nature of sin, because they are tainted by original sin. As Jenkyns observes (p. 236), the point of the article is to deny that the works of unjustified man, 'though they are not wholly bad, yet they are imperfect', can be good at all. Therefore, they can lay no claim to either the liberality or the justice of God. Indeed, even the works of Christians cannot be binding on God in virtue of his justice.

It is the purpose of Article XIII neither to brand the

works of the unconverted as vices, nor to assert that the unconverted are incapable of salvation: it merely asserts that the unconverted cannot be saved by their own merits. The over-reaching intention of the article is to assert the absolute sovereignty of God and to affirm the gratuity of his gift of grace.

[20]Romans 8, passim, Galatians 5.6, I Corinthians 7.19, II Peter 1.3-9, and I John 3.23.

[21]William Telfer, The Forgiveness of Sins (1959), pp. 111-2.

[22]Gerhard Ebeling, Luther: An Introduction to his Thought (1972), pp. 165-73.

[23]Telfer, p. 113.

[24]Parker, pp. 3, 137, and 138.

[25]Ibid., pp. 135-40.

[26]Ronald S. Wallace, Calvin's Doctrine of the Word and Sacrament (1953), p. 206.

[27]Ninth Sermon on the Passion as cited in François Wendel, Calvin: The Origins and Development of his Religious Thought (8th impression, 1978), p. 235.

[28]Commentary on Ephesians 5.30, as cited in Wendel, loc. cit.

[29]Telfer, p. 129.

[30]Ibid.

[31]Ebeling, p. 151.

[32]This is the understanding which leads the Church of England to condemn the Roman doctrine of works of supererogation (Article XIV, pp. 237-40). Works of supererogation can only exist within the context of a belief in the nature-changing effects of the scholastic definition of sactifying grace. Since, according to Anglican views, the taint of original sin remains in justified man, and since the goodness of his works depends entirely on the merit of Jesus Christ imputed to them in justification (p. 228); the Christian cannot even produce works good in themselves, let alone produce a quantity of them such as to be superfluous to the appeasement of the just wrath and the expiation of the legitimate condemnation of an absolutely good

God (p. 237).

[33]Evidently some interpreters of the article had argued that the doctrine of purgatory did not contradict scripture, but only that the Roman doctrine of purgatory did so. Jenkyns says 'this is a foolish objection; the clause clearly means that the doctrine of purgatory is contrary to scripture and that it is held by the Church of Rome' (p.313).

[34]The same line of thinking may also underlie the formulation of Article XVIII. Jenkyns understands the article to assert that people 'cannot be saved by other religions as well as by Christianity' (p. 287). He modifies this thought, no doubt under the pressure of the contemporary widening of world views, to say that Christians may be saved only by the name of Christ: 'but [the article] is also silent as to other persons' (p. 286). Jenkyns sees in the article an opposition between Christians who are saved by the name of Christ and non-Christians who are not saved. No doubt his view is valid, but it is also possible that the English Reformers wished to establish a basic opposition between Christians who are saved by faith in Christ (i.e., Protestants) and Christians who believe themselves to be saved by faith in the Church (i.e., as Jenkyns would see it, Roman Catholics). It is not the contention here that this latter opposition is actual but that it is such as the Reformers might have perceived it.

[35]'Arminianism'. The general description of Arminianism used here is drawn from this article.

[36]Cragg, p. 13.

[37]'Arminianism', loc. cit.; also, cf. Cragg, pp. 53-66.

[38]The fact that Jenkyns treats Arminianism as though it had no development beyond the Synod of Dort is indicative of that lack of historical perspective in him which is noted elsewhere.

[39]'Arminianism', loc. cit.

Chapter VII

[1]Although some Reformers, viz., Zwingli, did adopt this extreme view.

[2]Jenkyns says in this lecture (p. 351) that the Church of England accepts in part some of those five rites which Rome includes among the sacraments. These Anglicans call sacramentals, 'i.e., having something of the nature of a

sacrament'.

[3]Although the two communions do not agree on internal definitions: i.e., they agree about what a sacrament is (according to Jenkyns), but they do not agree about how a sacrament works or about how grace works in the sacrament.

[4]Cf. MS Jenks LV. 37, pp. 92-6.

[5]Ibid., p. 94.

[6]Ibid., p. 92.

[7]Ibid., p. 96.

[8]Ibid., p. 95.

[9]See lectures on Article II (MS Jenks LV. 34, pp. 59-117), especially p. 64 and p. 105.

[10]MS Jenks LV. 38, p. 134.

[11]In his lectures on the Second Book of Edward VI (MS Jenks LV. 37, pp. 190-218, passim), Jenkyns comments that the Church of England has vacillated on the question of absolution. There is a reasonably clear doubt that specific absolution (i.e., absolution of an individual's particular sins) was intended in the Eucharistic liturgy. He observes, however, that the final revision of the Prayer Book seems clearly designed to strengthen the notion of specific absolution.

[12]Evidently Jenkyns wishes to make it clear that faith is a pre-condition, not a result, of baptism.

[13]Jenkyns says that (c) is implied, though it is not directly stated, in the article.

[14]Specifically from those passages Jenkyns has cited (pp. 362-5) as 'proofs' of Article XXVII.

[15]See the lectures on original sin, pp. 180-96.

[16]And Jenkyns clearly believes this to be the case, though he does not attempt to prove the question. This position, of course, begs the issue since it was precisely a question of whether or not baptism of infants is ordained by God that was disputed at (and since) the Reformation.

[17]Jenkyns does not here mean any extraordinary gifts of the spirit but only those communicated to all Christians: i.e., the gift of eternal life (p. 360).

[18]MS Jenks LV. 37, pp. 186-9.

[19]This is actually the more accurate description of Luther's position, although Jenkyns steadfastly associates Luther with the doctrine of consubstantiation.

[20]MS Jenks LV. 37, p. 189.

[21]Ibid., p. 211. In his lecture on Article XXVIII (p. 375), Jenkyns lists four ceremonies which are condemned by the article: reservation, procession, elevation, and worship of the host. He comments that all of these practices are condemned because they were not ordained by Jesus Christ, although each practice has been variously supported in tradition: 'the reservation though only resting on human authority, was of very ancient practice--others are much more modern and objectionable'. Jenkyns fails to observe that the practice of reservation supports the antiquity of notions concerning local presence in the Eucharist.

[22]Ibid.

[23]Jenkyns argues elsewhere that if one passage of scripture clearly demands a figurative interpretation, all other parallel but more difficult passages must be similarly interpreted.

[24]MS Jenks LV. 37, pp. 186-9.

[25]Ibid.

[26]Wallace, pp. 189-90.

[27]Ibid., p. 192.

General Conclusions

[1]Jenkyns Papers VB. 10. Letter, 30 September 1835, Henry Hobhouse to Henry Jenkyns.

[2]John Henry Newman, 'Tract XC: Remarks on Certain Passages in the Thirty-nine Articles', in Tracts for the Times, V (1838-40), 3.

[3]John Hapgood, Bishop of Durham, 'The Bishop's Letter' to the diocese of Durham, no. 213 (May 1982).

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

Manuscripts

Durham University Library at Palace Green. Correspondence of Charles Thorp. Arranged and indexed with abstracts by Canon Joseph Thomas Fowler. 5 vols.

Durham University Library at Palace Green. Manuscript notes of the lectures of Canon Professor Henry Jenkyns. MS Jenks LV. 34-49.

Oxford. Balliol College Library. Jenkyns Papers. I-VII.

Periodical Literature

McNeill, J. T. 'The Democratic Element in Calvin's Thought'. Church History, XVIII (1949), 153-71.

Foster, Herbert D. 'Calvin's Programme for a Puritan State in Geneva'. Harvard Theological Review, I (1908), 391-434.

Fowler, Joseph Thomas. 'Senilia: Recollections of Durham University, 1858-1917'. Durham University Journal, XXII, 1 (Dec., 1918, New Series), 12-20.

Whiting, Charles E. ' The Study of Theology at Durham'. Durham University Journal, XXI (June, 1916), 325-27.

Works of General Reference

Boase, Frederick. Modern English Biography. 6 vols. London, Frank Cass & Co., Ltd., 1965.

Dictionary of National Biography. Edited by L. Stephen. 63 vols. London: 1885-1900. Smith, Elder & Co.

Dictionary of Christian Theology. Edited by Alan Richardson. 5th impression. SCM Press Ltd., 1977.

Encyclopaedia Metropolitana, Edited by E. Smedley, H. J. Rose, and H. J. Rose. 29 vols. London: 1817-45.

Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics. Edited by J. Hastings with the assistance of J. A. Selbie, et al. 13 vols. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark 1908-26.

Books

Arnold, Thomas. 'Sermons on Prophecy'. Sermons Chiefly on the Interpretation of Scripture, 1832-1840. London: Longman's Green and Co., 1878.

Bell, George Kennedy Allen, ed. Christian Unity: The Anglican Position. London: Hodder and Stoughton, Ltd, 1948.

Best, Geoffrey Francis Andrew. Temporal Pillars: Queen Anne's Bounty, the Ecclesiastical Commission, and the Church of England. Cambridge: University Press, 1964.

Brilioth, Yngve. Eucharistic Faith and Practice Evangelical and Catholic. London: SPCK, 1930.

Bullock, Frederick William Bagshaw. A History of the Training for the Ministry of the Church of England and Wales from 1800-1874. St. Leonards-on-Sea: Budd and Gillatt, 1955.

Burgon, John William. Lives of Twelve Good Men. 2nd ed. 2 vols. London: John Murray, 1888.

Burnet, Gilbert. An Exposition of the Thirty-nine Articles of the Church of England. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1819.

_____. The History of the Reformation of the Church of England. 4 vols. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1816.

Chadwick, Owen. The Victorian Church. 3rd ed. 2 vols. London: Adam and Charles Black, 1971.

Church of England. Homilies. The Two Books of Homilies Appointed to be read in Churches. Edited by John Griffiths. Oxford: University Press, 1859.

Clements, Robert E. A Century of Old Testament Study. 2nd impression. London: Lutterworth Press, 1979.

Cragg, Gerald Robertson. From Puritanism to the Age of Reason. Cambridge: University Press, 1966.

Cranmer, Thomas. The Remains of Thomas Cranmer, D. D., Archbishop of Canterbury. Edited by Henry Jenkyns. 4 vols. Oxford: University Press, 1833.

Creed, John Martin and Boys Smith, John Sandwith. Religious Thought in the Eighteenth Century. Cambridge: University Press, 1934.

Cyprian. The Writings of Cyprian, Bishop of Carthage, Part I, Containing the Epistles and Some of the Treatises. VIII (1868). Translated by Robert Ernest Wallis. Ante-Nicene Christian Library: Translations of the Fathers down to A.D. 325. Editors, Alexander Roberts and James Donaldson. 25 vols. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1867-72.

Durham Directory and Almanack. 1879. Durham: George Walker.

Durham University Calendar. 1839. Durham: Printed by F. Humble, printer to the University; sold by J. G. and F. Rivington.

Ebeling, Gerhard. Luther: An Introduction to his Thought. Translated by R. A. Wilson. London: Collins Clear-Type Press, Fontana Library of Theology and Philosophy, 1972.

Ernesti, John Augustus. Principles of Biblical Interpretation (Institutio interpretis Novi Testamenti, 1761). Translated by Charles H. Terrot. Edinburgh: Thomas Clark, 1832.

Faber, Geoffrey. Oxford Apostles: A Character Study of the Oxford Movement. London: Faber and Faber, 1933.

Farrar, Adam Storey. 'Introductory Memorandum'. In Prophecy, R. Glover's manuscript notes of the lectures of Henry Jenkyns. MS Jenks LV. 48.

_____. 'The Lectures of the Late Dr. Jenkyns'. In 'Appendix VI', Durham University: Earlier Foundations and Present Colleges, by Joseph Thomas Fowler. London: F. E. Robinson and Co., 1904.

Fowler, Joseph Thomas. Durham University: Earlier Foundations and Present Colleges. London: F. E. Robinson and Co., 1904.

Gibson, Edgar C. S. The Thirty-nine Articles of the Church of England. 5th ed. London: Methuen and Co., 1906.

Hampden, Renn Dickson. The Scholastic Philosophy Considered in its Relation to Christian Theology. Bampton Lectures, 1832. 2nd ed. Oxford: University Press, 1837.

Luther, Martin. 'The Disputation Concerning the passage: "The Word was Made Flesh" (John 1:14)'. Translated by Martin E. Lehmann. Word and Sacrament. IV. Edited by E. Lehmann. In Luther's Works. General editors, Jaroslav Pelican and Helmut T. Lehmann. 3rd printing. Vols 1-30, 31-55. Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1976.

_____. 'Preface to the New Testament 1546 (1522)' and 'Preface to the Epistles of St James and St Jude 1546 (1522)'. Translated by Charles M. Jacobs and revised by E. Theodore Bachmann. Word and Sacrament. I. Edited by E. Theodore Bachmann. In Luther's Works.

Maskell, William. Monumenta Ritualia Ecclesiae Anglicanae. 2nd ed. 3 vols. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1882.

More, Paul Elmer and Cross, Frank Leslie, editors. Anglicanism: The Thought and Practice of the Church of England, Illustrated from the Religious Literature of the Seventeenth Century. London: SPCK, 1935.

Newman, John Henry. Tutor of Oriel: January 1827-December 1831. Edited with notes and introduction by Ian Ker and Thomas Gornall. Volume II (1979) of The Letters and Diaries of John Henry Newman. Edited at the Birmingham Oratory with notes by C. S. Dessain, et al., general editors. Vols. 1-5, 11-31. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961-.

_____. New Beginnings: January 1832-June 1833. Edited by Ian Ker and Thomas Gornall. In The Letters and Diaries of John Henry Newman. III. 1979.

_____. The Oxford Movement: July 1833-December 1843. Edited by Ian Ker and Thomas Gornall. In The Letters and Diaries of John Henry Newman. IV. 1980.

_____. 'Tract XC: Remarks on Certain Passages in the Thirty-nine Articles'. In Tracts for the Times. V (1838-40). 5 vols. London: J. G. F. and J. Rivington.

Parker, Thomas Henry Louis. Calvin's Doctrine of the Knowledge of God. Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd, 1969.

Reid, John Kelmen Sutherland. The Authority of Scripture. London: Methuen and Co., 1957.

Rose, Hugh James. The State of the Protestant Religion in Germany. Cambridge: Cambridge University by J. Smith for J. Deighton and Sons, 1825.

Schlink, Edmund Wilhelm Ludwig. Theology of the Lutheran Confessions. Paul F. Koehneke and Herbert J. A. Boreman. Reprinted. Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1975.

Sparrow, John. Mark Pattison and the Idea of a University. Cambridge: University Press, 1967.

Stephen, Leslie. History of English Thought in the Eighteenth Century. 2nd ed. 2 vols. London: Smith, Elder and Co., 1881.

Storr, Vernon Faithful. The Development of English Theology in the Nineteenth Century: 1800-1860. London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1913.

Taverner, Richard. Postils on the Epistles and Gospels compiled and published by Richard Taverner in the year 1540. Edited by Edward Cardwell. Oxford: University Press, 1841.

Telfer, William. The Forgiveness of Sins. London: SCM, 1959.

Tertullian. 'The Sacred name Jesus most suited to the Christ of the Creator. Joshua a type of him'. Chapter XVI, book III of The Five Books of Quintas Sept. Flor. Tertullianus against Marcion. Translated by Peter Holmes. In Ante-Nicene Christian Library. VII (1868).

Von Loewenich, Walther. Luther's Theology of the Cross. Translated by J. A. Boreman. Belfast: Christian Journals Ltd, 1976.

Van Mildert, William. An Inquiry into the General Principles of Scripture Interpretation. Bampton Lectures, 1814. Oxford: University Press, 1815.

Varley, Elizabeth. 'The Excellency of the Liturgy: High Church Loyalty in 1800'. Unpublished paper read at Department of Theology Research Consultation, 19 December 1980, at Durham University.

Wallace, Ronald S. Calvin's Doctrine of the Word and Sacrament. London: Oliver and Boyd, 1953.

Wendel, François. Calvin: The Origins and Development of his Religious Thought. Translated by Philip Mariet. 8th impression. London: William Collins Sons and Co., Fontana Library of Theology and Philosophy, 1978.

White, Garnet Lee. Anglican Reactions to the Council of Trent in the Reign of Queen Elizabeth I. Vanderbuilt University: Ph. D. dissertation, 1975.

Whiting, Charles Edwin. The University of Durham 1832-1932. London: The Sheldon Press, 1932.